this duty is restricted to the entertainment of travellers in inns holding out to be such.' But an inn-keeper is not bound to receive a person who might communicate disease or cause serious inconvenience to occupants of the inn.2 of malice § 1588. Officers holding responsible posts in great business or social institutions, in which vast interests depend on Ignorance fidelity to official trust, are like statutory officers in and want this respect, that negligence on their part is justified as a deneither by ignorance of law nor by mistake of fact.3 fence. The duties of their office, as well as the necessities of society, require them to be both well informed and vigilant ; and if they make mistakes, however honest, they must bear the consequences. ignorance were a defence to an indictment against railroad or simi 269; Hall v. State, 4 Harring. 132, 1844; State v. Matthews, 2 Dev. & Bat. 424, 1837; Whart. Prec. 911, 912. It is otherwise as to intruders. Supra, & 625. On this position, common to the English and the Roman common law, an interesting question arises which is discussed by Bar in his Lehre vom Causalzusammenhange, to which reference has been several times made. An innkeeper refuses to receive a guest, who in consequence is obliged to wander in the woods during an inclement night, and finally dies from freezing. Is there such a causal connection between the innkeeper's act and the death as to make the innkeeper responsible for the homicide? The answer is yes, supposing that the inn is the sole house in the vicinity in which shelter could have been obtained; but not otherwise. And this coincides with the view heretofore expressed, that A. is only responsible for the death of B. resulting from A.'s negligent discharge of duty, when on A. the duty in question was specially thrown. 1 In an English case, decided in 1877, the evidence was that the defendant was the proprietor of a hotel, If and that attached to the hotel and under the same roof and license, but with a separate front door, was a bar in which persons casually passing by obtained refreshments. The prosecutor, who was a near neighbor, had been in the habit of coming to the bar with several large dogs, which had been found an annoyance to other guests; and letters had passed in which the defendant had objected to the dogs being brought into the bar, and the prosecutor had asserted his right to bring them. The prosecutor subsequently, while taking a walk for pleasure, went with one large dog to the bar and claimed to be served with refreshments, which the defendant refused him. On an indictment charging the defendant, as an innkeeper, with refusing refreshment to the prosecutor, it was ruled that he could not be convicted; first, because the refreshment bar was not an inn; secondly, because the prosecutor was not a traveller; thirdly, because, had it been otherwise, the defendant had reasonable ground for his refusal. R. v. Rymer, L. R. 2 Q. B. D. (C. C. R.) 136; 13 Cox C. C. 378. 2 Supra, 1436. lar officers, for negligence, the greater their ignorance, the more complete their impunity. The law would, in such case, give a premium to ignorance and sloth. Whatever good specialists, in their line, are accustomed to know, this they are bound to know.' And when charged with a violation of the law (as distinguished from negligence in the application of the law), then ignorance of the law is no defence.2 It is otherwise, however, with voluntary officers, who are legally clothed with no specific trust, and invested with no fiduciary care over others. And non-specialists, when charged with negligence, are only liable for the lack of such knowledge and diligence as is common to non-specialists of their class.3 It need scarcely be added that in no prosecutions for neglect is want of malice a defence. As has been shown, one of the conditions of negligence is want of malice. Not necessary to prove offi IV. EVIDENCE. § 1589. It is enough, as already shown, to prove that the person charged with misconduct in office held himself out to be an officer of the character described in the indictment. cer's com- The reason is twofold: first, his pretension to hold the office is an admission that he is such an officer; and, secondly, he is liable, even though an usurper, for misconduct in the office thus wrongfully assumed.3 mission. Malice and corruption to be inferentially proved. § 1590. Malice, corruption, or evil intent, when essential to the case, may be inferred, as presumptions of fact, from the evidence." V. RESISTANCE TO ILLEGAL ACTS OF OFFICERS. § 1591. To what extent illegal acts of officers can be resisted by individuals has been already incidentally discussed.7 POINTS REQUESTED FOR THE DEFENCE IMPROPERLY Resisting an Officer when Acting Illegally. In cases of misdemeanors the sheriff must be present either in sight or hearing, directing the arrest, to justify a person not armed with a warrant to make the arrest. On the trial of an indictment for resisting an officer, attempting to arrest for a misdemeanor, the defendant requested the court to charge: "If you find that the under-sheriff had no warrant with him at the time he attempted to arrest the prisoner and that the sheriff had the warrant, but was not with the under-sheriff at the time of the arrest, you must acquit him." Refused. Held error. People v. McLean, 68 Mich. 480, 1888, supra, 1591. And so of whatever is the sub- V. PUBLICATION. ject of civil action without special damage, 1598. And so of villifying deceased persons, & 1599. But there should be limit as to Unconscious and helpless per- But otherwise as to pictures or II. BLASPHEMOUS LIBELS. Blasphemy indictable at com- III. OBSCENE LIBELS. Obscenity indictable at com- tribution is indictable, 1608. VI. Obscenity need not be fully set forth, 1609. IV. SEDITIOUS LIBELS. Libels aimed maliciously at the existence of government indictable, 1611. To be seen by third person, ? 1618. When libel is sealed, intent to provoke breach of peace must be charged, 1619. Venue may be in places of mailing or of delivery, 1620. Post-mark may be evidence of mailing, 1621. Selling is publication, 1622. Instigator is principal, ? 1623. Printing not per se publication, 1624. Circulation proof of publication, 1625. Of non-obtainable libel parol proof is admissible, 1626. Master responsible for servant, ? 1627. Admissions may prove libel, ? 1628. Corporations may be indicted for libel, 1628 a. WHAT COMMUNICATIONS ARE PRIVILEGED. Bona fide confidential communications are privileged, ? 1629. Meddlesomeness is the test, ? 1630. |