Mr. Justice STORY delivered the opinion of the court: The record in this case presents a great variety of facts, out of which several important questions have arisen; but as the merits of the cause may, in the opinion of the court, be completely disposed of by the decision of a single point, the facts which illustrate that point will alone be mentioned. This is a writ of right, originally brought by the plaintiff in error, against the defendant in error, to recover a certain tract of land in Kentucky, described in the writ. Issue being joined on the mere right between the parties, the demandant, to sustain his suit, gave in evidence a patent of the land in question, granted to him by the commonwealth of Virginia, and dated the 28th day of January, 1784, and offered proof of the boundary. But he offered no proof, other than his patent, that he was ever seized of the land in question. According 29*] to the decision *of this court, in Green v. Liter (8 Cranch, 229), a patent of vacant lands of the state conveys to the grantee a constructive actual seisin, sufficient to maintain a writ of right; and therefore the demandant in this case entitled himself prima facie, upon this evidence, to a recovery. To rebut this conclusion, the tenants offered in evidence, as well for the purpose of proving title in themselves, as to show that the demandant was never seized of the premises, certain patents from the commonwealth of Virginia, which included the premises, to wit, a patent to John Lewis and Richard May, dated the first of June, 1782; a patent to Edmund Eggleston, dated the same day and year; and a patent to John Gratton, dated the same day and year; and a patent to Isham Watkins of the same date; under which patents the tenants endeavored to derive by mesne conveyances a good title to themselves in severalty. To the regularity of the title of the tenants so derived, the demandant took several objections, which were overruled by the court, and the conveyances were admitted in evidence; and if, in point of law, the patents so offered in evidence by the tenants were admissible, for the purpose of showing that the demandant never had any constructive actual seisin in the premises, which was the only seisin on which he relied, the regularity of these mesne conveyances to the tenant becomes wholly immaterial, since, if these patents were still outstanding in strangers, they would, if admissible, all establish the same defect of seisin in the demandant. The question, then, which meets us at the threshold of this cause 30*] is, whether it *be competent for the tenants, in a writ of right, where the demandant shows no seisin by a pedis positio, but relies wholly on a constructive actual seisin, in virtue of a patent of the land, as vacant land, to disprove that constructive seisin, by showing that the state had previously granted the same land to other persons, with whom the tenants claim no privity. In other words, whether the tenants can set up title and seisin in a stranger, to disprove the seisin of the demandant; and, upon the fullest consideration, we are all of opinion that they may. The reasoning on which our opinion isfounded, is this: The mise joined in a writ of right, necessarily involves the titles of both parties to the suit, and institutes a comparison between them. It is consequently the right of each party to give any fact in evidence which destroys the title of the other; for the question in controversy is, which hath the better mere right to hold the demanded premises. It has been already decided by this court, and is indeed among the best established doctrines of the common law, that seisin in deed either by possession of the land, and perception of profits, or by construction of law, is indispensable to enable the demandant to maintain his suit. The tenant may therefore show, in his defense, that the demandant had no such actual seisin; for the seisin of the freehold by the tenant, which is admitted by the bringing of the suit against him, is a sufficient title for the tenant, until the demandant can show a better title. The tenant may thus defeat the demandant, by proving that he never had any such seisin in deed, or if he once had it, that he has parted with *his whole estate, by [*31 a conveyance competent to convey, and actually conveying it. But To apply this doctrine to the present case. The demandant here relies, not on a seisin in deed, by a pedis positio, but on a seisin in deed by construction of law, in virtue of his patent. If the land included in the grant belonged, at the time of the conveyance, to the state, and was vacant, upon the principles already asserted by this court, it conveyed, by operation of law, a seisin in deed to the demandant. if the state had already granted the land by a prior patent, it was already, upon the same principles, in the adverse seisin of another grantee, and, consequently, the patent to