The amount which property will bring at a public sale authorized by law, or at a fair private sale, is a good prima facie criterion by which its value for assessment may be determined.1 Where there are several interests in property, to determine the valuation for assessment of a particular interest, the terms and conditions under which it is held are to be considered, as well as the value of the property itself.2 The assessment is void where it is clearly excessive or the overvaluation is intentional,3 though in such case a new assessment is not necessary, but the taxpayer may be required to pay the amount justly due.4 Where the officer agrees with the taxpayer to make an under assessment, or does so intentionally without an agreement, the assessment is invalid.5 (b) Deduction of Liabilities. In some states, statutes provide that State v. Bienville Water Supply Co., 89 Ala. 325; Pingree v. Berkshire County, 102 Mass. 76; State v. Jersey City, 36 N. J. L. 56; Winnipiseogee Lake, etc., Mfg. Co. v. Gilford, 64 N. H. 337. See also State v. Metz, 31 N. J. L. 378. In assessing the value of a railroad, for purposes of taxation, the inquiry should be, what is the property worth used for the purposes for which it was designed. State v. Illinois, etc., R. Co., 27 Ill. 64; 79 Am. Dec. 396. It is the policy of the tax law of New Jersey that property to be assessed, whether cultivated or wild land, shall be valued in the actual condition in which the owner holds it. State v. Abbott, 42 N. J. L. 111. 1. State v. Randolph, 25 N. J. L. 427; State v. Abbott, 42 N. J. L. 1; Willis v. Crowder (Ind. 1893), 34 N. E. Rep. 315; People v. Pond, 13 Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y. Supreme Ct.) 1; Atlantic, etc., R. Co. v. State, 60 N. H. 133; State v. Illinois, etc., R. Co., 27 Ill. 64; 79 Am. Dec. 396; Morgan's La., etc., R., etc., Co. v. Board of Reviewers, 41 La. Ann. 1156. And see Oregon Steam Nav. Co. v. Wasco County, 2 Oregon 206; State v. Bienville Water Supply Co., 89 Ala. 325; Daugherty v. Thompson, 71 Tex. 192; Webster-Glover Lumber, etc., Co. v. St. Croix County, 63 Wis. 647; Salschieder v. Fort Howard, 45 Wis. 521. 2. Cincinnati College v. Yeatman, 30 Ohio St. 276; Logan v. Washington County, 29 Pa. St. 373. And see People v. San Francisco County, 77 Cal. 136; Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Appeal Tax Court, 50 Md. 397; Daugherty v. Thompson, 71 Tex. 192; State v. Taylor (Tex. 1888), 12 S. W. Rep. 176. The valuation of all the particular estates taken separately should not be greater than upon the whole taken together. Logan v. Washington County, 29 Pa. St. 373. See also Consolidated Coal Co. v. Baker, 135 Ill. 545. The value of a life interest is to be ascertained by the table of mortality, upon the expectancy of the life of him who has such interest. syckle, 49 N. J. L. 366. State v. VanAnd the estate of a remainderman is to be assessed at its present value, to be ascertained on the expectancy of the life of the lifetenant. State v. Milroy (N. J. 1890), 19 Atl. Rep. 732. 3. Milwaukee Iron Co. v. Hubbard, 29 Wis. 51; Cincinnati Southern R. Co. v. Guenther, 19 Fed. Rep. 395; State v. Metz, 31 N. J. L. 365; People v. Ohio, etc., R. Co., 96 Ill. 411. And see State v. State, 24 N. J. L. 108; Smith v. Mosher (Supreme Ct.), 9 N. Y. Supp. 786; Wattles v. Lapeer, 40 Mich. 624. In State v. Randolph, 25 N. J. L. 427, it was held that if the tax assessed is larger than that authorized by the property, the assessment will be set aside to the extent of the excess; and each person against whom the assessment is made, is entitled to a reduction in proportion to the amount of his assess ment. "Over assessment," under the Louisiana statute, means overvaluation. State v. Board of Assessors, 30 La. Ann. 261. 4. State v. Waterville Sav. Bank, 68 Me. 515; Cincinnati Southern R. Co. v. Guenther, 19 Fed. Rep. 395. 