restriction on the previous grant, but an enlargement of it, if an enlargement should be thought necessary. This act might be construed in connexion with the judiciary act of 1789, and a general clause giving jurisdiction might be limited as to amount to the sum mentioned in the ninth section of that act. The subsequent words, therefore, of the section we are considering, were introduced for the purpose of obviating this construction, and removing the doubt, which might otherwise exist, of the right to take cognizance of sums less than one hundred. dollars. After giving the jurisdiction generally, the words are," although the debt, claim, or other matter in dispute, shall not amount to one hundred dollars." These words do not confine the jurisdiction previously given to one hundred dollars, but prevent it from stopping at that sum.

The jurisdiction of the district courts, then, over suits brought by the postmaster general for debts and balances due the general postoffice, is unquestionable. Has the circuit court jurisdiction?

The language of the act is "that the district court shall have cognizance concurrent with the courts and magistrates of the several states, and the circuit courts of the United States, of all suits," &c. What is the meaning and purport of the words

concurrent with" the circuit courts of the United States? Are they entirely senseless? Are they to be excluded from the clause in which the legislature has inserted them, or are they to be taken into view, and allowed the effect of which they are capable?

The words are certainly not senseless. They have a plain and obvious meaning. And it is, we think, a rule, that words which have a meaning are not to be entirely disregarded in construing a statute. We cannot understand this clause as if these words were excluded from it. They, perhaps, manifest the opinion of the legislature that the jurisdiction was in the circuit courts; but ought, we think, to be construed to give it, if it did not previously exist. Any other construction would destroy the effect of those words. The district court cannot

take cognizance concurrent with the circuit courts, unless the circuit courts can take cognizance of the same suits. For one body to do a thing concurrently with another is to act in conjunction with that other; it is equivalent to saying, the one may act together with the other. The phrase may imply that power was previously given to that other; but if, in fact, it had not been given, the words are capable of imparting it. If they are susceptible of this construction, they ought to receive it, because they will otherwise be totally inoperative, or will contradict the other parts of the sentence, which show plainly the intention that the district court shall have cognizance of the subject, and shall take it to the same extent with the circuit courts.

courts.

It has been said, and perhaps truly, that this section was not framed with the intention of vesting jurisdiction in the circuit The title of the act, and the language of the sentence, are supposed to concur in sustaining this proposition. The title speaks only of state and district courts. But it is well settled that the title cannot restrain the enacting clause. It is true that the language of the section indicates the opinion that jurisdiction existed in the circuit courts, rather than an intention to give it; and a mistaken opinion of the legislature concerning the law does not make law.

But if this mistake is manifested in words competent to make the law in future, we know of no principle which can deny them this effect. The legislature may pass a declaratory act, which, though inoperative on the past, may act in future. This law expresses the sense of the legislature on the existing law, as plainly as a declaratory act, and expresses it in terms capable of conferring the jurisdiction. We think, therefore, that, in a case plainly within the judicial power of the federal courts, as prescribed in the constitution, and plainly within the general policy of the legislature, the words ought to receive this construction.

So far as the suits brought by the postmaster general were referred to in argument, in the case of The Bank of the United States v. Osborn, this construction was assumed as unquestionable. As the act was referred to for the sole purpose of illus

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trating the argument on the point then under consideration, it was not examined with the attention which has since been bestowed upon it; but the opinion then expressed, that the section we have been considering conferred jurisdiction on the courts of the United States over suits brought by the postmaster general, was correct.

Had this suit been brought to recover the balance due from the deputy postmaster, on his original liability to pay the money in his hands, no doubt would have been felt respecting the jurisdiction of the court. The act of 1810 gives the postmaster general a right to sue for such balances, and the act of 1815 enables him to sue in the circuit or district courts of the United States. But it is contended that he has no right to secure such balances by bond; and, consequently, the bond being unauthorized, the act of congress cannot be construed to authorize a suit upon it.

