erty: Thompson v. Diffenderfer, 1 Md. Ch. 489; Kipp v. Hanna, 2 Bland, 31; Rollins v. Henry, 77 N. C. 467; Lenox v. Notrebe, Hemp. 225; Overton v. Memphis and Little Rock R'y Co., 3 McCrary, 436. Claimant of the legal title, out of possession, can have receiver only on showing case of special circumstances in aid of equitable title: Mapes v. Scott, 4 Ill. App. 268. If plaintiff proves equitable title in himself, but neither legal nor equitable title in defendant, and that the property needs protection, a receiver will be appointed: Cole v. O'Neil, 3 Md. Ch. 174. Where, during a controversy as to the title to land, the parties interfere with each other forcibly and prevent harvesting, a receiver may be appointed: Hlawacek v. Bohman, 51 Wis. 92. In an action to recover possession of real estate, and damages for detention, it is not proper to appoint a receiver of rents and profits: Thompson v. Sherrard, 35 Barb. 593; Burdell v. Burdell, 54 How. Pr. 91; Guernsey v. Powers, 9 Hun, 78; unless the rents and profits are in danger, or exposed to loss: Chase's Case, 1 Bland, 206; S. C., 17 Am. Dec. 277; Haas v. Chicago Building Society, 89 Ill. 498; and insolvency of the party receiving the rents and profits does expose them to danger of loss, and is ground for appointment of a receiver: Chase's Case, 1 Bland, 205; S. C., 17 Am. Dec. 277, note 306; Hughes v. Hatchett, 55 Ala. 631; Connelly v. Dickson, 76 Ind. 440; Nesbitt v. Turrentine, 83 N. C. 535; so on misapplication of rents, a receiver will be appointed to properly apply them to interest or otherwise, as the case may require: Stockman v. Wallis, 30 N. J. Eq. 450; Green v. Green, 30 Id. 451, both citing the principal case on this point; and this will be done at the instance of creditors: Beard v. Arbuckle, 19 W. Va. 145. Where realty, the subject of a suit, is about to be sold for non-payment of taxes, a receiver may be appointed to properly manage the same: Darusmont v. Patten, 4 Lea, 597; but where the person in possession will pay the taxes, receiver will be dispensed with: I.; so in case a debtor in possession will give security for rents and profits: Grantham v. Lucas, 15 W. Va. 425. A party claiming under a lien, who has the same security as he had when the debt was incurred, is not entitled to a receiver if he merely wishes to divert the rents and profits to his can use, and he shows no mismanagement: Oct, 11, 1862, Sales v. Lusk, 18 Rep. 382 (Wis.). § 1029. In the administration of estates in probate a receiver is not generally appointed, as probate courts grant proper relief, and in such cases it is only to prevent immediate irreparable injury that the appointment will be made: Randle v. Carter, 62 Ala. 95. A plaintiff may have a receiver appointed even when another receiver of the same funds has been appointed by another court in a different action, but the later appointment must be subject to the exercise of powers of previously appointed receivers, or of other prior judicial authority: Bailey v. Belmont, 10 Abb. Pr., N. S., 270; S. C., 33 N. Y. Super. Ct. 239. The jurisdiction of courts has been exercised by appointment of receivers over such matters as railway and bridge tolls: De Winton v. Mayor of Brecon, 26 Beav. 533; Covington Drawbridge v. Shepherd, 21 How. 125; State v. Northern Central R. R. Co., 18 Md. 193; profits and emoluments of an office, which were assignable: Palmer v. Vaugh, 3 Swanst. 173; assignable pensions: Heald v. Hay, 3 Giff. 467; profits of a solicitor's business: Candler v. Candler, Jacob, 225; machinery of steam-vessels: Brennan v. Preston, 2 De Gex, M. & G. 831. Receiver may be appointed to carry on business: Smith v. N. Y. Consolidated Stage Co., 18 Abb. Pr. 419; S. C., 28 How. Pr. 208; to receive the rents and profits of realty and of such personal estate as may be taken on execution, and of whatever is regarded in equity as assets: Chaplin v. Young, 33 Beav. 330; Blanchard v. Cawthorne, 4 Sim. 572; Sloan v. Moore, 37 Pa. St. 217. In proceedings in nature of a quo warranto to establish right to office, receiver will not be appointed to discharge duties of office or to receive the fees or emoluments: Tappan v. Gray, 9 Paige, 507, affirming S. C., 7 Hill, 259. Where there is litigation as to whom a debt is due, and it is necessary to enforce the debt immediately, a receiver will be appointed: Mills v. Pittman, 1 Paige, 495; Hamberlain v. Marble, 24 Miss. 586. Though neither fraud nor misconduct are charged, a receiver may be appointed to take charge of property which may be transferred beyond possibility of identification: Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Huber, 13 Phila. 