judgment is one by default. The note obligates the maker to pay principal, interest, and ten per cent attorneys' fees. This we construe to mean ten per cent on the amount of the note as attorneys' fees in any suit brought to enforce its collection. Such a demand will support a judgment by default for the entire amount due, including the attorneys' fees, without the intervention of a jury: Code 1886, sec. 2740; McKenzie v. Clanton, 33 Ala. 528; Burns v. Howard, 68 Id. 352. It is not a case of recovery for a mere penalty stipulated to be paid by written promise, as in McPherson v. Robertson, 82 Id. 459, where it was held error to render judgment by default without writ of inquiry by a jury to determine the amount of damage" Affirmed.

JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT, WHAT Judgment ROLL CONSISTS OF: Hahn v. Kelly, 94 Am. Dec. 742; effect of: Green v. Hamilton, 77 Id. 295, and note 302; record supporting, what insufficient: Ashley v. Laird, 77 Id. 69, note.

JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT NOT SET ASIDE unless party pays sum he has shown himself liable for: Gregorg v. Ford, 73 Am. Dec. 639.

EAST TENNESSEE ETC. R. R. Co. v. Kennedy.

[83 ALABAMA, 462.]

JURISDICTION-GARNISHMENT PROCEEDINGS IN ANOTHER STATE. - Where a citizen of Alabama is voluntarily within the territorial jurisdiction of Tennessee, and a judgment is there rendered against him on personal ser vice, a suit by garnishment is properly instituted against a railroad company chartered by the latter state condemning a debt due the judgment debtor for services rendered in Alabama, and payment of the judgment against the garnishee is a complete defense to a subsequent action on the debt brought in Alabama.

DEBTS HAVE NO LOCAL SITUS, AND ARE SUABLE in any country or locality where the debtor's person may be found.

EXEMPTION LAWS OF ONE STATE CANNOT AVAIL DEBTOR in a suit instituted

against him in another state; and a garnishee in the latter state cannot make the defense available to the debtor, and is under no duty to attempt it.

ACTION brought by James M. Kennedy against the appellant, a corporation chartered under the laws of Tennessee, but doing business in Alabama, and seeking to recover on account for work and labor done. Other material facts appear in the opinion.

Pettus and Pettus, for the appellant.

Sumter Lea, contra.

By Court, SOMERVILLE, J. The appellee, Kennedy, as plaintiff, recovered a judgment against the appellant railroad corporation, in the circuit court of Dallas County, for about fifty dollars, in September, 1887, the case being tried de novo on appeal from a justice's court. The amount was due for work and labor done by the plaintiff for the defendant in this state, of which the plaintiff was and is a resident.

The defense set up by the railroad company was payment. The admitted facts show that the plaintiff, Kennedy, being temporarily in the state of Tennessee, which was the residence of the defendant corporation where it was chartered, was there sued by one Kane, before a justice of the peace having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties, and after service of process upon him, a judgment was rendered against him for the debt claimed, with costs, amounting to about fifty dollars; that after a return of no property found against Kennedy, a suit by garnishment was instituted on the judgment against the railroad company, and on its answer as garnishee a judgment was rendered condemning this same debt, and that this judgment had been fully satisfied.

This, we think, was a full defense to the suit. The plaintiff having gone voluntarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the state of Tennessee, was liable to be sued there as fully as if he resided in that state. His residence in Alabama was no objection to the exercise of this jurisdiction over his person: Smith v. Gibson, 83 Ala. 285; Dearing v. Bank of Charleston, 5 Ga. 497; 48 Am. Dec. 300, and note 319.

The residence of the railroad corporation being in Tennessee, it was subject to be sued there as much as a natural person would be; and this jurisdiction over it could in no manner be affected by the fact that its road was operated in Alabama, and the debt garnished was created here. The debt was due by the railroad to Kennedy as much in Tennessee as in Alabama, and suit could certainly have been brought upon it by him in that state, where the defendant corporation had been chartered, and where it resided. Debts have no local situs, but are suable in any country or locality where the debtor's person may be found: Drake on Attachment, 6th ed., sec. 597; Sturtevant v. Robinson, 18 Pick. 175.

The exemption laws in Alabama, which are municipal in their nature, are local, and have no extraterritorial force or operation. They pertain to the remedy, and depend upon the law of the forum, or the place where the action is brought.

No rule of interstate comity requires their enforcement in a foreign jurisdiction. The Tennessee courts were under no obligation to enforce them in a suit within the jurisdictional limits of that state, it being settled that the exemption laws of one state cannot avail a debtor in a suit instituted against him in another state: Stevens v. Brown, 20 W. Va. 450; Leiber v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 49 Iowa, 688; Sturtevant v. Robinson, 18 Pick. 175; Drake on Attachment, sec. 597; Waples on Attachment and Garnishment, 528. If Kennedy had appeared before the Tennessee court and pleaded his exemption under the Alabama statute, it would have constituted no defense. For this reason, the garnishee could not have made the defense available for him, and was under no duty to attempt it: Moore v. Chicago etc. R. R. Co., 43 Iowa, 385; Newell v. Hayden, 8 Id. 140. If this were not the law, it is manifest that the garnishee would be subjected to a double liability in all cases of this kind, which cannot comport with justice.

