Laughlin, 8 Ohio 114; Caston v. Caston, 60 Miss. 475; Allen v. Smith, I Leigh (Va.) 231; Cummings v. Holt, 56 Vt. 384; Finley v. Gaut, 8 Baxt. (Tenn.) 148; Henderson v. Staritt, 4 Sneed (Tenn.) 470; Wistar v. Kammerer, 2 Yeates (Pa.) 99.

Where the deed shows upon its face that the requisite notice was not given, it is void. Moore v. Brown, 4 McLean (U. S.) 211; affirmed 11 How. (U. S.) 414; Dow v. Chandler, 85 Mo. 245.

In Kane v. Brooklyn, 114 N. Y. 586, the notice, in pursuance of which the plaintiff's property was sold, was dated and first published, on the 15th of March. The day of sale specified therein was the 14th of April. It was held that this was a compliance with the New York Laws of 1885, ch. 405, § I, requiring the sale to be at a time "not less than thirty days after the first publication."

Under Maryland Code, art. 4, § 874, both the day of giving the notice or making its first publication and the day of sale, should be excluded in computing the thirty days' notice of sale provided for. Steuart v. Meyer, 54 Md. 454.

Where the statute required the treasurer, on or before September 1st, to send a notice to certain newspapers for publication, and the notice sent by that officer was dated September 15th, the error was held to be immaterial; the provisions of the statute relating to the preparation and delivery of the notice were mandatory in so far only as to require it to be delivered in time to be published for the prescribed time preceding the sale. Chamberlain v. Taylor, 36 Hun (N. Y.) 24. See also Stout v. Coates, 35 Kan. 382.

Proof of Publication.-The county auditor's certificate that the delinquent list was published for four consecutive weeks prior to December 1st, does not show a compliance with 1 Kerwin's Ohio Sts. 630, requiring the delinquent list and notice of sale to be published for four weeks between the first day of October and the first day of December. Magruder v. Esmay, 35 Ohio St. 221.

See also Ramsay v. Hommel, 68 Wis. 12; Morris v. Carmichael, 68 Wis. 133.

The certificate of a printer that the notice given by the officer was published for thirty days beginning February 21st, 1869, is not sufficient proof that the notice was published "once a week for four weeks," as required by the Maryland Code, art. 81, § 56. proof in this particular must be affirmative and certain and nothing left to inference and conjecture. Prince George's County v. Clarke, 36 Md. 207.

The

In Fitch v. Pinckard, 5 Ill. 69, to prove the notice and advertisement, newspapers were introduced, published in 1837, containing the notice and advertisement dated "1836." It was held that it was not permissible to show by parol that the date was a mistake and that it was intended for 1837.

Under a statute requiring the first publication of the notice in a newspaper to be eight weeks before the day of sale, the date of the paper is ordinarily to be considered as the date of its publication. And evidence tending to prove that the paper was actually printed and ready to be delivered on the afternoon of the day before such printed date, and was actually delivered to the subscribers in the place of its publication that afternoon or evening, and the remainder were left in the post office that night directed to the other subscribers, and went by the mail of the next morning; that the whole edition was about four or five hundred-from fifty to seventy-five for the village subscribers-is not competent evidence to show that the paper was published the day before its date. Schoff v. Gould, 52 N. H. 512.

In Kansas, where the proof of the publication of notice is not transmitted to the county treasurer within the time prescribed by the statute, the charge for such publication may not be included in the amount for which the property is sold. And if it is included, the sale will be void. Fox v. Cross, 39 Kan. 350.

1. Thurston v. Miller, 10 R. I. 358. 2. Person v. O'Neal, 32 La. Ann.

228.

1. What is a Public Place.”. - Tidd v. Smith, 3 N. H. 178. In this case the court held, as a matter of law, that a shoemaker's shop was not a public place within the statute. This case was followed in Cahoon v. Coe, 57 N. H. 576, when two of the judges held as a matter of law, that upon the evidence reported, each of the six dwelling houses in Wentworth's Location was a public place, although the jury had found that there was no public place in that township; and the remaining judge who sat in the case concurred in the result.

In Hoitt v. Burnham, 61 N. H. 620, the defendant proved the posting of notices at a certain inn, and at the post office in the town of Dover, and the court ruled as a matter of law that prima facie both might be regarded as public places. No evidence was introduced as to the character of either place.

And in Scammon v. Scammon, 28 N. H. 419, it is held, that for the purpose of posting a notice, a meetinghouse is prima facie a public place.

The words "public place" mean such places as in comparison with others in the same town are those where the inhabitants and others most frequently meet, or resort, or have occasion to be, so that a notice there would for that reason be most liable to be seen. Russell v. Dyer, 40 N. H. 173. See also Wells v. Burbank, 17 N. H. 411; Alger v. Curry, 40 Vt. 437; Austin v. Soule, 36 Vt. 645.

