GENERAL INDEX

TO THE

FOUR VOLUMES OF WHEATON CONTAINED IN THIS BOOK.
FORMED BY CONSOLIDATION.

N. B.-Figures at right of title show volume to whose index it belongs.

Figures in parenthesis refer to marginal paging of the volumes contained in this book respectively,
while the black-faced figures indicate the page of this book on which the marginal paging, refered to
is found.

Hugh v. Higgs,

ACTION-8.

ADMIRALTY-5.

(697) 719

nocence of the party, condemnation follows, al-
offense having been committed.
(lb.) 238
No action at law will lie on the decretal order of though there be no positive testimony of the
Id.
a court of equity.
3. Although a mere intention to evade the pay-
ment of duties be not, per se, a cause of forfeiture.
yet when a question arises, whether an act has
been committed which draws after it that conse-
quence, such intention will justify the court in not
the act in question, an interpretation as favorable
putting on the conduct of the party, in respect to
as under other circumstances it would be disposed
to do.

mark.

ld.

1. The courts of the United States have no juris-
diction, under the act of April 30, 1790, c. 36, of the
crime of manslaughter, committed by the master
upon one of the seamen on board a merchant ves-
(191) 239
sel of the United States, lying in the river Tigris,
in the empire of China, 35 miles above its mouth,
4. In all proceeding in rem, on an appeal, the
off Wampoa, about 100 yards from the shore, in
four and a half fathoms water, and below low water-property follows the cause into the Circuit Court,
(76, 93) 37, 42 and is subject to the disposition of that court. But
United States v. Wiltberger,
it does not follow the cause into the Supreme
2. In the same act, the description of place con-
The Collector,
tained in the 8th sec., within which the offenses Court, on an appeal to that court.
therein enumerated must be committed, in order
to give the courts of the Union jurisdiction over
them, cannot be transferred to the 12th sec., so as
to give those courts jurisdiction over a man-
slaughter committed in the river of a foreign coun-
try, and not on the high seas.
(96) 43

ld.

3. History and extent of the criminal jurisdiction
of the Admiralty.

Id. note 1,

(106) 45
4. Information under the act of the 3d of March,
1807, c. 77, to prevent the importation of slaves into
the United States. The alleged unlawful importa-
tion attempted to be excused upon the plea of dis-
tress. Excuse repelled, and condemnation pro-
nounced.

The Josefa Segunda,

them is carried.

ld.

(194) 239

5. After an appeal from the District to the Circuit
ing the property, whether it has been sold, and the
Court, the former court can make no order respect-
proceeds paid into court, or whether it remains
specifically, or its proceeds remain, in the hands of
the marshal.

Id.

(Ib.) 239

6. It is a great irregularity for the marshal to
keep the property, or the proceeds thereof, in his
own hands, or to distribute the same among the
parties entitled, without a special order from the
court; but such an irregularity may be cured by
the assent and ratification of all the parties inter-
ld.
ested, if there be no mala fides.

(194) 239

7. Under the 67th section of the collection act of
(338, 351) 104, 107
5. Upon a piratical capture, the property of the the 2d of March, 1799, c. 128, where goods were
original owners cannot be forfeited for the mis- entered by an agent of the owner on his behalf,
which the packages contained, and the owner sub-
conduct of the captors, in violating the municipal and the entry included only a part of the goods
laws of the country where the vessel seized by sequently made a further, or post entry of the
(lb.) 104, 107 residue of the goods; and the packages being
6. But where the capture is made by a regularly opened several days afterwards and examined by
commissioned captor, he acquires a title to the the collector in the presence of two merchants, and
captured property, which can only be devested by their contents found to agree with the two entries
recapture, or by the sentence of a competent tri- taken together, but to differ materially from the
bunal of his own country; and the property is sub-first entry; held, that the collector was not pre-
ject to forfeiture for a violation, by the captor, of
the revenue or other municipal laws of the neutral
country into which the prize is carried.
(lb.) 104, 107
Id.
7. Speech of Mr. (now Chief Justice) Marshall, in
Congress, in the case of Thomas Nash, alias Jona-
than Robbins.

1. The non-intercourse act of the 18th of April,
1818, c. 65, prohibits the coming of British vessels to
the ports of the United States, from a British port
closed against the commerce of the United States,
either directly, or through an open British port;
but it does not prohibit the coming of such vessels
from a British closed port, through a foreign port
(not British), where the continuity of the voyage is
fairly broken.
(371, 377) 639, 640
2. A libel of information, under the ninth sec. of
the slave trade act of March 2d, 1807, c. 77, alleging
that the vessel sailed from the ports of New York
and Perth Amboy, without the captain's having de-
livered the manifests required by law to the collec-
tor or surveyor of New York and Perth Amboy, is
defective the act requiring the manifest to be de-
livered to the collector or surveyor of a single port.
The Mary Ann,
(380, 385) 641, 642

The Pitt,

5. In cases of seizures made on land under the
revenue laws, the District Court proceeds as a court
of common law, according to the course of the ex-
chequer on informations in rem, and the trial of is-
sues of facts is to be by jury; but in cases of seiz-
ures on waters navigable from the sea by vessels of
ten or more tons burthen, it proceeds as an instance
court of Admiralty, by libel, and the trial is to be
by the court.

