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houses of congress, it is not probable that this part of it would have been adopted.

That the chief executive magistrate should be the creature of the legislature, that he should view in them the source from which he sprung, and by which he was to be continued, would at once destroy the dig. nity and independence of his station and render him no longer what the constitution intended, an impartial and inflexible administrator of the public interests. To the people alone he would no longer consider himself responsible, but he would be led to respect, and would be fearful to offend a power higher than the people.

Such principles cannot be found in the constitution, and it is wholly inconsistent with its spirit and its essence, to effectuate indirectly, that which directly is not avowed or intended. These instances fully prove that the safety of the people greatly depends on a close adherence to the letter and spirit of their excellent constitution, but it is probable that a late failure will prevent a renewal of the attempt. ;

Before we close this subject, it is proper to add, that in one respect it cannot be violated---no senator, or representative, or person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States, can be an elector, and therefore the vote of every such person would be void.

CHAPTER VI.

Of the manner of Exercising the Legislative Power.

THE two houses possess co-equal powers in regard to originating laws, except those for raising revenue, which originate only in the house of representatives, but the senate may propose or concur with amendments as in other bills. Some doubts have existed as to the policy, or at least the necessity of this exception. It is introduced, however, into most of the state constitutions, and may be founded on the utility of keeping this frequent subject of legislation in a regular system, to prevent as much as possible public credit from being impaired by the suggestion of discordant plans, or needless innovations. In addition to which, it was probably supposed that the members of the house of representatives, coming more frequently from the body of the people, and from their numbers combining a greater variety of character and employment, would be better qualified to judge not only of the necessity, but also of the methods of raising

revenue.

On all other subjects, the bill originates in either house, and after having been fully considered is sent to the other. If amendments are proposed, the bill is sent back for concurrence. If the two houses disagree, either to the bill, as originally framed, or as amended, a conference usually takes place, and if neither house will recede, the bill is lost. It is not usual to bring forward another bill on the same subject during the same session, but it may be done, as it is a mere matter

houses of congress, it is not probable that this part of it would have been adopted.

That the chief executive magistrate should be the creature of the legislature, that he should view in them the source from which he sprung, and by which he was to be continued, would at once destroy the dig. nity and independence of his station and render him no longer what the constitution intended, an impartial and inflexible administrator of the public interests. To the people alone he would no longer consider himself responsible, but he would be led to respect, and would be fearful to offend a power higher than the people.

Such principles cannot be found in the constitution, and it is wholly inconsistent with its spirit and its essence, to effectuate indirectly, that which directly is not avowed or intended. These instances fully prove that the safety of the people greatly depends on a close adherence to the letter and spirit of their excellent constitution, but it is probable that a late failure will prevent a renewal of the attempt. ,

Before we close this subject, it is proper to add, that in one respect it cannot be violated—no senator, or representative, or person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States, can be an elector, and therefore the vote of every such person would be void.

CHAPTER VI.

Of the manner of Exercising the Legislative Power.

THE two houses possess co-equal powers in regard to originating laws, except those for raising revenue, which originate only in the house of representatives, but the senate may propose or concur with amendments as in other bills. Some doubts have existed as to the policy, or at least the necessity of this exception. It is introduced, however, into most of the state constitutions, and may be founded on the utility of keeping this frequent subject of legislation in a regular system, to prevent as much as possible public credit from being impaired by the suggestion of discordant plans, or needless innovations. In addition to which, it was probably supposed that the members of the house of representatives, coming more frequently from the body of the people, and from their numbers combining a greater variety of character and employment, would be better qualified to judge not only of the necessity, but also of the methods of raising revenue.

On all other subjects, the bill originates in either house, and after having been fully considered is sent to the other. If amendments are proposed, the bill is sent back for concurrence. If the two houses disagree, either to the bill, as originally framed, or as amended, a conference usually takes place, and if neither house will recede, the bill is lost. It is not usual to bring forward another bill on the same subject during the same session, but it may be done, as it is a mere matter

of parliamentary regulation, and not prohibited by the · constitution.

When a bill has passed both houses, it is presented to the president, and his share of the legislative duty commences, but it is wisely and prudently guarded. If he possessed the right of imposing an absolute ne gative, it would vest in him too great a power. If he sent back the bill, with or without his reasons for re. fusing his assent, and the same numbers that originally passed it, were still sufficient to give it the effect of a law, the reference to him would be an empty form. It is therefore most judiciously provided, that not only

order, resolution, or vote, on which the concurrence of both is necessary, except on questions of adjournment, may if not approved by him, be returned with his objections to the house in which it originated. These objections are to be entered at large on their journal, and the house is then to proceed to reconsider the bill or resolution; if after such reconsideration, two-thirds of that bouse shall agree to pass the bill or resolution, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other house, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of that house also, the bill becomes a law, and the resolution becomes absolute. But in all such cases, the votes of both houses shall be determined by yeas and nays, and entered on the journals. While this great share of the legislative power is given to the president, it would be improper to leave it to him indefinitely to exercise it, without some control in point of time, and therefore it is provided that if such bill or resolution, are not returned by him within ten days, (Sundays excepted, the resolution shall take effect, and the bill shall become a law, unless congress by their adjournment prevent it; a con

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