enemy a Spaniard had to fear-the patriot | cate, or bill of lading of the cargo, he is entitled privateer. But, as England was at peace with to restitution. To this the captor objects, that all the world except America, and enemy prop- the 17th article of the treaty with Spain, conerty secure from American capture in a Spanish templated a form of passport intended to be vessel, it is difficult to conceive a reason why attached to that treaty; that as no such form this disguise should have been thrown over a was settled by the two nations, the claim must British cargo. The course, however, which I rest altogether upon the provisions of the 15th will pursue in coming to a conclusion, precludes article, and the proprietary interest is to be inthe necessity of disentangling the web, in which quired into as in ordinary cases. But, if the the interests of the claimant are wound up by contracting parties are to be permitted to devise the various circumstances of the destruction, forms of passports for themselves severally, mutilation, and concealment of papers, and the then that this is not a passport in the language questionable shape in which several of the of the treaty, but a substitute for one, and is actors in the drama present themselves to the defective in not expressing unequivocally that view of this court. the ship was Spanish property.

On this part of the case it is proper to remark, that it is not always easy for the criticising eye of the common law to expand to the enlarged views and *remote perceptions which [*85 should govern the mind in the construction of

The claimant founds his right to restitution on his Spanish character, and the sufficiency of his Spanish documents under the treaty. The captor contends, that the documents found on board, were not of the first order under the 83*] treaty, and that when let in to the pro-treaties. duction of substitutes, a plenary inquiry is opened in to proprietary interest.

Yet nothing could be more inconsistent with international law, than to apply to such instruments those scrutinizing principles, Before entering upon these more general ques- which enter into the construction of a special tions, it is necessary to take notice of a pre-plea or a criminal statute. From history, analliminary ground of condemnation, which, if it can be sustained, anticipates every other inquiry. It appears that the vessel left the Havana under convoy of a British frigate, and, it is contended that this circumstance is, per se, a ground of condemnation.

This is, at least, a new ground in this court; and it cannot be expected that it will meet with a very favorable admission from a court which has manifested no disposition to multiply causes of condemnation. Without being supposed to express any inclination to adopt the principle, I deem it sufficient to remark, that if it could be admitted, it ought not to be applied to a nation which needed that protection against an existing and enterprising enemy; and which ought, therefore, to be considered, as having sought it for that purpose, and not against a neutral, whose principles of conduct it had then no reason to distrust. The Gulf of Florida, at that time, swarmed with patriot privateers; and the convoying ship had, moreover, parted from the fleet before this capture was made. The conduct of this vessel was perfectly pacific when overhauled by the American cruiser. The utmost to which the courts of Great Britain have gone, has been to affect the merchant vessel actually taken under convoy, with the resistance or character of the convoying ship; and when such a case shall occur, it will be time enough for this court to de84*] termine on the course it *will adopt. At present I feel no inclination to go so much beyond those decisions as has been here contended for.

ogy, and policy, as well as language, are to be gathered the views of the contracting parties; and however either may be pressed by the ap plication of conventional stipulations to particular cases, or under particular circumstances, not less is the obligation to execute them in a spirit, not only of good faith, but of liberality. Where no coercive power exists for compelling the observance of contracts but the force of arms, honor and liberality are the only bonds of union between the contracting parties, and all minor considerations are to be sacrificed to the great interests of mankind.

In the case before us, I see no reason for nullifying the operation of the 17th article, for want of the form which was in contemplation to be drawn up and attached to the treaty. The substance of the passport intended to be prescribed, is so copiously exhibited, as to render it a matter of the simplest effort to throw it into form. This, no doubt, was the cause why the contracting parties manifested so much indifference about carrying their intention into effect. I am, therefore, content to give the same effect to any instrument complying substantially with this article, as ought to have been given to a passport in a prescribed form. What is that effect?

