in the several acts of appropriation was ex-perior. This could not have passed free unless hausted before the road reached the Pennsyl- under the head of property. Ohio had, therevania line. fore, two distinct provisions in her law; Pennsylvania adopted only one of them. The toll on "stages" included the coach carrying the mail, in words and letters. The Ohio law asked her to exempt the mail, but she refused.

4. That the consent of Pennsylvania, under the law of 9th of April, 1807, was based upon the appropriation of the two per cent. fund, and that alone to the construction of said road within her limits.

5. That Congress possessed no power, under the Constitution, to collect toll upon said road in the State of Pennsylvania.

6. That the State of Pennsylvania had jurisdiction of said road, and the right to collect toll, and possessed this power as one of the rights not delegated in forming the Constitution of the Union, and which could only be relinquished by an amendment of the Constitution.

7. That the right to collect toll in this case was never surrendered by the State of Pennsylvania.

The power of the federal government to construct roads has been abandoned for eight years past. The authority to establish postroads, is merely to designate the road from point to point; and if the United States have no constitutional power, an act of one of the States cannot confer it. If there was no power to make the road, there was none to repair it or collect tolls; and an agreement to repair it was null and void, as being repugnant to the Constitution. The jurisdiction which Pennsylvania had, originally, over the soil of the road, was never surrendered; and if it had been, her Legislature had no power to surrender it.

But does "property" include the mail? Does a department, when making a schedule of its property, include the contents of the mail? The United States is only a common carrier, and paid as such. If not, then postage is exacted for carrying the property of the United States. It is the property of the persons interested; they can recover it at law. It has been said that because a common carrier has a special property in what he carries, therefore the United States have a property in the mail. But this technical principle was unknown to the farmers and mechanics who passed the Act of 1831. Again, what is the meaning of "laden"? It is the bulk of the load. If an officer of the United States puts a single box in a wagon, and the rest of the load is private property, could it be said with any propriety that the wagon was "laden" with the property of the government? To justify this, other words must be interpolated into the law, viz., "in whole or in part." But they are not there. If "property" means the "mail," then the section must read, "laden with the mail;" and if this be so, a single mail bag will not exempt the coach from tolls. If the contractors had a steam wagon conveying one hundred passengers and a small mail bag, would they all go free? It is said that we attack the mail, but we do not. The government pays turnpike gates everywhere else. When companies make roads with their own money, they allow the government to use them on the same terms with everyone else. If it can seize upon roads, the Postmaster-General would soon get rid of all difficulties with railroad companies. But we deny the right.

The speech of Mr. Burnet gives the history of this matter. The road was going to ruin, and Congress refused to appropriate. The friends of the road in Ohio obtained the passage of an act there. It was a favorite in that State, but not in Pennsylvania. The latter State had commenced a large system of improvement from Philadelphia to Pittsburg, and But upon whom does the tax fall in this case? knew that this Cumberland Road would draw The record says that stages conveying nothing off the travel from her own works. The law but the mail pass free. It is then the [*162 of Pennsylvania was, therefore, dissimilar from passengers who pay the tax. The contractors that of Ohio. Ohio did not require the road must increase the fare. The government is not to be put in repair before accepting the ces- a party upon the record, and the Postmastersion, but Pennsylvania did. There are many General has no business to come here by counother important differences between the sel. The whole difficulty has arisen from an 161*] *two laws. Congress hastened to ac-effort of contractors to draw custom to their cept the Ohio law before Pennsylvania acted. own line from roads where tolls are charged. What reason is there to think that Pennsyl- All opposition stages, too, must be broken down vania intended to imitate Ohio? There is none. on this road, because those stages will be chargIf so, why was the phraseology changed? Some ed with toll. words must have been intentionally omitted, It is said that passengers are a guard to the and yet this court is now asked to insert them, mail. They do not consider themselves as payto change places with the Legislature at Haring their passage money for the privilege of risburg, and do what it refused to do. Al-guarding the mail. But upon this theory, the though, in general, the mail may be property, contractors ought to be bound to carry some can it be considered so here, where there is a always; whereas the stages frequently run special exclusion? Every word of a statute without any passengers. must receive a meaning, unless the court are Pennsylvania has been charged with violating compelled to consider some words synonymous. her faith. But how can this be? She derives In the Ohio law, the words "mail" and "prop-no revenue from the road; the whole of the erty" are not synonymous; it exempts a "stage tolls are expended upon repairs, and that, too, or coach, carrying the mail," and a "wagon or carriage, carrying property of the United States;" referring to different vehicles, carrying different things. The "mail" is never carried in wagons. The government recently brought a large copper rock from Lake Su

