4. The act of assembly of Kentucky, of the 7th of February, 1812, "giving interest on judgments for damages, in certain cases," applies as well to cases depending in the circuit courts of the Union as to proceedings in similar cases in the state courts. Sneed v. Wister, (690) 717 5. The party is as well entitled to interest in an action on an appeal bond as if he were to proceed on the Judgment, if the judgment be on a contract for the payment of money. He is entitled to interest from the rendition of the original judgment. Id. (lb.) 717

1. A party cannot entitle himself to a patent for more than his own invention; and if the patent be for the whole of a machine, he can maintain a title to it only by establishing that it is substantially new in its structure and mode of operation. Evans v. Eaton, (356, 428) 472, 490 2. If the same combination existed before in machines of the same rature, up to a certain point, and the party's invention consists in adding some new machinery, or some improved mode of operation, to the old, the patent should be limited to such improvement; for if it includes the whole machine, it includes more than his invention, and therefore cannot be supported.

Id.

(430) 490 3. When the patent is for an improvement, the nature and extent of the improvement must be stated in the specification, and it is not sufficient that it be made out and shown at the trial, or established by comparing the machine specified in the patent with former machines in use. Id.

Id.

(432) 491 4. The former judgment of this court in the same case, (ante, Vol. III., p. 454) commented on, explained, and confirmed. (428) 490 5. It is no objection to the competency of a witness in a patent cause that he is sued in another action for an infringement of the same patent. Evans v. Hettich, (453, 468) 496, 500 6. The 6th section of the patent act of 1793, c. 156, which requires a notice of the special matter to be given in evidence by the defendant under the general issue, does not include all the matters of defense which the defendant may be legally entitled to make. And where the witness was asked, whether the machine used by the defendant was like the model exhibited in court of the plaintiff's patented machine, held, that no notice was neces sary to authorize the inquiry. ld.

PAYMENT—7.

(469) 500

to pay one debt, and an acknowledgment of another, with a delivery of the sum due upon it. would be such a circumstance. Taylor v. Sandiford, (20) 387

PENAL STATUTES 5. yet the intention of the legislature must govern in Though penal laws are to be construed strictly, the construction of penal, as well as other statutes, and they are not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the legislature. United States v. Wiltberger, (76, 95) 37, 42

6. The act of the 3d of March, 1819, c. 76, sec. 5, referring to the law of nations for a definition of the crime of piracy, is a constitutional exercise of the power of Congress to define and punish that crime. United States v. Smith, (153, 157) 57, 58

7. The crime of piracy is defined by the law of nations with reasonable certainty. Id.

(160) 58 8. Robbery, or forcible depredation upon the sea, animo furandi, is piracy by the law of nations and by the act of Congress. (184) 64

United States v. Furlong et al.,

9. Citations to show that piracy is defined by the law of nations. (163) 59

United States v. Smith, note 4,

10. The 8th section of the act of the 30th of April, against the United States, is not repealed by the act 1790. c. 36, for the punishment of certain crimes of the 3d of March, 1819, c. 76, to protect the comof piracy. merce of the United States, and to punish the crime

United States v. Furlong, alias Hobson et al., (184, 192) 64, 66 the act of the 30th of April, 1790, c. 36, sec. 8), it is 11. In an indictment for a piratical murder (under not necessary that it should allege the prisoner to be a citizen of the United States, nor that the crime was committed on board a vessel belonging to citiit as committed from on board such a vessel, by a zens of the United States; but is sufficient to charge mariner sailing on board such a vessel. ld.

(194) 67

ticular state," in the act of the 30th of April, 1790. 12. The words "out of the jurisdiction of any pardiction of any particular state of the Union. c. 36, sec. 8, are construed to mean out of the jurisld. (200) 68 eign country, is "upon the high seas" within the 13. A vessel lying in an open roadstead of a foract of 1790, c. 36, sec. 8.

Id.

(Ib.) 68

Tayloe v. Sandiford, (13, 19) 384, 386 2. A direction may be evidenced by circumstances, as well as by words; and a positive refusal

Id.

