Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 199. The taxing power is not limited by the prohibition against taking private property without compensation: Gilman v. Sheboygan, 2 Black, 510. Restriction on taxing power of states. The states have no power to tax the loans of the United States: Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 2 Pet. 449, 465; Bank of Commonwealth v. Commissioners of Taxes of New York, 2 Black, 620; Bank Tax Case, 2 Wall. 200; Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Id. 573; People v. Commissioners, 4 Id. 244; Bradley v. People, 4 Id. 459; Bank v. Supervisors, 7 Id. 26; Bank v. Mayor of New York, 7 Id. 16; Society for Savings v. Coite, 6 Id. 594; Provident Institution v. Massachusetts, 6 Id. 611; Hamilton Co. v. Massachusetts, 6 Id. 632; Bank of Louisville v. Kentucky, 9 Id. 353.

State taxation of instrumentalities of the general government. — The state cannot use its taxing powers in such manner as to defcat, embarrass, or burden the operations of the general government; and therefore cannot tax instrumentalities created by the general government for carrying on its operations: McCullough v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 432; Railroad Tax Cases, 8 Saw. 238; Santa Clara Tax Cases, 9 Id. 165.

But such exemption does not, unless so declared by Congress, extend to instrumentalities created by the state, and adopted by the general gov. ernment for its convenience. Nor does the fact that the general government, in order to make a private corporation more available as an instrumentality for carrying on its operations, has conferred upon it additional privileges and benefits, protect it from taxation by the state: Railway C. v. Penniston, 18 Wall. 5; Santa Ciara Tax Cases, 9 Saw. 165.

Power to regulate commerce. -This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the constitution: Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 193. Co amerce with foreign nations and among the several states can mean nothing more than intercourse with those nations, and among those states, for the purposes of trade, be the objecs of trade what it may; and this intercourse must include all the

means by which it can be carried on, whether by the free navigation of the waters of the several states, or by a passage overland through the states, where such passage becomes necessary to the commercial intercourse between the states: Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 378; Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Bel. Bridge Co., 18 How. 421; Columbus Insurance Co. v. Peoria Bridge Co., 6 McLean, 70; Columbus Insurance Co. v. Curtenius, 6 Id. 209; Jolly v. Terre Haute Draw Bridge Co., 6 Id. 237; United States v. Railroad Bridge Co., 6 Id. 518. This clause confers the power to impose embargoes: Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 191; United States v. The William, 2 Hall L. J. 255, 272; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196. And to punish crimes upon stranded vessels: United States v. Coombs, 12 Pet. 72. See also Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 263; New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102; Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299; Smith v. Maryland, 18 Id. 71; Dunham v. Lamphere, 3 Gray, 268; Ex parte McNeil, 13 Wall. 238; Edwards v. Steamship Panama, i Deady, 35; S. C., 1 Or. 418.

A state law which requires the masters of vessels engaged in foreign commerce to pay a certain sum to a state officer, on account of every passenger brought from a foreign country into the state, conflicts with the constitution and laws of the United States: Smith v. Turner, 7 How. 283; see also Elkison v. Delusseline, 2 Wh. Cr. C. 56; 1 Opin. 659; 2 Id. 426; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419; Nathan v. Louisiana, 8 How. 73; Mager v. Grima, 8 Id. 490; Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 5 How. 504; State v. Allmond, 4 Am. L. R. 538; Withers v. Buckley, 20 How. 84. Fees to port-wardens, when illegal, because a regulation of commerce: Southern Steamship Co. v. Port-wardens of New Orleans, 6 Wall. 31; People v. Compagnié Générale, 107 U. S. 59; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 Id. 196; People v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co., S Saw. 640.

Congress has power to prevent the obstruction of any navigable river which is a means of commerce between any two or more states: Works v. Junction Railroad, 5 McLean, 426; Jolly v. Terre Haute Draw Bridge C., 6 Id. 237; Devoe v. Pennre Ferry Bridge Co., 3 Am. L. R. 79. Where the stream is wholly within a

single state, see Veasie v. Moor, 14 How. 568; Wilson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 251; Silliman v. Hudson River Bridge Co., 2 Wall. 403; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 703; The Passaic Bridges, 3 Id. 782. Railways, as a means of carrying on commerce, are equally subject to the regulation of Congress as steamboats: Gray v. Clinton Bridge, 16 Am. L. R.

149.

Limit of power over navigable waters. Congress has no power to authorize the destruction of the navigability of a navigable stream within a state, for purposes wholly unconnected with commerce and post-roads. Its power over such streams is limited to the regulation of commerce and the establishing of post-roads: Mining Debris Case, 9 Saw. 441.

Local regulations by states. The states have power to make laws regulating the landing and receiving of passengers and freight coming to their ports from other states and from foreign countries, so far only as may be necessary to prevent confusion and collisions among vessels, and to insure safety and convenience and facilitate the receiving and discharge of passengers and freight: Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196.

