very serious difficulty in procuring larger accommodations and more clerical force, if that should be found necessary. But this is a mere anticipated difficulty, which I apprehend will not practically occur. If it should occur, I see no difficulty in providing means to remove it." Contrary to a right of reasonable use of the public records, is Bean v. The People (1883), 7 Col. 200. The claim of right to abstract the entire records of a county was denied, though no aid was required from the recorder; "for he is charged by statute with the safe keeping and preservation of the records, and is responsible for their truthfulness, and freedom from mutilation:" HELM, J., p. 201. Not that the Court insinuated either generic or individual traits of mutilation, because the opinion proceeds: "We think the business of relators [who were abstracters] should be treated as any other legitimate [sic] private enterprise. There is no law to prevent the clerk aiding them, if he chooses so to do, either gratis, or for a stipulated compensation; provided he does not neglect his official duties. But the Court should not, by mandamus, compel him to do this against his will:" p. 202. This is the same sort of argument so well answered by the Scripture quotation in the principal case (p. 58, supra). This decision, however, is based upon the interpretation of the General Statutes of the State (chap. xxiii, p. 285, ed. 1883), which provide—“SEC. 667. Every sheriff, county clerk, county treasurer and county judge, shall keep his office at the county seat of his county, and in the office provided by the county, if any such place has been provided; and if there be none established, then at such place as shall be fixed by special provision of law; or, if there be no such provision, then at such place as the board of county commissioners shall direct; and they shall each keep the same open during the usual business hours of each day, Sundays and legal holidays excepted, and all books and papers required to be in their office, shall be open for the examination of any person; and if any person, or officer, shall neglect to comply with the provisions of this section, he shall forfeit, for each day he so neglects, the sum of five dollars." The Court said "We feel confident that an examination of the statute is proper, with the view of determining whether or not the Legislature intended to grant the privilege here claimed." And after stating fear for the integrity of the records, "We are of opinion that the statute in question was not designed to allow individuals who wish to abstract the entire records, for future profit in their private business, the priv ilege of using continuously the public property, and of monopolizing, from day to day, for months and years, a portion of the time and attention of a public officer, against his will, and without recompense. In support of the foregoing reasons and conclusions, see Buck v. Collins (supra, p. 64), and Webber v. Townley (supra, p. 58),”— pp. 200, 202. The same sentiments were expressed by HAINES, J., in deciding Fleming v. Clerk of Hudson County (1863), 30 N. J. Law 280, 281; but this was in the Supreme Court, and the Court of Errors and Appeals ruled the other way in Lum v. McCarty (supra, p. 60). The same unnecessary fears for the safety of records inspected "under the watchful observation of the clerk," without paying the fees prescribed in the Code, were expressed in Buck & Spencer v. Collins (supra p. 64). In that State (Georgia), Section 3695 of the Code (ed. 1882, p. 949), prescribes the fees for "exemplification of record *** for inspection of books, when their [the clerks of the Superior Courts] service is required, *** for examination of record and abstract **." This part of the fee bill, "by implication, permits any citizen to make an inspection, without fee, if he does not require the clerk's aid: *** All laws are to be reasonably construed, in view of the object of them, and in view of other laws. The object of this permission to inspect, without fee, if no aid is required from the clerk, is plain. It is contemplated that lawyers, public officers and persons familiar with the books, by having frequent occasion to use them, may not need the clerk's assistance for the purpose. And, by impliIcation, this permission contemplates that the clerk shall, in such cases, make no charge for simply standing by and noticing that no improper interference with the record is had. But there is nothing in this implication (and that is all it is, at best) which authorizes the clerk to permit even an inspection, except in his own presence, or in the presence of his sworn deputy. He is required [Code, ed. 1882, p. 68], section 267 [9], “To keep all the books, papers, dockets and records, belonging to their [his] office, with care and security, * ***" He cannot do this, if any person may handle or inspect them, otherwise than under his own