the meaning of the statute.' A threshing-machine is within the purview of the act, though it had been, prior to its destruction, taken to pieces to avoid an expected mob.2 Plugging up the feed pipe of a steam-engine, and displacing other parts of the machinery so as to cause its stoppage, are within the statute; and so of injuring ploughs used in agriculture. As has been just incidentally seen, when a machine is broken by a mob, it is no defence that it was previously taken to pieces by the owner for its protection.5 On the other hand, where the prosecutor had not only taken the machine to pieces, but had broken the wheel of it, before the mob came to destroy it, for fear of having it set on fire and endangering his premises, and it was proved that without the wheel the engine could not be worked, it was held that the remaining parts of the machine, which were destroyed by the mob, did not constitute a threshing-machine."

mines.

§ 1082 b. Mines have also been protected by special enactments. In this country there can be no question' that malicious injury to mining property is indictable at common law. So as to But in such matters the interests involved are so large, and the risk to life so great, that statutes have been passed imposing heavy penalties on malicious injury to mines. Under these statutes it has been held that the offence of damaging an engine was consummated where a steam-engine used in draining and working a mine having been stopped and locked up for the night, the defendant got into the engine-house, and set it going, and there being no machinery attached, the engine went with great velocity, and received damage. A scaffold erected for the purpose of working a vein of coal is such an erection used in conducting the business of a mine, that injuring with intent to destroy it, or to render it useless, is included in the statute."

1 R. v. Bartlett, Deac. C. L. 1517. 2 R. v. Hutchins, Deac. C. L. 1517. See R. v. Mackerel, 4 C. & P. 448; R. v. Fidler, Ibid. 449.

6 R. v. West, Deac. C. L. 1518. As to damaging property generally, see supra, 1070. As to South Carolina statute in respect to packing cot

3 R. v. Fisher, 10 Cox C. C. 146; L. ton, see State v. Holman, 3 McCord,

1

to pull a signal rope attached to a bell on the engine. The intent is to be inferred from the facts; and where the evidence was that the prisoners placed a stone upon a line of railway, so as to cause an obstruction to any carriages that might be travelling thereon, it was ruled that if this were done mischievously, and with an intention to obstruct the carriages of the company, the jury would be justified in finding that it was done maliciously. sumption, in such case, is one of fact, not of law. land is no defence.1

But the pre-
Title to the

§ 1082 a. For the protection of manufactures and machinery analogous statutes have been enacted. Under these statutes the following points have been ruled:

So malicious in

jury to manufac.

A warp, not sized, but upon its way to the sizers, to tures, ma- fit it for being used in manufacturing goods, is not a terials, and 66 machinery warp in any stage, process, or progress of manufacture," or prepared for carding or spinning. It is not necessary that goods should be incomplete to be in "a stage, process, or progress of manufacture," under the statute. The working tools of a loom, and the cords employed to raise the harness, are "tackle employed in weaving.7 And so of any material part of the machinery.8

In another case in England the owner removed a wooden stage belonging to the machine on which the man who fed the machine. was accustomed to stand, and took away the legs, and it appeared in evidence that though the machine could not be conveniently worked without some stage for the man to stand on, yet that a chair or table, or a number of sheaves of corn would do nearly as well, and that it could also be worked without the legs: it was held, that the machine was an entire one within the act, though the stage and legs were wanting. And where certain side boards were wanting to a machine at the time it was destroyed, but the want did not render it so defective as to prevent it altogether from working, though it would not work so effectually as if those boards had been made good; it was held that it was still a threshing-machine within

1 Com. v. Killian, 109 Mass. 345, 1872.

2 R. v. Upton, 5 Cox C. C. 298. 3 Allison v. State, 42 Ind. 354, 1873. Under the Texas statute the obstruction must be of a character likely to endanger life. Bullion v. State, 7 Tex. App. 462, 1879.

* State v. Hessenkamp, 17 Iowa, 25, 1864.

5 R. v. Clegg, 3 Cox C. C. 295. See R. v. Ashton, 2 B. & Ad. 750.

R. v. Woodhead, 1 M. & Rob. 549. 7 R. v. Smith, 6 Cox C. C. 198. 8 R. v. Tracy, R. & R. C. C. 452. 9 R. v. Chubb, Deac. C. L. 1518.

the meaning of the statute.' A threshing-machine is within the purview of the act, though it had been, prior to its destruction, taken to pieces to avoid an expected mob.2 Plugging up the feed pipe of a steam-engine, and displacing other parts of the machinery so as to cause its stoppage, are within the statute; and so of injuring ploughs used in agriculture. As has been just incidentally seen, when a machine is broken by a mob, it is no defence that it was previously taken to pieces by the owner for its protection.5 On the other hand, where the prosecutor had not only taken the machine to pieces, but had broken the wheel of it, before the mob came to destroy it, for fear of having it set on fire and endangering his premises, and it was proved that without the wheel the engine could not be worked, it was held that the remaining parts of the machine, which were destroyed by the mob, did not constitute a threshing-machine."

mines.

