Very high words passed between the Major and Col. Allen, till Mr. Runnals left the house. This maneuver drew all the attention from the letters. It was then proposed that the board of war should be convened, and the governor summoned the members of the board to appear as soon as possible in his chamber, leaving Mr. Hathaway to detail the news to the populace, the board of war all being in the secret. New letters were made out from Gen. Enos and Cols. Fletcher and Walbridge's letters, and for the information and satisfaction of the public, read in council and assembly for the originals, and then returned to the governor. These letters contained every thing but the existing negotiations which prudence and policy dictated to be separated from other parts of the letters." 1

Gen. Haldimand, who as has been seen, had entered into the plan of making an offer to the Vermonters by proclamation with some reluctance, from the fear that it might be unfavorably received, appears to have left the time of its publication wholly to the discretion of the Vermont commissioners. They were of course in no hurry to have it forwarded while the enemy could be otherwise kept quiet. The legislature of the state did not complete their consideration of the proposal of congress of the 20th of August until the 19th of October, when as had been anticipated, its terms were declined, and commissioners were appointed to negotiate with the claiming states as before related. It had been agreed to delay the issuing of the proclamation till such legislative action had taken place. Events at the south furnished a sufficient excuse for not having it forwarded at all. The army of Lord Cornwallis had been besieged at Yorktown for some weeks by the combined American and French forces under Washington, and had actually surrendered on the 19th of October. News in those days traveled slowly. Towards the latter part of the month a report of the surrender, which had indeed been for some days expected, reached Charlestown. Upon which Col. Allen addressed a letter to the British com

1

The dispatches were committed by Gov. Chittenden for revision to Nathaniel Chipman then a rising young lawyer who had been admitted into the secret of the negotiation, who afterward became a senator in congress and chief justice of the state, and whose patriotism was never doubted. He was learned and eminent in his profession. His work on the principles of government, evinces a knowledge of constitutional law and a power of reasoning that would have done honor even to Daniel Webster. He is justly entitled to rank among the most profound and able jurists of the country. See his life by his brother Daniel Chipman generally, and particularly pp. 37, 70, also Chipman's Reports, Rutland, 1793, Principles of Government, Burlington 1833. Allen's Biography.

missioners, enclosing copies of the proceedings of the legislature on the resolutions of congress, stating the report of the capture of Cornwallis, and adding that whether true or false it would have an effect upon the people unfavorable to the negotiation, and that in the then critical situation of affairs it would be altogether improper to publish the proclamation. The package containing this letter appears to have reached the British commissioners at Ticonderoga about the first of November, upon which the troops and military stores were embarked, and were soon on their way to Canada, thus ending a campaign which had threatened carnage and desolation to the whole northern frontier, with the loss of only a single life, and with only a small expenditure of means.1

1 Haldimand Papers, vol. 1, p. 519, vol. 2, p. 127–139, 153-155, 122 – 127. Life of Stark, p. 285. Life of Brant, vol. 2, p. 201-3. Ira Allen's Vt., p. 189-192. The account in the text, especially in relation to the proclamation, differs in some respects from that of Mr. Allen, but appears to be fully sustained by the correspondence and reports found in the Haldimand Papers.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

FAVORABLE EFFECTS OF THE CANADA NEGOTIATIONS ON THE STATE AND COUNTRY.

1781-1782.

Gen. Stark at Saratoga in command of the northern frontier without the means of defence- The author of the life of Brant condemns the Canada negotiation, but admits that it saved New York as well as Vermont from invasion and carnage- Letter of Gov. Chittenden to Gen. Washington on the negotiation and the affairs of Vermont - Civil war threatened in the territories newly acquired from New York and New Hampshire -Washington's reply to Chittenden, urging the relinquishment of the eastern and western unions and assuring him of the consequent admission of the state into the federal union - The legislature of Vermont complies with his advice, and appoints agents and delegates to Congress.

URING the year 1781, while the negotiations of which an account has been given were going on, the frontiers of New York as well as those of Vermont, had been greatly exposed to incursions from the enemy, without any adequate means of defence. On the 25th of June Gen. Washington wrote Gen. Stark, then at his home in New Hampshire, requesting him to assume the command in northern New York, with his headquarters at Saratoga, informing him that the operations of the campaign made it necessary to recall the continental troops from that quarter; that his principal force would be a body of militia from Berkshire county, Massachusetts, and “the militia and state troops of New York;" and that he relied upon him to use his utmost exertions "to draw forth the force of the country from the Green mountains," which, from his "unlimited influence with those people," he trusted he would be able to do. On the 15th of July, Stark wrote Washington from Derryfield that he should set out for Saratoga the beginning of the next week, and on his way there would "hold a treaty with the Green Mountain Boys, but," he added, "not having seen or been acquainted with those turbulent sons of freedom for several years I am at a loss to determine my reception, but hope it will be such as shall lead to the general good."