*This is easily ascertained by compar- [*86 ing the provisions of the 15th, 17th, and 18th articles. By the 15th the principle is established that free ships shall make free goods, and that several branches of commerce which the modern law of nations has prohibited to neutrals, shall, notwithstanding, be freely prosecuted. But, knowing the endless litigation which questions of proprietary interest give rise to, and the sad depravity of morals exhibited by witnesses in prize courts, the enlightened statesmen who formed that treaty, resolved, by the 17th and 18th articles, to make the freedom of the ship to rest upon documentary evidence in the first instance; and evidence of property in those cases only, in which the vessel was unprovided with the necessary documents; that each nation should be sovereign to judge for itIn behalf of the claimant it is contended, that self in conferring upon its own vessels the imon the production of the passport and certifi-munity secured by the treaty, and that the ac

On the principle question, it appears that this vessel was provided, at the time of her sailing, both with a passport and certificate of her cargo. That these papers were on board at the time of the capture, cannot be doubted; they were both delivered by the captain to the registrar of the District Court, the former marked A. No. 7; the latter, B. No. 1. Some doubt arises whether they were both exhibited prior to the capture; but this is wholly immaterial in the question of condemnation.

knowledged right of adjudication in the courts of the capturing power, should be superseded, when a vessel was found on the ocean provided with the documentary evidence stipulated for by treaty; and only revert, when the vessel, being unprovided with such documents, was obliged to resort to evidence of property of a less solemn nature.

able to the enjoyment of it. To become the carriers of the world, was the object to which her negotiations were directed; and could she have obtained the same stipulation from all the rest of the European nations, she must have succeeded greatly.

The example of other nations in the construction of treaties is brought to the notice of this It is contended, that this is yielding an impor- court. But, besides that the analogy in the tant national right. What if it is? It is a mut- cases referred to is very remote, I cannot adual relinquishment, and one made by the gov-mit the force of any example that contravenes ernment, not by this court. And although it general principles. It is a melancholy truth, operate against us now, the time may come that nations and their courts are too often when the comity of Spain, or her colonies, may inclined to restrict or enlarge construction, extend the benefits of it to the commerce of *under a temporizing policy suggested by [*89 87*] this country. But, be that as it may, *if the pressure or allurement of present circumthe relinquishment has been made, it is in- stances. I will endeavor to give this treaty the cumbent on us to observe it. And although it same construction against an American captor, may not be so sensibly felt at present, the time as ought to be given it in the courts of the opis scarce gone by when it was thought a highly posite contracting party. And the day may beneficial stipulation to this country. Spain arrive when American commerce will have no was, at the date of that treaty, a respectable cause to regret that our courts have pursued naval power. Her relations with Europe and liberal and enlarged views in adopting this conthe Barbary powers often involved her in wars. struction. America abounded with ships and seamen, and her prospects were favorable for the enjoyment of peace. To carry on the commerce of the West Indies and Mediterranean, as the favorite carriers of belligerent cargoes, was, therefore, to us, a highly flattering object. And though occasional impositions might be practiced, it was, comparatively, a trivial consideration, and the chances mutual. When abuses should become flagrant and intolerable, it would have presented a just cause for dissolving the treaty; but it does not rest with courts of justice to dissolve a treaty.

As to considerations drawn from the impolicy of discouraging the spirit of cruising, I attach to them very little importance. The most serious doubts may well be entertained of the policy of giving encouragement to that species of enterprise. Certain it is, that no nation can pursue it long without feeling its demoralizing influence. It draws together a race of men, from every quarter, who want for nothing but a legal pretext for indulging their appetite for blood and violence; and while their habits and examples become popular, the rapid fortunes which are occasionally acquired, render the most valuable classes of a community dissatis88*] fied with seeking *competence by the slow progress of useful labor. It will not, perhaps, be too much to say, that this country is, at this time, experiencing something of the baneful effects which flow to the world from letting loose the passions of men to gratify themselves with plunder. But, be this as it may, it is the direct object of these articles, of this treaty, to cover commerce from capture; and if a treaty is to be construed with a view to effectuate its intent, that construction which will afford the most ample protection to commerce, will be most consistent with the views which dictated this treaty. Could the language of the treaty leave a doubt on this subject, it is historically known, that the policy of the United States, at the time of its date, was, if possible, to annihilate the right of cruising against commerce. With many ships, and a most flourishing trade, she had not a vessel of war; and while every other nation was likely to be embroiled in wars, her policy was peace, and her prospects favor

