with one another upon questions of mutual Right. These differences may arise, either by reason of a Nation refusing to perform a good office to another Nation, to the performance of which the latter considers itself to have a claim of Right; or by reason of a Nation suffering an ill office from another Nation, from which the former considers itself entitled of Right to be exempt. "The differences," says Vattel', "which arise between Nations or their rulers are on account either of contested rights or of injuries received. A Nation ought to maintain the rights which belong to it; on the other hand the care of its own safety and glory forbids it to submit to injury. But in fulfilling the duty which a Nation owes to itself, it must not forget its duties to other Nations." It is in the practical adjustment of these two principles, according to the circumstances of each individual case, that we discover the rule for appeasing the disputes which may arise between Nations upon questions of Right. A Nation cannot claim anything as of Right due to itself which would be injurious to another Nation; neither can it claim in redress for an injury, which it has undergone, anything which would be inconsistent with the Right of another Nation. Equality and reciprocity are fundamental conditions in measuring the remedies for international Wrong, equally as they are fundamental conditions in determining the Right, the violation of which constitutes international Wrong. § 2. The perfection of every political community consists in its aptitude to fulfil the ends of civil society; and one of the chief ends of civil society is to secure, by the cooperation of all the members of a political community, a greater degree of well-being to each individual than he could obtain by his own 1 Droit des Gens, L. II. c. 17. § 323 Self-preser unaided exertions. Accordingly, in the act of political association, by virtue of which a multitude of men constitute themselves into a State or Nation, each individual enters into an engagement with the body to promote the general welfare; and the State or Nation in return enters into an engagement with each member to facilitate for him the means of supplying his necessities, and to protect and defend him. It is manifest therefore that the maintenance of the political association itself is an essential condition for the fulfilment of these reciprocal engagements, and the State or Nation is thus under a primary obligation to preserve itself; in other words, Selfpreservation is a primary duty of National Life. This duty of Self-preservation on the part of a Nation Duty of implies, as a corollary, the duty of preserving each vation. of its members. It owes this duty in the first place to itself, since the loss of one of its members impairs the integrity of the body, and at the same time weakens it. It owes this duty also to each of its members in particular, for the individuals, who compose a Nation, have united themselves together for their mutual defence and common advantage; and none of them can justly be deprived of this Union, and of the advantages which he expects to derive from it, whilst he fulfils on his side the conditions of it. The body of a Nation cannot abandon a province, or a town, or even a single individual member, unless compelled to it by necessity, or indispensably obliged to it by the strongest reasons founded on considerations of the public safety2. §3. The obligation of a Nation to preserve itself and to preserve all its members, is not limited to. those matters only which affect its internal constitution, but extends to its external relations with other Vattel, Droit des Gens, L. I. c. 2. § 17. Nations; in other words, to those matters which regard the intercourse of itself as a political community, or of its members individually, with any other Nation as such, or with the several members thereof. The right of Self-preservation accordingly gives to a Nation a moral power of acting in regard to other Nations in such a manner, as may be requisite to prevent them from obstructing its preservation or its perfection. This Right is a perfect Right, since it is given to satisfy a natural and indispensable duty; and our Right may frequently fail to be respected, and its effects will be uncertain, unless we may use compulsion towards those who refuse to fulfil the corresponding obligation. A Nation has accordingly a right to resist any attempt on the part of another Nation to injure it, and in case that it has suffered an injury from another Nation, to exact complete reparation for it. At the same time it is bound to abstain from doing any injury to another Nation, and to give adequate satisfaction for any injury which it may have inflicted upon it. An individual citizen is at liberty to waive his right and to forgive an injury, without incurring any increased risk to his life or property, for he lives under the protection of the Civil Magistrate, and may invoke his aid against any ungrateful and malicious fellow-citizen, who may have been encouraged by his indulgence to renew the offence. But a Nation cannot appeal to any superior Power on earth, in case it should have forgiven an injury, which has been inflicted upon it by another Nation, and thereby have encouraged it to offend again. A more powerful Nation may indeed overlook an injury which it has received from a less powerful Nation, without any derogation to its future safety; but between Powers which are nearly 3 Vattel, L. II. c. 4. § 49. Interna equal, the submission on the part of one of such Powers to an injury, without insisting upon complete satisfaction from the other Power, is almost always attributed to cowardice or weakness, and seldom fails to subject the injured party to further wrong of a more atrocious character. A Nation is accordingly bound, in the presence of another Nation, to maintain its Right, and to seek satisfaction for wrong, under the penalty of forfeiting its character of an independent political body; for to acquiesce tamely in an injury which has been inflicted upon any of its members by another Nation, would be equivalent to the admission of its inability to secure to its members the enjoyment of their Right, without the con- Right of sent of the other Nation; in other words, it would be tional Aca virtual acquiescence on its part in a state of de- tion. pendence upon the other Nation. A Nation has therefore a moral Right of Action against other Nations, which withhold from it its Right, or has inflicted injury upon it. But this Right of Action against another Nation is capable of being exercised either by an appeal to reason, or by a recourse to arms. But a recourse to arms, although it may ultimately assert and enforce substantial justice to be done by the Nation, which has been a wrong-doer, brings with it, as an indirect but necessary consequence, such a train of evils and calamities resulting to innocent individuals, that an appeal to reason should always be made in the first instance, unless there is evident peril to the safety of a Nation, if it does not have immediate recourse to arms. Confer § 4. An appeal to Reason may be made in various ways. Amicable Conference is the first and most ob- Amicable vious mode; and it commends itself to Nations by two weighty considerations. Men will often concede to Reason what they feel bound to deny to Force; for, to ence. question in dispute between them to Arbitration, their good faith is pledged to abide by the decision of the Arbitrator, unless the decision should involve a clear departure from the terms of the reference, or should be in absolute conflict with the rules of justice, and therefore incapable of being the subject of a valid international compact, or should be the manifest result of fraud and collusion with one of the parties. A departure from the terms of the reference was alleged on the occasion, when the United States of America and Great Britain agreed by the Convention of London (29 Sept. 18277) to refer the points of difference which had arisen in the settlement of the boundary between the British and American dominions, as described in the fifth Article of Treaty of the Treaty of Ghent, to some friendly Sovereign or State, who should be invited to investigate and make a decision upon such points of difference; and they further agreed that the decision of the arbiter, when given, should be taken as final and conclusive, and should be carried without reserve into immediate effect by Commissioners appointed for that purpose by the contracting parties. Notwithstanding the absolute terms in which the parties to this Convention bound themselves to acquiesce in the decision of the Sovereign arbiter, the Senate of the United States. considered that the opinion of the King of the Netherlands on the case referred to him, which he delivered in writing to the Plenipotentiaries of the United States and of Great Britain on 10 Jan. 1831, was not obligatory on the United States, on the ground that the award did not follow the submission, but merely Ghent. 7 Martens, N. R. VII. p. 491. British and Foreign State Papers 1826, 7. p. 1005. 8 Message of President Jack son, 6 Dec. 1831. British and Foreign State Papers 1830, 31 p. 957. Message of 4 Dec. 1832 ib. 1831, 32. P. 244. |