1804. WILLIS against The Commis sioners of Ap peals in Prize v. Eden (a) the Court of Admiralty condemned the captor in pear that such sale was fraudulent or without due care." The 28th section had before provided "that the execution "of any sentence appealed from shall not be suspended in "case the parties appellate shall give security to restore the "ship, &c. or effects, or the full value thereof, in case the "sentence should be reversed." The bail, therefore, are put in the place of the thing itself; and the act of parliament has declared what shall be deemed the full value of the thing, viz. the net proceeds, and that the parties shall not be answerable beyond such net proceeds. Admitting, therefore, that the Admiralty Court has an original jurisdiction in rem, yet here the statute has substituted the net proceeds pro re. [Lord Ellenborough, C. J. The act has only said that they shall not be liable for the value of the thing itself beyond the net proceeds of the sale; but it does not say that they shall not be liable for the beneficial use or product which they make of that value while in their hands] The form of the security is given in a note to Brymer v. Atkins (b), (4) Dougl. 591, n. 1. C4 (b) 1 H. Blac. 194. and [ 30 ] 1804. WILLIS against and it is conditioned to restore the ship and cargo, or the value thereof, in case the sentence should be reversed. Since this transaction took place, more extensive powers The Commis have been conferred by the stat. 43 Geo. 3. c. 160. s. 50. of sioners of Appeals in Prize which requires agents, on registering their letters of attorney, to give security in 5000l. to the Court, for the due execution of their trust in all matters of prize agency; aud s. 62, looking, as it were, to the very case of making inte rest of prize money, has empowered the Judge of the Court, whose sentence is appealed from, "to assign the agents, or "other person's in whose hands the proceeds of the prize Causes. may have come, at the prayer of either party, to bring "into, and leave in the registry, the net proceeds of the "sales of such prize, &c. which shall be deposited in the "Bank of England; or in case the parties shall agree thereto, in some public securities at interest," &c. Even this provision is short of what is now contended for; for it only provides for making interest in future, at the prayer of either party, from the time of appealing; whereas the Court of Appeals has assumed to give interest as from the time of the sale by a collateral and subsequent proceeding; and that [31] too without any allegation that interest had been made by the agent, decreed to pay it. The Court of Appeals was functus officio after the decree against the captors, unless there were some new proceeding originated against the agents, nothing of which is suggested. But interest is either something arising out of a contract of lending, or something given by way of damages for misconduct. Now, as a contract, the prize court could have no jurisdiction over it; and indeed no contract can be presumed between the agents of the captors and the captured, at whose prayer the monition issued. And as a punishment, the prize courts only give damages for the misconduct of the captors in making the capture, to which their agents, as such, can be no parties; neither is any misconduct imputed to them. [Grose J. I consider the interest to have been given as part of the pro ceeds of the prize. Lord Ellenborough C. J. We must presume that interest has been given upon the best ground; namely, upon proof that the agents made interest of the proceeds of the prize in their hands; and then it cannot be considered as given by way of punishment.] Then the maxim applies 1804. WILLIS against The Commis applies respondeat superior (a). But the interest cannot be considered as proceeds; for the proceeds were before decreed to be brought into court by the captors; which, it is alleged, Then with respect to this application sioners of Aphas been done. coming after sentence, no objection arises on the final sen- peals in Prize tence, but on this collateral order; and therefore the appli- Causes. cation was made as soon as the grievance existed. And in Gare v. Gapper (b) the Court directed the plaintiff to declare in prohibition, which is still pending, in order to have the question well considered, whether, if the ecclesiastical court misconstrue an act of parliament, a prohibition will not lie even after sentence. Lord ELLENBOROUGH C. J. This prohibition is applied for, on a supposed want of jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals to decree interest to be paid by prize agents on the proceeds of a cargo, in their hands, from the time of the sale, under a prior sentence of condemnation as prize. It is clear that that Court has jurisdiction in rem, and may take into its possession the thing itself, or the proceeds, wherever they may be found, either in the hands of the principal captor, of agent, or of any other who has no lawful title to hold them. Here the agents have been fixed with the proceeds. It is, however, objected, that interest derived out of those proceeds cannot be decreed. It is not disputed but that interest may be decreed against the captors; but not, as it is urged, against an agent; because he is only responsible on his security for the amount of the net proceeds of the sale; and that even as against the captors themselves, it is only given. by way of damages for misconduct, for which the agent is not answerable. To be sure, the