eye. In our judgment, any clerk would be guilty of a failure in his official duties, should he permit any person, if only for a minute [sic], though he might be familiar with the books, and be able to examine them without the clerk's aid, to have the custody of the books and papers of his office. *** It is a perversion of the right of inspection, evidently intended to provide for examinations from time to time, as the ordinary occasions and business of men may require, to make a business of it. The law might well, in view of the ordinary wants of the people, permit an inspection of the books, when no aid is required from the clerk, without a fee. It is but a slight hindrance to him in his duties to keep his eye on the few citizens who visit his office for such purposes, and if he has only to stand by as a sentinel to prevent fraud or spoliation, for a minute or two, it is but a small matter, and may well be without a fee. But the law never contemplated that any person would make a business of it-spend days and weeks in the office engaged in an occupation which, in our judgment, cannot lawfully be carried on except under the immediate observation of the clerk. Fees are given for each inspection, each abstract. The law has in view the inspection of one chain of title-the status of one man-and fixes a fee for that:" 51 Ga. 395, 396. When Bean v. People was cited to the Wisconsin Court, in Hanson v. Eichstaedt, a distinction was suggested by Cassoday, J. (69 Wis. 541–2), based upon the fee bill of the several clerks and recorders (Gen. Stat. Colorado, p. 268, SEC. 584); hence, the abstracting of the entire records, if permitted would compel the recorder "to aid in building up a rival establishment, which would necessarily reduce the emoluments of his office, and without any statute, in terms, requiring him to do so:" Id. 69 Wis. 542. JOHN B. UHLE. ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS. AGENCY. Authority to sell goods does not, of itself and alone, apparently give to the agent authority to collect the price of such goods. Kane v. Barstow, S. Ct. Kan., Nov. 9, 1889. ANIMALS. Cattle running at large on a range, which is common pasturage for everybody, are in the actual possession of no one, and the constructive possession accompanies the title. Budd v. Power, S. Ct. Mont., Oct. 5, 1889. BANKS AND Banking. Exemption of national bank from suit in State courts, except in the county or city where it is located, may be waived by the bank, and it cannot, after submitting to trial in another county, raise the question of jurisdiction and claim the statutory immunity, on writ of error to the State supreme court. First Nat. Bank of Charlotte v. Morgan, S. Ct. U. S., Nov. 11, 1889. BILLS AND Notes. Indorser may maintain an action against the maker of a promissory note for the amount paid to take up such note, and the maker cannot defend on the ground that the payment was made without proper demand and notice; as these are for the benefit of the indorser, he may waive any defects therein. Stanley v. McElrath, S. Ct. Cal., Nov. 27, 1889. Substitution of new note, made by an indorser for the original note, after it had been dishonored by the maker, the new note being given and accepted in full payment of the other, is such a payment of the latter as will entitle the indorser to maintain an action upon it against the maker. Id. CHATTEL MORTGAGES. Mortgagee of a chattel may purchase at a sale under the mortgage, but the burden is upon him to show the fairness of his own sale. Wygal v. Bigelow, S. Ct. Kan., Nov. 9, 1889. CORPORATIONS. Misappropriation of corporate funds was constituted where the trustees of a society, incorporated without capital stock "for the purpose of promoting the cause of temperance," under a statute providing for the incorporation of "religious, social, benevolent and learned associations," passed a resolution to sell the property of the society, pay off some outstanding indebtedness, and "purchase other cheaper property suitable for the uses and purposes of the association"; a sale was made, under an order of court, and subsequently a portion of the proceeds was divided among a part of the members, including the trustees, pursuant to a motion "that the association donate to each member in good standing the sum of $1500, for past services, on signing a receipt for the same," no serv ices having been rendered by the persons receiving this money, other than being good and efficient members of the organization; and any member not a party to the transaction could maintain an action to compel restitution. Ashton v. Dashaway Asso., S. Ct. Cal., Nov. 22, 1889. Misappropriation of stock by the attorney in fact of a stockholder, who presents the certificate with a power of attorney giving him full authority to deal with the stock, and thereupon obtains a new certificate in his own name, the officers being ignorant of any fraudulent intention