engaged in the commission of a felony, there could not be the offense of murder in the second degree. No such evidence was presented, and the court properly refused to charge as requested. The bill of exceptions presents no other question, and the conviction must be affirmed. The People v. Owen Hand. Opinion by Barnard, P. J.

NEGLIGENCE.

1. Plaintiff improperly on defendant's railway train.The plaintiff and two other young men got upon a caboose car attached to a coal train upon defendant's railway. The train was not a passenger train, and the caboose was never used for the conveyance of passengers. Plaintiff got on the car while the train was in motion. The conductor of the train was in the caboose. He inquired of plaintiff where he was going. Plaintiff replied "to Brooklyn," and requested to ride. The conductor told plaintiff that he (the conductor) had no right to give him (plaintiff) a ride. Plaintiff begged for the ride, saying he was without food, and weary. The conductor "out of sympathy didn't turn them off." He told them he had no right to let them ride. The train went as far as Chatham and then returned. When the conductor got on the returning train he found plaintiff still in the caboose. He had said nothing about returning. The conductor asked plaintiff what he was doing there and he replied that a man had persuaded them that they might get work if they went back and they wanted to go back. On the way back, the accident complained of happened. Plaintiff paid no fare. The justice below instructed the jury that plaintiff had made out his case, and that he was entitled to recover, and directed the jury to assess the damages. Held, from the evidence it appears that plaintiff was improperly upon the train. He got

on without permission; he was notified that the conductor had no right to permit him to be there; he paid no fare; the consent of the conductor, which the plaintiff knew was unauthorized by defendants, conferred no legal right upon plaintiff to ride on the train; his consent was not binding upon defendants. It was utterly void, and plaintiff was not lawfully upon defendant's caboose car. The justice therefore erred in the direction he gave to the jury that plaintiff was entitled to recover as matter of law. Judgment reversed and new trial ordered. Eaton v. The Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Co. Opinion by Barnard, P. J. 2. Negligence by servant.-Plaintiff had been riding in a street car. The car stopped to allow her to alight. She got out and went as fast as she could (she being an old lady) to the sidewalk, about fourteen feet distant. The defendant's wagon, driven by defendant's servant, was going in the same direction as the car, and was behind the car and between the car track and the sidewalk toward which plaintiff was proceeding. looked up, saw the wagon, and ran for the sidewalk in an oblique direction, so as to strike it at a point beyond which she would have reached it if she had gone at right angles from the car, and in doing this she was overtaken by defendant's wagon and knocked down, and the horses passed over her. Action for the injury so sustained. Held, that defeudant's servant was negligent, and that thereby he caused the injury complained of; and that in omitting to look down the street in the direction from which the car had just come, plaintiff was not imprudent, and was not guilty of contributory negligence. Under the circumstances attending this accident, defendant's servant should

She

have so driven as to render such an accident impossible. McGowan v. Kuntz. Opinion by Barnard, P. J. 3. Evidence as to service.-As to whether or not S. was an employee and driver for defendant at the time of this occurrence, it was proved that S. was driving a wagon with defendant's name and place of business painted on it. The foreman of defendant testified that S. was a driver for defendant, and when asked, "about what time," replied, "I guess it was about October to December, or November and December." The accident occurred January 12th, following. The driver was in the court room and was not called. Held, there was sufficient evidence to establish S. as an employee and agent of defendant. Ib.

1. Sale of infants' lands.-The land in question is about thirty-six feet front on Bedford avenue, at the south-east corner of Bedford avenue and De Kalb street in the city of Brooklyn, and of a depth of about one hundred feet. Of this lot twelve feet six inches from said corner, fronting on Bedford avenue, was originally part of a lot of the Steinworth children; the remainder was the northerly half of DeKalb street. The plaintiff claims under a title alleged to have been acquired by the city of Brooklyn under proceedings to open De Kalb avenue pursuant to the charter of the city. Laws 1833, p. 501, section 3.

