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sels which had arrived in their own port, as the terminus of their voyage; and he cites a decision of the Admiralty Court of Zealand (27 Jan. 1631) in regard to a vessel which had been purchased by a Scotchman in the port of Dunkirk, which was at such time under blockade, and which escaped out of Dunkirk, and took refuge from pursuit in the port of Yarmouth, which was not her actual port of destination. On venturing out of Yarmouth in prosecution of her original voyage, the vessel was captured on the High Seas by a Dutch cruiser, and condemned as good prize to the captors. So likewise Lord Stowell, in dealing with the case of a Prussian ship which had escaped out of the port of Amsterdam, then under blockade, and had been captured by a British cruiser off Dungeness, observed, that if the principle is sound that a neutral vessel is not at liberty to come out of a blockaded port with a cargo, he knew no other natural termination of the offence, but the end of the voyage. "It would be ridiculous to say, If you can get past the blockading force, you are free this would be a most absurd application of the principle. If that is sound, it must be carried to the extent that I have mentioned, for I see no other point, at which it can be terminated. Being of opinion that the principle is sound, I shall hold that if a ship, that has broken a blockade, is taken in any part of that voyage, she is taken in delicto, and is subject to confiscation 76" Lord Stowell has further laid it down, that a vessel which has committed a breach of blockade by egress, shall not have her offence purged by being driven by stress of weather into a port, which is not her port of destination. Such an accident, he says, is not entitled to

76 The Weelvaart Van Pillaw, 2 Ch. Rob. p. 130.

Effect of

fraud in egress.

be considered as any discontinuance of the voyage, or as a defeasance of the penalty which has been incurred".

§ 115. An exception to the rule, that the offence of violating a blockade by egress is purged upon the arrival of the vessel at her port of destination, was made by Lord Stowell in a case which was altogether novel, but of which the importance was considerable, when viewed in the extent of the consequences to which it might lead. A neutral vessel was blockaded in the port of Rotterdam, and could only come out under the indulgence of a British Order in Council, which made an exception in favour of vessels bound to a neutral port. She came out in cargo with an ostensible destination to the neutral port of Smyrna, but on her voyage she put into Alicant, in Spain, under pretext of requiring repairs; and then having sold her cargo, took on board a return cargo for Copenhagen. She was captured by a British cruiser on her return voyage, and the ship and cargo were condemned, as prize, to the captor. Lord Stowell, in considering this case, observed, that "she was in fact blockaded in the port of Rotterdam, and could not come out with a cargo, unless going to a neutral port. The permission to go to a neutral port, if accepted, implies a contract that that destination shall be bona fide pursued. The vessel avails herself of the indulgence, and comes out with a professed intention of acting conformably to the Order. But the fact turns out, that she deposits her cargo in a port, to which she would not have been permitted to go, if the real intention of the voyage had been disclosed. This is unquestionably an act of perfidy; and I ask by what means can the Order be maintained,

77 The General Hamilton, 6 Ch. Rob. p. 62.

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or such conduct be repressed, unless by the application of the penalty to the subsequent voyage. Until the vessel had actually entered an interdicted port, nothing appeared whether she was in delicto or not. Cruisers see nothing; she goes in, and then the offence is consummated, and the intention is for the first time declared. It is not till the vessel comes out again, that any opportunity is afforded of vindicating the law, and of enforcing the restriction of this Order 78" This case may be regarded as analogous in some respects to a breach of blockade by ingress, in which there is no opportunity of enforcing a penalty until the offending vessel ventures out again to sea. There is however one case in which the offence of entering a blockaded port may be purged before the vessel comes out, and in which likewise the penalty of violating a blockade by egress may be determined, before the offending vessel has reached her port of destination. This case arises, whenever the blockade itself is raised. Lord Stowell observed, in the case of the Lisette, that he knew of no case in which a vessel had been condemned, which had been seized for the breach of a bygone blockade. The same reason for rigour in such a case no longer exists, because the blockade being gone, the necessity of applying the penalty to prevent future transgression cannot continue. When the blockade is raised, a veil is thrown over everything that has been done, and the vessel is no longer taken in delicto.

always

§ 116. It is a general rule that both ship and cargo Cargo not are confiscable for the breach of a blockade, and the condemned presumption of law is that the violation of a blockade with the is intended for the benefit of the cargo as well as of the ship, and takes place with the sanction of the

78 The Christianberg, 6 Ch. Rob. p. 381.

79 The Lisette, 6 Ch. Rob. p. 392.

ship.

owners of both. This presumption, unless it be rebutted by documents found on board of the ship when captured, is a præsumptio juris et de jure, which excludes all other evidence to the contrary. In cases where the ship and cargo belong to the same individuals, it is obvious that no difficulty can arise, for the act of the master, as the legal agent of the owner of the ship, will affect his principal to the extent of the whole of his property concerned in the transactions. On the other hand, where the ship and the cargo are the properties of different individuals, the reasonable conclusion is, that the master of the ship does not hazard the interests of his vessel except in the service of the cargo. There is a necessary presumption also in such cases, that this is done with the cognisance and at the instigation of the owner of the cargo. But it may happen that the fact of a blockade is known to the master of a ship, but not to the owner of the cargo; as for instance, a vessel may have begun her voyage when the blockade of her port of destination did not exist, or when it was unknown to the owners of the cargo; and it may happen that the master, having been informed of the blockade during his voyage, or having been warned off at the entrance of the blockaded port, has persisted in pursuing his course to his original destination. In such a case no question of fact can arise whether the owner of the cargo was consentient to the breach of the blockade. Other cases may be supposed; as for instance where a vessel has been despatched in ballast to fetch a cargo from a port, which is placed under blockade after she has entered

80 The Alexander, 4 Ch. Rob. P. 93.

81 The Columbia, 1 Ch. Rob. p. 154, affirmed on appeal, 12 August 1801.

82 The Adonis, 5 Ch. Rob. p. 261. The Alexander, 4 Ch. Rob. p. 93.

83 The Adonis, 5 Ch. Rob.

p. 262.

the port, and the owner of the cargo has no opportunity of ascertaining the fact of the blockade, so as to countermand the shipment of his cargo. In such a case Lord Stowell has observed, that it would be hard to bind the owners of the cargo by the act of her agents in the blockaded port, as they do not stand in the same situation as other agents. They have not only a distinct but even an opposite interest from that of their principal, namely, to fulfil the commission at all risks as rapidly as possible, for their own private advantage and for the public interests of their country, at such a time under particular pressure as to the exportation of its produce. This may be fairly allowed to impose a strong obligation on the candour of the Court not to hold an employer too strictly bound on mere general principles by an agent, who may be actuated by interests different from those of his principal.

coast which

may may be force placed and blockade.

under

§ 117. There is no limit to the extent of coast Extent of along which the blockade of an enemy's ports be extended, short of the natural limit of a adequate to maintain the blockade really effectively. The British Government in 1806 declared the ports of the Continent of Europe, from Brest to the River Elbe, to be under blockade. In the circular note bearing date 16 May 1806, and addressed to the Ministers of Neutral Governments then resident in London, Mr. Fox, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, announced "that a consideration of the novel method adopted by the enemy for the interruption of British commerce, had determined the British Government to issue orders for placing in a state of blockade all the coasts, rivers,

84 The Neptunus, 3 Ch. Rob. p. 177. The Adelaide, Ibid. p. P. 173.

85 The Neptunus, 3 Ch. Rob.

281.

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