void. Those who have not been made parties, or who have no interest in the land, are not affected by the judgment; 2 nor by a decree foreclosing the tax lien.3 (6) Appeal and Review.-In the absence of statute, no appeal lies from a judgment in a tax suit.4 Where provided for, the statute must be followed, and the right can be exercised only in the manner prescribed. But it has been held that orders in such it appears in the record. Eitel v. Foote, 39 Cal. 439; Truman v. Robinson, 44 Cal. 623. In the latter case it was also held that legislative bodies have power to provide that a recital in a judgment that the summons has been served on all the defendants, and that they have made default, shall be proof of such facts. 1. See Gage v. Bailey, 102 Ill. 14; Belleville Nail Co. v. People, 98 Ill. 399; Thatcher v. People, 93 Ill. 240; Taylor v. Thompson, 42 Ill. 9; Campbell v. State, 41 Ill. 454; Drake v. Ogden, 128 Ill. 603; Kent v. Brown, 38 La. Ann. 802; Gamble v. Witty, 55 Miss. 26. 2. See Williams v. Hudson, 93 Mo. 524; Hogan v. Smith, 11 Mo. App. 314; Allen v. McCabe, 93 Mo. 138; Blodgett v. Schaffer, 94 Mo. 652; Watt v. Donnell, 80 Mo. 195; Boatmen's Sav. Bank v. Grewe, 13 Mo. App. 335; Mayo v. Ah Loy, 32 Cal. 477; Mix v. People, 116 Ill. 265; Virden v. Needles, 98 Ill. 366; Davenport v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 38 Iowa 633; Pritchard v. Greenwood County, 26 Kan. 584; Desormeaux v. Moylan, 26 La. Ann. 730. Compare Reiley v. Lancaster, 39 Cal. 354. Those claiming under persons made parties to the action, are bound by a judgment in rem, though not made parties. State v. Central Pac. R. Co., 10 Nev. 47; Vance v. Corrigan, 78 Mo. 94. In Berlien v. Bieler, 96 Mo. 491, it was held that a sale of land for taxes in a proceeding against heirs, will not divest the life estate of the widow under a will. Where a tax debtor is dead, a judgment against him is void as to his heirs. Crosley v. Hutton, 98 Mo. 196. A trustee under a deed of trust is an "owner," and so a necessary party to a suit to enforce a lien for taxes; but the omission to join him as a party does not render the tax sale wholly void. His rights are not foreclosed by the tax sale. Gitchell v. Kreidler, 84 Mo. 472. See also Boyd v. Ellis, 107 Mo. 394. A cestui que trust has the right to pay the taxes and redeem the land from the paramount lien of the state, and when he is not made a party to the tax suit, that right remains unimpaired, and not affected by the judgment and sale in the tax proceeding. Allen v. McCabe, 93 Mo. 138; Williams v. Hudson, 93 Mo. 524. 3. Williams v. Hudson, 93 Mo. 524; Gitchell v. Kreidler, 84 Mo. 474; Stafford v. Fizer, 82 Mo. 393; Corrigan v. Bell, 73 Mo. 53; Mix v. People, 116 Ill. 265; Bleidorn v. Abel, 6 Iowa 6. In Hogan v. Smith, 11 Mo. App. 314, it was held that the fact that the defendant in an action to enforce a lien for taxes is merely the owner of a life estate in the land and that the remainderman is not made a party, does not make the judgment rendered therein void. But the judgment is not binding upon the remainderman. Allen v. De Groodt, 98 Mo. 159. 4. State v. Jones, 24 Minn. 251; People v. Smith, 94 Ill. 226. See Hess v. People, 84 Ill. 247; Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Brown, 26 Kan. 443; State v. Jones, 24 Minn. 251. In Hess v. People, 84 Ill. 247, it was held that where a statute allowing an appeal from a tax judgment is repealed, no appeal will lie where the final judgment is rendered, after the day the appeal takes effect, although the application is made before that time. To What Court.-Under the Illinois statutes, suits for taxes are regarded as suits relating to the public revenue, from the determination of which, appeals must be taken directly to the supreme court. Johnson v. Eliel, 9 Ill. App. 520; Mix v. People, 7 Ill. App. 224. 