The twelve and one-half feet above mentioned was the residue of the land of the infants. This section authorized the city to acquire such a residue upon the "consent in writing of the owners," and upon comfirming the report of the commission containing the estimated value of the same, and payment of the amount, the fee simple is vested in the city. Held, this proceeding is, in effect, a sale by the owners of such residue to the city at the estimated value, and the question is whether the title of the infants was divested by the proceedings in the case.

1. The jurisdiction of the court to order the sale of the real estate of infants rests entirely upon the statute. It has no inherent power or jurisdiction to entertain the question, or to order or consent to a sale.

2. Unless the requirements of the statute are complied with, no title will pass by the deed.

3. The statute requires, first, an application by next friend or guardian for the sale; second, the appointment of a guardian ad litem of the infant; third, a bond by the guardian for the faithful performance of the trust; fourth, an inquiry by referees into the merits of the application; fifth, when it appears that a sale is necessary or proper, the court may order it to be made by such guardian, in such manner and with such restrictions as shall be deemed expedient; and, sixth, upon an agreement for a sale being made pursuant to the order, the same shall be reported to the court on the oath of the guardian, and if it be confirmed, a conveyance shall be executed under the direction of the court. 2 R. S. 202.

The proceedings in evidence in this case show that there was no attempt to comply with the provisions of the statute. Assuming that the recitals in the order of the court of the 26th November, 1847, are to be taken as evidence of the presentation of the petition and its

contents as stated, and it appears that H. claiming to be general guardian, and S. the guardian ad litem of the children in the proceeding under the charter, presented a petition setting forth that the city had instituted proceedings to open De Kalb street; that commissioners of estimate and assessment had been appointed; that the infants are seized in fee of a lot numbered on the county map 444, and that the petitioners gave a notice, in pursuance of a statute, that they intended to abandon said land, and have desired the commissioners to award to said owners the entire value of the land, and asked an order giving them power to abandon the lands and to consent in writing thereto; and thereupon the order authorized the petitioners, or either of them, to consent in writing, on behalf of the infants, to the abandonment of the said land; whereupon H., describing himself as guardian of the "infant children" (not even naming them), "pursuant to the statute in such case made" (not in pursuance of the order), "consent, in writing, to abandon to the city of Brooklyn, for the purposes of said opening, the following lands and premises of which I am the owner," attempting to describe them, but doing so in such an imperfect manner as that it is impossible to identify the land unless by the number, "444," and further releasing and quit-claiming the premises to the city, and siguing the consent and conveyance "J. H. H., guardian of the above-named infants." This was no compliance with the statute as to the sale and disposition of infants' lands.

The proceeding was invalid and the city acquired no part of the lands in question, and could convey none to the plaintiff's predecessor in title.

2. On closing street, land reverts to adjoining owners.But even if the proceedings were valid to vest the title in the city of the gore or residue, viz.: the twelve and a-half feet front to De Kalb street, still the plaintiff has no title to the remaining twenty-one feet which was the northerly half of that street. Under the act the title to the residue of a lot so taken vested in fec in the city, on the confirmation of the commissioners' report and payment of the award. The report was confirmed July 8, 1848, and the award fully paid to H. in February, 1849. At that date, then (if at all), the fee to the gore vested in the city, and also one-half of De Kalb street, subject to the easement of the public. De Kalb street was "closed forever," and discontinued as a public highway by resolution of the common council of May 26, 1851, which became a law on the 9th June, 1851. Thereupon the fee simple of the street vested immediately in the city. On the 23d July, following, by a deed of that date recorded 26th July, the city conveys to J. H., the plaintiff's predecessor, the gore of twelve and a-half feet on Bedford avenue. J. H. took no title to the land which had been part of the street. Upon the closing of De Kalb street and the discontinuance by the proper authorities to use it as a street, the fee reverted to the adjoining owners, although they did not immediately put up fences and exclude the public from driving over the land, nor does the fact that De Kalb street continued to be used as a public highway till after the conveyance from the city to J. S. alter the effect of the previous closing and discontinuance of the street. Judgment reversed and new trial granted. Battell v. Burrill. Opinion by Barnard, P. J.