The Sarah,

(391, 394) 644
6. A libel charging the seizure to have been made
on water, when in fact it was made on land, will not
support a verdict, and judgment or sentence there-
on; but must be amended or dismissed. The two
jurisdictions, and the proceedings under them, are
to be kept entirely distinct.
Id.

(394) 644
7. Note on the jurisdiction of the Instance Court
in revenue causes.
ld. Note 1,
(396) 645
8. If a British ship come from a foreign port (not
British) to a port of the United States, the contin-
uity of the voyage is not broken, and the vessel is
not liable to forfeiture, under the act of April 18th,
1818, c. 65, by touching at an intermediate British
closed port, from necessity, and in order to procure
provisions, without trading there.

The Frances and Eliza,

(398) 645
9. A case of forfeiture, under the twenty-seventh
section of the registry of vessels act, of December
31, 1792. c. 146, for the fraudulent use of a register,
by a vessel not actually entitled to the benefit of it.
The Luminary,
(407) 647

H. and others, merchants in Baltimore, consigned
a vessel and cargo to W. and others, merchants in
Amsterdam, with instructions to them respecting
her ulterior destination, which showed, that on the
failure of getting a freight to Batavia, or of selling
the vessel at a price limited, she was to proceed to
St. Petersburg, and there take in a return cargo of
structions to the master committing to him the
Russia goods for the United States, but with in-
management of the ulterior voyage. No freight to
Batavia could be obtained, and the vessel could
not be sold for the price limited at Amsterdam:
and W. and others, purchased in Amsterdam, with
Russian goods, partly with the money of H. and
the concurrence of the master, a return cargo of
selves. On the return of the vessel to Baltimore,
others, and partly with money advanced by them-
H. and others objected to the purchase of this car-
go in Amsterdam, as being contrary to express or-
ders, and gave notice to W. and others, of their de-
termination to hold them responsible for all losses
sustained in consequence of this breach of instruc-
tions; but received the goods and sold them. W.
and others brought an assumpsit against H. and
others, to recover from them the moneys advanced.
The declaration contained the three usual money
counts. Held, 1st. That the plaintiffs had a de-
mand in law against the defendants, which could
be maintained in this form of action. 2d. That
whether the plaintiffs could, or could not, be made
responsible in any form of action which might be
devised for the possible loss resulting from the
breaking up of the intended voyage to St. Peters-
tion from the plaintiffs' demand, for the amount of
burg, the defendants were not entitled to a deduc-

such loss.

See Admiralty, 4.

AMENDMENT-8.

ASSIGNMENT-5.

(545) 519

10. Where the onus probandi is thrown on the
claimant, in an instance or revenue cause, by a
prima facie case, made out on the part of the pros-
ecutor, and the claimant fails to explain the diffi-prietor, he cannot interfere to defeat the rights of
1. Where a chose in action is assigned by the pro-
culties of the case by the production of papers and the assignee in the prosecution of a suit brought to
other evidence which must be in his possession, or
under his control, condemnation follows from the
enforce those rights.
defects of testimony on the part of the claimant.
Id.
(411) 648
See Prize.

AGENT-5.

1. The acts of agents do not derive their validity
from professing on the face of them to have been
done in the exercise of their agency.
Mechanics' Bank v. Bank of Columbia,
(326, 337) 100, 103

Mandeville v. Welch,

(277,283) 87, 89

2. It makes no difference, in this respect, whether
the assignment be good at law, or in equity.

ld.

(283) 89
3. A bill of exchange is an assignment to the
payee, of the debt due from the drawee to the
drawer.
ld.
(285) 90
4. But this principle does not apply to a partial
assignment of the fund.

Id.

(286) 90

See Fraud.

BANKRUPT-7.

BASTARD-5.

(146) 228
6. A protest of an inland bill or promissory note
is not necessary, nor is it evidence of the facts
stated in it.

The Union Bank v. Hyde,

(572) 333
7. The following undertaking of the endorser of
a promissory note, "I do request that hereafter
any notes that may fall due in the Union Bank, in
which I am, or may be indorser, shall not be pro-
tested, as I will consider myself bound in the same
manner as if the said notes had been or should be
whether it amounted to a waiver of demand and
legally protested," held to be ambiguous as to
notice; and parol proof admitted to show that it
mand and notice required by law to charge the
was the understanding of the parties, that the de-
indorser, should be dispensed with.

