generally said that a knowingly false specific averment of wealth and solvency is within the statute.1 And so that defendant possessed certain specified assets. 2 § 1136. Whatever we may think on the last point, we may hold it settled that it is a false pretence under the statute to falsely claim the ownership of specified assets on which credit is given. Thus in one of the earliest cases under the Pennsylvania statute,3 two distinct false pretences were averred: one, that the defendant had in the hands of his guardians in New York an estate equal to two thousand dollars a year; the other that he would procure and bring on from New York money from his mother to pay the prosecutor. The first of these was held to be a false pretence under the statute.1 1 Ibid.; People v. Kendall, 25 signed. See Morris v. People, (Colo.) Wend. 399, 1841; Abbott v. People, 35 Pac. Rep. 188, 1893. 75 N. Y. 602, 1878; Clifford v. State, 56 Ind. 245, 1877; State v. Timmons, 58 Ind. 98, 1877; Com. v. Schwartz, 92 Ky. 510, 1892; Hathcock v. State, 88 Ga. 91, 1891; State v. Neimeyer, (Iowa) 20 Rep. 399, 1885. See, however, Com. v. Stevenson, 127 Mass. 446, 1879 Where the defendant, then a minor, fraudulently obtained goods by falsely representing himself to be a joint owner with his father of a number of cows and other stock on a neighboring farm, it was held this was within the statute, and his minority did not avail in a criminal action, although it would have in a civil. People v. Kendall, 25 Wend. 399, 1841. In Vermont a more restricted view is taken, based mainly on the distinctive limitations of the Vermont statute. State v. Sumner, 10 Vt. 587, 1838; see Dyer v. Tilton, 23 Vt. 313, 1851. That this view is peculiar to Vermont, see 1 Bigelow on Fraud, 25. 2 See cases under 1138: Com. v. Blanchette, 157 Mass. 486, 1892; Bobbitt v. State, 87 Ala. 91, 1888. 3 Com. v. Burdock, 2 Barr, 163, citing Mitchell's Case, 2 East P. C. 936, 1754; R. v. Goodhall, R. & R. 461, 1821; R. v. Douglas, 1 Mood. C. C. 480, 1836; R. v. Jackson, 3 Camp. 370, 1813; R. v. Parker, 7 C. & P. 825, 1837; R. v. Henderson, 1 C. & M. 138, 1844. See, to same effect, R. v. Cooper, L. R. 2 Q. B. D. 510, 1877; 36 L. T. 671, 1877; 13 Cox C. C. 617; State v. Tomlin, 5 Dutch. 13, 1860. In Pierce v. People, 81 Ill. 98, 1876, it was held that a false exhibition of business cards and of drafts on a bank was a false pretence. When the false pretence is in writing the meaning of any ambiguous terms is for the jury, while the construction is for the court. Com. v. Hutchinson, 2 Penn. L. J. 244; 2 Pars. 309, 1843. Where the pretence was that the In New York, by the penal Code of defendant owned real estate on Pass1882, 544, it is essential to sustain a yunk Road worth seven thousand prosecution based on the purchaser's dollars, and that he had personal propstatement of his means, that such erty and other means to meet his statement should be in writing and liabilities, and that he was in good Same rule applies when ob § 1137. The same rule applies when the object is to obtain negotiable paper.1 Thus where an indictment charged that N. represented to O. that he possessed certain specified valuable property, which he would sell him for four bills of exchange on Philadelphia, and that in consequence of this representation the bills were drawn by O., and that this representation was made knowingly and designedly, and with intent to cheat O. of his drafts, and that in fact N. possessed no such property as he pretended to have, this was held to present a false pretence under the statute.2 ject is to obtain negotiable paper. ment is tained. So so generally as to dant's defen § 1138. It has further been held that a false representation that the defendant had money in the hands of a third person, So when absent at the time, sufficient to take up a note, to which, indorseby means of the representation thus made, the prosecu- thus obtor's signature was obtained, is within the statute.3 § 1139. It is clear that a false representation of the status of the defendant brings him within the statute; although where there is an original felonious intent the case may be larceny." That this is the case when an infant falsely pretends to be of full age will be hereafter seen." § 1140. A person who falsely makes claim to supernatural powers, and thereby obtains money or goods (e. g., as in case so as to of gypsy fortune-telling), is indictable for false pretences, when the party defrauded is thereby really imposed upon. 7 status. pretention to super natural powers. 