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Belleisle.

an interpretation of the passage, but as Grotius elsewhere 63 says that if political Envoys (legati) presume to pass without a safe conduct through the territory of a Power to which they are not accredited, and are going to its enemies, or coming from its enemies, or in any other way take part with its enemies, they may be lawfully killed, there is no difficulty in supposing that he means to lay it down, that a mission to or from an enemy will expose a Political Envoy, whilst he is in transitu through the territory of a belligerent Power, to the operation of reprisals on the part of that Power. Thus the Duc de Duc de Belleisle, having incautiously entered the Hanoverian territory on his way to St. Petersburg, as ambassador from the King of France, who was at that time at war with Hanover and Great Britain, was arrested with his suite by the Hanoverian Government, and sent to England as a prisoner of State. It is quite another thing, observes Grotius, if any Prince shall out of his own territory contrive to surprise the Ambassadors of another State, for this would be a direct breach of the Law of Nations 65. The case of the seizure of the Envoys of the Confederate States of America on their way to Europe on board the British The British Post Office Packet, the Trent, by an United States Trent. cruiser, would seem to come within the prohibition laid down by Grotius. Their seizure was justly re

63 Non pertinet ergo hæc lex ad eos per quorum fines, non accepta venia, transeunt legati; nam siquidem ad hostes eorum eunt, aut ab hostibus veniunt, aut alioqui hostilia moliuntur, interfici etiam poterunt. De Jure Belli, L. II. c. 18. § 5.

64 Martens, Causes célébres du Droit des Gens, Tom. I. p. 285.

65 Aliud sit si quis extra fines suos insidias ponit legatis alienis, eo enim jus gentium violaretur. Et hoc continetur in Thessalorum oratione contra Philippum apud Livium (L. XXXIX. c. 25). Grotius de Jure Belli et Pacis in notis suis ad L. II. 118. § v. 2.

Packet

Institution of Letters

of Marque.

sented by Great Britain as a direct breach of the Law of Nations, and the Envoys, at the demand of the British Government, were set at liberty by the Government of the United States, and allowed to proceed to Europe in a British vessel.

§ 21. It has been observed that the institution of Letters of Marque and Reprisal was the first systematic step in controlling private warfare, and in restraining individuals from disturbing the public peace at their own discretion. The Right of Marque, as a prerogative of Sovereign Power, is mentioned in Letters Patent and Diplomas of the twelfth century 67, in which the Sovereign grants to certain of his subjects the Right of Marque against other of his subjects, in other words, grants to them permission to seize the persons and goods of others of his subjects, against whom they have made complaint. In the thirteenth century we find Sovereign Princes granting Marque to their subjects against the subjects of other Sovereign Princes. In the fourteenth century Municipal Laws were passed in various countries, prohibiting individual citizens from making Reprisals without having previously obtained Letters of Marque from a Sovereign Prince. In the fifteenth century 69 Treaties of Peace occur frequently, in which there are stipulations that all ships, which should go out of port, should give security not to make Reprisals; other treaties also occur in this century, in which the Contracting Parties undertake not to grant Reprisals

68

66 Ducange, Glossarium, Vox Marcha.

67 Rymer. Fœdera, Tom. II. p. 691. Letter of king Edward I. of England.

68 27 Edw. III. St. 2. c. 17.

anno 1359.

69 Treaties between France and England, anno 1440, Dumont, T. III. pars i. p. 548; between Spain and England, anno 1489, Dumont, T. II. pars ii. p. 219.

of Practices

to their subjects at all, unless they should have first Regulations. addressed a complaint to the Sovereign, from whose of Marque subjects they have received injury, and have been by Treaties. refused redress 70. In the sixteenth century we find it stipulated in various treaties of commerce that neither party shall grant Letters of Marque or Reprisal against any others than the principal delinquents and their goods, and only for manifest delay or denial of justice". In the seventeenth century treaties for the first time appear, in which it is agreed. that no Reprisals shall be granted on either side, but that prompt justice shall be administered". These treaties however are exceptional, as it was stipulated in most treaties of this period, that if justice were not done within a definite period, as for instance, three, four, or six months, Reprisals should be allowed. In the eighteenth century we find a great number of treaties, providing that the goods of the subjects of either party, which may lie within the territory of the other party, shall be exempt from seizure for Reprisals, except on account of the debt or crime of the owner73. It has been the crowning work of the Congress of Paris, in the nineteenth cen- Renunciatury, to abolish the practice of Sovereign Princes Marque by issuing Letters of Marque, as far as the Nations Congress of which are parties to the Declaration of Paris are 1856.

70 Treaty between France and Spain, anno 1489, Dumont, T. IV. pars ii. p. II.

71 Treaty between France and England, anno 1510, Dumont, T. IV. pars i. p. 126.

72 Treaty between England and Denmark, anno 1621, Dumont, T. V. pars ii. p. 393.

73 Treaties between France

and the United Provinces, anno
1739; France and Denmark,
anno 1742; Sweden and the
United States, anno 1783;
Prussia and the United States,
anno 1785; Austria and Russia,
anno 1785; England and France,
anno 1786; France and Russia,
anno 1787; Russia and Portu-
gal, anno 1787.

tion of

Paris in

42

SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES.

concerned, the first Article of which declares that "La Course est et demeure abolie 74." The effect of this Declaration will be examined in a subsequent chapter, in which La Course, or the use of Privateers, will be more fully discussed.

74 Martens, N. R. Gén. XV. p. 768.

CHAPTER II.

WAR AND ITS CHARACTERISTICS.

War as defined by Grotius-Bynkershoek's definition-War the contention of independent political communities in the prosecution of Right-View of Grotius as to Private Warfare-Albericus Gentilis-War a necessary Alternative-Lord Bacon's view of War as the highest trial of Right-Grotius-Private Peace inconsistent with Public War-Lawful recourse to War-Offensive and Defensive War-Vattel-Grotius-Formal Declaration of War-Law of the Germanic Empire in the Twelfth Century-Law of Europe in the Fourteenth Century-Declaration of War by Heralds-at-Arms-Proclamation of War at home by Heralds-No British Declaration of War by a Herald since Queen Mary's reign-Last occasion of a Declaration of War by a Herald-at-Arms in 1657, at Copenhagen -Printed Declarations of War in the reign of Charles II-Manifestoes of War to Neutral Nations-Recall of resident EnvoysDisuse of formal Declarations of War-Last occasion of a formal Declaration of War by Great Britain in 1762-Letter of Lord Chancellor Thurlow in 1778-Object of Proclamations of War at home-Object of Manifestoes to Neutral Powers-Opinion of M. de Hautefeuille as to the necessity of a Declaration of War—A State of War de facto-Texas and Mexico-Burlamaqui's opinion-Practice of the United States of America-The maintenance of the Status ante bellum conditional-Unilateral Declaration of War sanctions reciprocal hostilities-Recall or Dismissal of resident EnvoysTreaties-Ignorance of hostilities on the part of Neutrals.

22. WAR has been defined by Grotius, at the War as defined by outset of his work, to be the State or Condition of Grotius. parties contending by force, as such. "Status per vim certantium quâ tales sunt." Under this large

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