variation, from its passage in September, 1704, to the present day.

In

The rate of interest in Virginia in 1730, was fixed at six per cent. per annum ; in 1734 it was reduced to five per cent., and the former act amended by giving costs to the prosecutor, and authority to the borrower to exhibit a bill in equity against the lender to discover the usury. the revisal of 1748, the provisions of the act of 1734 were re-enacted -1748 edition 1752, chap. 37, and ed. 1769, chap.. 30. The same rate of interest is prescribed in the act of 1786, and it continued at five per cent. until the 1st of May 1797, when the act of 1796 took effect, (ed. 1803 and 1814 c. 209,) by which it was raised to six per cent.

The original act against usury in North Carolina, which was passed 1741, continues in force in that state through subsequent enactments, and was in force in Tennessee, until the act of that state, passed 1819, which made usury indictable-which continued until the present act in that state passed in 1835, which is now in force.

In South Carolina two laws were passed, one in 1720, the other in 1721, against usury; the last of which brings indirectly into view the rate of interest. This prohibits the taking of more interest for money lent than ten per cent. per annum, under a forfeiture of treble the amount in 1748, a law passed for reducing interest from ten to eight per cent., and in 1777 it was reduced from eight to seven per cent. With the last laws for reducing interest, severe penalties against usury were incorporated See Ramsay's History, vol. 2, p. 197. At the present time the legal interest is seven per cent., as it has been since 1777. The bank interest is six per cent.

Georgia passed an act against usury 27th March, 1759, similar in its provisions to the statute of Queen Anne, but allowing interest at eight per cent. per annum. For this see Prince's Laws of Georgia. It continued in force until its repeal by the passage of the present act, 1822.

Alabama, by the act of 1805 allowed interest at six per cent. per annum, and declared the contract void for the excess. Afterwards, by the act of 1818, any rate of interest or premium for the loan oruse of money, wares, merchandise or other commodity, fairly and bona fide stipulated and agreed upon by the parties to such contract, expressed in writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith, was legal and recoverable, and no bona fide contract was to be varied or in any manner impeached by reason of any premium or rate of interest so stipulated and expressed. This law was repealed the next year, 1819, by the act now in force, to which a supplement was added in 1834.

The territorial legislature of Ohio, passed an act on the 14th of July, 1795, declaring in force the eighth chapter of the statute of the parliament of Great Britain, held in the thirteenth year of the reign of Queen Elizabeth, and the ninth chapter of the statute of the parliament of Great Britain, held in the thirty-seventh year of the reign of King Henry the Eighth. Another act was passed November 15th, 1799, repealing the former act, and fixing the rate of interest at six per cent., with a forfeiture of all over principal lent, in case of receiving more. Chase, Laws of Ohio, vol. 1, page 218.

The state of Ohio passed an act to prevent usury, which forfeited the excess over principal only, December 29, 1804, which continued until its repeal by the passage of the present act, January 12, 1824.

The first act against usury in Kentucky was passed 1798, which was similar in its provisions to the act then in force in Virginia. This continued until its repeal by the passage of the present act, 1819.

Such being the laws against usury in the different states, and materially variant in many particulars, both as to the effect of the contract, and the mode of proceeding under them; the constantly increasing facility of communication, and the daily negotiation of loans in one state, to be made in another, and to be secured on lands or other property, perhaps in a third, it becomes an object of necessary inquiry, as to the practical operation of these conflicting statutes upon such contracts and securities.

In the recognition of the laws of a foreign state, and in the selec tion of one of several conflicting laws, the following general principles may be adopted.

1. The obligatory force of every law is confined to the country in which it is established; and it attaches on those only who are the subjects of that country.

2. But it is considered that persons may, for this purpose, become subjects of that country, not only on account of their domicil being in it, but in respect of their temporary residence, or of their being possessed of property in it, or of their being parties, to a suit instituted before its tribunals.

3. Although the law does not by its own force operate in any other country but that which established it, or on any other persons than the subjects of that country, and the judicial tribunals of another country are not bound to recognize it; yet states, from comity and considerations of mutual interest, recognize and give effect to the laws of each other, when the rights either of their own subjects or of foreigners are derived from, or are dependent on those laws.