3. Possession of tenant for life possession of remainderman.- Plaintiff became seized of a vested remainder in fee on the lands in question, immediately upon

her birth. It was subject to her mother's life estate until the delivery of the deed from her mother to her. The plaintiff's estate, before the execution of the deed from the mother to plaintiff, was one commencing in presenti, though to be occupied and enjoyed in futuro. Held, that the possession of the tenant for life was the plaintiff's possession. The plaintiff has, therefore, been in possession, for the purposes of this action, more than three years, and comes within the provisions of the statute applicable to proceedings to compel the determination of claims to real estate. Demurrer overruled, and judgment affirmed. Barron v. Martense. Opinion by Barnard, P. J.

4. City of Brooklyn owns fee of strip of park taken for street. It was erroneous to allow the city of Brooklyn the value of the strip taken by the legislature from the park, and thrown into the street. The park has been purchased for a public use as a park. The legislature changes the form of the use. The fee still remains in the city. Whatever of pledge there is to the public credit remains. Order reversed. In the matter of widening of Ninth avenue and Fifteenth street, Brooklyn. Opinion by Barnard, P. J.

Also, see Mortgages, and Abstracts of Title.

STATUTES, CONSTRUCTION OF.

1. As to issue of bonds.-The requirement of an act of the legislature, that bonds shall be exchanged "dollar for dollar" for certificates, means only that a dollar of bond shall extinguish a dollar of debt. At the time of the passage of the act in question it was contemplated that the amount for which authority was given would cover the entire indebtedness of the defendant. The debt proved to be considerably larger. A ratable payment in bonds, or in money the proceeds of bonds sold upon all the claims, is just. The village is still bound to pay the balance, and payment can be enforced at law. If the plaintiff is unwilling to receive seventy per cent on his certificates, that furnishes no ground why he should restrain the defendant from paying that proportion to other creditors who are willing to receive the same. Meyer v. The Village of Edgewater. Opinion by Barnard, P. J.

2. Opening of streets improper title of act.-The legislature, in 1862, authorized the common council of Brooklyn to open certain streets by a general geographical description, and not by the names of the streets, and the statute only dispenses with the usual petition of owners of property to be affected thereby. In 1867 an additional section is enacted, to the effect that the expenses of the proceedings under the act shall be included in the next tax levy of certain wards named. In 1869 an act is passed directing the opening of Pratt street, to be "paid for in the manner now provided for by law for opening that part of North Thirteenth street which is closed by this act, and, in pursuance thereof, North Twelfth street was recently opened." This act is entitled "An act to alter the commissioners' map of the city of Brooklyn." North Thirteenth street has never been opened. Held, that the act of 1869 is a snare. It is to be assumed that North Thirteenth street would have been opened under the act of 1862, as amended in 1867, although it is not named in those acts. By the act of 1869, part of North Thirteenth street which was never opened is closed. Pratt street is opened. These subjects might properly come under the title, but a provision is inserted that the street shall be paid for in the manner now provided for by law for opening that part of

North Thirteenth street which is by the act closed. This is not within the title. Who could tell from the title that the city charter was altered as to the mode of payment for the expense of the street? People ex rel. Pratt v. The Common Council of Brooklyn.

STREETS AND HIGHWAYS. See Statutes.

USURY. See Mortgages.

WILLS.

Capacity to make a will: spiritualism.—This will is contested among other grounds, for the alleged reason, that the testatrix was a believer in spiritualism and was influenced by supposed spiritual manifestations. Held, that if the testatrix believed supernatural spiritual manifestations, such a belief would not destroy the power to make a will, even if the belief was founded in delusive appearances, unless the will is shown in some way to be the result of this belief. Fowler v. Ramsdell. Opinion by Barnard, P. J.

