The action of the Commission, as a Board of Appraisers, in assessing for taxation the branch roads of the Wilmington and Weldon Railroad Company, has been approved by our Supreme Court in the case of Wilmington and Weldon Railroad Company vs. B. I. Alsbrook, decided at February Term, 1892, and reported in the 110th Volume of the Supreme Court Reports, page 137. The plaintiff company has taken the case by writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States, where it is now pending on appeal from the decision of our Court. The question to be decided is, whether two hundred and eighty-nine 10% miles of branch roads already completed and in operation by this company are exempt from taxation.

In our former report to your Excellency, with reference to the mode of assessing the property of the railroad companies, we used the following language: "The machinery for taxation, as prescribed in section 47 of the Act constituting the Commission a Board of Appraisers, was drawn to meet the case of the North Carolina Railroad, and can be applied to no other, from the fact that, by its charter, its road bed is exempt from taxation, and the capital stock bearing a market value, which is an exception to all other roads not claimed to be altogether free from taxation. By attempting to apply the method as indicated above, its impracticability will at once be discovered."

We recommend that the law be so amended as to authorize the assessment to be made as in the case of private property, ascertaining the value from the earnings, as compared with the operating expenses, and taking into consideration the value of the franchise, as well as all other conditions proper to be considered in arriving at the true value of property.

The 45th section of the Act constituting the Railroad Commission a Board of Appraisers, provides: "That all machine and repair shops, general office buildings, store-houses, and also real and personal property, outside of said right-of-way and depot grounds as aforesaid, of and belonging to any such railroad and telegraph companies shall be listed for purposes of taxation by the principal officers or agents of such companies with the list-takers of the county where said real or personal property may be situated, in the manner provided by law for the listing and valuation of real and personal property," &c, &c. In order to secure uniformity in assessment, we recommend that the Act be so amended as to authorize the Commissioners to make the assessment of property off the right-of-way as well as on it, and to certify the same to the Chairman of the County Commissioners or the Mayor of each city or incorporated town where such property is situated, along with

the apportionment that may be certified to each of these officers. respectively, as is provided in the 47th section of the Act.

The Act confers no authority upon the Commissioners to make any assessment of the property of steamboat companies. At the request of your Excellency, we have made an investigation and find that steamboats, now plying within our waters, of the value of $290,000, pay no taxes. We believe that these companies ought to bear their just proportion of the public burdens, and we recommend that the Act be so. amended as to authorize the Commissioners to assess them for taxation, as is provided in the case of railroad and canal companies.

Questions have presented themselves as to the power of the Commissioners to enforce compliance with the rules, regulations and orders. which they are required to make, by the 5th section of the Act constituting the Commission. These rules and regulations, as declared in the section referred to, are intended to fix reasonable rates and charges to prevent deception and unjust discrimination, and to facilitate commerce by making joint through rates upon the railroads of the State. The 10th section of the Act makes provision for relief in behalf of any person or corporation injured by a violation of the rules and regulations prescribed by the Commissioners, requiring the wrong-doer to make such recompense as the Commissioners may direct, within thirty days, under the penalty therein prescribed. But the Act does not seem to authorize the Commissioners to enforce compliance with the orders. which it requires them to make, except upon the complaint of an injured party. We recommend that the following words be added to the close of Section 5, viz.: "Any company refusing to comply with any rule, regulation or order of the said Commissioners, made in pursuance of this section, shall incur a penalty, to be fixed as provided in Section 20 of this Act"; and all penalties fixed by the Commission, in any case, shall be recovered as provided in Section 10 of this Act. Whenever action is instituted by the Commission against any company, the cause shall be entitled: "State of North Carolina, on the relation of the Railroad Commissioners against such company," and whenever such action is instituted upon the complaint of any injured person or corporation, the cause shall be entitled: "State of North Carolina, on the relation of the Railroad Commissioners, upon the complaint of such injured person or corporation against such company."

Section 29 provides: "That from all decisions or determinations arising under the operation or enforcement of this Act, the party or corporation affected thereby shall be entitled to appeal therefrom as in other cases of appeal, where no appeal has heretofore been provided for,

as now provided by law." It does not sufficiently appear, from this provision, how the appeal shall be prosecuted. Section 7 regulates, with clearness, appeals from the action of the Commissioners in fixing rates. We suggest that the provision in Section 29 be so amended that the appeals therein mentioned may be regulated as provided in Section 7; so that the provision may read as follows: "That from all decisions or determinations arising under the operation or enforcement of this Act, the party or corporation affected thereby shall be entitled to appeal therefrom, as provided in Section 7 of this Act, and when no exception is made to the facts as found by the Commissioners, then the appeal shall be taken direct to the Supreme Court." We would also respectfully suggest that provision be made for the payment of costs in cases of appeal, where the costs shall be allowed by the Court against the State, as provided in Section 28 of the Act.