5. Auditor Gen'l v. Jenkinson, 90 Mich. 523; Goff v. Outagamie County, 43 Wis. 55; Schettler v. Fort Howard, the taxpayer shall be entitled to deduct his bona fide debts from his credits; or, that the taxpayer's total indebtedness shall be deducted from the value of his taxable property. Thus, a mortgage debt is taxable to the mortgagee only for the amount due upon it.2 Mortgages, in some jurisdictions, are taxable to the mortgagee only when the mortgagor has been allowed a deduction upon the valuation of the mortgaged property equal to the value of the mortgage debt.3 43 Wis. 48; Semple v. Langlade County, 75 Wis. 354; Dunham v. Chicago, 55 III. 357. 1. See City Bank v. Bogel, 51 Tex. 355; Griffin v. Heard, 78 Tex. 607; State Bank v. Board of Revenue, 91 Ala. 217; Hammersley v. Franey, 39 Conn. 176; Bridgman v. Keokuk, 72 Iowa 42; Matter v. Campbell, 71 Ind. 512; Clark v. Belknap (Ky. 1890), 13 S. W. Rep. 212; Baldwin v. Hewett, 88 Ky. 673; Com. v. St. Bernard Coal Co. (Ky. 1888), 9 S. W. Rep. 709; Deane v. Hathaway, 136 Mass. 129; Detroit v. Board of Assessors, 91 Mich. 78; Standard L. Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 91 Mich. 517; First Nat. Bank v. St. Joseph Tp., 46 Mich. 526; Jones v. Seward County, 5 Neb. 561; Peavey v. Greenfield, 64 N. H. 284; State v. Pearson, 24 N. J. L. 254; State v. Hornbacker, 42 N. J. L. 635; People v. Ferguson, 38 N. Y. 89; People v. Barker (Supreme Ct.), 25 N. Y. Supp. 340; People v. Ryan, to Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y. Supreme Ct.) 37; People v. Haren (Supreme Ct.), 3 N. Y. Supp. 86; People v. Hicks, 40 Hun (N. Y.) 598; 105 N. Y. 198; Treasurer v. Bank, 47 Ohio St. 503; Wetmore v. Multnomah Co., 6 Oregon 464; Ankeny v. Multnomah Co., 3 Oregon 386; Tripp v. Merchants' Mut. F. Ins. Co., 12 R. I. 435; In re Assessment and Collection of Taxes (S. Dak. 1892), 54 N. W. Rep. 818; Richards v. Rock Rapids, 31 Fed. Rep. 505; National Albany Exch. Bank v. Wells, 18 Blatchf. (U. S.) 478; Evansville Bank v. Britton, 105 U. S. 322. But it has been held that in the absence of such statute, credits may be taxed, though the person to whom they are due is indebted in an equal or greater amount. Drexler v. Tyrrell, 15 Nev. 128; Lindell v. Bank of Missouri, 4 Mo. 315. And see Lappin v. Nemaha County, 6 Kan. 403; Allen v. Harford County, 74 Md. 294. Debts Exceed Property-Debts Incurred to Escape Taxation.-Where the debts of a taxpayer are greater than the value of his taxable property, he is exonerated from assessment, People v. Ryan, 10 Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y. Supreme Ct.) 37; and it was held in that case that it made no difference that the indebtedness was incurred for the purpose of escaping taxation. And to the same effect is Hutchinson v. Board, 67 Iowa 182. Corporate property falls within the meaning of such statutes. People v. Coleman (Supreme Ct.), 1 N. Y. Supp. 666; McAden v. Mecklenburg County, 97 N. Car. 355; People v. Tax Com'rs, 46 How. Pr. (N. Y. Supreme Ct.) 315. Compare People v. Board of Education, 46 Barb. (N. Y.) 588. 2. State v. Jones, 39 N. J. L. 652; State v. Melroy (N. J. 1890), 19 Atl. Rep. 732. The same rule has been applied to taxation of annuities and annuity bonds. State v. Cornell, 31 N. J. L. 374; State v. Melroy (N. J. 1890), 19 Atl. Rep. 732. And see State v. Pettit, 39 N. J. L. 654. In McCoppin v. McCartney, 60 Cal. 367, it was held that an assessment upon a mortgage which had been satisfied was not invalid, but was payable by the owner of the land. 3. See State v. Runyon, 41 N. J. L. 98; State v. Trenton, 40 N. J. L. 89; State v. Jones, 40 N. J. L. 105; Merchants' Ins. Co. v. Newark, 54 N. J. L. 138; State v. Nunn, 44 N. J. L. 354; Hammersley v. Franey, 39 Conn. 176; Detroit v. Board of Assessors, 91 Mich. 78. In such case the mortgage is regarded as an interest in real property. Detroit v. Board of Assessors, 91 Mich. 78; Knight v. Boston, 159 Mass. 551. In State v. East Brunswick Tp., 44 N. J. L. 153, it was held that where a deduction was claimed and allowed on account of a mortgage upon the prop erty taxed, the whole mortgage should be taxed to the mortgagee, though its amount exceeds the value of the premises. Such a provision is not open to In the absence of a statute expressly permitting it, no such