2. Publication.— The question is, whether the attesting witnesses to a will subscribed their names to the will at the request of the testatrix. The facts as shown by the testimony are these: The will was drawn by S. W., a justice of the peace, who was accustomed to draw wills. The testatrix, the two witnesses and S. W. were present at its execution; the testatrix, in the presence of the two witnesses and of S. W., signed her name to the will; she then, in answer to a question put by S. W., and in the presence of the two witnesses, acknowledged the instrument to be her last will. The draughtsman of the will, the said S. W., then said to one of the witnesses, "now Mr. White," and handed him the pen in the presence of all. White signed as a witness, and handed the pen to the other witness; he signed also, in the presence of all. The attestation clause is full; the will was found in the possession of testatrix at the time of her death. Held, the will was duly published; all the parties present knew what the paper was. The witnesses signed, knowing what paper they were attesting. The testatrix was present when they signed and made no objection. whom she had employed to draw the will, requested the witnesses to sign it, and the request, being made in her presence, was, in law, her request. The decision of the surrogate should be reversed, and the question tried by a jury at a circuit court. Smith et al. v. Smith et al. Opinion by Barnard, P. J.

COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT.

JUNE DECISIONS, 1871.

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.

S. W.,

1. Satisfaction of judgment by attorney: satisfaction for less than sum due, how far valid. — An attorney is not authorized by his retainer to satisfy a judgment without payment, and if he does so his satisfaction will be set aside. Beers v. Hendrickson. Opinion by Grover, J.

2. It is still held, that a release under seal from a debt given upon payment of a part constitutes a valid defense to an action for the residue, and the execution and acknowledgment of a satisfaction of judgment, as required by statute, should be held equally effectual as an instrument under seal. Ib.

3. Where a judgment is assigned to a party as security for a claim less than the face of it, the satisfaction of such judgment by such assignee, upon

receiving from the judgment creditor a sum smaller than the secured claim, will only operate to extinguish the judgment to the extent of such claim. lb.

BANKS AND BANKING.

1. Receipt of check on deposit: what sufficient demand. The receiving by a bank of a check drawn on itself upon deposit, and placing the amount to the credit of the depositor upon the deposit ticket, precludes the bauk from claiming such amount back from the depositor, even though such check is an overdraft and is never paid by the drawer. (Distinguished from Boyd v. Emerson, 2 Ad. and El. 184.) Oddie v. National City Bank of New York. Opinion by Church, C. J.

2. It is not presumed in such case that the check was deposited with the bank as the depositor's agent for collection. Placing the amount to the depositor's credit was equivalent to payment, and the bank is not relieved, even though they, within a very short time, return the check, and notify the depositor that it is an overdraft and that they shall not honor it. Ib.

3. The credit on the deposit ticket is as significant of the assent of the bank as if entered in the depositor's pass-book and the books of the bank. Ib.

4. A demand would be necessary in such a case before suit brought, but a tender of the returned check to the bank with a demand that credit should be given for its amount, which was refused, is a sufficient demand. Ib. 5. Lien of national bank on its own stock: agreements as to, void. All agreements by a stockholder in a national bank, providing that the bank shall have a lien upon his stock for any liability thereafter created by him, are within section 35 of the national currency act and are void. Conklin v. Second Nat. Bank of Oswego. Opinion by Grover, J.

6. Neither can such lien be created by a law of the bank. Ib.

CONTRACTS.