1877; R. v. Burnsides, Bell C. C. It has been held an indictable pretence for a party falsely to represent that he had a capital of two thousand dollars, and thus obtain the property of the prosecutor. Com. v. Poulson, 6 Penn. L. J. 272, 1847; S. P., State v. Penley, 27 Conn. 587, 1858. See, also, State v. Reidel, 26 Iowa, 430, 1868; State v. Pryor, 30 Ind. 350, 1868; State taining money was held larceny. See v. Monday, 78 N. C. 460, 1878. R. v. Giles, L. & C. 508; 10 Cox C. C. 44, 1865. See, infra, 1155; State v. Phifer, 65 N. C. 321; Bowen v. State, 9 Baxt. 45, 1876. In R. v. Bunce, 1 F. & F. 523, 1859, thus ob supra, ¿ 964. R. v. Bull, 13 Cox C. C. 608, And in Philadelphia, in 1884, the same position was taken in respect to frauds by an alleged "spiritual medium." So as to pretence that defendant § 1141. False representations of delivery of goods are within the statute. Where a carrier, falsely pretending that he had carried certain goods to A. B., demanded and thereupon obtained from the consignor sixteen shillings for carriage of them, it was held within the statute. In another case, tain goods where the carrier falsely pretended that goods given to or money. him for carriage had been delivered, but that he had left at home the receipt, the same rule was applied.* had deliv ered cer False representations of payment for the prosecutor fall under this head. It has been held, on this principle, that a false statement by the agent of an insurance company that he had paid over to the company certain premiums paid him by the defendant, thus preventing its lapsing, is a false pretence. And where it was the duty of C., a servant, to ascertain daily the amount of dock dues payable by his master, and, having ascertained it, to apply to his master's cashier for the amount, and then to pay it in discharge of the dues, but where, by representing falsely to the cashier that the amount was larger than it really was, as he well knew, he obtained from the cashier the sum he stated it to be, and then paid the real amount due, and appropriated the difference, it was held that the case was one of false pretences.7 § 1142. Where a person obtains goods under the false pretence that he is employed by A. B., who sent him for them, he So as to pretence that defendant was sent is within the statute, supposing the intention of the owner was to pass property to the defendant, or supposing the for certain statute covers cases where only possession is obtained.8 And this may be extended to all false pretences of agency, goods 1 Gordon's Case, 15 W. N. C. 282, 1884. 8 R. v. Bulmer, L. & C. 476; 9 Cox C. C. 492, 1864; R. v. Davis, 11 Ibid. 2 See People v. Genet, 19 Hun, 91, 181, 1868; Com. v. Hulbert, 12 Metc. 1871. 2 3 R. v. Coleman, 2 East P. C. 672. R. v. Airey, 2 East, 30, 1801. R. v. Barnes, T. & M. 387; Den. C. C. 59, 1850. Infra, & 1181. 6 R. v. Powell, 51 L. T. (N. S.) 713, 1884. 1 R. v. Thompson, L. & C. 233; 9 Cox C. C. 222, 1862. Supra, % 956960. See Bonnell v. State, 64 Ind. 498, 1878. 446, 1847; People v. Johnson, 12 Johns. 292, 1815; People v. Miller, 14 Ibid. 371, 1817; McCorkle v. State, 1 Cold. 333, 1860; Mack v. State, 63 Ala. 138, 1879; Thorne v. Turck, 18 Week. Dig. 200, 1883; State v. Dixon, 101 N. C. 741, 1883. In Chapman v. State, 2 Head, 36, 1858, it was held that to obtain a quart of whiskey on the pretence that the defendant was sent for it by another was, under supposing that property passed to the defendant. If, however, there was no property passed to the defendant, but the goods were given to him as the servant of A. B., then the offence is not false pretences but larceny.' pretence a certain § 1143. A false pretence that the party is a practising So as to physician is within the statute. The same view is taken of being of a false pretence, for the purpose of selling an alleged physimedicine, that the defendant had effected with it certain cian. cures.3 § 1144. A false allegation, also, that the defendant represented a principal of means is within the statute; and so of a so as to false pretence that the defendant could secure a place for pretence the prosecutor.5 that the defendant repre sented a of means principal or influ ence. so as to pretence that the § 1145. The same result was reached when the evidence was that the defendant obtained a sum of money