deductions can be made.1 A constitutional provision that all property shall be subject to taxation has been held to preclude such deduction. Where the indebtedness is exempt from taxation in the hands of the person to whom it is due, it cannot be deducted from the value of the debtor's property; 3 nor can deduction be made for debts due to a non-resident creditor.4 The statutory requisites must be complied with. Thus, only such deductions may be made, and from such property or credits, as the statute permits; and they must be made in the manner, and upon the production of such evidence, as the statute requires.5 the objection of imposing double taxation. Atty. Gen'l v. Sanilac County, 71 Mich. 16. In New Jersey, the claim of deduction on account of a mortgage must be made in the first instance in the township where the person claiming it resides. State v. Jones, 40 N. J. L. 105. And see State v. Pearson, 24 N. J. L. 254; State v. Grey, 29 N. J. L. 380; State v. Williamson, 33 N. J. L. 77; State v. Bishop, 34 N. J. L. 45; State v. Crosley, 36 N. J. L. 426. But it need not be in writing. State v. East Brunswick Tp., 44 N. J. L. 153. 1. Territory v. Delinquent Tax List (Arizona, 1890), 24 Pac. Rep. 182. And see Wilcox v. Ellis, 14 Kan. 588; 19 Am. Rep. 107; Kansas Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Hill (Kan. 1893), 33 Pac. Rep. 300; Hamersley v. Franey, 39 Conn. 176; Goldgart v. People, 106 Ill. 25; Exchange Bank v. Hines, 3 Ohio St. 1; Lamar v. Palmer, 18 Fla. 147. 2. Exchange Bank v. Hines, 3 Ohio St. 1; Treasurer v. Bank, 47 Ohio St. 503; In re Assessment and Collection of Taxes (S. Dak. 1893), 54 N. W. Rep. 818. And see Clark v. Belknap (Ky. 1890), 13 S. W. Rep. 212. In re Assessment and Collection of Taxes (S. Dak. 1893), 54 N. W. Rep. 818, it was held, where such a provision permitted the owner of personal property to deduct his indebtedness from the value of such property without extending such privilege to the owners of realty, that it violated the provision_in favor of equality and uniformity. But it has been held in Oregon, where no such distinction is made between real and personal property, that a provision permitting the deduction of indebtedness does not violate such a provision. Wetmore v. Multnomah County, 6 Oregon 464. 3. State v. Trenton, 40 N. J. L. 89; State v. Silvers, 41 N. J. L. 505; State v. Vansyckle, 49 N. J. L. 366; Balterson v. Hartford, 50 Conn. 558. And see Home Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 42 La. Ann. 1131. When the mortgaged property is exempt, the mortgage must be taxed to the mortgagee without reference to the allowance. State v. Lantz, 53 N. J. L. 578. But in California, it has been held that where the state is the creditor, and, therefore, not liable to taxation, yet the debtor may deduct the mortgage from the value of the property. People v. San Francisco County, 77 Cal. 136; Smith v. Keagle (Cal. 1888), 20 Pac. Rep. 152. 4. State v. Manning, 40 N. J. L. 461; State v. Vansyckle, 49 N. J. L. 366; Ankeny v. Multnomah County, 4 Oregon 272. And see Johnson v. Oregon City, 3 Oregon 13. A note payable at a specified place in the state is an indebtedness within the state, notwithstanding the owner may be a non-resident. Ankeny v. Multnomah County, 3 Oregon 386. 5. See Ankeny V. Multnomah County, 4 Oregon 271; Lappin v. Nemaha County, 6 Kan. 403; People v. Tax Com'rs, 51 Hun (N. Y.)641; People v. Coleman, 135 N. Y. 231; Farmers' L. & T. Co. v. New York, 7 Hill (N. Y.) 261; State v. Silvers, 41 N. J. L. 505; State v. Gray, 29 N. J. L. 380; State v. Pettit, 39 N. J. L. 654; Harness v. Williams, 64 Miss. 600; State v. Redwood Falls Bldg., etc., Assoc., 45 Minn. 154; Hawkeye Ins. Co. v. Board of Equalization, 75 Iowa 770; Los Angeles Sav. Bank v. Hinton (Cal. 1893), 32 Pac. Rep. 6; Security Sav. Bank, etc., Co. v. Hinton, 97 Cal. 214; Equitable Ins. Co. v. Board of Equalization, 74 Iowa 178; Griffin v. Heard, 78 Tex. 607; Kansas Mut. L. Assoc. v. Hill (Kan. 1893), 33 Pac. Rep. 300; Standard L., etc., Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors (Mich. 1893), 55 N. W. Rep. (5) Extending the Taxes.