only be fruitless but absolutely prejudicial, unless they are aided by corresponding efforts on her part. The number of our military posts, the vigilance, activity, and courage of our troops, all tend to drive these marauders from our border towards that of Mexico, where they can carry on their depredations with almost certain impunity. The difference in the character of the inhabitants of the 2 countries also tends to the same result. Our people are all familiar with the use of arms, and readily form themselves into militia companies for their own defence. It was this circumstance, joined with a native hardihood of character, that enabled the pioneers of all our States to subdue tribes far more formidable than the robber bands that infest the frontiers of Mexico. The inhabitants of Mexico, on the contrary, have little skill in fire-arms, nothing that deserves the name of a militia, and little of that daring intrepidity which distinguished the early settlers of our own country. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Indians stand less in awe of the Mexicans than they do of our people, and that, where both countries present equal temptations to plunder, they should direct their incursions towards the former rather than the latter. It is not improbable, also, that the feebleness of the federal authority in Mexico, the distracted state of that republic, and the civil contests that have so long divided her people, may impair her influence among savages who know no right but power, and no motive but the fear of its exercise. The portion of Mexico which is said to have suffered more from these depredations, is the State of Sonora. Between that State and the inhabited portions of Texas and New Mexico, there is an extensive range of mountain and desert for the most part uninhabitable, and, at certain seasons of the year, almost impassable. To send, therefore, to that frontier a sufficient force to afford it any effectual protection, and to maintain it there, would be attended with difficulties almost insuperable. A post, however, has been established at the junction of the Gila and the Colorado, and the commander of the Pacific division has been directed to examine whether it would not be practicable and expedient to establish one or more posts higher up the Gila. His report on that subject has not yet been received. It has been fully ascertained, however, that to maintain even an inconsiderable force in that region would be attended with an enormous expense. These depredations in Sonora are committed chiefly by the Apaches and Navajos, the same tribes that are the most troublesome in Texas and New Mexico. The troops employed in the defence of our own settlements are, therefore, indirectly aiding in the defence of Sonora ; for if we can succeed in compelling these tribes to make Treaties and to fulfil them, the measure will be as conducive to the protection of the Mexican territory as of our own. It must not, however, be supposed that the Indians that infest the Mexican settlements all reside within our limits. It is difficult to assign any definite boundaries to wandering tribes who subsist almost entirely by the chase, or on herds of cattle which they drive before them in their migrations, but it is well known that some of them have their habitual haunts within the limits of Mexico. There are strong reasons, too, to believe that the vague rumours that have reached this country of ravages committed by Indians in the Mexican States have been grossly exaggerated, and sometimes entirely fabricated. An idea seems to have gone abroad among the people of that country, that this Government was bound, by its Treaty with Mexico, to indemnify citizens of that country who might sustain losses by depredations of the Indians, and from information that has reached the Department there can be no doubt that, in some instances, tales of depredations have been invented with a view of bringing fictitious claims for damages against the Government. The Indians, west of the Rocky Mountains, are represented to be less warlike in character than those on the eastern side of the continent, and until recently, had manifested no unfriendly feelings towards the white settlers in their neighbourhood. Several outbreaks however have, within a few months past, occurred both in California and Oregon. There is reason to believe that, in some instances, the Indians have been goaded on to these acts of hostility by the conduct of our own people. Treaties have recently been made with some of these tribes, which, if they are faithfully observed on our part, and if the white inhabitants are compelled to respect the boundaries of the territory assigned to them, will go far towards reconciling this unfortunate race to their fate, and preventing future outbreaks. I recommend, therefore, that the laws respecting intercourse with the Indians and encroachments on their lands be rigidly enforced, and, if necessary, more stringent enactments be passed for that purpose. It would not be safe, however, to rely on any pacific policy, however wise and just, for the protection of our fellow-citizens in that remote region. Since the withdrawal of the regiment of mounted riflemen, the military force in the Pacific is extremely small. By the returns of the Adjutant-General, appended to the report of the General-in-Chief, it appears that the entire force stationed on the Pacific amounted at the last return, to only 736 men. This force is deemed entirely inadequate for the protection of the inhabitants, particularly of Oregon. The Governor of that territory has represented this fact, and has urged an increase of the force stationed within it. The means now at the disposal of the Department do not enable it to comply with this demand. In my last annual report I recommended the creation of a new regiment of mounted men. The withdrawal of the regiment of mounted riflemen from the Pacific has, to some extent, diminished the necessity of creating an additional regiment of that description of force, as that country is not peculiarly adapted to cavalry, and its place may well be supplied by infantry. Nevertheless, by the report of the General-in-Chief, it will be seen that he considers not only this additional regiment of cavalry, but also an increase in the rank and file of the infantry and artillery as indispensably necessary. While I feel some hesitation in urging upon Congress any addition to the force on the frontier, where the support of troops is attended with such enormous expense, I cannot but acknowledge the force of his remarks and the weight that is due to his recommendation. I hope, therefore, that the matter will be submitted to Congress. The entire