the demandant could not convey either title or seisin. It is, therefore, manifest, that for this purpose, to disprove the seisin of the demandant, the tenants in this case were entitled to introduce the four patents above stated (even if they failed to establish a privity of estate in themselves), since these patents were all prior to that of the demandant, included the land, and, if admitted, would show that the seisin in deed, by mere construction of law upon the grant of his patent, never had a real existence. It has been supposed, however, at the bar, that the case of Green v. Liter establishes a different doctrine on this point. In our opinion, that case does not justify any such conclusion; and certainly was not understood by the court to require it. It will be recollected, that the case of Green v. Liter came before this court upon a division of opinion of the judges of the Circuit Court upon certain questions of *law, stated in the record. To those [*32 questions, in the form in which they were stated, and to those questions only, could the opinion of this court properly extend. In answer to the fifth question, which involved the inquiry, whether actual seisin, or, as it is commonly expressed, seisin in deed, is necessary to maintain a writ of right, and whether a patent from the state, of its vacant lands, conferred, 64 by construction of law, a seisin in deed to the grantee, this court expressed an unhesitating opinion in the affirmative on both points. It follows, therefore, by necessary inference from this doctrine, that the tenant may disprove the demandant's seisin in deed by any evidence competent for this purpose; and if he succeeds in establishing the fact, the demandant must fail in his suit. That the proof of a prior patent of the same lands to another person would be sufficient for this purpose, in a case where the demandant relied exclusively upon a constructive seisin in deed, in virtue of the grant of his patent, has been already asserted. The eighth question propounded to the court, in Green v. Liter, is that, however, upon which the difficulty at the bar has arisen. It is in these words: Can the defendant defend himself by an older and better existing title than the demandants in a third person?" Now, it is material to consider, that this question does not purport to inquire whether the tenant may disprove the defendant's seisin in a writ of right; nor does it purport to inquire whether the tenant may not show that the demandant has no title, or a title defective in point of legal operation. It supposes that the demandant has 33* a *title per se, sufficient for a recovery, and then asks if a better title may be shown in a third person to defeat such recovery. answer of the court is in the following words: “We are of opinion that a better subsisting adverse title in a third person is no defense in a writ of right. That writ brings into controversy only the mere rights of the parties to the suit. It is most manifest, that in this answer the court proceed upon the supposition that the demandant has, prima facie, a good title, upon which he may maintain his suit; and that he has established a seisin sufficient, in point of law, to entitle him to a recovery. And the point then is, whether a superior adverse title and seisin in a stranger can be given in evidence to dispute such recovery. The very reason assigned against the admission of such evidence shows the understanding of the court to be precisely what we now assert. It cannot be admitted, because a writ of right does not bring into controversy the right of the demandant as against all the world, but the mere right of the parties to the suit. But it does bring into controversy the mere right between these parties; and if so, it, by consequence, authorizes either party to establish, by evidence, that the other has no right whatsoever in the demanded premises, or that his mere right is inferior to that set up against him. The If, in the case at bar, the demandant had established an actual seisin by occupation of the land, and taking the esplees, the case would then have presented precisely the point which was understood to be presented in Green v. 34*] Liter; and from the opinion *given in that case, on that point, there is not the slight est inclination in this court to depart. We think that the decision in the present case may well be made upon the principles which have been already expounded, without, in any degree, breaking in upon the doctrines of that case. If we are right in this view of the subject, it is unnecessary to enter into a minute examination of the points made in the court below, since the evidence which was objected to, was, under the circumstances of the case, clearly admissible, for the purpose of disproving the seisin of the demandant. As to the instructions prayed for by the demandant, in the close of the evidence, and refused by the court and