On the exceptions taken to the form of the passport it is to be observed, that on the face of the instrument it is declared to be issued in default of royal passports. From this circumstance, a doubt arose whether it was an instrument of the highest authority. This led to an inquiry at the highest sources of information relative to the powers of the Governor of Cuba to issue such passports. From the information thus obtained, I am satisfied that his powers are amply sufficient to support the authority of that document. Some very serious doubts also have been raised relative to the form of the instrument, particularly that passage of it which has relation to the national character of the ship. The treaty requires that it should set forth the name, property, and bulk of the ship; also, the name and habitation of the master or commander. These requisites are all minutely complied with, unless we except that part which relates to the property of the vessel. The words used with that view are simply fragata mer cante Espanola; and a doubt has existed whether this be a sufficient affirmance of the property or national character of the vessel. Nor has this doubt *been removed without a care- [*90 ful reference to the passports of various nations. The result is, that in all of them the affirmance is general, without specifying the individual proprietor. It is also in evidence that this is the form known and used in Spain and her colonies, as the passport of regularly documented and acknowledged Spanish vessels; and I feel myself bound to receive and acknowledge it as sufficient in form and substance.

Thus far the opinion was written, and prepared to be delivered, prior to the argument ordered at the instance of the executive. I have seen no reason to change a word of it, from anything since heard. On the contrary, the last argument has fully confirmed me in its correctness. Thousands of imaginary cases of fraud and collusion have been suggested to alarm the court; and it may be, that our government, having now a prospect of becoming a respectable naval power, and having experienced the activity and enterprise of our privateers in the late war, may feel less disposed to promote the principles of the armed neutrality, than they

did formerly. This conviction of former error has generally grown out of the same change of circumstances in other states. But it is not through the medium of courts of justice that this change of sentiment is to develop itself. If this treaty was ever binding, it is equally binding now; and in adjudicating between individuals, the same rules which would ever have been applicable, ought to be religiously adhered to, under all possible changes of interest or policy.

But the interests and apprehensions so elo91*] quently *pressed upon the notice of this court are not real. They are factitious; and may have their effect on a client's cause, but they are not the well-understood interest, or the well-founded apprehensions of the government. The execution of one treaty in a spirit of liberality and good faith, is a higher interest than all the predatory claims of a fleet of pri

vateers.

of the commander of the convoying ship is to be taken conclusively for the neutral character of every vessel in the fleet. This is the substitute in the case of a fleet for the passport of a single vessel. I speak of authentic documents; for the absurdity never was imagined that a passport stolen or seized by violence was to have the force of one regularly issued.

But it is contended, that it is due to Spain to pursue these inquiries into proprietary interest, and due to the peace of both nations that such questions *should be examined [*93 in courts of justice, rather than leave them to be the subjects of diplomatic remonstrance. This is a specious, but very unsound argument. Have not the vexations of courts of vice-admiralty, and the violence of armed cruisers, been the pregnant sources of half the commercial altercations of the last century? This was the evil intended to be remedied, and whatever impositions might flow from the remedy, What has this country to fear? A practical it was well understood, that the benefits of a answer is always most satisfactory on such a commerce uninterrupted by the cupidity of question; with similar treaties existing with cruising vessels, would more than compensate. various other powers, what real injury was sus- There is one consideration, which, on this subtained in the late war? The truth is, and every-ject, is conclusive. No sovereign can appear one conversant in national policy well knows, in courts of justice to defend his subjects, and that there is always less danger of imposition it was, therefore, that a method was devised in realty than a limited view of the operation of such a stipulation would suggest. It is not the interest of the belligerent to foster the carrying trade of a commercial rival; hence, Great Britain would rather, in time of war, compel her own vessels to sail under convoy, than permit her merchants to use a neutral bottom. Nations are generally jealous of permitting foreigners to hold domestic tonnage, or use domestic names. There are, commonly, privileges of trade attached to the ship's character, and severe laws enacted against a practice which is always viewed as a fraud upon the government whose flag is thus acquired. Witness the severity of our own laws in such cases.