(201) 68

15. The courts of the United States have jurisdic tion under the act of the 30th of April, 1790, c. 36, of murder or robbery committed on the high seas, although not committed on board a vessel belonging to citizens of the United States, as if she had no

national character, but was held by pirates, or per-
sons not lawfully sailing under the flag of any for-
eign nation.

United States v. Holmes, (412, 416) 122, 123
16. In the same case, and under the same act, if
the offense be committed on board of a foreign ves-
sel by a citizen of the United States; or on board
a vessel of the United States by a foreigner; or by
a citizen or foreigner on board of a piratical vessel,
the offense is equally cognizable by the courts of
the United States.

Id.

(417) 123.
17. It makes no difference in such a case, and un-
der the same act, whether the offense was commit-
ted on board of a vessel, or in the sea, as by throw-
ing the deceased overboard and drowning him, or
by shooting him when in the sea though he was not
thrown overboard.
ld.

(418) 123
18. In such a case, and under the same act, where
the vessel, from on board of which the offense was
committed, sailed from Buenos Ayres where she
had enlisted her crew; but it did not appear by
legal proof that she had a commission from the
government of Buenos Ayres, or any ship's papers
or documents from that government, or that she
was ever recognized as a ship of that nation, or of
its subjects, or who were the owners, where they
resided, or when or where the vessel was armed or
equipped; but it did appear in proof that the
captain and crew were chiefly Englishmen, French-
men, and citizens of the United States; that the
captain was by birth a citizen of the United States,
domiciled at Baltimore, where the privateer was
built. Held, that the burthen of proof of the na-
tional character of the vessel was on the prisoners.
ld.
(lb.) 123
19. Late act of Congress for the punishment of
piracy.
Appendix, Note IV.,
(149) 179

PLEADING -6.
See Practice, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10.

PLEADING-8.

1. It is, in general, not necessary, in deriving title
to a bill or note, through the indorsement of a part-
nership firm,or from the surviving partner, through
the act of the law, to state particularly the names
of the persons composing the firm.

Childress v. Emory,

(642) 705
2. A declaration, averring that "J. C., by his
agent. A. C., made" the note, &c., is good.
ld.
(lb.) 705
3. A general profert of letters testamentary, is
sufficient; and if the defendant would object to
their insufficiency, he must crave oyer; or, if it be
alleged that the plaintiffs are not executors, the
objection must be taken by plea in abatement.
Id.

(lb.) 705
4. Debt, against an executor, should be in the
detinet only, unless he has made himself personally
responsible, as by a devastavit.
(lb.) 705
5. An action of debt lies, upon a promissory note,
against executors.

ished.

ld.

ld.

(lb.) 705
6. The wager of law, if it ever had a legal exist-
ence in the United States, is now completely abol-
Id.
(lb.) 705
7. Oyer is not demandable of a record; nor, in an
action upon a bond for performance of covenants
in another deed, can oyer of such deed be craved;
for the defendant, and not the plaintiff, must show
it, with a profert of it, or an excuse for the omis-
Sneed v. Wister,
(690) 717
8. If oyer be improperly demanded, the defect is
aided on a general demurrer; but it is fatal to the
plea, where it is set down as a cause of demurrer.
Id.
(lb.) 717
9. Nil Debet is an improper plea to an action of
debt upon a specialty or deed, where it is the foun-
dation of the action.
Id.

sion.

(lb.) 717

Gibbons v. Ogden,

(448) 302

3. In order to maintain a suit in the Circuit Court,
the Jurisdiction must appear on the record; as if
the suit is between citizens of different states, the
citizenship of the respective parties must be set
forth.

Sullivan v. The Fulton Steamboat Company.
(450) 303
4. An admiralty suit, where an appeal has been
taken from the Circuit Court to this court, but not
prosecuted, will be dismissed, upon producing a
certificate from the court below, that the appeal
has been taken, and not prosecuted.