In the absence of legislation by Congress on the subject, a state law authorizing bridges or other structures across navigable streams which are wholly within the state is not repugnant to the constitution of the United States: Wilson v. Blackbird Creek Co., 2 Pet. 245; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713; Pound v. Turcke, 95 U. S.

459.

And generally, in respect to commercial matters, which are local and limited in their scope, not requiring national and uniform regulations, the states may regulate them until Congress interferes. But as soon as Congress acts, the state is excluded: Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196; Brown v. Houston, 114 Id. 622.

Regulation of carriers, warehousemen, etc.- Employments carried on in the state, which are in their nature public, such as those of common carriers, warehousemen, and the like, are subject to regulation by the legislative power of the state, not only as to the manner of conducting them, but also in respect of the charges therefor; and the fact that

regulations made by the state may in- March 4, 1789. cidentally affect interstate commerce does not, in the absence of any action in the premises by Congress, affect their validity: Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113.

Railway corporations have extraordinary powers conferred upon them in order that they may the better serve the public as carriers for hire. They are engaged in a public employment, affecting the public interests, and are therefore subject to legislative control as to their rates of fare and freight, unless protected by their charters. So far as their business is carried on wholly within a single state, the regulation thereof is a matter of domestic concern, and wholly within the power of the state; and until Congress shall interfere, the state may make such regulations as may be necessary for the promotion of the general welfare of the people within its jurisdiction, even though in doing so, those outside its jurisdiction may be incidentally affected: Chicago & R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155.

A charter granted to a railway company by a state legislature contained a provision authorizing the corporation "to demand and receive such sum or sums of money for the transportation of persons and property, and for storage of property, as it shall deem reasonable. The constitution of the state, in force at the time this charter was granted, provides that all acts creating corporations in the state "may be altered or repealed by the legislature at any time after their passage.' Under this provision of the constitution, the state possesses the power to regulate, by legislative enactment, the rates of fares and freights to be charged by the company; and such regulation is not in violation of the constitution of the United States: Peik v. Chicago etc. R. Co., 94 U. S. 164.

Whenever the subjects in regard to which a power to regulate commerce is asserted are in their nature national, or admit of one uniform system or plan of regulation, they are exclusively within the regulating control of Congress. The transportation of freight, or the subjects of commerce, is a constituent part of commerce itself; and a tax upon freight transported from state to state is a regulation of commerce among the states, and a state statute impos

ing such a tax is in conflict with this provision of the constitution of the United States: Case of the Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232; P. C. S. S. Co. v. R. R. Commissioners, 9 Saw. 253.

But a tax upon the gross receipts of a railway company is not a regulation of interstate commerce, nor a tax upon imports and exports; a statute of a state imposing a tax upon such gross receipts is not an infringement of the constitution of the United States, notwithstanding the fact that the gross receipts so taxed and made up, in part, from freights received for the transportation of merchandise from state to state: Reading Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 15 Wall. 284.

Regulation of commerce with the Indians. Under the power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, Congress have power to prohibit all intercourse with them, except under a license: United States v. Cisna, 1 McLean, 254. And may also prohibit the sale of liquor to an Indian, under the charge of an Indian agent, within the limits of a state: United States v. Holliday, 3 Wall. 407; United States v. Shaw Mux, 2 Saw. 364; United States v. Earl, 9 Saw. 79. But this power does not confer on the national government a general jurisdiction over an Indian territory, within the boundaries of a state: United States v. Bailey, 1 McLean, 234. An act of Congress may supersede a prior treaty with an Indian tribe: The Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall. 621.

May regulate commerce with the Indians irrespective of state lines. Congress has power to legislate upon the subject of intercourse with the Indian tribes, wherever they exist, irrespective of state lines or governments: United States v. Bridle man, 7 Saw. 243; United States v. Barnhart, 10 Id. 491.

And this power includes the power to provide for the prosecution and punishment of persons who commit crimes against Indians upon reservations: United States v. Bridleman, supra; United States v. Martin, 8 Saw. 473: United States v. Barnhart, supra. Naturalization. The power to pass naturalization laws is exclusively in Congress: Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. 269; United States v. Villato, 2 Dall. 372; Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 5 How. 585; Smith v. Turner, 7 Id. 556; Golden v. Prince, 3 Wash. C. C.

314; Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 405. This power is exclusively in Congress: Golden v. Prince, 3 Wash. C. Č. 313. To what the power extends: In re Klein, 1 How. 277; Mitchell v. Great Works M. & M. Co., 2 Story, 648; In re Arnold, 16 Am. L. R. 624; In re Muller, 1 Deady, 523. Bankrupt laws. - The states have authority to pass bankrupt laws, provided they do not impair the obligation of contracts, and provided there be no act of Congress in force to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy conflicting with such laws: Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122; McMillan v. McNeill, 4 Id. 209; and see Farm. & Mech. Bank v. Smith, 6 Id. 131;. Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Id. 213; Mason v. Haile, 12 Id. 370; Boyle v. Zacharie, 6 Pet. 348, 635; Beers v. Haughton, 9 Id. 329; Cook v. Moffat, 5 How. 295.