5. See Mix v. People, 7 Ill. App. 224; Johnson v. Eliel, 9 Ill. App. 520; Andrews v. Rumsey, 75 Ill. 598; State v. Jones, 24 Minn. 251; Washington County v. German-American Bank, 28 Minn. 360. Where the statute requires the transcript of a judgment in a tax suit, to be filed at the next term after the appeal is taken, a delay in doing so amounts to an abandonment of the appeal. Fortman v. Ruggles, 58 Ill. 207. proceedings may be reviewed where similar orders in ordinary actions are made reviewable.1 Where the right of appeal is given, and no mode of procedure is prescribed, that obtaining in ordinary actions is adhered to.2 For example, a question cannot be raised, for the first time, in the appellate court. But this rule does not apply to jurisdictional questions, nor to questions as to the observance of mandatory requirements of law,5 which may be raised upon appeal, though no exceptions were taken in the court below. 4. The Return—a. OF THE WARRANT.-A return of the tax Parties. A former owner having no interest in the property taxed, cannot appeal. McClure v. Maitland, 24 W. Va. 561. Security on Appeal.-In Nashville v. Weiser, 54 Ill. 245, it was held that the appeal bond on an appeal from a judgment against real estate for the nonpayment of taxes assessed by a city, in which the city alone is interested, need not be made payable to the people of the state; but may be made payable to the city. The legislature may constitutionally require one who wishes to appeal from a judgment against his land for taxes, to deposit a sum equal to the amount of the judgment and costs. Andrews v. Rumsey, 75 Ill. 598. 1. Chisago County v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 27 Minn. 109; Aitkin County v. Morrison, 25 Minn. 295. In Minnesota, notice to the supreme court of an appeal from an order of the district court, refusing to set aside a tax judgment, must be served upon the county attorney. Nobles County v. Sutton, 23 Minn. 299. 2. See State v. Northern Belle Min. Co., 15 Nev. 385; Hosmer v. People, 87 Ill. 385; Hosmer v. People, 96 Ill. 58; Nobles County v. Sutton, 23 Minn. 299. Where a judgment against land for taxes, is in proper form, and it is affirmed on appeal, a general judgment of affirmance is sufficient, without specifying the taxes due on each tract. Durham 7. People, 67 Ill. 414. In State v. California Min. Co., 13 Nev. 203, it was held that an undertaking on appeal in a suit for taxes, which complies with the Civil Practice Act for a stay of execution, is sufficient. Jurisdictional Limits.-In Rhode Is land, provisions limiting the jurisdiction of the court, on appeal, to a certain amount in ordinary cases, do not apply to tax suits. Tripp v. Torrey, 17 R. I. 359. And see as to Louisiana, State v. Sies, 30, La. Ann. 918. 3. See Speight v. People, 87 Ill. 595; Law v. People, 87 Ill. 385; Karnes v. People, 73 Ill. 274; Chiniquy v. People, 78 Ill. 570; Melrose v. Bernard, 126 Ill. 496; Hosmer v. People, 96 Ill. 58. Where a judgment for taxes is partly valid, special objection must be made to the invalid part, in order to save the question on appeal. Jenkins v. Rice, 84 Ind. 343. And see Speight v. Pecpie, 87 Ill. 595. An obiection that a delinquent tax list was not properiv certified by the auditor, is not avaise in the appellate court, where the s itself is not contained in the record, and there is no statement snowing that there was a want of a certifica.e, or that it was defective in any respect. State v. Manhattan Silver Min. Co., 4 Nev. 318. Where a taxpayer appears before the court and makes specific objections to a judgment for taxes, but does not object on account of the levy being improperly made, he admits the legality of the levy, and cannot afterwards question it on appeal. Karnes v. People, 73 Ill. 274. 4. People v. Dragstran, 100 Ill. 286; Law v. People, 87 Ill. 385. A judgment for illegal taxes or taxes which are in part illegal, will be reversed. Taylor v. Thompson, 42 Ill. 9; Campbell v. State, 41 Ill. 454. The right of a city to maintain an ordinary action at law for the collection of delinquent taxes, is not a jurisdictional question which may be first urged in the appellate court. Davenport v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 38 Iowa 633. 