of the United States, and they decided that the statute was not unconstitutional, and their decision was acquiesced in. I have seen a report of a case (Kamper v. Hawkins) decided in 1793, in the general court of this commonwealth, respecting the constitutionality of a law which gave the district courts a power of granting injunctions in certain cases, in which case the judges of the general court (four to one) determined that the law was unconstitutional and void. On yesterday I saw the record of another case, in the Court of Appeals of this commonwealth (in 1788), on which it appears that the general assembly passed "An act to establish district courts," and the judges (ten being present), adjudged "that the Constitution and the said act were in opposition, and could not exist together, and that the court ought not to do anything officially in the execution of an act, which appeared to be contrary to the spirit of the Constitution." I also observed, that the then governor, Mr. Edmund Randolph, immediately on this decision called the general assembly by proclamation; and I have been informed that they altered the law according to the opinion of the court. From these two decisions, in the two highest courts of justice in this state, I may fairly conclude, that, at that period, it was thought that the courts of justice were the proper judicature to determine the constitutionality of the laws of this commonwealth. It is now contended, that the constitutionality of the laws of Congress should be submitted to the decision of a petit jury. May I ask, whence this change of opinion? I declare that the doctrine is entirely novel to me, and that I never heard of it before my arrival in this city. It appears to me to be not only new, but very absurd and dangerous, in direct opposition to, and a breach of the Constitution. And I wish those who maintain this doctrine, and have sworn to support the Constitution, conscientiously to reconsider their opinions with a calm and deliberate temper, and with minds disposed to find the truth, and to alter their opinion if convinced of their error. It must be evident, that decisions in the district or circuit courts of the United States will be uniform, or they will become so by the revision and correction of the Supreme Court; and thereby the same principles will pervade all the Union; but the opinions of petit juries will very probably be different in different states. The decision of courts of justice will not be influenced by political and local principles, and prejudices. If inferior courts commit error, it may be rectified; but if juries make mistakes, there can be no revision or control over their verdicts, and therefore, there can be no mode to obtain uniformity in their decisions. Besides, petit juries are under no obligation by the terms of their oath, to decide the constitutionality of any law; their determination, therefore, will be extra judicial. I should also imagine, that no jury would wish to have a right to determine such great, important and difficult questions; and I hope no jury can be found, who will exercise the power desired over the statutes of Congress, against the opinion of the Federal courts. I have consulted with my brother, Judge Griffin, and I now deliver the opinion of the court, "That the petit jury have no right to decide on the constitutionality of the statute on which the traverser is indicted; and that, if the jury should exercise that power, they would thereby usurp the authority entrusted by the Constitution of the United States to this court." Governed by this opinion, the court will not allow the counsel for the traverser to argue before the petit jury, that they have a right to decide on the constitutionality of the statute, on which the traverser stands indicted. If the counsel for the traverser had offered sufficient arguments to the court, to show that the petit jury had this right, the court, on being convinced that the opinion delivered was erroneous, would have changed it; for they hold it a much greater reproach for a judge to continue in his error, than to retract. The gentlemen of the profession know, that questions have sometimes occurred in state courts, whether acts of assembly had expired, or had been repealed; but no one will say that such questions were ever submitted to a jury. If the Constitution of the United States had not given to the judiciary a right to decide on the constitutionality of Federal laws-yet if such power could be exercised, it could not be by a juror, from this consideration-it is a maxim of law in all the states, that the courts have the exclusive right to decide every question, as to the admissibility of evidence in every case, civil or criminal, whether the evidence be by act of assembly, or by deed, or other writing, or by wit nesses. JUDGE CHASE concluded with observing, that, if he knew himself, the opinion he had delivered and the reasons offered in its support, flowed not from political motives, or reasons of state, with which he had no concern, and which he conceived never ought to enter courts of justice, but from a deliberate conviction of what the Constitution and the law of the land required. I hold myself equally bound to support the rights of the jury, as the rights of the court. I consider it of the greatest consequence to the administration of justice, that the powers of the court, and the powers of the petit jury, should be kept distinct and separate. I have uniformly delivered the opinion, "that the petit jury have a right to decide the law as well as the fact, in criminal cases;" but it never entered into my mind that they, therefore, had a right to determine the constitutionality of any statute of the United States. It is my duty to execute the laws of the United States with justice and impartiality, with firmness and decision, and I will endeavor to discharge this duty with the assistance of the Fountain of wisdom, and the Giver of all human reason and understanding. THE VERDICT AND SENTENCE. After two hours, the jury returned with a verdict of guilty, upon which the court sentenced the defendant to a fine of two hundred dollars, and an imprisonment of nine months. |