If there is any nation in the world more interested than all others in the liberal support of the doctrine contended for by this claimant, it is the United States. Our chances of enjoying peace are much greater than any other; and if 92*] there be a tendency to war, it is with a nation which will not be driven to the necessity of making use of neutral bottoms. I cannot, therefore, really see why our administration should have been so seriously alarmed at the prospect of our deciding in favor of this Spaniard, as has been urged upon this court.

But, considerations of policy, or the views of the administration, are wholly out of the question in this court. What is the just construction of the treaty, is the only question here. And whether it chime in with the views of the government or not, this individual is entitled to the benefit of that construction.

The more I have examined this subject, the more thoroughly I have been convinced that my view of the construction of the treaty is the correct one, viz., that national protection was to depend upon authentic documents, and not proprietary interest; or more correctly, that each nation should be restricted from looking beyond those documents. There is one provision contained in all these treaties, which sets this point, in my opinion, beyond all doubt. Which is, that in the case of convoy, the word

for taking such questions from courts of justice if possible, and referring them to another tribunal. Every stipulation in the treaties of that day, teems with the project of ridding commerce of vexatious capture, and more vexatious litigation. A better practical illustration of the wisdom of such a measure cannot be imagined than that which the present case presents.

But it has been earnestly and successfully contended, that if such was the intention of the treaty, it must fail altogether for want of the form of a passport, contemplated in the 17th article.

Yet if there is any one question more clear of doubt than all others, I think it is this. For the fallacy of the proposition admits almost of mathematical demonstration. This omission must have been the result of either accident or design. It may have *proceeded from ac- [*94 cident between the negotiators in Europe; but after the receipt of the treaty, and its submission to the cabinet and the senate here, the omission could not have been the result of accident when it received the sanction of our government. It must, then, have been designedly omitted by our constituted authorities. And for what purpose? Will anyone presume to suggest that it was a deliberate fraud upon the other government? calculated to leave our courts at liberty, on some subsequent day, to declare the 17th and 18th articles in effect void? Did we hold out to them the idea of having adopted the provisions of those articles into our national code, when we were conscious that they contained an innate vice, calculated to defeat every beneficial effect? If the argument on this point could meet the sanction of our government, I would blush for it. From the advocate of a captor, it might have been expected; but cannot lay claim to the sanction or countenance of the American government. I am sensible that the cabinet would disavow such a doctrine.

But, it is urged with much emphasis, that

the only operation intended by them was to prescribe a law to the caprice or violence of cruisers, and subject them to more exemplary punishment than in ordinary cases.

we have no right to annex a form, or to add a clause to the treaty. It is not contended that we have. No member of this bench entertains such a thought. But why may not the contracting parties supply one? All the requisites being prescribed in language, the form and the substance are the same thing. If the contract is complied with, what matters form? Whether it is substantially complied with or not, must be a question for the courts of the contracting parties. But how ridiculous would it be, to be 95*] trying *form, and shape, and size, like the ignorant Arab, where the treaty is sub-ity may affect to sneer at it, and melancholy stantially complied with. Had it merely stipulated, that a passport, in a form prescribed, should be given mutally, there would have been something in the argument; but in expressing with precision the substance of the instrument to be given, it renders the devising of a form a mere work of supererogation. If no other conclusion is to be drawn from its omission, certainly this may, that it was too trivial to be remembered.