on his part, will not render the corporation liable for the conversion of the stock; and it makes no difference that the attorney was a director of the corporation, nor that the certificate of stock was not indorsed by the owner. Tafft v. Presidio & Ferries R. R. Co., S. Ct. Cal., Oct. 30, 1889. DAMAGES. Expected profits are not a proper element of damages in an action for false representations, used as an inducement to the purchase of mining stock; recovery can be had only for the actual loss sustained. Smith v. Bolles, S. Ct. U. S., Nov. 11, 1889. Liquidated damages will be changed by the waiver of complete, and the acceptance of part performance, of an entire contract, into a penalty, which will entitle the party injured to recover only for the damages actually sustained through a partial breach of the contract. Wibaux v. Grinnell Live-Stock Co., S. Ct. Mont., Oct. 5, 1889. EMINENT DOMAIN. Municipal corporation, whose charter contains no provision by which private property can be taken for a public use, has no power to open a street through private lands, and where such power is conferred by the Legislature, provision must be also made for means by which the owner can have his damages assessed by an impartial tribunal, and on his own motion obtain the compensation to which he is entitled; otherwise he may resist the initial attempt to divest him of his title, and will be sustained by the courts. State v. City of Perth Amboy, S. Ct. N. J., Nov. 8, 1889. GIFTS. Receipt in full for a bond given by a daughter to her father, payable to his estate one year after his death, was found among his papers by his executor; the receipt being dated eight years prior to the father's death; there having been no delivery of the receipt, the daughter was liable upon the bond. Justice v. Justice's Ex'rs, Ct. Ch. N. J., Nov. 16, 1889. Satisfaction of mortgage by a father, payment of which had been assumed by his son, such satisfaction being entered of record two months before the father had executed his will, but no consideration having been paid by the son, will operate to discharge the son's liability, which cannot be reasserted after the death of the father, in the absence of proof of mental incapacity, fraud or undue influence. Id. HUSBAND AND WIFE, Taxes on wife's real estate, which is occupied by both as a homestead, do not constitute a personal liability of the husband. Richerds v. Tarr, S. Ct. Kan., Nov. 9, 1889. JUDGMENTS. Enforcement of confessed judgment, which has been entered without a substantial compliance with the statute authorizing such entry, may be enjoined upon principles of equity, at the suit of a third party prejudiced by such judgment. Schuster v. Rader, S. Ct. Colo., Nov. 1, 1889. JURISDICTION. Forgery of notes, payable at a national bank and made by officers of the bank for the purpose of deceiving the examiner appointed under the United States national banking laws, is not an offense which is triable exclusively in the Federal courts, but may be tried by the courts of the State where the crime is committed. Cross v. State of North Carolina, S. Ct. U. S., Nov. 11, 1889. MORTGAGES. Mortgage upon homestead and other real estate entitles the mortgagor, as against the mortgagee and all other creditors and lienholders whose rights are not prior or superior to those of the mortgagee, to require in foreclosure proceedings that, before the homestead shall be resorted to for the purpose of satisfying the mortgage debt, all the other mortgaged property shall first be exhausted. Frick Co. v. Ketels, S. Ct. Kan., Nov. 9, 1889. NEGLIGENCE. Contributory negligence is not chargeable to a pedestrian who, being aware of defects in a sidewalk, abandons it for the roadway, and it is therefore erroneous, in charging a jury who are engaged in the trial of an action against a borough to recover damages for injuries sustained by a foot passenger by falling from such a defective walk, for the Court to say that the roadway was not intended for foot passengers. Borough of Sandy Lake v. Forker, S. Ct. Pa., Nov. 4, 1889. Contributory negligence will be charged to one who, by the invitation of another, and not for compensation, rode with the latter in his wagon, knowing the locality well and knowing also that they were approaching a railroad crossing where a train was about due, but who sat with his back to the driver, as they approached the crossing at a fast trot, and, though he might have seen the danger, did not look, or warn the driver, or ask him to stop and listen, or take any precaution whatever; but the negligence of the driver cannot be imputed to the passenger. Dean v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., S. Ct. Pa., Nov. 11, 1889. POST OFFICE. Payments for expediting mail service, made under a mistake of the Post Office Department as to the additional number of men and animals required, and in ignorance that none were employed, may |