of Greece. Sweden is the more commendable, if it puts an end to a war which would prove destructive to one or both of the parties. Upon some such principle, Russia, France, and Great Britain, interposed as mediators between the Ottoman Porte and the Hellenic people, and secured on the part of the Porte the recognition Kingdom of an independent kingdom of Greece, under their joint guaranty. Bynkershoek 19 holds that it is not allowable for a Nation to interpose between other Nations and to compel them to make peace; but the practice of Nations is opposed to his views, and one of the instances which he cites seems to suggest a principle which rather sanctions the right of interposition, than militates against the existence of this right. Thus France, England, and Holland, united to compel Sweden to make peace with Denmark on 21 May 1659, at a moment when Sweden was on the point of entirely subjugating Denmark. The extinction of the international life of a State, in the continued existence of which, as a member of the family of Nations, all other Nations have an interest, is an event respecting which all Nations may claim to have a voice, and, if they please, to take up arms to prevent it. War between Nations, in the sense in which it imposes the duties of Neutrality upon other Nations, is a contest for the attainment of Right, and not a struggle to accomplish the ruin of either party. Grotius 20 maintains that war may be justly undertaken by any Nation against a Nation which prosecutes its revenge with malice, and exceeds the just measure of punishment in avenging a wrong which it may have suffered from another Nation. Thus a powerful Nation, under the pretext of injury received and Denmark. 19 Quæst. Jur. Publ. c. 25. § 10. 20 De Jure Belli, L. II. c. 20. § 40. from a weaker Nation, might declare war against it, § 8. It is not always easy for a third Power, which offers to mediate between two contending Powers, to satisfy them both of the integrity of its intentions in offering its mediation, and if it should advise either to remit something of its pretensions, to preserve a character for impartiality. Hence it becomes advisable, when war threatens to break out between any two Nations, in the necessary absence of any constituted tribunal before which the plaint of a Nation can be brought for adjudication, that two or more Nations should offer their joint mediation to maintain peace. Grotius holds that it would be not only useful, but that it is in some respects necessary, that Con- Congresses gresses of the Christian powers should be held from Powers. time to time, in which the controversies, that may have arisen amongst any of them, may be settled by others whose interests are not affected by them, and in which 21 21 De Jure Belli, L. II. c. 23. § 8. 4. of Christian Conferences of Vienna. measures may be taken to compel disputing parties to accept peace on equitable terms. The practice of the Sovereign Powers of Europe since the peace of Westphalia has been to cooperate in a policy of Mediation, wherever there has been probable danger of the Balance of Power, as established by the Treaties of Osnabrück and Munster, being effectively disturbed. A system of European Concert has thus been maintained, with slight intermissions, since that time, by Conferences or Congresses of the European Powers. A Congress 22 is an assembly of Plenipotentiaries, appointed to find out means of conciliation, and to discuss and adjust the respective pretensions of the contending parties, who should always be invited to take part in the deliberations of the Congress. One of the most recent instances of this form of joint Mediation is furnished by the Conferences of Vienna, commenced on 15 March 1855, and in which Austria, France, and Great Britain endeavoured to mediate between Russia and the Ottoman Porte, with a view to prevent a war between those Powers, and to bring about an amicable settlement of their differences in the general interest of Europe. The Plenipotentiaries of the two contending Powers took part in the Conferences; and when the efforts of the Congress had failed to secure peace, the mediating Powers 23 sided with that Power, which in their opinion had been wrongfully attacked. 9. It is the duty of a Nation, when it advances a claim of right, to show a good foundation for demanding a thing which it does not possess. Possession in the case of Nations gives rise to the Right of not being disturbed, unless the origin of the possession can be shown to have been wrongful. Hence 22 Vattel, L. II. c. 18. § 330. 23 Martens, N. R. Gén. XV. p. 633. moderation. it is not justifiable for a Nation to disturb by force of arms another Nation which is in possession of a territory, if the claimant has only an uncertain or a doubtful title, but a claimant in such a case has a right to compel a possessor, even by force of arms, if Duty of necessary, to come to an amicable discussion of the question of right, or to submit it to arbitration, with a view to settle the point in dispute by articles of agreement. If, on the other hand, a dispute should arise between two Nations on account of an injury received" by one of them, the injured party ought to follow a similar rule of proceeding, unless it is convinced that its adversary would not entertain with sincerity its proposal for an amicable reparation, or that the delay, which the discussion of the wrong would give rise to, would only expose it to greater danger of being worsted in an appeal to arms. This moderation is the more becoming, and as Vattel says, is in general cases even indispensable, since the act which a Nation may be disposed to regard as an injury, does not always proceed from a design25 to offend it, and may be rather a mistake than an act of malice. Besides it frequently happens that the injury has been done by individuals without any sanction from the Nation of which they are members, and if satisfaction should be demanded from it, the Nation will not refuse to do justice. Instances are frequent in which Sovereign Princes have refused to countenance the wrongful acts of their subjects towards the subjects of other Sovereign Princes, and have thought it not a derogation from their independence, upon complaint made to them, to give satisfaction for the wrong. It is perfectly consistent with good faith for a Nation, which has received an injury, to make preparations for war, 24 Vattel, L. II. c. 18. § 331. 333. 337. 25 Ibid, L. II. c. 18. § 338. while it attempts by pacific negotiation to obtain reparation for the injury. For war must be presumed to be the necessary alternative, if amicable negotiation should fail, and the right of self-preservation warrants a Nation in taking measures to guard itself against hostile surprise. 10. When a Nation cannot obtain redress in an amicable manner from another Nation, either for the refusal of a right, or the infliction of a wrong, it may proceed to do justice to itself in the former case by Retorsion, in the latter case by Reprisals. When a Sovereign Prince is not satisfied with the manner in which his subjects are treated according to the laws Retorsion and customs of another Nation, he is at liberty to of Right. declare, that he will treat the members of that Nation in the same manner as his own subjects are treated. This is what is called by Vattel 26 Retorsion of Right. "There is nothing in this," he observes, "but what is conformable to justice and sound policy. No one can complain on receiving the same treatment which he has exhibited to others." Klüber27 has instituted a Retorsion distinction between Retorsion of Fact (retorsio facti) and Retorsion of Right (retorsio juris), and limits the application of the latter term to questions of Comity, as distinguished from questions of Right. But the distinction appears to have no practical value, and tends to cause confusion rather than greater clearness. It may be true that for offences against Comity, a Nation has no other remedy than to reciprocate the uncourteous conduct of the offending Nation, for a violation of Comity is clearly not the subject of a just war28, as every Nation must be the final judge for itself of the nature and extent of the Comity or of Fact. 26 Rétorsion de Droit, L. II. c. 18. § 341. Retorsio Juris, Wolfii, Jus Gentium, § 582. 27 Klüber, § 234. 28 Grotius, L. II. c. 22. § 16. |