number of men borne on the rolls amounts to 10,538, which, according to the usual estimate, will furnish an effective force of not more than 8,500 men. When it is considered that this small force is scattered over a frontier of several thousands of miles in extent its insufficiency will be apparent. In my last annual report, I adverted to the enormous increase in the expense of supporting the army, and to the causes that produced it. These causes are principally, 1st. That, as has been already stated, more than one-half of the whole army is stationed on our remote frontier, and so far as expenses are concerned, may be considered as in active service in time of war. 2nd. That the military posts on the frontier were formerly on or near navigable rivers, but now, on the contrary, are either far in the interior of the country or on the Pacific, and, consequently, can only be reached by an overland journey of hundreds of miles, or by a sea voyage of several thousand. The following is a list of what were our most remote posts in 1845, and their respective distances from navigation. Fort Snelling, accessible by steamboats. Fort Leavenworth, accessible by steamboats. Fort Smith, accessible by steamboats. Fort Jessup, 24 miles from steamboat navigation, by waggons. Compare this list with that of some of the most remote posts at the present time. Indianola, now the depôt for the greater part of the posts in Texas, and some of those in New Mexico, is 540 miles by water. from New Orleans; from this depôt it is by waggons, to Fort Worth, 420 miles; to El Peso, 803 miles; to Donna Aña, 859 miles; to the post at the copper mines, 979 miles. Fort Towson and Fort Smith, both depending upon New Orleans, are the frontier depôts for the posts on the north line of Texas; the transportation by waggons is, from Fort Towson to Fort Belknap, 302 miles; from Fort Smith to Fort Arbuckle, 167 miles. Fort Leavenworth, 420 miles from St. Louis, by water, is the frontier depôt for the posts on the Santa Fé and Oregon routes. Thence it is by waggons:-To Fort Laramie, 637 miles; to Fort Union, 728 miles; to Santa Fé, 821 miles; to Socorro, 981 miles; to San Juan, 1,048 miles. From St. Louis to Fort Snelling, by water, is 725 miles, and thence to Fort Ripley, by waggons, 125 miles. From St. Louis to Keokuk, by water, 179 miles, and thence to Fort Dodge, by waggons, 280 miles. A large portion of the supplies for the posts on the Pacific are drawn from the Atlantic States. 3rd. The frontier posts, as may be seen by the foregoing list, were then situated in the midst of a fertile and productive country, where nearly all the supplies for the troops could be procured. Now, on the contrary, they are, for the most part, in one of the most unproductive regions in the world, which furnishes but a small portion of the necessary supplies for an army. Those supplies must, therefore, all be drawn from the older States and transported immense distances. The consequence is that, while in 1845 the cost of transportation (of troops and supplies) was 130,053 dollars, in 1850-1851 it amounted to 2,094,408 dollars. In the former the cost of forage was 99,794 dollars, in the latter it was 1,287,327 dollars. The great increase in this last item arises not only from the causes just mentioned, but also from the great increase of animals in the Quartermaster's Department, which in 1845 amounted only to 847, and in 1850-51 to upwards of 8,000; and also to the fact that the mounted force has been greatly increased. 4th. The great distance which troops have now to be transported in going to and from the several posts. This is a very important item. Owing to the smallness of our army, changes of station are very frequent and instead of being made, as they formerly were, by water, they are now made by land. When it is recollected what a vast amount of transportation is necessary for an army on a long march, when not only their baggage but supplies of every kind (including provisions for their daily consumption,) must be carried with them, some idea may be formed of the expense attending these changes of station. The above facts will serve, in some degree, to explain the great increase that has taken place in the expenditure of that Department. For fuller explanations on this subject, I refer to the accompanying report of the Quartermaster-General. It is probable, however, that in some instances, the expenditures both of the Quartermaster's and the Commissary Departments may have been increased by mal-administration. The transactions of both these departments involve such a variety of details, and their agents are so far removed from the supervision of their chiefs, that abuses may exist a long time before they are discovered. Every effort, however, has been used to detect these abuses, and to prevent their recurrence. Inspectors have been sent to the frontiers to inquire into the manner in which the affairs of these departments are administered, and a rigid scrutiny into accounts has been ordered. I regret to say, that the Department has some reasons to fear that its apprehensions on this subject were not altogether without foundation. From statements carefully prepared by the different bureaus of this Department, it appears that the increased expenditures in the army, resulting from our newly-acquired territory (including Texas) amounted to 4,556,709 dollars. Congress, at their last session, omitted to provide for a deficiency which was ascertained to exist in the appropriations for the Quartermaster's Department for the year ending 30th June last. Serious embarrassment would have resulted to the service from this omission, had there not existed some unexpended balances of former appropriations, which, under the Act of August 26, 1842, were transferred to the Quartermaster's Department. Congress also reduced all the items of appropriations but one, for the same Department, for the current fiscal year ending 30th June next, 50 per cent. below the estimates; the consequence of which is, that the appropriations for that department are entirely inadequate to its wants, and that Congress will be called upon, at an early period, to supply the deficiency. Congress having clearly manifested a determination to reduce, as far as possible, the expenditures of the army, I felt it my duty, as far as was practicable, to carry their views into effect. I have accordingly laboured to reform abuses, to enforce rigidly all regulations looking to economy, and to retrench every unnecessary expense. I will enumerate some of the measures adopted for this purpose: The number of enlisted men in the Ordnance Department prior to the late war, amounted to 250 men, but during the war it was |