No one who reads and compares these four articles, the 15th, 16th, 17th and 18th, and considers the historical events in which they originated, can for a moment suppose that this was the object which led to the insertion of the two latter of those articles. The intention was to ingraft into the law of nations a great and a new principle. And although power and cupidexperience cannot dismiss the apprehension that it is too ethereal to subsist in this nether atmosphere, yet it is one which philanthropy will ever cling to, and justice cherish. To ingraft into this treaty the principles of the armed neutrality was the object, and for this purpose the 15th article declares those principles in detail. The 16th furnishes the exceptions to them; the 17th prescribes the evidence on which those privileges shall be conceded; and the 18th, after regulating the conduct of cruisers towards vessels so protected, proceeds to declare. that "the ship, when she shall have showed such passport, shall be free, and at liberty. to pursue her voyage; so as it shall not [*97 be lawful to molest or give her chase in any manner, or force her to quit her intended course. It is impossible for language to be stronger. That the violation of these stipulated privileges would aggravate the punishment to be inflicted on cruisers, is a consequence of the thing provided for, not the thing itself.

In order to support the argument, that the absence of the form nullifies the 17th and 18th articles of this treaty, the attention of this court has been drawn to the provisions of the 14th article of the treaty with Prussia. And it has been contended, that until a form of a passport be adjusted between the two nations, that article is also a dead letter. The construction is one which could not be supported even on a common law instrument. The words are, which passports shall be made out in good and due forms (to be settled by conventions between the parties whenever occasion shall require)." If the Spanish treaty is to be construed by analogy to this, the argument is directly on the other side. For these words, obviously leave 'the good and due forms" of these instruments to be devised by the parties severally, and only stipulate for settling a form by convention, "when-amine into this part of the case. ever occasion shall require;" that is, whenever Sentence affirmed. either shall be dissatisfied with the form used by the other. The nations which, in the very same article, could repose such implicit faith in each other's candor, as to leave the neutrality 96*] of *whole fleets to be determined on the word of the convoying officer, merit more the confidence of each other, than to have imputed to them an evasion so obvious.

As it became indispensable to assign some reason for retaining these two articles in the treaty, if they were to be held a dead letter for want of the form, it has been suggested, that

1.-Modelo del Pasaporte, ó Patente de Mar que se concede á los Buques para navegar en América, citado en el Articulo XVII.

Don Carlos, por la Gracia de Dios, Rey de Castilla, de Leon, de Aragon, de las dos Sicilias, de Jerusalem, de Navarra, de Granada, de Toledo, de Valencia, de Galicia, de Mallorca, de Sevilla, de Cerdeña, de Córcoba, de Córcega, de Murcia, de Jaen, de los Algarbes, de Algezira, de Gibraltar, de las Islas de Canarias, de las Indias Orientales y Occidentales, Islas y Tierra-firme del Mar Océano; Archiduque de Austria, Duque de Borgoña, de Brabante y Milan, Conde de Abspurg, Flandes, Tirol y Barcelona, Señor de Vizcaya y de Molina, &c. Por quanto he concedido permiso á que con su nombrado de porte de Toneladas, pueda salir del Puerto de carga, y registro de efectos de comercio, y transferirse al y restituirse à España al Puerto de con expresa condicion de hacer su derrota de ida y vuelta directamente á los señalados par

para

con

Upon the whole, I am decidedly of opinion that the claimant is entitled to restitution. Nor should I find much difficulty in supporting his right on the ground of proprietary interest. But entertaining the opinion that I do on this preliminary point, there is no necessity to ex

Mr. Harper, for the claimant and appellant, moved to vacate the decree of condemnation entered in this cause, and that it should be again continued to the next term in order to enable the claimant to procure farther proof as to the annexation of forms of passports to the original Spanish treaty, and read an affidavit annexed to a printed copy of the treaty, published at the royal printing office in Madrid, which contained two forms of passport, which will be found in the margin.'

ages de su destino, sin extraviarse, ni hacer arribada á Puertos Nacionales ó Extrangeros, en Islas, ó Tierra-firme de Europa, ó América, á ménos de verse obligado de accidentes de otra suerte no remediables: Por tanto quiero, que el Presidente de la Contratacioná Indias ó el Ministro encargado del despacho de Navios á aquellos Dominios, y el Intendente, ó Ministro de Marina del Puerto en que se equipare, concurran á facilitarle quanto fuere regular o este fin, cada uno en la parte que le tocare: el primero en lo respectivo á su habilitacion y carga; y el de Marina en lo que mira á Tripulacion, que deberà componerse de gente matriculada, y constar que lo sea por lista certificada, que ha de entregarle, obligándose á cuidar de su conserracion, y responder de sus faltas, segun previenen las Ordenanzas de Marina.