5. Chicago v. Wright, 32 Ill. 192; People v. Dragstran, 100 Ill. 286. When the error appears upon the face of the record of the tax, it may be first urged upon appeal. Wiggins Ferry Co. v. People, 101 Ill. 446. warrant, showing the proceedings taken under it, is usually required.1 A clause in a tax warrant, directing the tax collector to make his return at a certain time, is held directory only, and does not prevent the collector from making collection after that time. The power to collect remains until the taxes are actually paid,3 and the warrant may be extended when necessary to effect the collection.4 b. OF DELINQUENCY.-In general, property cannot be sold to enforce the tax,5 nor an action brought for its recovery or to charge 1. See Olean v. King, 116 N. Y. 355; it is assessed, not operating to discharge Shimmin v. Inman, 26 Me. 228; Upton it. Oteri v. Parker, 42 La. Ann. 374. v. Kennedy, 36 Mich. 215; Mast v. Na- 4. Griswold v. Union School Dist., cogdoches County, 71 Tex. 380; Jude- 24 Mich. 262; Bird v. Perkins, 33 Mich. vine v. Jackson, 18 Vt. 470; Taylor v. 28; Fairfield v. People, 94 Ill. 244; French, 19 Vt. 49. See also infra, this Bradley v. Ward, 58 N. Y. 401. And title, Tax Sales. see First Nat. Bank v. St. Joseph Tp., 46 Mich. 526; Drennan v. Beierlein, 49 Mich. 272; Brown v. Hogle, 30 Ill. 119; Brown v. Porter, 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 373; Chadwell v. State, 8 Heisk. (Tenn.) 340. 2. Picket . Allen, 10 Conn. 146; White v. State, 51 Ga. 252; Smith v. Messer, 17 N. H. 420; Homer v. Cilley, 14 N. H. 85; Sheldon v. Van Buskirk, 2 N. Y. 473. And see Gove v. Newton, 58 N. H. 359; Richards v. Stogsdell, 21 Ind. 74; Bassett v. Porter, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 487. A tax warrant is not invalidated by the fact that an unreasonably brief time was granted for its payment, provided the notice and proceeding by the collector were legal and regular. Weeks v. Batchelder, 41 Vt. 317. In Walker v. Miner, 32 Vt. 769, it was held that a neglect to comply with a statutory provision requiring a warrant for the collection of a school tax to specify a limited time within which the tax is to be collected, is not a defect of which a taxpayer can take advantage, and, though it may render the warrant informal and defective as between the district and collector, it does not invalidate the action taken by the latter to collect the tax. 3. Homer v. Cilley, 14 N. H. 85; Smith. Messer, 17 N. H. 420; Perry County v. Selma, etc., R. Co., 58 Ala. 546; Jacks v. Dyer, 31 Ark. 334; White v. State, 51 Ga. 252; Union Trust Co. v. Weber, 96 Ill. 346; McCracken v. Elder, 34 Pa. St. 239. And see Brown v. Porter, 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 373; Bassett v. Porter, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 487. A constitution requiring taxes on movable property to be collected in the year in which the assessment is made, does not prohibit the collection of the tax during a subsequent year; the failure to collect a tax in the year in which A renewal signed by all the supervisors personally, and attested by the town clerk, is a sufficient renewal by them as a board. New Richmond Lumber Co. v. Rogers, 68 Wis. 608. In Blain v. Irby, 25 Kan. 499, it was held that where a levy is made upon the personal property of the person against whom the tax warrant is issued, previous to the return day of the warrant, a sale thereof is not invalid by being made after the return day. An act extending the time for the collection of taxes does not revive a warrant which has already expired. Phillips v. New Buffalo Tp., 68 Mich. 217. In Michigan, a township treasurer cannot sue for a tax after the expiration of his warrant, and his warrant cannot be extended beyond the next annual session of the board of supervisors. Putman v. Fife Lake Tp., 45 Mich. 125. In New Jersey, an alias can be issued by a justice other than the one who issues the original tax warrant, only when a request is made for the issue of the second writ, by the township committee. State v. Dobbs, 42 N. J. L. 136. 