Were it even true that an official bond cannot be taken in a case where it is not expressly directed by law, we do not think that a bond taken to secure the payment of a sum of money is void, because it is also an official bond. Even supposing this bond to be void, so far as it is intended to stipulate for the performance of official duties, it is not necessarily void, so far as it stipulates for the payment of money of the United States which might come to the hands of the deputy postmaster. That part of the condition, which shows the bond was taken to secure the payment of money which should be received for the United States, is not vitiated by that part of it which shows that it was also taken to secure the general official conduct of the deputy. Now a part of the condition is, expressly, "that, if he shall pay all moneys that shall come to his hands, for the postages of whatsoever is by law chargeable with postage," then the obligation is to be void. The obligation itself, on which the suit is brought, was intended to secure the payment of money collected for the United States, as well as the official conduct of the deputy; and as no law prohibited such an official bond, we cannot think, although it might not in itself be valid, that it would

destroy an obligation taken for a legitimate purpose. As the breach assigned is altogether in the non-payment of the money collected, we do not think, that, if a bond would be good taken for this single object, it is made bad by being extended also to the official conduct of the obligor.

The inquiry, then, is, whether, under a fair construction of the acts of congress, the postmaster general may take bonds to secure the payment of money due, or which may become due, to the general postoffice.

All the acts relative to the postoffice make it the duty of the postmaster general to superintend the department, to regulate the conduct and duties of his deputies, and to collect the moneys received by them for the general postoffice. May not these powers extend to taking bonds to the officer who is to perform them? May not these bonds be considered as means proper to be used in the collection of debts, and in securing them?

If this interpretation of the words should be too free for a judicial tribunal, yet, if the legislature has made it, if congress has explained its own meaning too unequivocally to be mistaken, their courts may be justified in adopting that meaning.

The twenty-second section of the act of 1799, after directing the postmaster general to sue for all balances due from his deputies, within six months after the expiration of the three months within which they ought to have been paid, enacts "that all suits, which shall be hereafter commenced for the recovery of debts or balances due to the general postoffice, whether they appear by bond or obligations made in the name of the existing or any preceding postmaster general, or otherwise, shall be instituted in the name of the postmaster general of the United States."

These words follow immediately the clause which makes it the duty of the postmaster general to sue for the money due from his deputies, and are obviously applied to the moneys in their hands. They show the sense of the legislature, that this money may be a "debt" or a "balance," may "appear by

bond or obligation," or otherwise; and are, we think, a legislative exposition of the words, describing the power and duty of the postmaster general in the superintendence of his department, and the means he may employ for collecting the money due from his deputies.

The thirty-first section of the same act repeals the previous laws for establishing the postoffice department, after the first day of the ensuing May; and adds a proviso to the repealing clause, that, as to "all bonds, contracts, debts, demands, rights, penalties, or punishments, which have been made, have arisen, or have been incurred," &c., "the said acts shall have the same effect as if this act had not been made."

It is said by the counsel for the defendants, that these words do not give efficacy to the bonds to which they refer, but leave them as they were anterior to the repealing act. This is true. But they explain the sense of the legislature respecting the powers of the postmaster general, and the manner in which he might execute those powers.

After

An additional proviso extends even to official bonds. continuing the postmaster general and all his deputies in office, it adds, “and also the bonds, which they or either of them have or may give for the faithful execution of their several duties, shall continue to have the same force and effect, to all intents and purposes, after the first day of May next, as though this act had not been made."

This proviso, also, is no more than a recognition of the validity of those bonds; but it is a recognition of it, and goes the full extent of showing the legislative opinion that they might be taken. The act of 1810 repeals former acts, and contains the same provisions on this subject with the act of 1799.

The court has felt the pressure of this part of the case. There is always difficulty in extending the operation of words beyond their plain import; but the cardinal rule of construction is, that, where any doubt exists, the intent of the legislature, if it can be plainly perceived, ought to be pursued. It is also a rule that the whole law is to be taken together, and one part