-After listing and valuation, and after the persons taxable have been designated, the amount to be imposed upon each must be computed and entered in the roll by the assessors, or by the officer or body upon whom the duty is imposed.1 A failure to extend the tax, so as to show how much is imposed upon each person, is fatal to its validity.2 The per 112; State v. Bettle, 50 N. J. L. 132; State v. Trenton, 40 N. J. L. 89; State v. Bishop, 34 N. J. L. 45; Taylor v. Love, 43 N. J. L. 142; State v. Parker, 32 N. J. L. 341; State v. Parker, 34 N. J. L. 71; State v. Horner, 38 N. J. L. 212; State v. Johnson, 30 N. J. L. 452; State v. East Brunswick Tp., 44 N. J. L. 153; Bridgman v. Keokuk, 72 Iowa 42; People v. Davenport, 25 Hun (N. Y.) 630; Baltimore v. Canton County, 63 Md. 218. A debt which has been released or which is never intended to be paid, cannot be deducted. Baldwin v. Hewitt, 88 Ky. 673. See also Kansas Mut. L. Assoc. v. Hill (Kan. 1893), 33 Pac. Rep. 300; People v. Tax Com'rs, 99 N. Y. 154. In State v. Warner (N. J. 1891), 22 Atl. Rep. 341, it was held that the refusal of the assessor to make allowance for debts does not discharge the taxpayer from presenting an account of his indebtedness. In State v. Creveling, 40 N. J. L. 150, it was held that assessors allowing a deduction without the taxpayer's oath or affirmation are liable to indictment as for a misdemeanor. In New Jersey, it has been held that though the assessor may require an affidavit to satisfy himself of the existence of the amount of the mortgage, yet, if the deduction is claimed and allowed and is correct, the owner of the mortgage cannot complain that affidavit was not required. State v. Runyon, 41 N. J. L. 98. an What Are Credits From Which Debts May Be Deducted Within the Statutes. Under the Texas statute, a deposit at a bank is regarded as cash, and the liabilities of the taxpayer cannot be set off against it. Campbell v. Wiggins (Tex. 1892), 20 S. W. Rep. 730. And the rule is the same under the Massachusetts statute. Gray v. Street Com'rs, 138 Mass. 414. In Raleigh, etc., R. Co. v. Wake County, 87 N. Car. 414, it was held that guarantied stock is stock, and not a credit to be diminished by an outstanding indebtedness. In Seward County v. Cattle, 14 Neb. 144, it was held that funds in the hands of correspondents or agents were not credits. Non-Taxable Credits.- United States bonds, though not themselves taxable, will be counted as part of the assets of the taxpayer, and as off-setting to that extent the liabilities which may be deducted from the amount of his estate. State v. Assessors, 37 La. Ann. 850. See also People v. Coleman, 18 N. Y. Supp. 675; 63 Hun (N. Y.) 633; People v. Barker (Supreme Ct.), 25 N. Y. Supp. 394. And the same rule applies to national bank stock. Ruggles v. Fond du Lac, 53 Wis. 436; Weston v. Manchester, 62 N. H. 574. 1. People v. Hagadorn, 104 N. Y. 516; Seymour v. Peters, 67 Mich. 415; Greenough v. Fulton Coal Co., 74 Pa. St. 486. In State v. Perkins, 24 N. J. L. 409, it was held that it is not sufficient to give the valuation of property and mention the rate per cent. without mentioning the amount of the tax. In Harwood v. Brownell, 48 Iowa 657, it was held that the validity of a tax does not depend upon its extension on the tax books in the year in which it was voted, and the failure to extend it does not prevent it from being afterwards entered as an unpaid tax of a former year. See also Robbins v. Barron, 33 Mich. 124. Where the legislature authorizes the collection of a tax, but authorizes no one to extend the tax upon the tax list, the intention that such duty should be performed by the clerk of the board of supervisors, will be implied. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. v. Kossuth County, 41 Iowa 57. 