decree of interest cannot be brought forward here as matter of punishment against the agent, against whom there is no substantive charge of misconduct. Neither is it brought forward as on the ground of contract; but simply, on the ground that the res, the proceeds, have got into the hands of the agents, and have there grown and accumulated, producing the interest now sought to be recovered. In many instances, it happens that one who has got the fund of another in his hands, and is proved to have made interest of it, shall be responsible in equity for [ 32 ] (a) Sadler v. Evans, 4 Burr. 1986. (b) 3 East. 480. such 1801. WILLIS against The Commis sioners of Appeals in Prize Causes. [ 34 ] such increase. Then it is said, that no interest appears to have been made of the proceeds by the agents. But we must give credit to the Court below for having exercised its jurisdiction soundly, and that it was sufficiently proved to it that interest had been made. And though it may be a new proceeding in these courts to compel an agent, who has made interest of the proceeds of a prize in his hands, to render it to those to whom it is due, it is high time that it should be done. For it would be an enormous defect of justice when the captor is liable, on the reversal of a sentence of condemnation, to be called upon to render interest who has not had the proceeds in his hands in the interval, that the agent who has held them, and has derived all the benefit, should not be answerable. I am, therefore, clear upon principle, that though the parties appellate, and their sureties be only made liable under the 32d section of the act, for the value of the prize to the extent of the net proceeds of the sale, yet that the captors are liable for interest upon such net proceeds, and so are their agents, and those into whose hands the res, or proceeds, have come. It does not appear here that the agents have not made interest of the money in their hands, and we must conclude that the Court of Appeals was properly satisfied that they had. The only question for us to consider, is, Whether interest is to be deemed part of the res, or proceeds, in the hands of an agent? which I am satisfied that it may well be. GROSE J. It is admitted that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the rem, and every thing incident to it. The law is clear, as laid down by Mr. Justice Buller in the case referred to of Smart v. Wolff (a), that the Admiralty Court has jurisdiction not only over the question of prize, but of all its consequences: and that though it has taken a stipulation, it is not confined to proceed on that alone, but may also proceed in rem, according to to its ancient course. Then what is the res? The prize, or what it produces: interest is part of the res; it is an incident to it. It is clear that the Prize Court has jurisdiction over what the act calls the proceeds; and money is the proceeds, and interest is the product of money and part of the proceeds. I am glad to find 1804. WILLIS against The Commis sioners of Ap the provision referred to in the late act of parliament for directing the proceeds to be laid out in public securities: not that it furnishes any doubt of the power of the Court to decree interest before; but because it secures the claimant's money, as it was intended to do, against the insolvency and peals in Prize mismanagement of agents. But it is said that Willis, not Causes. being a registered agent, was not within the jurisdiction of the Court: but he had the proceeds of the prize, the money, in his hands; and that Court had jurisdiction over him, as it had over the money. Then it is urged that interest is treated as distinct from the proceeds in the suggestion: but the proceeds decreed by the Court to be brought in, meant the proceeds as they existed at the time of the sale of the cargo: and the interest is what was made afterwards, and which afterwards increased the amount of those proceeds. Then if the captor be liable to interest beyond the original proceeds, so is the agent who has received them into his hands. LAWRENCE J. It is supposed that the prize court has jurisdiction over the agent only under the prize acts; but that is not so: for if those acts had never been passed, that Court would have had no jurisdiction over the res, and the proceeds of it, into whosever hands they get. The question then is, Whether interest be not a part of the proceeds? [ 35 ] which I take it clearly to be. But it is said, that by the 32d section of the stat. 33 Geo. 3, the parties shall not be liable, in case of the reversal of a sentence of condemnation, beyond the net value of the proceeds at the time of the sale of the prize. The meaning, however, of that section was, that the captors should not be charged with the value of the prize beyond the amount of what it then produced. But that does not shew, that if the proceeds, of whatever given value at the time of the sale, be afterwards made productive, the parties in whose hands they are shall not be liable for that product. Then it is said further, that interest is not alleged to have been made. But in Smart v. Wolffe, upon a suggestion that the party decreed to bring in the produce had not the proceeds, Mr Justice Buller said, that if such were the facts, it should have been pleaded below. So here, if the agents had not made interest of the money in their hands, they should have insisted on it below. They do not, however, even now, suggest that no interest was made by them; they only argue that |