5. See Kelly v. Craig, 5 Ired. (N. Car.) 129; Mordecai v. Speight, 3 Dev. (N. Car.) 428; Wartensleben v. Haithcock, So Ala. 565; Fleming . McGee, 81 Ala. 409; Simms v. Greer, 83 Ala. the lands,1 unless there has been a return of the delinquency. A failure to make such return when required,2 or to make it within the time prescribed by law,3 invalidates all subsequent proceedings; but the validity of the tax itself, and of the lien therefor, is not affected.4 The delinquent list is usually required to be a copy 263; Otis v. Chicago, 62 Ill. 299; Muskegon v. Martin Lumber Co., 86 Mich. 625; Newkirk v. Fisher, 72 Mich. 113; Burns v. Ledbetter, 54 Tex. 374; Thatcher v. Powell, 6 Wheat. (U. S.) 119; Martin v. Barbour, 34 Fed. Rep. 701; Huntington v. Brantley, 33 Miss. 451; Swan v. Knoxville, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 130; Thompson v. Burhaus, 61 N. Y. 52; Striker v. Kelly, 2 Den. (N. Y.) 323; Johnson v. Elwood, 53 N. Y. 431; Tallman v. White, 2 N. Y. 66. In Homer v. Cilley, 14 N. H. 85, it was held that a sheriff acting as collector, is bound to deliver a copy of his list of taxes to the deputy sheriff, in the same manner as collectors are required to do, and that until such list is so delivered, he cannot lawfully advertise and sell. Forfeiture. The return is also necessary, to lay the foundation for a forfeiture. Hill v. Mason, 38 Me. 461. 1. Pidgeon v. People, 36 Ill. 249; Taylor v. People, 7 Ill. 349; Pickett v. Hartsock, 15 Ill. 279; Morrill v. Swartz, 39 Ill. 108. And see Buck v. People, 78 Ill. 560; Ogden v. Chicago, 22 Ill. 592; Burns v. Ledbetter, 54 Tex. 377. In some of the states, the filing of a delinquent list constitutes the institution of an action against each tract of land described in it, for the recovery of the taxes appearing in the list against such tract. Redwood County v. Winona, etc., Land Co., 40 Minn. 512; Chauncey v. Wass, 35 Minn. 1. And it is in the nature of a pleading stating what is the cause of action. Wiggins Ferry Co. v. People, 101 Ill. 446. Under the Nevada statutes, the existence of a delinquent list is not essential to a right of action for taxation, and evidence tending to show that the tax sued for had not been entered on the delinquent list, before the action was commenced, is immaterial. State v. Northern Belle Min. Co., 15 Nev. 385; State v. Central Pac. R. Co. 10 Nev. 47. 2. People v. Otis, 74 Ill. 384; Pickett v. Hartsock, 15 Ill. 279; Wartensleben v. Haithcock, 80 Ala. 565; Fleming v. McGee, 81 Ala. 409; Simms v. Greer, 83 Ala. 263; Lawrence v. Zimpleman, 37 Ark. 643; Newkirk v. Fisher, 72 Mich. 113; Huntington v. Brantley, 33 Parol evidence is inadmissible to supply the omission, when the delinquent list and notice of sale, and proof of their publication, are required by statute to be perpetuated by a record, to be certified to by the court before the sale. It is indispensable that such record be kept. Martin v. Barbour, 34 Fed. Rep. 701. 3. Weir . Kitchens, 52 Miss. 74; Huntington v. Brantley, 33 Miss. 451; Hickman v. Kempner, 35 Ark. 505; Burns v. Ledbetter, 54 Tex. 374; Martin v. Barbour, 34 Fed. Rep. 701. But see Chiniquy v. People, 78 Ill. 570; Leindecker v. People, 98 Ill. 21; Houghton County v. Rees, 34 Mich. 481; Gutches v. Todd County, 44 Minn. 383. In State v. Carneall, 10 Ark. 156, it was held that a sheriff cannot be deprived of his office by failing to return his assessment list within the time prescribed by law, without an official determination of delinquency. The return in the prescribed time is also necessary to entitle the collector to credit for lands reported for non-payment. Chadwell v. State, 8 Heisk. (Tenn.) 340; State v. Viator, 37 La. Ann. 734. A warrant for the collection of a tax based on a tax roll, returned before the time prescribed by law, furnishes no protection to the collector, Westfall v. Preston, 49 N. Y. 349; and is void. See Ronkendorf v. Taylor, 4 Pet. (U. S.) 349; Flint v. Sawyer, 30 Me. 226; Hobbs v. Clements, 32 Me. 67; Hickman v. Kempner, 35 Ark. 505; Bleidorn v. Abel, 6 Iowa 6. But see Jackson v. Cummings, 15 Ill. 449. Three Weeks.