The case of the Atlantic Express Company against the Wilmington and Weldon Railroad Company and the Richmond and Danville Railroad Company was brought before the Commission, under the 4th and 5th sections of the Act, from which it appeared that the defendant. companies had granted to the Southern Express Company the exclusive privilege of doing an express business over their respective lines, and had refused to grant to the plaintiff company, upon its application therefor, equal facilities with those granted to the Southern Express Company. After finding the facts, to which no exception was taken by the parties, the Commission was of opinion that the defendant companies had given undue preference and advantage to the Southern Express Company, in violation of the said 4th section, and rendered judgment requiring the defendant companies to grant unto the plaintiff company equal rates and facilities for conducting a general express business over their respective roads within the limits of the State of North Carolina with those already granted to the Southern Express Company, or which they may hereafter grant to the Southern Express Company, or to any other person, firm or corporation to whom they may at any time grant the privilege of conducting a general express business within the limits of this State. This order, or rule, which appears in our Report, 1891, page 641, was made under the 5th section of the Act, which requires the Commission to make such just and reasonable rates and regulations as may be necessary for preventing unjust discrimination, after the conclusion had been reached, from the facts found, that the defendants had violated the 4th section by giving undue preference and advantage to the Southern Express Company, and by unjustly discriminating against the plaintiff company. The case was

taken by appeal to the Superior Court of Wake County, in Term, dismissed by the Judge presiding, and is now pending in the Supreme Court on appeal from his Honor's decision. The opinion of the Court, it is believed, will determine the powers and duties of the Commission under the 4th and 5th sections of the Act, in preventing unjust discriminations.

Complaint was made in the case of Mayo against the Western Union Telegraph Company, that the defendant had been guilty of unreasonable delay in forwarding important pre-paid messages between the towns of Winston and Mt. Airy, and also between the towns of Mt. Airy and Henderson, to the injury of the complaining party. The defendant company demurred to the complaint, upon the ground that the Commission had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and that the complaint failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was overruled, and the case taken by appeal to the Superior Court of Wake County, where the demurrer was sustained by the Judge presiding, and it is now pending in the Supreme Court on appeal from his Honor's decision. This case, which appears in our Report, 1892, presents the question whether the Commission can grant relief under the 10th section of the Act to any person or corporation. injured by unreasonable delay on the part of a telegraph company in forwarding or delivering messages, or in performing the duty which it owes to such person or corporation. The facts and opinion of the Commission thereon fully appear in the report of the case.

On the 18th of February, 1892, complaint was filed in the case of the State of North Carolina on the relation of the Railroad Commissioners, upon the complaint of Eugene Albea against the Western Union Telegraph Company, alleging a violation of the tariff rate prescribed by the Commission for the transmission of telegraphic messages, the said Albea complaining that the defendant had refused to transmit a message from Elizabeth City to Winston, although he had tendered the rate prescribed by the Commission, but had demanded a larger sum for said service. The defendant answered on the 17th of May following, denying that it was subject to the act creating the Commission; alleging that it had violated no law of the State, nor any rule or regulation of the Commission, and that this matter being one of commerce between the States, the Commission had no jurisdiction thereof. After hearing testimony and finding the facts, the Commission was of opinion that it was the duty of the defendant to transmit commercial messages from its offices at Elizabeth City, Edenton, and other points on the Norfolk and Southern Railroad, at the rate pre

scribed by the Commission, when tendered, to any point in North Carolina. It was so ordered, the order to take effect on and after the 20th day of August, 1892, The defendant has taken this case by appeal to the Superior Court of Wake County, where it is now pending. It presents the question whether telegraphic messages transmitted from and to points in North Carolina, but which traverse another State in their route, constitute commerce between the States, and thus are not. subject to the rate prescribed by the Commission. This case will appear fully in our Report for 1892.

We have called the attention of your Excellency more particularly to these cases, because we believe that each of them will be carefully reviewed by the Supreme Court, and that the opinions rendered therein will be of more value in suggesting any amendments to the Act that may be needed, than anything we can say.

We call the attention of your Excellency, also, to the case of the State of North Carolina on the relation of the Railroad Commissioners, upon the complaint of citizens of Charlotte and Wilmington against the Carolina Central Railroad Company. The complaint was filed on the 5th day of July, 1892, alleging that the defendant company had changed its schedule of passenger trains between Wilmington and Charlotte, and had withdrawn one train from passenger service to the serious loss and inconvenience of the complainants, and asking that the schedule in effect prior to the change be continued, and that neither of the trains be withdrawn. After hearing testimony and finding the facts, the Commission was of opinion that the Act did not confer jurisdiction to fix a schedule for any common carrier, prescribing the time of arrival and departure of its trains, or their number, to suit the convenience of those who may wish to travel over its line, but that the purpose of the Act was to afford relief to the traveling public by preventing unreasonable delay and inconvenience at connecting points on account of a failure to afford all reasonable, proper and equal facilities for speedy transit. It was adjudged that the relief asked ought not to be granted. No appeal was taken from this judgment. The case is fully set out in our report, and we have called attention to it because it presents our construction of the Act, especially the 24th section thereof, as to the powers and duties of the Commission in fixing. schedules. If we are mistaken in our construction of the Act, and it was the purpose of the Legislature to confer the larger power and duty to fix schedules in any case, then the legislative intent may be expressed by so amending the 24th section of the Act as to express such purpose.