The Jonquille,

(452) 303
5. The defendant's denial, in his answer in sup-
port of his plea, is conclusive, unless contradicted
by the testimony of more than one witness, or one
witness accompanied with corroborating circum-

stances.

Hughes v. Blake,

(453, 468) 303, 307

6. In an equity cause, the res in litigation may be
sold by order of the Circuit Court, and the proceeds
invested in stocks, notwithstanding the pendency
of an appeal to this court.

Spring v. The South Carolina Insurance
Co.,
(519) 320
7. In real or personal actions, at common law, the
death of parties, before judgment, abates the suit;
and it requires the aid of some statutory provision,
like that of the 31st section of the judiciary act of
1789, c. 20, to enable the suit to be prosecuted by, or
against the personal representative or heir of the
deceased, where the cause of action survives.

Green v. Watkins,

(260) 256
8. In writs of error upon judgments already ren-
dered, in personal actions, if the plaintiff in error
dies before assignment of errors, the writ abates at
common law; but if after assignment of errors, the
defendant may join in error, and proceed to get the
judgment affirmed, if not erroneous, and may then
revive it against the representatives of the plaintiff.
Id.
(Ib.) 256
9. But a writ of error in personal actions, does not
abate by the death of the defendant in error, wheth-
er it happen before or after errors assigned; and
the personal representatives may not only be ad-
mitted voluntarily to become parties, but a scire
facias may issue to compel them.

2. In cases brought to this court by appeal from
the highest state court under the 25th section of
the judiciary act of 1789, c. 20, this court is con-
fined to an examination of the right, title, claim,
or exemption, set up by the party as depending
upon the construction of the law or treaty, &c., of
the United States, under which it is set up.
(206) 435

Matthews v. Zane,

3. Note on the appellate jurisdiction of this court
in cases arising in the state courts under the con-
stitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.
Matthews v. Zane, Note 1,
(Ib) 435
4. Inconvenient and unnecessary practice of
spreading the judge's charge in extenso, upon the
record.
(426) 489
5. In real actions, the death of the ancestor, with-
out having appeared to the suit, abates the suit,
and it cannot be revived and prosecuted against
the heirs of the original defendant.

Evans v. Eaton,

Macker's Heirs v. Thomas,

(530) 515
6. If the heirs be made parties by order of the
court in which the suit is brought, and judgment
is entered against them by default for want of a
plea, upon a summons and count against the
original defendant, they may sue out a writ of
error, and reverse the judgment.
Id.

PRACTICE-8.

(lb.) 515

1. The appellate jurisdiction of this court, under
the twenty-fifth section of the judiciary act of
1789, c. 20, may be exercised by a writ of error, is-
sued by the clerk of a circuit court, under the seal
of that court, in the form prescribed by the act of
the 8th of May, 1792, c. 137, s. 9; and the writ itself
need not expressly state that it is directed to a final
judgment of the state court, or that the court is
the highest court of law or equity of the state.
(312, 320) 624, 626
2. It is not necessary to aver on the record that
the defendant in the Circuit Court was an inhabi-
tant of the district, or was found therein at the
time of serving the writ. Where the defendant
appears, without taking the exception, it is an ad-
mission of the regularity of the service.
Gracie v. Palmer,

Buel v. Van Ness,

See Admiralty, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10.
See Chancery, 17.

See Constitutional Law, 13, 14.

See Construction of Statute, 2.

See Covenant.

See Debt.

See Evidence, 1, 2.

PRESUMPTION-7.

See Limitation of Actions, 1, 2.

PRIZE 5.

10. In cases of violation of our neutrality by any
of the belligerents, if the prize comes voluntarily
within our territory, it is restored to the original
owners by our courts. But their jurisdiction tor
this purpose, under the law of nations, extends only
to restitution of the specific property, with costs
and expenses during the pendency of the suit, and
does not extend to the infliction of vindictive
damages, as in ordinary cases of marine torts.
La Amistad de Rues,
(lb.) 116

11. Where the original owner seeks for restitution
in our courts upon the ground of a violation of our
neutrality by the captors, the onus probandi rests
upon him, and if there be reasonable doubt respect-
ing the facts, the court will decline to exercise its
jurisdiction.
ld.
(391) 117
12. A question of proprietary interest on farther
proof.