§ 1082 b. Mines have also been protected by special enactments. In this country there can be no question' that malicious injury to mining property is indictable at common law. So as to But in such matters the interests involved are so large, and the risk to life so great, that statutes have been passed imposing heavy penalties on malicious injury to mines. Under these statutes it has been held that the offence of damaging an engine was consummated where a steam-engine used in draining and working a mine having been stopped and locked up for the night, the defendant got into the engine-house, and set it going, and there being no machinery attached, the engine went with great velocity, and received damage. A scaffold erected for the purpose of working a vein of coal is such an erection used in conducting the business of mine, that injuring with intent to destroy it, or to render it useless, is included in the statute."

1 R. v. Bartlett, Deac. C. L. 1517. 2 R. v. Hutchins, Deac. C. L. 1517. See R. v. Mackerel, 4 C. & P. 448; R. r. Fidler, Ibid. 449.

8

6 R. v. West, Deac. C. L. 1518. As to damaging property generally, see supra, 1070. As to South Carolina statute in respect to packing cot

3 R. v. Fisher, 10 Cox C. C. 146; L. ton, see State v. Holman, 3 McCord,

So as to trees and shrubs.

66

193

§ 1082 c. We have already seen that in several jurisdictions in this country it is at common law indictable to maliciously injure fruit or ornamental trees.' In England prosecutions of this kind are now exclusively statutory; the statutes having absorbed the common law. Under these statutes, apple- and pear-trees grafted in a wild stock, and producing fruit, are trees ;; and cutting down a tree is sufficient to bring a case within the statute, although the tree is not thereby totally destroyed.* As to hop-binds, however, it was held that when "destroying" is alleged, it must be shown that the plant died in consequence of the injury received. Proof of the infliction of injury by cutting and bruising is insufficient. It has been further ruled that where shrubs are cut upon an unproved allegation that they are likely to be injurious to an adjoining wall, it is a malicious trespass, though the title to the spot on which the shrubs grow is in dispute between the parties." "Woods," when used in this relation in a statute, includes a field which has been overgrown with wild brush. It is usually enough, in such cases, if the indictment follow the statute.8

§ 1082 d. Similar legislation has taken place to protect animals from cruelty, irrespective of the question of ownership." As

1 See Dailey v. State, (Ohio) 37 N. to uncultivated roots or plants growE. Rep. 710, 1894. ing upon the realty is insufficient to justify a conviction.

2 As to indictments under English statutes, see R. v. Lewis, 2 Russ. on Cr. 1066; R. v. Patrick, 2 East P. C. 1059; R. v. Howe, 1 Leach, 481; R. v. Dodson, 9 A. & E. 704.

3 R. v. Taylor, R. & R. C. C. 373. See R. v. Whiteman, Dears. C. C. 353; State v. Shadley, 16 Ind. 230, 1861. * R. v. Taylor, R. & R. C. C. 373. 5 R. v. Boucher, 5 Jur. 709.

8 State v. Priebnow, 14 Nebr. 484, 1883; People v. O'Brien, 60 Mich. 8, 1886.

9 State v. Bruner, 111 Ind. 98, 1887; Territory v. Crozier, 6 Dak. 8, 1887. By 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 40, "whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously kill, maim, or wound any cattle shall be guilty of felony." (Former provision, 7 & 8 Geo. IV. c. 30, s. 16.) By section 58, malice against the owner of the cattle or other animal injured

6 R. v. Whateley, 4 M. & R. 431. But see supra, ?? 1072 a, 1077; Dawson v. State, 52 Ind. 478, 1876. 'Hall v. Cranford, 5 Jones Law, unnecessary to be shown. (N. C.) 3, 1857.

For statutes in this country, see State v. Avery, 44 N. H. 392, 1862; State v. Pratt, 54 Vt. 484, 1882; People v. Brunell, 48 How. N. Y. Pr. 435, 1874; State v. Barnard, 88 N. C. 661, 1883; State v. Comfort, 22 Minn. 271, 1875; Tatum v. State, 66 Ala.

It has been held that at common law an indictment does not lie for maliciously injuring trees (Brown's Case, 3 Greenl. 177, 1824), and growing corn (State v. Helmes, 5 Ired. 364, 1845). Cases to the contrary will be found, supra, 1067. Mere damage 465, 1880; Jones v. State, 9 Ibid. 178,

"cattle," under the statutes,' have been considered steers; pigs ;3

hogs; asses geldings; horses, mares, and colts." In Statutory

Missouri, however, the term has been held not to in- cruelty to clude a tame buffalo. Dogs, though not the subject of larceny, have been held in this country to be protected by the statutes. The statute of 12 & 13 Vict. c. 92, § 2, which makes cruelty to "any animal" penal, goes on, in its interpretation clause, to specify as falling under this head, "any horse . . . sheep goat, dog, cat, or any other domestic animal." Under the words italicized cocks are held to be included.10

It is not necessary that the injury inflicted be permanent, if it be serious and painful." Hence driving a nail into a horse's Injury frog out of malice to the owner was held to be within must be 9 Geo. I. c. 52, though the damage was but temporary;'