In Cambridge v. Chandler, 6 N. H. 271, the advertisement was put upon a board that was fixed in the sand by the side of a certain river. There was no settlement nor inhabitant in Cambridge at that time. Hunters were accustomed to pass up and down the river. There was a public highway laid out through that place, leading from another point in that state to the State of Maine. It was held that the notice was not posted in a public place.

A notice of the sale posted "at the courthouse door and at three other of

the most public places in the county," is a compliance with the requirement of the Maryland Code, art. 81, § 59, that the notice shall be put up "at the courthouse door and at the most public places in such county." It is not required that the notice shall be put up at all of the most public places in the county. Prince George's County v. Clarke, 36 Md. 207.

Failure by the county treasurer to post a notice of a tax sale "in a conspicuous place in his office," as required by Wisconsin Rev. Stat., § 1130, will render invalid a deed founded upon such sale. Morrow v. Lander, 77 Wis. 77.

An affidavit of the posting of the notice in four specified places, "the same being four public places in the village of N.," etc., does not show that it was posted in four public places in the county, since the places may have been public so far as the village was concerned, and yet not public so far as the whole county was concerned. Ramsay v. Hommel, 68 Wis. 12. See also Hilgers v. Quinney, 51 Wis. 62; Jarvis v. Silliman, 21 Wis. 600; Wisconsin Cent. R. Co. v. Wisconsin River Land Co., 71 Wis. 94.

And where the officer's affidavit does not show a proper posting of the notices, the fact that they were duly posted may not be shown by parol at the trial of an action involving the validity of the tax title, as this would be calculated to defeat the object of the statute in requiring the affidavit to be filed and preserved in the clerk's office. Iverslie v. Spaulding, 32 Wis. 394, distinguishing Adams v. Wright, 14 Wis. 408.

In Ireland v. George, 41 Kan. 751, it was held that where some evidence is offered tending to show that a delinquent tax notice was duly posted in four public places as required by law, such evidence is conclusive when approved by the trial court; and in the absence of all proof, such duty is presumed to have been performed. See also Hart v. Smith, 44 Wis. 213.

Time of Posting. In proving the

posting of a notice, by the officer, of the time and place of sale, in some convenient and public place within his precinct, three weeks before the time of sale as required by Massachusetts R. S., ch. 8, § 27, the time when such notice was posted must be established with certainty, and its contents must be sufficiently shown, in order to identify it with the notice required to be published by the 24th section of the same chapter. Farnum v. Buffum, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 260.

An affidavit of the collector that an advertisement of the lands had been posted up more than eight weeks, is no evidence that the lands have been duly advertised. The affidavit should state the time when the advertisement was posted up, so that it may be seen whether the posting was made in due season. Nelson v. Pierce, 6 N. H. 194.

1. Lagroue v. Rains, 48 Mo. 536. In this case the court said: "There are doubtless good and sufficient reasons why the notice should be printed. Some persons can read printing who cannot read writing. Printed notices are calculated to attract more attention, impart more information, and give greater facility for examining into what land is to be sold or has become delinquent. Everything that has a tendency to inform the community and promote competition in these sales is essential. But without giving reasons, it is sufficient for us to know that the law absolutely demanded that the handbills posted up should be printed, and that the officers disregarded and disobeyed its express mandates. If they could make one kind of substitution, they could another, and no person could ever know how or where to look for the protection of his rights."

2. Hill v. Nicholson, 92 N. Car. 24. The written notice to the owner or his agent, prescribed by Louisiana Act No. 47 of 1873, is an essential prerequisite of the sale, and in its default, the sale is absolutely void. Villey v. Jarreau, 33 La. Ann. 291. Accordingly, a sale

of property assessed in the name of another person than the true owner, preceded by notices given to the party assessed and not to the true owner, is absolutely void. Lague v. Boagni, 32 La. Ann. 912. See also Workingman's Bank v. Lannes, 30 La. Ann. 871.

In McPhee v. Venable, 77 Ga. 772, the ordinance provided that personal notice should be given to "the owner, or the tenant in possession, if the owner is unknown." The owner was a nonresident, but had a resident agent, who was so known to be by the officer, he having paid the taxes on the lot for several years, and his name being entered on the city books as the agent of the owner. It was held that the notice required should have been given to him.

Where the statute requires notice to be served upon the owner, his agent or representative, or left at his residence, after the death of the owner, the notice must be given to his heirs, or personal representative, and a notice addressed to his "estate" and left at his former residence, confers no jurisdiction to order a sale, when it is shown that he had been dead many years, that his estate had been finally settled and distributed, and that the lands were at the time of the assessment in the possession of purchasers from his heirs. Carlisle v. Watts, 78 Ala. 486.