Id.

(lb.) 333
BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY

NOTES-7.

1. A bill, or note, is prima facie evidence, under
a count for money had and received, against the
drawer or indorser.

Page's Administrator v. The Bank of Alex-
andria,
(35) 390
2. But the presumption, that the contents of the
bill or note have been received by the party sued,
and for the use of the plaintiff, may be rebutted
by circumstances; and a recovery cannot be had,
in such a case, where it is proved that the money
was actually received by another party.

ld.
(lb.) 390
BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY
NOTES-8.

1. Banks, and other commercial corporations,
may bind themselves by the acts of their authorized
officers and agents, without the corporate seal.

Fleckner v. U. S. Bank, (338, 357) 631, 635
2. The negotiability of a promissory note, payable
to order, is not restrained by the circumstance of
its being given for the purchase of real property in
Louisiana, and the notary, before whoin the con-
Note on the history of the disabilities and rights tract of sale is executed, writing upon it the words
of illegitimate children in different ages and coun-ne varietur," according to the laws and usages of
that state, and other countries governed by the civil
(262) 83 law.
Id.

tries.

Note 1,

See Local Law, 5, 6, 7.

4. Evidence of a letter, containing notice, having
been put into the post-office, directed to the in-
dorser, at his place of residence, is sufficient proof
of the notice to be left to the jury, and it is un-
necesary to give notice to the defendant to pro-
-duce the letter before such evidence can be ad-
mitted.
Id.
(lb.) 216

(363) 637

3. The statutes of usury of England, and of the
states of the Union, expressly provide that usurious
contracts shall be utterly void; but, without such
a provision, they are not void as against parties
who are strangers to the usury.

ld.

(355) 635

4. The statute incorporating the Bank of the Unit-
ed States does not avoid securities on which usu-
rious interest may have been taken, and the usury
cannot be set up as a defense to a note on which it
is taken. It is merely a violation of the charter, for
which a remedy may be applied by the govern-
Id.
(lb.) 335
See Evidence, 6, 7, 8.

ment.

6. Exemption of public ships from foreign juris-
diction. The Cassius, 3 Dall. 121. The Invincible,
ante, Vol I., p. 238, and The Exchange, 7 Cranch,
116; commented on in The Santissima Trinidad.
(350) 471
7. Patent. Evans v. Eaton, ante, Vol. III., p. 454,
explained and confirmed in S. C. and Evans v.
Hettich,
(427, 431, 468) 490, 491, 500
8. Practice in Real Actions. Green v. Watkins,
ante, Vol. VI., 260, commented on and confirmed in
Macker's heirs v. Thomas,
(531) 515

CHANCERY-5.

Mandeville v. Welch,

7. But as length of time necessarily obscures all
human evidence, and deprives parties of the means
of ascertaining the nature of the original transac-
tions, it operates, by way of presumption, in favor
of innocence, and against imputation of fraud.
Prevost v. Gratz,
(497) 315

8. The lapse of forty years, and the death of all
the original parties, deemed sufficient to presume
the discharge and extinguishment of a trust,
proved once to have existed by strong circum-
stances; by analogy to the rule of law, which after
a lapse of time presumes the payment of a debt,
surrender of a deed, and extinguishment of a trust,
where circumstances require it.

ld.

(lb.) 315

1. A deposit of title deeds as security for a debt,
9. The general rule is, that time is not of the
creates a lien which is considered an equitable essence of a contract of sale; and a failure on the
mortgage.
part of the purchaser, or vendor, to perform his
(277,284) 87, 90 contract, on the stipulated day, does not, of itself,
2. So also the deposit of a note, not negotiable, as deprive him of his right to a specific performance,
security for a debt, will entitle the creditor, after when he is able to comply with his part of the en-
notice to the maker, to enforce in equity his lien gagement.
against the depositor and his assignees in bank-
Brashier v. Gratz,
(528) 322
ruptcy,
10. But circumstances may be so changed that
ld.
(284) 90 the object of the party can no longer be accom-
3. But this doctrine proceeds upon the supposi-plished, and be cannot be placed in the same situa-
tion that the deposit is clearly established to have
tion as if the contract had been performed in due
been made as security for the debt, and not upon
time. In such a case, a court of equity will leave
the ground that the mere fact of a deposit unex-
the parties to their remedy at law.
plained affords such proof.
ld.
ld.
(lb.) 90
4. In equity, a final decree cannot be pronounced
until all the parties in interest are brought before
the court.

Marshall v. Beverley,

(313, 315)

97
5. Where a bill was filed for a perpetual injune-
tion, on judgments obtained on certain bills of ex-
change drawn by the plaintiff, and negotiated to
the defendant, and which had subsequently passed
from the latter into the hands of third persons, by
whom the judgments were obtained; held, that the
injunction could not be decreed until their answers
had come in, although the bill stated, and the de-
fendant admitted, that he had paid the judgments,
and was then the only person interested in them,
because such statement and admission might be
made by collusion.

ld.