-In Pennell v. Monroe, 30 Ark. 661, it was held that a statute requiring a delinquent list to be published at least three weeks, means twenty-one days. 4. Union Trust Co. v. Weber, 96 Ill. 346; Chiniquy v. People, 78 Ill. 570; State v. Hurt, 113 Mo. 90; State v. of the assessment roll showing what taxes remain due and unpaid,2 upon what property, and upon whom they were imposed,3 and that all statutory requisites have been complied with. A statutory form for the return of delinquency must be substantially complied with.5 Hutchinson, 116 Mo. 399; Glover v. Edgwater, 3 Thomp. & C. (N. Y.) 497. And see Oteri v. Parker, 42 La. Ann. 374; People v. Seymour, 16 Cal. 332; 76 Am. Dec. 521. 1. Hayes v. Viator, 33 La. Ann. 1162. It should appear, either in the return, or in its annexed verification, that it is a transcript of the assessment, or that it was taken therefrom. Thompson v. Burhaus, 61 N. Y. 52. 2. Bristol v. Chicago, 22 Ill. 587; Beers v. People, 83 Ill. 488; Bleidorn v. Abel, 6 Iowa 6; Chouteau v. Hunt, 44 Minn. 173. And see Burns v. Ledbetter, 54 Tex. 374; Mann v. People, 102 Ill. 346; Whitney v. Wegler (Minn. 1893), 55 N. W. Rep. 927. In Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Com., 85 Ky. 198, it was held that in reporting delinquents, the sheriff is not confined to those who become so during his term of office. A collector's report of delinquent lands, which shows that he was collector of taxes for a certain year, and that he had not been able to collect the taxes due on the lands mentioned in the report, sufficiently shows for what year the taxes were levied. Karnes v. People, 73 Ill. 274. Where different rates of taxation are imposed upon different property, the return of the collector should specify the several sorts of property, so that each kind may bear its proper rate of taxation. Savannah, etc., R. Co. v. Morton, 71 Ga. 24. In Morrill v. Swartz, 39 Ill. 108, it was held that a collector's report merely showing the total amount of taxes due, without showing whether they were due to the state or county, is invalid. See also Fox v. Turtle, 55 Ill. 377. Abbreviations. The use of initials or abbreviations at the head of each column in the collector's report, to indicate the kind or amount of tax, is unobjectionable. Chiniquy υ. People, 78 Ill. 570. And see State v. Eureka, etc., Min. Co., 8 Nev. 15. Halsey v. People, 84 Ill. 89; Morgan v. Camp, 16 Ill. 175; Chouteau v. Hunt, 44 Minn. 173; Burns v. Ledbetter, 54 Tex. 374. And see Oliver v. Gurney, 43 Minn. 69; Kane v. Brooklyn, 1 N. Ÿ. Supp. 306; 48 Hun (N. Y.) 618; Kelly v. Craig, 5 Ired. (N. Car.) 129. The description must be sufficient to identify the land, and the person or persons against whom it was assessed, must be named. Burns v. Ledbetter, 54 Tex. 374. And see Cooper v. Jackson, 71 Ind. 245; Knight v. Alexander, 38 Minn. 384; 8 Am. St. Rep. 675. But slight variations which are not misleading will not vitiate it. Davis v. How, 52 Minn. 157. And see State v. Rau, 93 Mo. 126. Where a tract of land containing more than one subdivision is assessed to the owner of one parcel thereof, who pays the proportion of taxes chargeable against his land, the residue of the tract should be returned as delinquent. Pennell v. Monroe, 30 Ark. 661. In Thompson v. Burhaus, 61 N. Y. 52, it was held that where neither the return of the collector nor that of the treasurer shows that the unpaid taxes are imposed upon non-residents of lands, there can be no sale by the comptroller. Name of Owner.-In Halsey v. People, 84 Ill. 89, it was held that where there is a column in a delinquent list, headed "In Whose Name Assessed," and in such column, opposite the sev eral tracts of land, names are given, and the collector states that he gives the owners' names so far as they are known, the names appearing will be taken to be the names of the owners of the land so far as they are known, and the list sufficiently complies with the requirement of the statute in this particular. 4. Cooley on Taxation (2d ed.) p. 455. And see Wartensleben v. Haithcock, So Ala. 565; Fleming v. McGee, 81 Ala. 409; Williams v. State, 6 Blackf. (Ind.) 36; Charles v. Waugh, 35 Ill. 315; People v. Land Owners, 82 Ill. 408; Stambaugh v. Carlin, 35 Ohio St. 209; Belden v. State, 46 Tex. 103; Thatcher v. Powell, 6 Wheat. (U. S.) 119. 5. Fox v. Turtle, 55 Ill. 377; Pickett v. Hartsock, 15 Ill. 279; Morgan v. |