as to the instructions actually given by the court to the jury, it does seem necessary to pass them in minute review. Several of them turn altogether upon the deduction of title by the tenant, from the original patentee, whose patents they set up in defense. And as to the others, they may be disposed of by the single remark, that no error has been shown by them, in the argument here, and no error is perceived by the court. ERROR to the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, for the County of Alexandria. This was an action of assumpsit, brought by the defendants in error, the Bank of Alexandria, against the plaintiffs in error, the administrators of William Byrd Page, deceased. The declaration contained two counts. The first was on a promissory note, which was set forth, as made by William Hodgson, and payable on demand to the intestate, Page, who indorsed it to the Bank of Alexandria, where it was discounted, and the money paid to Hodgson. In support of this count, a note was given in evidence, drawn by Hodgson, in favor of, and indorsed by Page, payable fiftyfour days after date. The other counts were for money lent and advanced by the plaintiffs below to the intes tate, Page, and for money had and received by him for their use. Evidence was also given to show that the bank had *used due dili- [*36 gence in demanding payment of the maker, and in giving notice of non-payment to the indorser; and that Page, in his life-time, frequently promised the bank payment of the note, after it became due. Judgment was given for the plaintiffs below, on a demurrer to the evidence, and the cause was brought to this court by writ of error. This cause was argued by Mr. Swann and - Mr. Lee for the plaintiffs in error, and by bank can only recover from the administrators Mr. Taylor for the defendants in error. Mr. Justice LIVINGSTON delivered the opinion of the court, and after stating the case, proceeded as follows: Whether due diligence were used by the holder of the note, is immaterial now to inquire, as this court is of the opinion, that a note payable any number of days after date, could not be applied to a count describing it as one payable on demand. of Page, if at all, on his indorsement; but that, having set forth the note incorrectly, and there not being sufficient evidence to support the second count, the present action cannot be sustained. The judgment of the Circuit Court is therefore reversed, and judgment is to be entered for the defendants below. Cited 6 How. 37; 2 Wood. & M. 78; 4 Cranch, C. C. 12; 2 McLean, 237. [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.] Ex-parte KEARNEY. This court has authority to issue a habeas corpus, where a person is imprisoned under the warrant or order of any other court of the United States. crimina! cases, confided to it by the laws of the But this court has no appellate jurisdiction in United States, and cannot revise the judgments of the circuit courts, by writ of error, in any case fense. where a party has been convicted of a public of *Hence the court will not grant a habeas [*39 corpus where a party has been committed for a contempt adjudged by a court of competent juris diction. In such a case, this court will not inquire into The only remaining question is, whether this note were sufficient proof of the count for money lent and advanced, and for money had and received. There are certainly cases in which a promissory note or an indorsement of 37*] such note, may be offered in *evidence, against the maker or indorser, under a count of this nature, and if unconnected with other circumstances, may be sufficient proof, in itself to charge the defendant. This proceeds on the ground that such note warrants a fair presumption or inference that the maker or indorser has received the contents of such note. But the court is not satisfied that, in this case, the mere production of this note was sufficient proof of Page's having borrowed money of the bank, or of his having received moneys for their use. Although a note or an indorsement be prima facie evidence of a receipt of money from the holders, by the maker, or indorser, yet, when all the other testimony in the cause produced by the plaintiffs themselves, shows unequivocally that the money for which the R.JONES moved for a habeas corpus to bring note was made was paid, not to the indorser, up the body of John T. Kearney, now in but to the maker himself, and for his sole use, jail, in the custody of the marshal, under a the presumption arising from the mere act of commitment of the Circuit Court for the District indorsement is destroyed, and the party, in of Columbia, for an alleged contempt. The such case, ought not to be permitted to aban-petition stated, that on the trial of an indictdon his count on the written contract of the ment in that court, the petitioner was examined party, and apply it to the general money as a witness, and