from the prosecutor by pretending that he carried on an extensive business as an auctioneer and a house agent, and that he wanted a clerk, and that the money was to be deposited as security for the prosecutor's honesty as such defendant. clerk; the jury finding that the prisoner was not carrying on any such business at all. That the defendant was a storekeeper may be also a false pretence." § 1146. On the same principle an indictment was sustained which alleged that the defendant obtained money So as to by pretending falsely that he was an attorney who had pretence was an auctioneer in search of a clerk or was a store keeper. that de the circumstances, not within the 473, 1875. As to falsely pretending statute; but this was on the ground to represent a reliable firm getting up of the triviality of the act. Contra, a directory, see R. v. Speed, 15 Cox C. R. v. Butcher, 8 Cox C. C. 77, 1858. If possession only be obtained, it may be larceny. Supra, 888. 1 Supra, 888. Com. v. Murphy, (Ky.) 27 S. W. Rep. 859, 1894. * Bowen v. State, 9 Baxt. 45, 1876. Or is a member of a certain medical institute. Boscow v. State, (Tex.) 26 S. W. Rep. 625, 1894. 3 1 R. v. Bloomfield, C. & M. 537, 1842. 4 C. 24; 46 L. T. (N. S.) 174, 1882. As to a pretence that the defendant had authority to indorse for a reliable principal, see supra, ?? 657, 669. 5 People v. Winslow, 39 Mich. 505, 1878. See Com. v. Howe, 132 Mass. 250, 1882. R. v. Crab, 11 Cox C. C. 85—C. C. R. 1868. 7 See R. v. Barnard, 7 C. & P. 784, 1837; R. v. Hamilton, 9 Ad. & El. (N. S.) 271, 1846; R. v. Archer, ut supra; Com. v. Drew, 19 Pick. 179, 1837; Com. v. Daniels, 2 Pars. 332, R. v. Archer, Dears. C. C. 449; 6 Cox C. C. 515, 1855; 33 Eng L. & Eq. 528. As to exhibiting false business cards, see Jones v. State, 50 Ind. 1847. fendant was a cer got a third party out of a difficulty such as that in which tain attor the prosecutor was placed.1 ney. So that § 1147. Where a man assumes the name of another to defendant whom money is required to be paid, this is a pretence within the meaning of the act.2 was a cer tain payee. So that defendant was un money. § 1148. Where the prisoner paid his addresses to the prosecutrix, and obtained a promise of marriage from married, her, which promise she had refused to ratify, in consethereby obtaining quence of which he threatened her with an action, and thus obtained money from her; and where, during the whole transaction, it appeared he had a wife; the indictment presented two pretences: 1st. That he was unmarried. 2d. That he was entitled to bring an action against her for a breach of promise. It was held (Lord Denman, C. J., and Maule J.) that the case was within the statute, and that the fact of the prisoner paying his addresses to the prosecutrix was sufficient evidence to prove the first pretence. It has been held an indictable offence for a married man to pretend he was unmarried, and thus to obtain from a woman he courted money to furnish a house. But a mere promise to marry is insufficient." So that had cer tain legal 3 6 § 1149. That the defendant was, as to personal status, e. g., infancy or coverture, invested with rights which he did not defendant in fact possess, is a pretence under the statute. This principle, which has been elsewhere noticed in other relations, leads to the conclusion that a minor having nothing in his appearance or otherwise to put parties dealing with him on their guard, who pretends to be of full age, and hence legally responsible, is liable to be prosecuted for false rights which he did not possess. 1 R. v. Asterley, 7 C. & P. 191, 1835. 2 R. v. Story, R. & R. 81, 1842; Hall v. Com., (Ky.) 9 S. W. Rep. 409, 1888. 3 R. v. Copeland, C. & M. 517, 1805. 4 R. v. Jennison, 9 Cox C. C. 158; L. & C. 157, 1862. 1841, and comments, supra, ? 1135. See, however, Price v. Hewett, 8 Exch. 146, 1852; Liverpool Loan Assn. v. Fairhurst, 9 Ibid. 422, 1854; Wright v. Leonard, 11 C. B. (N. S.) 258, 1861; Goode v. Harrison, 5 B. & Ald. 147, 1821, where it is argued that 5 R. v. Johnston, 2 Mood. C. C. 254, no action on the case lies against a 1842. minor under similar circumstances. 6 R. v. Simmonds, 4 Cox C. C. 277, In Gabbett's Crim. Law, 204, it is de1850. clared to be a common law cheat for 7 See supra, 1124; and, also, Whart. an infant to impose generally on the Confl. of Law, 22 113, 119. community under the pretence of being * People v. Kendall, 25 Wend. 399, of full age. |