3. Hill v. Nicholson, 92 N. Car. 24; Whitehurst v. Gaskill, 69 N. Car. 449; 12 Am. Rep. 655; Ex p. McCay, 84 N. Car. 63.

4. Howze v. Dew, 90 Ala. 178.

Where an estate was owned by several heirs, and the collector levied upon the entire estate, and advertised it for sale, and gave notice to only one of the heirs, the sale was adjudged void for want of notice to the other heirs. It seems, however, that had the collector levied only on the interest of the heir who was notified, and advertised his interest for sale, the sale would have been good. Thurston v. Miller, 10 R. I. 358.

1. Cooley v. O'Connor, 12 Wall. (U.S.) 391.

2. Vernon v. Nelson, 33 Ark. 748; Allen v. Ozark Land Co., 55 Ark. 549; McGehee v. Martin, 53 Miss. 519; Mead v. Day, 54 Miss. 58; Harkreader v. Clayton, 56 Miss. 384; Mayer v. Peebles, 58 Miss. 628; Caston v. Caston, 60 Miss. 475; Haynes v. Heller, 12 Kan. 381; Eutrekin v. Chambers, 11 Kan. 368; Park v. Tinkman, 9 Kan. 615; Doe v. Allen, 67 N. Car. 346; Den v. Rose, 4 Dev. (N. Car.) 549; Essington v. Neill, 21 Ill. 139; Dougherty v. Crawford, 14 S. Car. 628; Roddy v. Purdy, 10 S. Car. 137; Chandler v. Keeler, 46 Iowa 596; Conrad v. Darden, 4 Yerg. (Tenn.) 307; Gomer v. Chaffee, 6 Colo. 314. If the statute does not specify the time and place, but provides that the sale shall be at a time and place to be stated in the notice of sale, a sale at another time or place than that stated in the notice is void. Prindle v. Campbell, 9 Minn. 212; Sheehy v. Hinds, 27 Minn. 259.

Under the Ohio Act of 1822, the sale must be on the day named in the advertisement, or, if made on a subsequent day, the reason therefor must appear in the officer's return. Wilkins v. Huse, 10 Ohio 140.

In Bestor v. Powell, 7 Ill. 119, the statute required the sale to be made on the "second Monday succeeding the term of the court" at which judgment against the land was rendered, and it was held that the statute intended the second Monday after the first day of the term. It was, however, intimated that a sale made on the second Monday after the close of the term, would not be objectionable. But the latter position was denied in Hope v. Sawyer, 14 Ill. 253, where it was held that the sale must be made on the second Monday succeeding the commencement of the term of the court, and if not made on that day, the sale is invalid. Followed in Polk v. Hill, 15 Ill. 131, where it was held that if more than two weeks intervene between the commencement of the term and the sale, the sale is void.

Where the statute directed the sale to be made on the first Monday in July and the next ensuing days," and the officer's certificate recited that he

sold on the first Monday in July "and the next ensuing days," but failed to show on which of these days the tract in controversy was sold, or how long the sale continued, the omission was deemed fatal; as the statute authorized the owner to redeem within a certain time from the date of sale, if the day of sale does not appear, this valuable right may be lost. Bloomstein v. Brien, 3 Tenn. Ch. 55.

Where the tax deed shows that the land was sold two days before the time advertised for sale, the deed on its face shows that there is not a valid sale. Cook v. Pennington, 15 S. Car. 185.

While the sale may, under the charter of the City of Kansas, be continued from day to day, the officer must begin it on the day for which the notice was given; and if not begun then, his power to sell becomes functus officio. Sullivan v. Donnell, 90 Mo. 278.

In Spear v. Ditty, 8 Vt. 419, it was held that where the officer advertises the sale to take place at a particular time and place, and his return states it to have been held in the town and on the day designated, it will be presumed, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that it was held at the precise time and place named.

Under the Kansas laws of 1860, when lands have been duly advertised for sale at the regular sale days, and are not sold on those days by reason of injunction or other judicial proceeding, they may be sold at any time after the dissolution of the injunction, or restraining order, upon ten days' notice. Patterson v. Carruth, 13 Kan. 494. See also Jordan v. Kyle, 27 Kan. 190; Morrill v. Douglass, 17 Kan. 291.

The auditor general of Michigan may not directly or indirectly postpone tax sales beyond the time fixed by law. People v. Auditor Gen'l, 41 Mich. 28.

In Shell v. Duncan, 31 S. Car. 547, South Carolina Gen. St., § 592 was construed as empowering the comptroller general to postpone the time of the sale in question.

Under section 558 of the Mississippi Code of 1880, providing that if from any cause the sale shall not be made at the time appointed by law, it may be had thereafter, in the same or a subsequent