refused to answer a certain counts. It is admitted or proved, that this question which was put to him, because he was a note made and indorsed for the accom- conceived it tended materially to implicate modation of Hodgson, and that this fact was him, and to criminate him as a particeps crimknown to the directors of the bank, who re-inis. The objection was overruled by the ceived and discounted it as such, and for his sole use, and that he, and not Page, received the avails thereof. What pretense, then, is there, that this money was lent to Page, or that he received it for the use of the bank? the sufficiency of the cause of commitment. MR court, and he having persisted in refusing to answer the question, was committed to jail for the supposed contempt; and for no other cause. Mr. Jones, for the petitioner, now argued, 1. That this court has power to issue the writ of There was also proof in the cause that habeas corpus in every case where the personal Page, in his life-time, frequently promised liberty of the citizen is restrained under the the bank payment of the said note, after it be- judicial authority of the Union. The jurisdic38*] came due. This promise *must be re- tion is settled by a uniform series of decisions. garded as applying exclusively to the note It had been exercised in a case of treason;3 in a which was offered in evidence, and was pay-case where the warrant of commitment was deable in fifty-four days after date; and if that note had been declared on, its influence on the cause would deserve serious consideration; but it cannot be used in support of the other count, for the testimony, in terms, confines this promise to payment of the note, and says not a word of his undertaking to repay the money which the bank had loaned to him or which he had received for their use. The opinion of the court, then, is, that the 1.-They cited Sheehy v. Mandeville, 7 Cranch, 209; 1 H. Bl. 602; French's Adm. v. the Bank of Alex., 4 Cranch, 141; 2 H. Bl. 609; Macky v. Davis, 2 Wash. Rep. 219; Goodhall v. Stewart, 2 Hen. & Munf. 105. 2. He cited Tatlock v. Harris, 3 T. R. 174; 3 fective, in not showing a good cause certain, on oath or affirmation; and, at last the [*40 case of Bollman and Swartwouts settled the power of the court to be universal, and co-extensive with the general judicial power of the Union. 2. He insisted that a fit case was made out to justify the exercise of the jurisdiction upon the present application. The jurisdiction of this court cannot depend upon the nature of the commitment by the other court. The writ of Burr. 1516; 2 Wash. Rep. 233, 265; 6 Munf. 392; 5 habeas corpus is a writ of right, and the nature judgment of the Circuit Court, in any case and grounds of the commitment are to be looked where a party has been convicted of a public into on the return. This court must have power offense. And undoubtedly the denial of this to issue the writ where an inferior court com- authority proceeded upon great principles of mit even for a contempt; because if the process public policy and convenience. If every party of contempt be a branch of criminal judica- had a right to bring before this court every ture, considered as a punishment for an offense, case, in which judgment had passed against this court has authority to control all inferior him, for a crime or misdemeanor or felony, the courts and magistrates. In England, the court course of justice might be materially delayed of common pleas, although a tribunal of original and obstructed, and, in some cases, totally and civil jurisdiction only, has, from the earliest frustrated. If, then, this court cannot directly times, exercised the authority of issuing the revise a judgment of the Circuit Court in a crimwrit of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause inal case, what reason is there to suppose that of commitments by other jurisdictions.' it was intended to vest it with the authority to do it indirectly? Mr. Swann (District-Attorney), contra, admitted that this court had a general power of It is also to be observed, that there is no quesissuing the writ of habeas corpus ad subjicien- tion here, but that this commitment was made 41*] dum to all the other *courts and officers by a court of competent jurisdiction, and in the of the United States, but insisted that this was exercise of an unquestionable authority. The not a case in which the court could exercise only objection is, not that the court acted bethe authority. Because the Circuit Court yond its jurisdiction, but that it erred in its for the District of Columbia was an inferior judgment of the law applicable to the case. If, tribunal, it did not therefore follow that an then, we are to give any relief in this case, it is appeal lies to this court from its judgment in by a revision of the opinion of the court, [*43 criminal cases. This court has no appellate given in the course of a criminal