The case of Louisville etc. R. R. Co. v. Dooley, 78 Ala. 524, is clearly distinguishable from this. There the debt sought to be attached was contracted by a foreign corporation in another state, and was due to one of its employees, who was a resident of Kentucky. It was held that the Alabama court had no jurisdiction of the res or subject-matter which it was sought to condemn, nor of the person of the garnishee, by reason of its non-resident character, -the statute making no provision for serving process on a foreign corporation, to reach a debt not capable of being brought under the control of the court.

The court erred in sustaining a demurrer to the second plea of the defendant, and in refusing to give the written charge requested by defendant's counsel. The other rulings are immaterial, and need not be noticed.

Reversed and remanded.

GARNISHEE, JUDGMENT AGAINST, EFFECT OF: Adams v. Filer, 73 Am. Dec. 410, and note 421; protects garnishee from further liability when he goes into another state: Molyneux v. Seymour, 76 Id. 662.

EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECT OF EXEMPTION Laws: Mumper v. Wilson, 2 Am. St. Rep. 238, and note 240-242.

IRON AGE PUBLISHING Co. v. WESTERN UNION

TELEGRAPH Co.

[83 ALABAMA, 498.]

BILL IN EQUITY IN NATURE OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE IS Demurrable FOR UNCERTAINTY and indefiniteness, where, seeking by the auxiliary force of an injunction, to prevent the breach of an alleged contract for personal services, it does not allege when nor where the contract was made, nor where to be performed, nor the consideration agreed to be paid, and fails to give the name of the defendant's agent by whom the contract was alleged to have been made. JURISDICTION OF NON-RESIDENTS IS MATTER OF STATUTORY CREATION and regulation, and under the provisions of the Alabama statutes there is no jurisdiction in equity to enforce the specific performance of a contract for personal services made with a foreign corporation, or to prevent its breach by process of injunction against resident defendants, the bill failing to aver with sufficient certainty that the contract was made in Alabama, or was to be performed within its jurisdiction. WANT OF JURISDICTION OF FOREIGN CORPORATION, an indispensable party defendant, may properly be taken advantage of by demurrer, or motion to dismiss, when the defect of jurisdiction appears on the face of the bill, and the question is raised by a co-defendant, but a plea to the jurisdiction would be proper for the foreign corporation itself. COURTS OF EQUITY WILL DECLINE JURISDICTION TO DECREE SPECIFIO PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT FOR PERSONAL SERVICES involving the exercise of special skill, judgment, and discretion, continuous in their nature, and running through an indefinite period of time; and injunctions to prevent the breach of such contracts are granted with great caution by the courts, although the remedy by damages at law may be inadequate. CONTRACTS, IN ORDER TO BE ENFORCED BY SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, must be mutual in obligation as well as in remedy. The rule is, that equity will not enforce the performance of continuous duties, involving personal labor and care of a particular kind, which the court cannot superintend.

BILL in equity in nature of specific performance. The opinion states the case.

Smith and Lowe, and Taliaferro and Smithson, for the appellant.

Webb and Tillman, J. J. Altman, and Martin and McEachin,

contra.

By Court, SOMERVILLE, J. The bill is one in the nature of specific performance, seeking, by the auxiliary force of an injunction, to prevent the breach of an alleged contract by the New York Associated Press selling, as is insisted, to the complainant the Iron Age Publishing Company-an exclusive right to receive and publish, at Birmingham, Alabama, all of the Associated Press dispatches gathered and prepared for the

press by the New York company, and transmitted over the telegraph lines of the Western Union Telegraph Company, which body corporate is also made a party defendant to the bill. The breach complained of is averred to be the delivery of these dispatches, for publication, to the Morning Herald Publishing Company, and the News Publishing Company, which companies publish a daily paper in the city of Birmingham, and are also made parties defendant to the present suit. The chancellor sustained a demurrer to the bill, and the complainant brings this appeal. Some of these grounds of demurrer we proceed to discuss.

1. The first which we notice is based on the alleged uncertainty of the contract as set out in the third paragraph of the bill. The rule of law as to pleadings on this subject is more stringent in bills for specific performance than in other cases. The terms of the contract must be distinctly alleged, so as to leave none of its essential details in doubt or uncertainty. Vagueness of statement, or indefiniteness, as to matters of substance, is not permitted. Facts must be clearly stated, not left to inference by the court. So, in like manner, the proof is required to be clear, definite, and satisfactory; and a strict correspondence must exist between the alleged terms of the contract and the proof seeking to establish it: Derrick v. Monette, 73 Ala. 75. The contract, in other words, which the court is asked to enforce, must be alleged and proved to be "reasonably certain as to its subject-matter, its stipulations, its purposes, its parties, and the circumstances under which it was made": 3 Pomeroy's Eq. Jur., sec. 1405. Unless the court be fully advised as to what particular obligations the parties have undertaken to assume, and what specific rights they have mutually stipulated to confer, it would be impossible to adjudge whether the contract is sufficiently fair, just, and equitable in its parts, to justify its enforcement by the strong arm of the court, or to render a decree intelligibly settling the rights and duties of the parties which the court is asked to enforce.

The contract averred to exist between the complainant and the New York Associated Press does not seem to us to possess these requirements. It is not stated with sufficient definiteness, if at all, when the contract was made, nor where it was entered into, nor where to be performed, whether in or out of the state of Alabama, -a fact material to the inquiry of jurisdiction. While it is alleged to have been made with an agent