1. Construction of, covenant in deed. One Haviland conveyed by deed containing covenants to plaintiff and his heirs the right to wall up a certain spring upon Haviland's land, and to lay pipes thereto for the purpose of conducting water therefrom to plaintiff's house, and also to enter upon the land where such pipes were laid, to repair the same, reserving a right to himself to tap said spring, leaving a certain flow of water to plaintiff and to alter the course of plaintiff's pipe when the same could be done without injury to the plaintiff, etc. The consideration of the deed was $1. Subsequent to making it, Haviland conveyed the land to defendant, who, for her own purposes, but without malice, dug out a new spring some twenty-seven feet from the other, whereby plaintiff's spring was rendered nearly useless. This action was brought to restrain defendant from maintaining the new spring. A judgment was given in plaintiff's favor at special term, which was reversed at general term, from which plaintiff appealed. Held, that the defendant was not, by the deed of her grantor, debarred from digging a new spring in another part of her farm, even though by natural causes such act might result in injury to the spring granted to plaintiff. Bliss v. Greeley. Opinion by Peckham, J.

2. The grantor did not by his deed covenant that he would not use the rest of his farm in a farmer-like manner, or that he should not dig a spring to supply his buildings with water, if by so doing he should reduce the underground supply to plaintiff's spring. Ib.

3. The conceded rule that a grant carries with it every

incident necessary to make the grant effectual, does not aid the plaintiff. There was no grant of any waters outside of that spring under or above the earth. Ib.

See Attorney and Client, 2; Insurance; Banks and Banking.

1. Protest of ship captain: rights of party as to his own witness. A protest made in a foreign port by a captain of a vessel owned and managed by a party to the action is not such a declaration as comes within the rule allowing declarations made by a party out of court to be proved against him. But where a party has in one action for his own benefit used such protest made by his own agent, he cannot repudiate its statements in another action, and the opposing party is entitled to use it against him. Atkins v. Elwell. Opinion by Folger, J.

2. Diverse statements made by a witness in the same examination are matter of comment to a jury as to the reliability of a witness, but there is no error in allowing a question put by the party calling him, predicated upon a supposition that he may answer differently from what he has theretofore testified to the questions of the same party on the same trial. Ib.

1. Shifting policies lawful: when owner need not be named. The plaintiffs, owning a quantity of oil which was in store in a bonded warehouse, had the same insured in their name by defendant. By the terms of the policy the risk was to cover oil designated as "their own," as "held in trust," as "held on commission," and as "sold, but not removed." After obtaining the insurance the plaintiffs sold the oil, received their pay therefor, and delivered sufficient papers to the vendees to constitute a complete delivery of the oil. By the terms of the sale and the custom of the trade, the oil remained in the warehouse without expense to the vendees, and in the possession of the plaintiffs, and while there was destroyed. Held, that a policy of insurance is legal when so framed that the insurance shall be inseparably attached to the property meant to be covered, so that successive owners during the continuance of the risks shall become the parties really insured. Waring v. Indemnity Insurance Co. Opinion by Folger, J.

2. One, in his own name, and without the authority and sanction of the owner, may insure property, and the owner may recover on the contract, by adopting it, after a loss has occurred. This right to insure and right to recover is founded upon a certain relation between the person procuring the insurance and the property. The right of possession in the plaintiffs was sufficient to authorize them to insure. Ib.

3. There is no necessity of naming, in a policy, the person whose benefit it is for. Phrases describing property, as "held in trust,' on commission," and kindred terms, are held as giving to the owner a right to take the place of the insured and enforce the contract. Ib. 4. While it must be made to appear that the owner was in the intention of the person effecting the insurance when the contract was made, such intention need not have fastened at the time of entering it upon the very person who, when it matures, seeks to take the benefit of it. And it must be assumed that every one is within the intention of the insurer who, subsequently and with design, takes such relations to him as brings him within the clauses of the policy. The intention must

have been to effect insurance for any and all persons who, during the running of the policy, should have goods within its description of property insured. Ib. JUDGMENT. See Attorney and Client.

NEGLIGENCE.