trial, and thus jurisdiction in criminal cases. It can only re-asserting a right to control its proceedings, and vise the decisions of the Circuit Court in such take from them the conclusive effect which the cases where there is a certificate of a division of law intended to give them. If this were an apopinion of the judges below. Here there was plication for a habeas corpus, after judgment no doubt the court had jurisdiction of the case on an indictment for an offense within the juin which the party was committed for refusing risdiction of the Circuit Court, it could hardly be to answer a question put to him, and which the maintained that this court could revise such a court had determined he was bound to answer. judgment, or the proceedings which led to it, This court cannot revise the principal case by or set it aside, and discharge the prisoner. an appellate process, neither can it revise that There is, in principle, no distinction between which has incidentally arisen out of it. Every that case and the present; for when a court court of justice must have a discretionary power commits a party for a contempt, their adjudiof punishing contempts; and if an appeal were cation is a conviction, and their commitment, in allowed upon every interlocutory judgment of consequence, is execution; and so the law was this sort, there would be the greatest possible settled upon full deliberation, in the case of Brass Crosby, Lord Mayor of London (3 Wilson, 188). embarrassment and confusion. Upon the argument of this motion, two questions have been made: First, whether this court has authority to issue a habeas corpus, where a person is in jail, under the warrant or order of any other court of the United States; secondly, if it have, whether, upon the facts stated, a fit case is made out to justify the exercise of such an authority. 42*] *As to the first question, it is unnecessary to say more than that the point has already passed in rem judicatam in this court. In the case of Bollman and Swartwout (4 Cranch. 75) it was expressly decided, upon full argument, that this court possessed such an authority, and the question has ever since been considered at rest. ance. The second point is of much more importIt is to be considered, that this court has no appellate jurisdiction confided to it in criminal cases, by the laws of the United States. It cannot entertain a writ of error, to revise the 1.-Wood's case, 3 Wils. 173; Scroggs v. Coleshill, Dyer, 175; 4 Inst. 290; Bushell's Case, Sir T. Jones's Rep. 12: 2 W. Bl. 745; 2 Hale's P. C. 144: Moor, 838; 1 Hale P. C. 399, 406, 446. Indeed, in that case the same point was before the court as in this. It was an applica tion to the Court of Common Pleas for a habeas who was committed for contempt by the House corpus to bring up the body of the Lord Mayor, of Commons. The habeas corpus was granted, and upon the return, the causes of contempt for which the party was committed, were set forth. It was argued, that the House of Commons had no authority to commit for a contempt; and if they had, that they had not used it rightly and properly, and that the causes assigned were insufficient. But the whole court were of opinion that the House of Commons had a right to commit for a contempt, and that the court could not revise its adjudication. Lord Chief Jus tice De Grey, on *that occasion said: [*44 "When the House of Commons adjudged anything to be a contempt, or a breach of privilege, their adjudication is a conviction, and their commitment, in consequence, is execution; and no court can discharge, on bail, a person that is in execution by the judgment of any other court. The House of Commons, therefore, having an authority to commit, and that commitment being an execution, what can this court do? It can do nothing, when a person is in execution by the judgment of a court having a competent jurisdiction. In such a case this court is not a court of appeal." Again: "The [*CHANCERY.] [*46 The vendor of real property, who has not taken a separate security for the purchase money, has a lien, for it, on the land as against the vendee and his heirs. This lien is defeated by an alienation to a bona fide purchaser without notice. courts of K. B. or C. B. never discharged any under a bona fide conveyance from the vendee. Nor can it be asserted against creditors holding Quere, Whether the lien can be asserted against the assignees of a bankrupt, or ther creditors coming in under the purchaser by act of law. The dictum of Sugden in his Law of Vendors, 364, examined and questioned. could, by writs of habeas corpus, examine and APPEAL from the Circuit Court for the Dis determine the contempt of others." So that it is most manifest from the whole reasoning of the court in this case, that a writ of habeas corpus was not deemed a proper remedy, where a party was committed for a contempt by a court of competent jurisdiction; 45*] *and