To coin money. - Congress has power to give to treasury notes the character and qualities of money: Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 529; Dooley v. Smith, 13 Id. 604; Railroad v. Johnson, 15 Íd. 193; Legal Tender Case, 110 U. S. 421.

Power to punish counterfeiting. The power to punish the crime of passing counterfeit money is possessed by the states: Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410. Congress may provide for punishing the crime of bringing into the United States false, forged, and counterfeit coins, made in the similitude of coins of the United States, and also for the crime of uttering and passing the same: United States v. Marigold, 9 How. 560.

Passing counterfeit money. The power to punish the making of counterfeit money rests exclusively in the general government. But the state has power to punish for uttering it, not because it debases or affects the currency, -a subject over which Congress has exclusive control, but because it is a fraud upon those who are deceived into accepting it: State v. Brown, 2 Or. 221.

Post-offices and post-roads. — It is under the power to establish post-offices and post-roads that Congress has adopted the mail regulations of the Union, and punish all depreda tions on the mail: Sturtevants v. City of Alton, 3 McLean, 393. As to the power to establish post-roads, see Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. 421.

Patents and copyright. — Patents are entitled to a liberal construction, since they are not granted as restrictions upon the rights of the community, "but to promote the progress of science and the useful arts": Blanchard v. Sprague, 3 Sum. 535; Grant v. Raymond, 6 Pet. 218; Hogg v. Emerson, 6 How. 486; Brooks v. Fiske, 15 Id. 223. The power of Congress upon the subject of patents is plenary by the terms of the constitution, and as there are no restraints on its exercise, there can be no limitation of their right to modify their legislation at their pleasure, so that they do not take away the rights of property in existing patents: McClurg v. Kingsland, 1 Id. 206. Therefore Congress has the power to grant the extension of a patent, which has been renewed under the act of 1836: Bloomer v. Stolley, 5 McLean, 158. Their power to reserve rights and privileges to assignees, on extending the terms of a patent, is incidental to the general power conferred by the constitution: Blanchard Gun Stock Turning Factory v. Warner, 1 Blatchf. 258. Congress is not empowered to pass laws for the benefit of authors and inventors, except as a means of promoting the progress of "science and the useful arts": Martinetti v. Maguire, 1 Deady, 223. It cannot grant the exclusive right to exhibit an immoral spectacle: Id. 222.

In the United States, an author has no exclusive property in a published work, except under some act of Congress: Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591; and see Dudley v. Mayhew, 3 N. Y. 9.

To define piracies. The crime of piracy is defined by the law of nations with reasonable certainty: United States v. Smith, 5 Wheat. 153. For definition of a pirate, see United States v. Baker, 5 Blatchf. 6.

To declare war. - As a consequence of the power of declaring war and making treaties, the government possesses the power of acquiring territory either by conquest or treaty: American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 542. When the legislative authority has declared war, the exccutive authority, to whom its execution is confided, is bound to carry it into effect; he has a discretion vested in him as to the manner and extent; but he cannot lawfully transcend the rules of warfare established among civilized nations": Brown v. United States, 8

Cranch, 153. The United States, March 4, 1789. under the present constitution, cannot acquire territory to be held as a colony, to be governed at its will and pleasure. But it may acquire terri tory and govern it as such, until in the judgment of Congress it has sufficient population to entitle it to be admitted as a state of the Union: Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 447. A state of actual war may exist without any formal declaration of it by either party; and this is true both of a civil and foreign war. A civil war exists whenever the regular course of justice is interrupted by revolt, rebellion, or insurrection, so that courts cannot be kept open, and may be prosecuted on the same footing as if those opposing the government were foreign invaders: Prize Cases, 2 Black, 635. The effect of war upon the citizens of the hostile nations: The William Bagaley, 5 Wall. 337. The President can recognize a state of war as actually existing, and the courts are bound by such recognition: Semmes v. City Fire Insurance Co., 6 Blatchf. 445. Congress can determine what property of public enemies shall be confiscated: United States v. Miller, 11 Wall. 229. It may carry on a civil war as well as a foreign one: Tyler v. Defrees, 11 Id. 331. Authority to suppress rebellion is found in that to suppress insurrection and carry on war: Texas v. White, 7 Id. 700.

Power to suppress rebellion. In the enforcement of rights against an armed rebellion, the United States government has all the powers both of sovereign and belligerent: Lamar v. Browne, 92 U. S. 187.

It has the right to treat rebels in arms as alien enemies, and may seize and confiscate their property: United States v. Miller, 11 Wall. 269.

To raise and support armies. - Congress has a constitutional power to enlist minors in the army or navy of the United States, without the consent of their parents: United States v. Bainbridge, 1 Mass. 71; Case of Emanuel Roberts, 2 Hall L. J. 172; United States v. Stewart, Crabbe, 265; Commonwealth v. Murray, 4 Pa. St. 487; Ex parte Brown, 5 Cranch C. C. 554. Public policy requires that a minor shall be at liberty to enter into a contract to serve the state, whenever such contract is not positively forbidden by the state itself: Commonwealth v. Gamble, 11 Serg. & R.