2. Seymour . Peters, 67 Mich. 415; Barke . Early, 72 Iowa 273; Hooper v. Sac County Bank, 72 Iowa 280; Moon v. March, 40 Kan. 58; State v. Perkins, 24 N. J. L. 409; Bellinger v. Gray, 51 N. Y. 610; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. State, 47 Ark. 323. In Thatcher v. People, 79 Ill. 595, it was held that such failure does not af formance of this duty cannot be delegated, but must be performed by, or under the supervision of, the body or officer upon whom it is imposed.1 d. AUTHENTICATION AND RETURN-(1) The Authentication. -The provisions made by statute for the authentication of the assessment roll or list must be substantially complied with. An assessment may be invalidated by the failure of the assessor to annex his certificate in the manner provided, or to verify by oath,3 or to sign the roll as required. 4 The formalities prescribed for the manner of making the oath fect the substantial justice of the tax, and cannot defeat its collection. A tax is collectible, notwithstanding the fact that the date fixed by law for assessment renders impossible a compliance with the formal requirements of the statute, respecting the manner in which the tax should be extended upon the tax list. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. v. Kossuth County, 41 Iowa 57. 1. People v. Hagadorn, 104 N. Y. 516; State v. Harper, 11 Mo. App. 301. The duty is judicial in its nature. Bellinger v. Gray, 51 N. Y. 610; People v. Hagadorn, 104 N. Y. 516. It is presumed that taxes were placed upon the duplicate by the proper officer. Adams v. Davis, 109 Ind. 10. The board authorized to make the extension must act as a body, and not as individuals. People v. Wemple, 67 Hun (N. Y.) 495. But computing the amount, where the rate of tax is fixed by law, or otherwise, is a mere ministerial act which may be performed by anyone. State v. Maginnis, 26 La. Ann. 558; Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Com., 104 Pa. St. 86; Heft v. Gephart, 65 Pa. St. 510. 2. Van Rensselaer v. Witbeck, 7 N. Y. 517; Matter of Cameron, 50 N. Y. 502; People v. Adams (Supreme Ct.), 10 N. Y. Supp. 295; Westfall v. Preston, 49 N. Y. 349; Kelly v. Craig, 5 Ired. (N. Car.) 129; Norridgewock v. Walker, 71 Me. 181; Newkirk v. Fisher, 72 Mich. 113; Alger v. Curry, 38 Vt. 382; Reed v. Chandler, 32 Vt. 285; Rowe v. Hulett, 50 Vt. 637; Lamb v. Farrell, 21 Fed. Rep. 5. 3. Bradley v. Ward, 58 N. Y. 101; People v. Suffern, 68 N. Y. 323; Bellinger v. Gray, 51 N. Y. 610; McNish v. Perrine, 14 Neb. 582; Morrill v. Taylor, 6 Neb. 236; Maxwell v. Paine, 53 Mich. 32; State v. Schooley, 84 Mo. 451; State v. Cook, 82 Mo. 185; Walker 7. Burlington, 56 Vt. 131; Tunbridge v. Smith, 48 Vt. 648; Iverslie v. Spaulding, 32 Wis. 394; Jarvis v. Silliman, 21 Wis. 600; Marshall v. Benson, 48 Wis. 558; Griggs v. St. Croix County, 20 Fed. Rep. 341. An oath executed by a former assessor who had made the valuation, and who was succeeded by another before the book was filled out, was insufficient. Bode v. New England Invest. Co., 6 Dakota 499. When the quinquennial appraisal of real estate is not sworn to by the listers, a subsequent annual list verified according to the provisions of the statute, does not cure the defect.. Houghton v. Hall, 47 Vt. 333. In Wisconsin, an attempt upon the part of the legislature to make the omission of the affidavit of no effect, declaring the requirement of the affidavit to be merely directory, was held to be invalid as an unauthorized intrusion upon the judicial functions. Plumer v. Marathon County, 46 Wis. 177; Tierney v. Union Lumbering Co., 47 Wis. 248; Marshall v. Benson, 48 Wis. 565; Scheiber v. Kaehler, 49 Wis. 301; Power v. Kindschi, 58 Wis. 539; 46 Am. Rep. 652. Impossibility.-The rule of the statute.cannot be relaxed by showing that compliance with it is impossible. Marsh v. Clark County, 42 Wis. 502. Mandamus will not lie to compel assessors to make oath to their assessment rolls, as prescribed by statute, that they estimated the value of the real estate at the true and full value thereof, when it appears that they have estimated it at less than its full value. People v. Fowler, 55 N. Y. 252. 4. Smith v. Hard, 61 Vt. 469; Bartlett v. Wilson, 59 Vt. 23; Sullivan v. Peckham, 16 R. I. 525; Goddard v. Seymour, 30 Conn. 394. The signing of a warrant, inserted at the end of the tax bill, was not sufficient |