The Atalanta,

13. Note on the subject of prize law,
Appendix, Note III.,

(54) 147
15. Extracts from the French Prize Ordinance of
1400.

(433) 127

14. Prize chapters of the Consolato del Mare.
Id.

(52) 146

5. In general, the circumstance of goods being
found on board an enemy's ship raises a legal pre-
sumption that they are enemy's property.
Id.
(137) 53
8. Upon a piratical capture, the property remains
in the original owners, and cannot be forfeited for
the misconduct of the captors in violating the mu-
nicipal laws of the country where the vessel seized
by them is carried.

The Josefa Segunda, (338, 357) 104, 108
7. But where the capture is made by a regularly
commissioned captor, he acquires a title to the capt-
ured property, which can only be devested by re-
capture, or by the sentence of a competent tribunal
of his own country; and the property is subject to
forfeiture for a violation, by the captor, of the rey-
venue or other municipal laws of the neutral coun-
try into which the prize may be carried.
Id.

(358) 108
8. Quare, Whether, when a prize has been taken
by a privateer fitted out in violation of our neu-
trality, the vessels of the United States have a right
to recapture the prize, and bring it into our ports
for adjudication."

27. British Statutes and Prize Instructions.
ld.
(129) 171
28. Additional documents on the neutrality main-
tained by the United States during the present war
between Spain and her American colonies.

ld. Note V.,

PRIZE 6.

(151) 180

1. Whether the capture is made by a duly com-
missioned captor, or not, is a question between the
government and the captor, with which the claimant
has nothing to do.
The Amiable Isabella,
(1,66) 191, 207
2. If the capture be made by a non-commissioned
captor, the government may contest the right of
the captor after a decree of condemnation, and be-
fore a distribution of the prize proceeds; and the
condemnation must be to the government.
Id.
(15.) 207

3. The 17th article of the Spanish treaty of 1795, so
far as it purports to give any effect to passports, is
imperfect and inoperative, in consequence of the
omission to annex the form of passport to the
treaty.
(69) 207

(lb.) 209
9. Where these are not satisfactory, farther proof
may be admitted, if the claimant has not forfeited
his right to it by a breach of good faith.
Id.
(lb.) 209
10. On the production of farther proof, if the neu-
trality of the property is not established beyond
reasonable doubt, condemnation follows.

ld.

(b.) 209
11. The assertion of a false claim, in whole or in
part, by an agent, or in connivance with the real
owner, is a substantive cause of condemnation.
ld.
(lb.) 209
12. A foreign consul has a right to claim or libel,
in rem, where the rights of property of his fellow
subjects are in question, without any special au-
thority from those for whose benefit he acts.
The Bello Corrunes, (152, 168) 229, 233
13. But a consul cannot receive actual restitution
of the res in controversy, without a special author-
ity from the particular individuals who are entitled.
ld.
(169) 233
14. A citizen of the United States cannot claim
in their courts, the property of foreign nations in
amity with the United States, captured by him in
war, wheresoever the capturing vessel may have
been equipped, or by whomsoever commissioned.
ld.
(lb.) 233
15. In case of an illegal capture, in violation of the
neutrality of this country, the property of the law-
ful owners cannot be forfeited for a breach of its
revenue laws, by the captors, or persons who have
rescued the property from their possession.

ld.

(Ib.) 233
16. Whatever difficulty there may be under our
municipal institutions, in punishing, as pirates, citi-
zens of the United States who take from a state at
war with Spain, a commission to cruise against that
power, contrary to the 14th article of the Spanish
treaty, yet there is no doubt that such acts are to be
considered as piratical acts for all civil purposes,
and the offending parties cannot appear, and claim
in our courts the property thus taken.
ld.