(lb.) 97

6. In appeals to this court, from the circuit courts,
in chancery cases, the parol testimony which is
heard at the trial in the court below ought to ap-
pear in the record.

Conn v. Penn,

(424) 125
7. A final decree in equity, or an interlocutory
decree, which in a great measure decides the merits
of the cause, cannot be pronounced, until all the
parties to the bill, and all the parties in interest,
are before the court.
(lb.) 125
8. Explanation of the former decree of this court
in the case of Campbell v. Pratt et al. (9 Cranch, 500,
S. C.)
(429) 126

Id.

CHANCERY-6.

1. There is no difference in respect to the con-
clusiveness of a judgment at law and of a decree
in chancery. Both are conclusive as to the facts
directly in controversy.

Hopkins v. Lee,

(109, 113) 218, 219

(Ib) 395
6. It is a rule, both of law and equity, that a

2. A decree cannot be pronounced, on the 'testi-party must recover on the strength of his own title,
mony of a single witness, unaccompanied by cor-
and not on the weakness of his adversary's.
roborating circumstances, against a positive denial,
by the defendant, of any matter directly charged
by the bill, in the defendant's answer, or answer in
support of his plea.

(lb.) 303
4. Under what circumstances a plea of a former
judgment at law, for the same cause of action, is a
good bar in equity.
lb. 303
5. To establish the existence of a trust, the onus
probandi lies on the party who alleges it.
Prevost v. Gratz,
(481) 311
6. In general, length of time is no bar to a trust
clearly established to have once existed; and where
fraud is imputed and proved, length of time ought
not to exclude relief.
(497) 315

ld.

Watts v. Lindsey's heirs, (158, 161) 423, 424
in the pleadings, as well as the proofs in the cause.
7. The decree must conform to the allegations
Crocket v. Lee,
(522, 525) 513, 514

See Local Law, 3, 28, 29, 30.
See Practice, 1.

CHANCERY-8.

1. A letter of attorney may, in general, be revoked
by the party making it, and is revoked by his death.

Hunt v. Rousmanier, (174, 201) 589, 596
2. Where it forms a part of a contract, and is a se-
curity for the performance of any act, it is usually
made irrevocable in terms, or, if not so made, is
deemed irrevocable in law.
Id.
(201) 596
3. But a power of attorney, though irrevocabile
during the life of the party, becomes (at law) ex-
tinct by his death.
(202) 596
4. But if the power be coupled with an interest, it
survives the person giving it, and may be executed
after his death.

17. On a bill of interpleader, the plaintiffs are, in
general, entitled to their costs out of the fund.
Where the money is not brought into court, they
must pay interest upon it.
Id.

(293) 620
18. Under the act of assembly of Virginia, of Oc-
tober, 1783, for the better locating and surveying
the lands given to the officers and soldiers on con-
tinental and state establishments, the state of Vir-
ginia has no right to call upon the person who was
appointed one of the principal surveyors, to account
for the fees received by him, of one dollar for ev-
ery hundred acres, on delivering the warrants, to-
wards raising a fund for the purpose of supporting
all contingent expenses; the bill filed by the Attor-
ney-General of the state, to compel an account, not
sufficiently averring the want of any proper private
parties in esse to claim it.

(365, 369) 637. 638
19. Quere, Whether, in such a case, the assignees
of the warrants, or a part of them, suing in behalf
of the whole, could maintain a suit in equity for an
account?

(370) 638
20. A trustee cannot purchase or acquire by ex-
change, the trust property.

(421,438) 651, 655
21. Where the trustee, in a marriage settlement,
has a power to sell, and re-invest the trust proper-
ty, whenever, in his opinion, the purchase money
may be laid out advantageously for the cestuis que
trust, that opinion must be fairly and honestly ex
ercised; and the sale will be void where he appears
to have been influenced by private and selfish in-
terests, and the sale is for an inadequate price.
(442)
Id.

656

24. But wherever the purchaser is affected with
notice of the facts, which, in law, constitute the
breach of trust, the sale is void as to him; and a
mere general denial of all knowledge of fraud will
not avail him, if the transaction is such as a court
of equity cannot sanction.

25. A bona fidei purchaser, without notice, to be
entitled to protection, must be so, not only at the
time of the contract or conveyance, but until the
purchase inoney is actually paid.
(449) 658
Id.

26. This court will not suffer its jurisdiction, in
an equity cause, to be ousted, by the circumstance
of the joinder or non-joinder of merely formal par-
ties, who are not entitled to sue, or liable to be
sued, in the United States courts.
ld.

(451) 659
27. Note on the subject of who are necessary par-
ties to a bill in equity.
ld. note 1,