that, if granted, the court could not inquire into the sufficiency of the cause of commitment. If, therefore, we were to grant the writ in this case, it would be applying it in a manner not justified by principle or usage; and we should be bound to remand the party, unless we were prepared to abandon the whole doctrine, so reasonable, just, and convenient, which has hitherto regulated this important subject. We are entirely satisfied to administer the law as we find it, and are all of opinion, that upon the facts of this case, the motion ought to be denied. The argument of inconvenience has been pressed upon us with great earnestness. But where the law is clear, this argument can be of no avail; and it will probably be found, that there are also serious inconveniences on the other side. Wherever power is lodged, it may be abused. But this forms no solid objection against its exercise. Confidence must be reposed somewhere; and if there should be an abuse, it will be a public grievance, for which a remedy may be applied by the legislature, and is not to be devised by courts of justice. This argument was also used in the case already cited, and the answer of the court to it is so satisfactory that it would be useless to attempt any farther refutation. Upon the whole, it is the opinion of the court that the motion be overruled. Writ denied.1 Cited 3 Pet. 208; 5 Pet. 210;7 Pet. 572, 581; 14 Pet. 600, 603, 604, 623, 626, 628; 5 How. 190; 14 How. 119, 129, 130, 132; 18 How. 317;18 Wall. 185, 187, 206; 20 Wall. 392:3 Otto, 23; 10 Otto, 23, 283; 12 Otto, 122; 1 Wood. & M. 440; 4 Biss. 499; 2 Sawy. 409; 7 Blatchf. 25; 8 Blatchf. 94; 2 Cranch, C. C. 248, 392. 1.-Vide Ante, Vol. VI., p. 204, Anderson v. Dunn, where it was determined, that an action could not be maintained against the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representatives for imprisoning the plaintiff on a warrant for a contempt adjudged by the House. See also the case of J. V. N. Yates, 4 Johns. Rep. 317; Yates v. Lansing, 9 Johns. Rep. 395; Yates v. The People, 6Johns. Rep. 337; Burdett v. Abbott, 11 East's Rep. 1, S. C.; 5 Dow. Parl. Rep. 165. trict of Columbia. This suit was brought by the appellant in the Circuit Court for the county of Washington, for the purpose of subjecting a tract of land, lying within that county, which was sold by the plaintiff, Bayley, to the defendant, Greenleaf, to the payment of so much of the purchase money as still remains due. It appeared by the proceedings in the cause that in the year 1792 William Bayley purchased from William B. Worman *the land which is [*47 the subject of this suit, which he afterwards sold to James Greenleaf, to whom the title was made by Worman. A bond was given by Greenleaf to Bayley for the purchase money, which, in March, 1796, was surrendered to Greenleaf on his accepting bills drawn in favor of Clement Biddle for its amount. Some of these bills were alleged to be unpaid, and were produced by the plaintiffs. On the 30th day of September, 1796, James Greenleaf, being then greatly indebted, conveyed sundry estates, and among others, the land in controversy, to George Simpson, in trust for the security of Edward Fox, who had entered into engagements for the said Greenleaf, to a very large amount. The deed was also made to secure the said Fox for any further advances he might make to, or engagements he might enter into, on account of the said Greenleaf. On the 23d of March, 1797, George Simpson conveyed this land to the defendants, Pratt, Francis and others, as trustees for the uses and purposes mentioned in the deed from Greenleaf to Simpson. On the 26th of June 1797, a NOTE-Lien for purchase money. The vendor of real estate who has not taken a separate security for the purchase money, has a lien for it on the land, as against the purchaser and his heirs, and privies in estate. This lien is, in some respects, analogous to an equitable mortgage. Randall v. Jaques, 4 Quart. Law J. 218; Chilton v. Braiden, 2 Black, 458; Nairn v. Prouse, 6 Ves. 752, 760; Hughes v. Kearney, 1 Sch. and Lefr. 132; English v. Russell, Hempst. 35; 4 Kent's Comm. 151. 154; Burgess v. Wheate, 1 W. Bl. 150; S. C. 1 Eden, 210; Champion v. Brown, 6 John. Ch. 402; Daniels v. Davison, 16 Ves. 249; S. C. 17 Ves. 433; 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 3, s. 3, note (e); 2 Madd. Ch. 105, 106; McLean v. McLelland, 10 Pet. 625; Sugden on Vendors, Vol. III..p.182; 6 Am. ed, p. 117; Irvine v. Campbell, 6 Binn. 118; Williams v. Price, 5 Munf. 507; Stouffers Les. v. Coleman, 1 Yeates. 393: White v. Casanave, 1 Har. & J. 106; Ridgley v. Curey, 4 Har. & McH. 167; Hatcher v. Hatcher, 1 Rand. 53; Cox v. Fenwick, 3 Bibb, 183; Kennedy v. Woolfolk, 3 Hayw. 197; Wragg v.Compt, Gen. 2 Des. 509; Reeves v. Kimbal, 40 N. Y. 299; Phyfe v. Wardwell, 5 Paige, 268; 2 Edw. 47; Crafts v. Aspinwall, 2 N. Y. 289; Ross v. Whitson, 6 Yerg. 7w 46 36f 861 |