1. Liability of telegraph companies for non-delivery of message: measure of damages.-The defendants were a telegraph corporation organized under the laws of New York, with lines extending from Syracuse to Rounesville, Pa. The plaintiffs, at Ogdensburgh, N. Y., delivered to another telegraph corporation organized under the same law, with lines extending to Syracuse, a message to his agent, one Darling, at Rounesville, worded as follows: "Telegraph me at Rochester what that well is doing." This was in answer to a message received over defendants' and the other line of an offer of $3.800 for the well. The operator at Ogdensburgh was told that one of the plaintiffs would go to Rochester by first train, and if he received no telegram would close with the offer. By a mistake of the defendants, the dispatch received at Rounesville was addressed to one Cooley, so that Darling did not get it. The plaintiff at Rochester, after waiting several days for a dispatch from Darling, accepted the $3,800 offer. A few minutes after he had done so he received, via Ogdensburgh, a telegram from Darling, informing him of the success of the well, and of an offer of $5,000 therefor. This action was brought to recover damages for the misdelivery of the message. Evidence was given at the trial tending to show that the market value of the well was $6,000. A verdict of $1,200 was given plaintiff at the trial. Held, that no evidence having been given to show that the defendants or their agents knew of the purpose of the message sent by the plaintiff or the consequences that might result from its non-delivery, and the message not indicating what the consequences might be, they could, in case of negligence, only be held liable for the damages naturally resulting therefrom, which would be the amount paid for the transmission of the message. Baldwin v. U. S. Telegraph Co. Opinion by Allen, J.

2. The company taking the message for transmission, and its operators cannot be presumed to be the agents of the defendants, merely because defendants are in the habit of receiving from such company messages for transmission on their lines, because they are bound by statute so to do. Complying with the statute in this respect raises no presumption of business connection between the companies. Ib.

3. Telegraph companies undertake for ordinary care and vigilance in the performance of their duties, but risks arising from the nature of their business and without fault of the corporation are upon the person sending messages, unless he elects to comply with the usual terms and have his message repeated. Ib.

4. In crossing railway track: concurrent negligence.It is the clear duty of a traveler upon the highway in approaching a railroad crossing to use all proper precautions to avoid injury, and the least he can do is to look in both directions from which trains may approach. Gorton v. Erie Railway Co. Opinion by Allen, J.

5. And where the traveler neglects to so look, the railway company will not be liable for injury done him by a passing train, although those managing the train are negligent in not giving the required signals, or any signal, when approaching the crossing. Ib.

RAILWAYS. See Negligence, 4.
TELEGRAPHS. See Negligence.

SCHEDULE OF STAMP DUTIES.

(Continued from last week.)

GENERAL REMARKS.

Revenue stamps may be used indiscriminately upon any of the matters or things enumerated in Schedule B, except proprietary and playing-card stamps, for which a special use has been provided.

Postage stamps cannot be used in payment of the duty chargeable on instruments.

The law does not designate which of the parties to an instrument shall furnish the necessary stamp, nor does the commissioner of internal revenue assume to determine that it shall be supplied by one party rather than by another; but if an instrument subject to stamp duty is issued without having the necessary stamps affixed thereto, it cannot be recorded, or admitted or used as evidence in any court, until a legal stamp or stamps, denoting the amount of tax, shall have been affixed as prescribed by law; and the person who thus issues it is liable to a penalty if he omits the stamps with an intent to evade the provisions of the internal revenue act.

The first act imposing a stamp tax upon certain specified instruments took effect, so far as said tax is concerned, October 1, 1862. The impression which seems to prevail to some extent, that no stamps are required upon any instruments issued in the States lately in insurrection, prior to the surrender, or prior to the establishment of collection districts there, is

erroneous.

Instruments issued in those States since October 1, 1862, are subject to the same taxes as similar ones issued at the same time in the other States.

No stamp is necessary upon an instrument executed prior to October 1, 1862, to make it admissible in evidence or to entitle it to record.

Certificates of loan in which there shall appear any written or printed evidence of an amount of money to be paid on demand, or at a time designated, are subjects to stamp duty as "promissory notes."