(lb.) 233
17. It seems, that the terms, "a state with which
the said King shall be at war," in the 14th article of
the treaty, include the South American provinces
which have revolted against Spain.

Id.

Id.

(Ib.) 233

18. But, however this may be, the neutrality act
of June, 1797, c. 1. extends the same prohibition,
with all its consequences, to a colony revolting, and
making war against its parent country.
Id.
(lb.) 233
19. In the case of such an illegal capture, the prop-
erty of the lawful owners cannot be forfeited for a
violation of the revenue laws of this country, by
the captors, or by persons who have rescued the
property from their possession.
ld.
(lb.) 233
20. The rights of salvage may be forfeited by spo-
liation, smuggling, or other gross misconduct of
the salvors.
(Ib.) 233
21. Where a capture is made of the property of
the subjects of a nation in amity with the United
States, by a vessel built, armed, equipped, and
owned in the United States, such capture is illegal,
and the property, if brought within our territorial
limits, will be restored to the original owners.
La Conception,
(235, 238) 249, 250
22. Where a transfer of the capturing vessel in
the ports of the belligerent state, under whose flag
and commission she sails on a cruise, is set up in
order to legalize the capture, the bona fides of the
sale must be proved by the usual documentary evi-
dence, in a satisfactory manner.
Íd.

(Ib.) 250
23. This court does not recognize the existence of
any lawful court of prize at Galveztown, nor of any
Mexican republic or state, with power to authorize
captures in war.
(193) 239
24. Citation from De Steck as to the powers of
consuls.

The Nueva Anna and Liebre,

Note to the Bello Corrunes, Note 2, (156) 230
25. Opinion of M. Portalis on the right of consuls
to claim in a court of prize.

Note to the Bello Corrunes, Appendix, Note V.
(59) 362

26. Articles of the Spanish treaty of 1795, referred
to in the case of The Amiable Isabella, Appendix,
Note I.
(8) 343
27. Decisions of the French Council of Prizes res-
pecting the form and effect of passports to neutral
vessels.
The case of The Amiable Isabella.
Appendix, Note II.

(12) 346
28. Articles of the French, Dutch, Swedish, and
Prussian treaties, referred to in The Amiable Isa-
bella, Appendix, Note III.
(23) 350
29. Convention of 1801 between Russia and Great

Britain, referred to in the above case.
Appendix, Note 1V.

PRIZE-7.

(52) 360

14. But this court has never decided that the of-
fense adheres to the vessel under whatever change
of circumstances that may take place, nor that it
cannot be deposited at the termination of the
cruise, in preparing for which it was committed;
but if this termination be merely colorable, and
the vessel was originally equipped with the inten-
tion of being employed on the cruise during which
the capture was made, the delictum is not purged.
Id.
(487) 504

15. A question of fact respecting the proprietary
interest in prize goods, captured by an armed ves-
sel fitted out in violation of the statutes of neu-
trality of the United States. Restitution to the
original Spanish owners decreed.
(490) 505

Id.

16. This court will restore to the former owners property captured in violation of the neutrality of the United States, where it is claimed by the original wrong-doer, though it may have come back to his possession after a regular condemnation as prize.

Id.

The Arrogante Barcelones, (496, 518) 507, 512 17. Quære, How far a condemnation would protect the title of a third person, being a bona fide purchaser, without notice, in such a case. (519) 512 18. In cases where a condemnation is relied on, the libel as well as the sentence must be produced. The Nereyda, Note 2, (lb.) 512 19. In such cases, the claimant must show by competent evidence that he was a bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration. ld.

(Ib.) 512

1. Quære, Whether a regular sentence of condemnation in a court of the captor, or his ally, the captured property having been carried infra præsidia, will preclude the courts of this country from restoring it to the original owners, where the capture was made in violation of our laws, treaties, and neutral obligations.