Y mando á los Officiales Generales, ó particulares Comandantes de mis Esquadras y Baxeles, al Presidente, y Ministros de la Contratacion á Indias, á los Comandantes, y Intendentes de los departamentos

98*] *The motion was opposed by the Attor- | [*COMMON LAW. BILLS OF EXCHANGE.] *102 ney-General and Mr. Wheaton, for the captors

and respondents.

BUSSARD v. LEVERING.

Where the second day of grace falls on Saturday,

Notice to the drawer, by putting the same into

99*] *Mr. Justice STORY. Without giving it is the last day of grace; and notice of non-payany opinion upon the sufficiency of the evi- ment given to the drawer of a bill on that day, after 100*] dence, to establish the *probability, that a demand upon the acceptor on the same day, is the forms of passport now offered to the in-sufficient to charge the drawer. spection of the court were ever authoritatively 101*1*annexed to the original treaty, in the possession of the Spanish government, the court is of opinion, that the motion for a con

uted.

tinuance must be denied. The passport found on board the Isabella, is materially variant, both in form and substance, from the forms of passport now produced; and to the form of the passport actually annexed to the treaty, and to no other, was the effect intended by the treaty, whatever that effect may be, meant to be attrib The possession of that form, and not of any other passport which might be substituted for it, was of the very essence of the treaty. It is clear, therefore, that even if the case were as the claimant's counsel supposes, he could derive no benefit whatever from it, because the treaty passport was not on board; and the case must, therefore, in this respect, be judged by the rules of the prize court, independent of the conventional law.

Motion denied.

the post-office, where the persons live in different places, is good.

ERROR to the Circuit Court for the District

of Columbia.

Assumpsit against the defendant below (Bussard), as drawer of an inland bill of exchange drawn at Baltimore on the 3d of October, 1816, upon one Martin Gillet, for $1,244.79, payable six months after date, and accepted by Gillet. Plea, non-assumpsit. On the trial of the cause, the plaintiff produced and read in evidence to the jury, the bill, acceptance, and protest; the

NOTE-See note to Fenwick v. Sears, 5 Cranch,

259.

Notice of demand and non-payment of a note

given on the last day of grace after demand of payment is sufficient. Lidenberger v. Beall, post, 104; Mandeville v. Rumney, 3 Cranch, C. C. 424.

When Saturday is the proper day for demand, notice on Monday, early enough to go by the mail of that day is sufficient. Seventh Bank v. Hanrich, 2 Story, C. C. 416; Crawford v. Milligan, 2 Cranch, C. C. 226; McElroy v. English, 2 Cranch, C. C. 528.

In such case, demand and notice on Saturday is good to hold the indorsers. Doremus v. Burton, 5 When second day of grace falls on Saturday, it is

Cited-8 Pet. 522 (n); 15 Pet. 595; Blatchf. Pr. 65, Biss. 57. 309, 457, 539; Woolw. 156.