A check, draft or order for the payment of a sum of money drawn otherwise than at sight, or on demand, is liable to stamp tax at the rate of five cents for each $100 or fractional part thereof in excess of $100, but, like a promissory note, is exempt when for less than $100.

66

Every memorandum, or other written or printed evidence of an amount of money to be paid upon demand or at a time designated, is subject to stamp tax at the same rate as a promissory note. When a loan is obtained upon collateral security, and an instrument substantially as follows is given : Received of- - Bank, $10,000 advance on $10,000 United States bonds," it should be stamped at the rate of five cents for each $100 or fractional part thereof in excess of $100, and is exempt when for less than $100. There is no stamp tax upon a promissory note until it is issued. A stamp is to be canceled when it is "attached or used," and although a stamp may be affixed when a note is signed, it cannot be said to be used until the note is issued.

A guaranty indorsed upon a note, bond, mortgage or contract, whether made at the time of the execution of the note, etc., or subsequently, should be stamped as an agreement.

A contract for the sale of land, or to make a title deed to the purchaser on the payment of the purchasemoney, requires a five cent stamp as an agreement for each sheet or piece of paper upon which it is written.

When two or more persons join in the execution of an instrument, the stamp to which the instrument is liable under the law may be affixed and canceled by either of them; and "when more than one signature is affixed to the same paper, one or more stamps may be affixed thereto, representing the whole amount of the stamp required for such signatures.'

No stamp is required on any warrant of attorney accompanying a bond or note, when such bond or note has affixed thereto the stamp or stamps denoting the duty required; and whenever any bond or note is secured by mortgage, but one stamp duty is required on such papers, such stamp duty being the highest rate required for such instruments, or either of them. In such case, a note or memorandum of the value or denomination of the stamp affixed should be made upon the margin or in the acknowledgment of the instrument which is not stamped.

No stamp tax is required upon any papers necessary to be used for the collection from the government of claims by soldiers of the United States, or their legal representatives, for pensions, back pay, bounty, or for property lost in the service. This exemption in regard to bounties, etc., applies to those papers only which relate to United States bounties, pensions, etc., and does not extend to those relating to State, county, and town bounties, etc. A power of attorney to indorse the official check of a United States disbursing officer, issued for money to be applied in payment of a United States bounty or pension, or in discharge of a claim against the United States for what is technically known as arrearages of pay, is a paper relating to the receipt of such pension, bounty, etc., and is therefore exempt from stamp tax.

A mortgage given to secure bonds, which are to be issued from time to time as sales of them can be made, is valid so far as stamp taxes are concerned, though no stamps are affixed thereto, if the bonds are properly stamped, as provided in section 160, as they are issued. A note or bond given for a part of the consideration for realty sold and conveyed is not relieved from stamp tax by the fact that a lien to secure the payment thereof is retained in the conveyance, unless the lien is stamped as mortgage.

A foreign bill of exchange or letter of credit drawn in, but payable out of, the United States, if drawn singly, or otherwise than in sets of three or more, according to the custom of merchants and bankers, is liable to the same stamp tax as an inland bill of exchange, i. e., if drawn at sight or on demand, it is liable to a tax of two cents; if drawn otherwise than at sight or on demand, it should be stamped at the rate of five cents for each $100, or fractional part thereof in excess of $100, but, like promissory notes, it is exempt when for less than $100.

Particular attention is called to the change in section 154, by striking out the words "or used;" the exemption thereunder is thus restricted to documents, etc., issued by the officers therein named. Also to the changes in sections 152 and 158, by inserting the words "and canceled in the manner required by law."

The acceptor or acceptors of any bill of exchange, or order for the payment of any sum of money, drawn or purporting to be drawn in any foreign country, but payable in the United States, must, before paying or accepting the same, place thereupon a stamp indicating the duty.

It is only upon conveyances of realty sold that conveyance stamps are necessary. A deed of real estate