La Nereyda,

(108, 174) 574, 589 2. Whoever claims under such a condemnation, must show that he is a bona fidei purchaser, for a valuable consideration, unaffected with any participation in the violation of our neutrality by the captors. Id.

(167) 588 8. Whoever sets up a title, under a condemnation, as prize, is bound to produce the libel, or other equivalent proceeding, under which the condemnation was pronounced, as well as the sentence of condemnation itself. Id.

(168) 588 4. Quære, Whether a condemnation in a court of an ally, of property carried into his ports by a cobelligerent, is valid. Id.

(109) 574 5. Where an order for further proof is made, and the party disobeys, or neglects to comply with its injunctions, courts of prize generally consider such disobedience, or neglect, as fatal to his claim. (171) 589

ld.

6. Upon such an order, it is almost the invariable practice for the claimant (besides other testimony) to make proof by his own oath of his proprietary interest. and to explain the other circumstances of the transaction; and the absence of such proof and explanation always leads to considerable doubts. (lb.) 589

ld. 7. In cases of collusive capture, papers found on board one captured vessel may be invoked into the case of another, captured on the same cruise. The Experiment, (261) 612 8. A commission obtained by fraudulent misrepresentations will not vest the interests of prize. Id. (264) 613 9. But a collusive capture, made under a commission, is not, per se, evidence that the commission was fraudulently obtained.

ld.

By a charter-party, the sum of $30,000 was agreed to be paid for the use or hire of the ship, on a voyage from Philadelphia to Madeira, and thence to Bombay, and, at the option of the charterer, to Calcutta, and back to Philadelphia (with an addition of $2,000 if she should proceed to Calcutta), the whole payable on the return of the ship to Philadelphia, and before the discharge of her cargo there, in approved notes, not exceeding an average time of ninety days from the time at which she should be ready to discharge her cargo. The charterer proceeded in the ship to Calcutta, and, with the consent of the master (who was appointed by the ship-owners), entered into an agreement with P. & Co., merchants there, that if they would make him an advance of money he would deliver to them a bill of lading, stipulating for the delivery of the goods purchased therewith, to their agents in Philadelphia, free of freight, who should be authorized to sell the same, and apply the proceeds to the repayment of the said advance, unless the charterer's bills, drawn on G. & S., of Philadelphia, should be accepted; in which event the agents of P. & Co. should deliver the goods to the charterer. goods were shipped accordingly, and a bill of lading signed by the master, with the clause, "freight for the said goods having been settled here." The bills of exchange, drawn by the charterer, were refused acceptance, and the agents of P. & Co. demanded the goods, which the owners of the ship refused to deliver, without the payment of freight. Held, that the owners of the ship had a lien on these goods for the freight. Gracie v. Palmer, (605) 696 SLAVE-TRADE ACT-8.

See Admiralty, 2, 3.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-6. See Chancery, 9, 10, 11, 12.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-8. See Attorney, 3.

STATUTES OF CONNECTICUT-7. See Local Law, 7.

STATUTES OF OHIO-6. See Local Law, 14.

(lb.) 613

STATUTES OF MARYLAND-6. See Local Law, 19, 20.

STATUTES OF MASSACHUSETTS-7. See Local Law, 7.

10. A collusive capture vests no title in the captors, not because the commission is thereby made void, but because the captors thereby forfeit all title to the prize property.

Id. (lb.) 613 11. Collusive captures and violations of the revenue laws, committed by a private armed vessel, are a breach of the condition of the bond given by the owners, under the prize act of June 26, 1812, c. 430, s. 3. If such breach appear upon demurrer, the defendants are not entitled to a hearing in equity, under the judiciary act of 1789, c. 20, sec. 26. Greeley v. United States, (256) 611

REGISTRY ACT-8.

See Admiralty, 9.

STATUTES OF NORTH CAROLINA-7. See Local Law.

STATUTES OF VIRGINIA-6. See Local Law, 2, 3, 4, 8.

STATUTES OF VIRGINIA-7.

See Local Law.

STATUTES, CONSTRUCTION OF 7.

See Admiralty.

The