On the 9th of August, he again wrote Washington from Albany, that he had been at Bennington and made a visit to the governor, who together with the leading men of the country, had promised him every assistance in their power to repel the common enemy; and,

he added, "I have reason to believe from their conduct that their promises are not fallacious; for before I came to Bennington, Major McKinstry, who has command of the troops at Saratoga, sent an express to apprise them of the enemy's advance for his post. The alarm was spread and in a few hours one hundred and fifty men on horseback, marched to his assistance. The alarm proved false, and next day they returned but not until they had visited Saratoga." As further evidence of the good disposition of these people, he stated that on the Monday previous, a party of eleven men principally tories, had been discovered in the south-east part of Bennington, who had made prisoner of Esq. Bleecker of the New York government and were taking him to Canada, that they were pursued and captured by the Vermonters and their prisoner released. Gen. Stark suggested that they might be treated as spies, but referred the disposition of them to Gen. Washington who afterwards wrote him to consider them as prisoners of war. It may be added that Gen. Enos, who was in command of the Vermont troops, placed himself under the military direction of Gen. Washington, and his subordinate United States officers, and that he was in continued correspondence with Gen. Stark, and always in readiness to render him assistance and obey his commands.1

Gen. Stark, at Saratoga found himself in command of an extensive frontier, without any proper means of defending it against any serious attack of the enemy. The imbecility which characterized the efforts of the New York government in the early part of the season, of which an account has already been given, continued to a great extent to prevail. Want of men and destitution of supplies of every description were the constant complaints of the general; and Gov. Clinton's best exertions, from the disaffection of his people and the consequent weakness of his authority, were insufficient to furnish adequate relief. In cases of alarm, which from the known strength and mysterious movements of the enemy in Canada and on Lake Champlain were not unfrequent, calls on the militia, if not wholly disregarded, were but tardily and partially responded to. There is no doubt whatever that the British force in Canada which at several times made hostile demonstrations from St. Johns, but which was kept at bay by the negotiation of the Vermonters, was sufficient to have made a successful inroad upon the

1

1 Life of Stark, p. 211, 215, 275, 277, 282. Rev. Cor. vol. 3, p. 353. Correspondence of Gen. Enos with Washington, and Enos and Col. Walbridge with Stark, in the Washington Papers, U. S. State Department, vol. 53.

exposed northern frontier of New York, with a fair prospect of extending its ravages as far south as Albany. Col. Stone, in his interesting life of Brant, has given a detailed history of the military preparations and movements in the northern department during this campaign, together with some account of the Vermont troubles, in which he takes the New York view of the controversy, and attributes the worst of motives to the Vermont leaders. He nevertheless admits that the invasion of northern New York was averted, not by the military preparations for her defence, but by what he calls the treasonable negotiations of the Vermonters with the enemy.1

Mr. Stone is among the few writers of history who have charged the Vermont leaders with the serious intention of surrendering their state to the British crown. The evidence on which he appears

to rely in support of this charge consists of the affidavits laid before the New York legislature early in 1782, by Gov. Clinton, of two persons who had been in Canada and had learned that Allen and Fay were there negotiating with the enemy for uniting Vermont to the British crown, together with information obtained and furnished the governor by an intelligent gentleman then lately in New York city, stating what were understood to be the terms of the treaty. It will be perceived that this proves nothing more than what has been fully stated in the preceding pages and has always been admitted, viz: that the Vermont leaders in answer to the advances made to them by the British officers, persuaded those officers that they were desirous of entering into such a treaty, whenever they could induce their people and legislature to concur in the measure. question remains, what were the motives and objects of the Vermonters in these proceedings? Was the negotiation, as they always insisted, an act of dissembling on their part to secure their state from the invasion and ravage of a public enemy, or were they really intending to surrender it to that enemy? That the motive which they assigned for their conduct was amply sufficient to account for it, without seeking for any other, cannot be questioned. And when their acts are well explained by the patriotic motive under which they profess to have acted, it seems unjust, as well as unnecessary, to undertake to convict them of others less pure, which they altogether disclaim and deny.

The

Mr. Stone, while charging the Vermont leaders with the design of delivering their state into the hands of the enemy, concedes that

1

Life of Brant, vol. 2, chap. 6 and p. 196, 197, 203. Life of Stark, p. 215, 286.