4. But such recognition does not take place by any foreign state, when it would be incompatible with its own authority or prejudicial to the interest of its own subjects.

5. From comity, foreign states recognize and give effect, almost universally, to those laws of the domicil, which constitute the status, quality, or capacity of the person, and which are called personal.

6. Real laws, which affect real or immovable property, are confined in their operation to the place in which the property is situated; but the judicial tribunals of another country, before which the title to that property is litigated, will consult and adjudicate according to the laws of the country in which such property is situated.

7. Foreign states recognize and give effect to those laws which affect personal property, and which, as its situs is that of the domicil, are such as prevail in the place of the domicil.

8. With respect to those laws which are called mixed laws, all dealings, contracts, wills, and other instruments, which are made in the manner prescribed by the law of the place in which they are entered into and made, are in every other place deemed valid and effectual.

9. But neither personal, real, or mixed laws will be allowed to operate on, or control the title to real or immovable property, in opposition to a prohibitory law of a contrary tendency prevailing in the place in which that property is situated.

10. The personal law of the domicil, whether permissive or prohibitory, prevails everywhere in preference to another personal law of a contrary nature, and which may be in force in the place where the property is situated.

11. A personal law which gives a permission, yields to a real law which prohibits.

12. The law which disposes of property primarily and per se, although it has in view the quality of the person, is a real statute ; of this description are the laws of succession.

13. A law which, whilst it leaves a person the general liberty of disposing of his immovable property, limits this liberty to a certain case only, is a real statute in respect of such limitation.

14. A law which prohibits the disposition of real property in a particular case, although in respect of the status or condition which the person had acquired his disposition may be prohibited in every other case, is a personal law, if this permission be consistent with the general capacity of the party before he had acquired that status or condition, and which would be again enjoyed by him when that status or condition no longer existed.

15. That which is the predominant, direct, and immediate subject matter of the law, determines its nature and quality, whether it be real or personal.

16. The motive or end of a law, when it is so clear that no one can reasonably doubt what that motive or end is, ought also to determine its nature and quality. If the right in dispute depend on the sta

tus and condition of the person, the law which governs the person is followed. If the question arise as to the law which should determine the rights of husband and wife, those rights not having been provided for by express contract, at the time of their marriage, resort is to be had to the law of their domicil on the day of their marriage; if they had different domicils, that of the husband is to be adopted in preference to that of the wife.

17. When a law equally affects persons and things, so as to render it doubtful whether its personal or real nature predominates, the presumption is that it is a real law.

18. In a conflict between the personal law of the domicil and the personal law of another place at variance with it, that of the domicil prevails.

19. But the preceding rule admits of some qualification. It is not to be applied when it would enable a person to avoid a contract, which he was competent to make by the personal law of the place in which he made it, although he was incompetent by the law of his domicil. Thus if a person whose domicil of origin was in Spain, where he does not attain his majority until his twenty-fifth year, should at the age of twenty-three, enter into a contract in England, or any other place, where his minority ceases at twenty-one, he would not be permitted to avoid his contract by alleging that he was a minor, and incompetent to contract, according to the law of Spain. The maxim that every man is bound to know the laws of a country in which he enters into a contract is of universal application, and is perfectly just and reasonable, because it is in his power to attain that knowledge; but the maxim, Qui cum alio contrahit, vel est, vel debet esse non ignarus conditionis ejus, cannot be applied to those cases in which the condition depends on facts and law to which he is a perfect stranger.

20. In a conflict between a personal law of the domicil and a real law, either of the domicil or of any other place, the real law prevails over the personal law. Thus a person who had attained his majority, and has, as incident to that status, the power of disposing by donation inter vivos ofevery thing he possessed, may, by the real statute of the place in which his property is situated, be restrained from giving the whole, or from giving it except to particular persons.

21. The person may have at the same time one status conferring capacity, and another status conferring incapacity, for there may be capacity for some and incapacity for other acts. Thus a married woman is by the law of some countries incapable of contracting or alien