52. Corporations. A court may ap Oct. 11, 1862, 1029. point a receiver where there are no persons authorized to take charge of the corporate property, or where fraud is shown in the defendant corporation, and its funds are in danger of being wasted or misapplied, or to prevent the removal of its property beyond the jurisdiction of the court: Lawrence v. Greenwich Fire Ins. Co., 1 Paige, 587; Conro v. Gray, 4 How. Pr. 166; Willis v. Corlies, 2 Edw. Ch. 281; Orphan Asylum v. McCartee, 1 Hopk. Ch. 429; Hand v. Dexter, 41 Ga. 454; North Carolina R. R. Co. v. Drew, 3 Woods, 691; Sanford v. Sinclair, 8 Paige, 373; Conro v. Port Henry Iron Co., 12 Barb. 27. Receiverships are granted with the greatest caution, in cases of corporations, and only in event of pressing apparent necessity: Patten v. Accessory Transit Co., 13 How. Pr. 502; S. C., 4 Abb. Pr. 235; and the power conferred must be strictly pursued: Bangs v. McIntosh, 23 Barb. 591. - Partnerships. An application for a receiver, in a proceeding between partners for an account and settlement of their partnership affairs, is a proper subject of equity jurisdiction: Sheppard v. Oxenford, 1 Kay & J. 491; Allen v. Hawley, 6 Fla. 142; S. C., 63 Am. Dec. 190; Saylor v. Mockbie, 9 Iowa, 209; Gridley v. Conner, 2 La. Ann. 87. The mere fact, however, that a bill prays for a dissolution is not sufficient ground for appointment of a receiver; the allegations must be such that if proved would entitle the plaintiff to a dissolution: Goodman v. Whitcomb, 1 Jacob & W. 569; Pirtle v. Penn, 3 Dana, 247; S. C., 28 Am. Dec. 70; and the bill must be so framed that a decree may be made thereon, either that the business be continued according to the partnerhips articles, or that the partnership be wholly ended and dissolved: Const v. Harris, Turn. & R. 517; Slemmer's Appeal, 58 Pa. St. 168. Before an order will be made appointing a receiver, the plaintiff must show that there has been a dissolution, or that he is entitled thereto, and that no provision is made in the partner ship agreement for a dissolution; or that the partnership is insolvent, and that his copartners are wasting or misapplying the assets; or generally, that there has been some breach of the partnership duty, or violation of the partnership agreement: Henn v. Walsh, 2 Edw. Ch. 129; Pirtle v. Penn, 3 Dana, 247; S. C., 28 Am. Dec. 70; Williamson v. Wilson, 1 Bland, 418; Allen v. Hawley, 6 Fla. 142; S. C., 63 Am. Dec. 190; so as to warrant the apprehension that the property is in danger of being lost, and the object of the suit defeated: Bard v. Bingham, 54 Ala. 463; Barnard v. Davies, 54 Id. 565; Seighortner v. Weissenborn, 20 N. J. Eq. 172; Anonymous, 2 Daly, 533. Trusts. The case must be a strong one to dispossess a trustee by appointing a receiver, the courts being averse to the displacement of a trustee under an express trust, except for good cause shown: Barkley v. Reay, 2 Hare, 306; Smith v. Smith, 2 Younge &C. 361; Orphan Asylum v. McCartée, Hopk. Ch. 429; Haines v. Carpenter, 1 Woods, 262. Where there is no evidence which shows the necessity of interference, and no showing that property is in danger, courts will not place a receiver over a trust estate in preference to the trustee: Whitworth v. Whyddon, 2 Macn. & G. 52; Harrup v. Winslet, 37 Ga. 655; Leddel v. Starr, 19 N. J. Eq. 163. But if it is established that there has been misconduct, waste, improper disposition of the trust estate, or mismanagement or incompetency of the trustee, a case for appointment of receiver is made out: Chase's Case, 1 Bland, 206; S. C., 17 Am. Dec. 277; Haines v. Carpenter, 1 Woods, 262; Jenkins v. Jenkins, 1 Paige, 243; provided it is shown that the trust estate is likely to suffer by the continuance of the trustee in authority: Poythress v. Poythress, 16 Ga. 406; and the same is true where by neglect the trustee has not done what in his position as such he should have done for the best interest of the estate, as where the reats have been allowed to fall in arrears, or where, by failing to get in personal property, it has been lost, or the like: Wilson v. Wilson, 2 Keen, 249; Ilart v. Tulk, 6 Hare, 611; Richards v. Perkins, 3 Younge & C. 307. Tenants in common. - Courts will not grant a receiver