Por quarto he concedido permiso á

vecino nombrado

de Marina, Ministros de sus Provincias, Subdelegados, Capitanes de Puerto, y otros qualesquiera Ofi- de para que con su ciales, Ministros, y Dependientes de la Armada, á de porte de toneladas pueda navelos Vireyes, Capitanes, ó Comandantes generales de gar, y comerciar en los Mares y Puertos de Europa, Reynos y Provineias, á los Gobernadores, Corregi- tanto de mis Dominios, como de Extrangeros dores y Justicias de los Pueblos de la Costa de Mar singularmente en los con absoluta prohibide mis dominios de Europa y América, á los Offici- cion de pasar á los de Islas, ó Tierra-firme de Améales Reales, ó Jueces de arribadas en ellos estable- rica: Por tanto quiero, que constando la pertenencia cidos, y á todos los demas Vasallos mios, á quienes de la Embarcacion al referido ó a otro pertenece, ó pertenecer pudiere, no le pongan em- Vasallo mio de quien tenga poder, se le permita barazo, causen molestia, ò detencion; antes le aux- equiparla con gente de su misma ilien, y faciliten lo pue hubiere menester para su Provincia, o de otra de mis Dominios, habil á este regular navegacion, y legitimo comercio: Yà los effecto, segun lo prevenido en las Ordenanzas de Vassallos y Subditos de Reyes, Principes y Repù- Marina, para salir á navegar, y comerciar en ella, blicas amigas y aliadas mias à los comandantes, baxo las regas establecidas. Gobernadores 6 Cabos de sus Provincias, Plazas, Esquadras, y Baxeles, requiero, que asimismo no le impidan su libre navegacion, entrada, salida ò detencion en los Puertos, à los quales por algun accidente se conduxere; permitiéndole que en ellos se bastimente, y provea de todo lo que necesitare: A cuyo fin he mandado despachar este Pasaporte, refrendado de mi Secretario de Estado, y de la negociacion de Marina, el qual valdrà por el tiempo que durare su viage de ida y vuelta; y concluido que sea, le recogerá el Ministro que entendiere en su descarga: Y para su validacion y uso pondrá á continuación la nota que corresponde, el que concurriere á su despacho. Dado en á mil setecientos

Yo El Rey,

PEDRO VARELA.

de

Modelo del Pasaporte, o Patente de Mar que se concede a los Buques para navegar en Europa, citado en el Articulo XVII.

Don Carlos, por la Gracia de Dios, Rey de Castilla, de Leon, de Aragon, de las dos Sicilias, de Jerusalem, de Navarra, de Granada, de Toledo, de Valencia, de Galicia, de Mallorca, de Sevilla, de Cerdeña, de Cordoba, de Corcega de Murcia, de Jaen, de los Algarbes, de Algezira, de Gibraltar, de las Islas de Canarias, de las Indias Orientales y Occidentales, Islas y Tierra-firme del Mar Oceano; Archiduque de Austria; Duque de Borgoña, de Brabante y Milan; Conde de Abspurg, Flandes, Tirol, Barcelona, Señor de Vizcaya y de Molina, &c.

Y mando a los Oficiales generales, o particulares comandantes de mis Esquadras y Baxeles; á los Comandantes y Intendentes de los Departementos de Marina: á los Ministros de sus Provincias, Subdelegados, Capitanes de Puerto, y otros qualesquier Oficiales y Ministros de mi Armada: á los Capitanes, 6 Comandantes generales de Provincias: á los Gobernadores, Corregidores, Jueces y Justicias de los Puertos de mis Dominios, y a todos los demas Vasallos mios, á quienes pertenece, ó pertenecer pudiere, no le pongan embarazo, causen molestia, ó detencion alguna; ántes le auxilien, y faciliten lo que hubiere menester parą su regular navegacion y legitimo comercio: Ÿ á fos Vasallos y Subditos de Reyes, Principes y Republicas amigas y aliadas mias: á los Comandantes, Gobernadores, ó Cabos de sus Provincias, Plazas, Esquadras y Baxeles, requiero, que asimismo no le pongan embarazo en su libre navegacion, entrada, salida, ó detencion en los Puertos, á los quales deliberadamente, ó par accidente se conduxere, y le permitan exercer en ellos su legitimo comercio, bastimentarse, y proveerse de lo necesario para continuarle; á cuyo fin he mandado despachar este Pasaporte, refrendado de mio Secretario de Estado, y de la Negociacion de Marina, el qual valdra, y tendrá fuerza por termino de contado desde el día en que usare de él, segun conste por la Nota que á su continuacion se pusiere. Dado en á de de mil setecientos noventa.