against a tenant in common except in cases of destructive waste or gross exclusion: Ex parte Billinghurst, I Amb. 164; Ex parte Radcliffe, 1 Jacob & W. 619; and the application will be denied, except in extreme cases: Scurrah v. Scurrah, 14 Jur. 874; Norway v. Rowe, 19 Ves. 159; Milbank v. Revett, 2 Mer. 405; Spratt v. Aheance, 1 Jones Eq. 50. Upon a showing that his cotenants are insolvent, that they are in possession, and are excluding him from the receipt of his share of the rents and profits, a tenant in common may have a receiver: Williams v. Jenkins, 11 Ga. 595; Cassety v. Capps, 3 Tenn. Ch. 524. So a receiver may be appointed where one of two cotenants refuses to unite with the other in renting the premises, and all rent is therefore lost: Pignolet v. Bush, 28 How. Pr. 9. Debtor and creditor. In the absence of contrary statutory provision, a general contract creditor cannot before judgment have a receiver appointed against his debtor, on whose property he has acquired no lien: Uhl v. Dillon, 10 Md. 500; Bayard v. Fellows, 28 Barb. 451; Hulse v. Wright, Wright, 61; McGoldrick v. Slevin, 43 Ind. 522; Hubbard v. Hubbard, 14 Md. 356; Nusbaum v. Stein, 12 Id. 315; Rich v. Levy, 16 Id. 74; Blondheim v. Moore, 11 Id. 365; Wiggins v.. Armstrong, 2 Johns. Ch. 144. But creditors having a special or equitable lien on a debtor's property may be entitled to protection of a receiver: Bryan v. McCormick, 1 Cox, 422; Todd v. Lee, 15 Wis. 365. But to entitle an equitable creditor to the relief, he must show that the property is in danger, or base his application on some other equity: Davis v. Duke of Marlborough, 2 Swanst. 137. A judgment creditor who has taken out his execution at law, and finds that he is precluded from collecting the amount of his judgment by a prior title affecting the debtor's interest in the property, or generally where the execution is returned unsatisfied, in whole or in part, will be entitled to the appointment of a receiver: Curling v. Marquis of Townshend, 19 Ves. 632; Plaskett v. Dillon, 2 Bligh, N. S., 239; Bloodgood v. Clarke, 4 Paige, 574; Hadden v. Spader, 20 Johns. 554; Lent v. McQueen, 15 How. Pr. 313; Darrow v. Lee, 16 Abb. Pr. 215; Herry v. Gibson, 10 Bosw. 591; Brown v. Nichols, 42 N. Y. 26. Where the personal property is in danger a receiver will be appointed as soon after judgment as the execution is put into Oct. 11, 1862, the hands of the sheriff: Smith v. $ 1029. Hurst, 1 Coll. C. C. 705; Rose v. Bevan, 10 Md. 456. Mortgages. The remedy by appointment of a receiver of rents and profits in a foreclosure suit is an equitable one, and rests in the sound discretion of the court: Milwaukee R. R. Co. v. Soutter, 2 Wall. 510; Verplank v. Caines, 1 Johns. Ch. 57; Syracuse Bank v. Tallman, 31 Barb. 201; Jacobs v. Gibson, 9 Neb. 380; Connelly v. Dickson, 76 Ind. 440; Rider v. Bagley, 84 N. Y. 461; Cone v. Paute, 12 Heisk. 506. If on the application the validity of the mortgage is impeached on probable grounds, the application should be granted: Leahy v. Arthur, 1 Hogan, 92. The appointment should be made only where there is an imperative necessity therefor: First National Bank v. Gage, 79 Ill. 207; Callanan v. Shaw, 19 Iowa, 183; Quincy v. Cheeseman, 4 Sand. Ch, 405; McLean v. Pressly, 56 Ala. 211; Oldham v. First National Bank, 84 N. C. 304; Morrison v. Buckner, Hemp. 442. The property or rents and profits must be in danger to warrant the appointment of a receiver: Chase's Case, 1 Bland. 206; S. C., 17 Am. Dec. 277. Where the legal title to the mortgaged premises is in the mortgagee, as he may bring ejectment for the recovery of the possession, he is not entitled to a receiver: Mahon v. Crothers, 28 N. J. Eq. 568; Williamson v. New Albany R. R. Co., 1 Biss. 201; Williams v. Robinson, 16 Conn. 524; Beverly v. Brooke, 4 Gratt. 209. As against a prior mortgagee in possession of the property under his mortgage, a receiver will not be granted in favor of a subsequent mortgagee, as long as anything remains due to the prior mortgagee under his encumbrance. The remedy of the subsequent mortgagee is to pay off the prior encumbrance. Compensation. If no measure of compensation is provided for by statute, the court may allow a receiver a reasonable compensation: Martin v. Martin, 14 Or. 165. § 1030. § 1062. [1030.] A receiver, before entering upon his Oct. 11, 1862, duties, shall be sworn faithfully to perform his trust, to the best of his ability, and shall also file with the clerk undertaking of of the court an undertaking, of one or more sufficient Oath and receiver. Oct. 11, 1862, Ø 1030. Oath and un sureties, in a specified sum, to be fixed by the court or judge thereof, to the effect that he will faithfully disdertaking of charge the duties of receiver, and will obey the orders of the court or judge thereof in respect thereto. The sureties must justify in the same manner as bail upon an receiver. § 1065. § 1066. Trial fee to be paid by whom, and when recovered as a disbursement. § 1068. § 1069. Proceeding in circuit court where county court has jurisdiction. § 1070. Trial fee to be paid to clerk. Clerk to pay to treasurer and keep Oct. 11, 1862, § 1031. Trial and district attorney's fees. Oct. 11, 1862, § 1032. Trial fee, amount of, in the several courts. § 1075. In criminal action fee to be taxed against defendant. § 1076. In other than criminal action, fee not taxed, but county entitled to costs. Fees earned in supreme court, how paid. § 1063. [1031.] Parties to a judicial proceeding are required to contribute towards the expense of maintaining courts of justice, or a particular action, suit, or proceeding therein, by the payment of certain sums of money, as provided in this title, which are denominated trial and district attorney fees. § 1064. [1032.] The trial fee in the several courts is as follows: 1. In the supreme court, upon each appeal heard and determined, six dollars; 2. In the circuit court, for every trial by jury, twelve dollars; for every trial by the court, six dollars; for every judgment or decree given without trial, three dollars; 3. In the county court, one half the amount required in the circuit court in like cases; 4. In justice's court, for every trial by jury, six dollars. 1033. Trial fee, by and when disbursement. § 1065. [1033.] The trial fee is to be paid by the oct. 11, 1862, plaintiff, appellant, or moving party, before he is entitled to or can claim the trial or other proceeding upon which whom paid, such fee is imposed, and if the party paying such fee recovered as a prevail in the action, suit, or proceeding, so as to be entitled to recover costs therein, such fee shall be allowed and taxed as a disbursement, and collected off the adverse party. Validity of this section. The provision that the moving party must pay the trial fee before he is entitled to a trial is not repugnant to the provision of the constitution that justice shall be administered without purchase; nor does it violate the right of trial by jury within the meaning of the constitutional restriction upon that subject: Bailey v. Frush, 5 Or. 136. required to advance the fee. If he Inability to pay: See § 1069 Trial fee. The trial fee is to be paid by the plaintiff or moving party in the court of original jurisdiction. In the appellate court it is always to be paid by the appellant: Bailey v. Frush, Or. 136. When a party is unable to advance the trial fee, he need not do so to maintain the action or suit: Id. Ø 1034. Who must pay trial fee. In the court of original jurisdiction the moving party, whether plaintiff or defendant, must pay the trial fee; but on appeal the appellant is in all cases § 1066. [1034.] When the state or any county therein oct. 11, 1862, is a party to a judicial proceeding, it need not pay the trial fee in advance, and if it be entitled to recover costs therein, such fee shall be allowed and taxed in its favor as a disbursement, and collected off the adverse party as in ordinary cases. When state or county a party, need not pay trial fee. $1035. In justice's court, when and to whom § 1067. [1035.] The trial fee in a justice's court shall oct. 11, 1862, be paid to the justice upon the demand for a jury, and unless so paid, the demand shall be disregarded, and the trial proceed as if no such demand had been made, ex- paid." cept when a party is prosecuted in a criminal action at the suit of the state, in which case the party is entitled to a jury trial without the prepayment of such fee; and if judgment be given against him, the fee shall be allowed and taxed in favor of the state as other disbursements in ordinary cases. 1036. § 1068. [1036.] Whenever any action, suit, or pro- Oct. 11, 1862, ceeding is commenced in the circuit court, which might Trial fee in have been commenced in the county court, the plaintiff when county therein shall pay the trial fees required in the circuit furisdiction. circuit court, court has |