in a case where her own pecuniary interests suffer, because the travel is drawn away from her own roads. The true interest of the United States is to maintain our view of the case; because, if tolls enough are not collected to keep the road in repair, it must go to ruin. and then

the contractors will charge a higher price for carrying the mail, even at a slower pace.

of showing the character of the present controversy, and explaining the principles upon which the opinion of this court is founded.

The Act of 1836 is only declaratory of that of 1831, and not inconsistent with it. The The road in question is the principal line of latter exempts wagons when laden with the communication between the seat of government property of the United States in the whole; and the great valley of the Mississippi. It and the former proportions the exemption to the passes through Maryland, Pennsylvania, Viramount of property thus owned. The imposi-ginia, and Ohio, and was constructed at an imtion of half toll is, in fact, a privilege granted. mense expense by the United States, under the The whole of the Pennsylvania legislation is authority of different and successive acts of one continued series, instead of being separate Congress: the States contributing nothing eiand inconsistent acts. The law of 1831 accept- ther to the making of the road or to the pured the road, when it should be put in repair chase of land over which it passes. They did and toll-houses erected. The act of Congress nothing more than enact laws authorizing the making the appropriation, did not pass till United States to construct the road within their 1834; and in April, 1835, Pennsylvania ac respective limits, and to obtain the land necescepted the surrender, and appointed commis- sary for that purpose from the individual prosioners. Between that time and the first of prietors upon the payment of its value. January, 1836, gates were erected, and the Act of 1836, now under consideration, was passed without any loss of time. The case in Watts & Sergeant has been referred to, but here is a certified copy of the record, showing that, from 1836 to 1839, bills were made out quarterly. Before the Act of 1836, all the stages, except the fast line, paid tolls. These were therefore collected under the Act of 1831. There were only two lines, and the commissioners agreed to excuse one, on the condition that the other paid. This was half toll, and was the foundation of the law.

Mr. Chief Justice TANEY delivered the opin

ion of the court:

The question in this case is, whether the State of Pennsylvania can lawfully impose a toll on carriages employed in transporting the mail of the United States over that part of the Cumberland road which passes through the territory of that State?

163*] *The dispute has arisen from an act of the Legislature of Pennsylvania, passed in 1836, whereby wagons, carriages, stages, and other modes of conveyance, carrying the United States mail, with passengers or the goods of other persons, are charged with half the toll levied upon other vehicles of the like description. The plaintiff in error is the commissioner and superintendent of the road, appointed by the State. The defendants are contractors for carrying the mail, and they insist that their carriages when engaged in this service are entitled to pass along the road free from toll, although they are conveying passengers and their baggage at the same time. In order to obtain the opinion of this court upon the subject, an amicable action was instituted by the plaintiff in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Pennsylvania, for the tolls directed to be collected by the law above mentioned, and the facts in the case stated by consent. The judgment of the Circuit Court was against the plaintiff, and it is now brought here for revision by writ of error.

After the road had thus been made-although it was constructed with the utmost care, sparing no efforts to make it durable-it was still found to be incapable of withstanding the wear and tear produced by the number of carriages continually passing over it, engaged in transporting passengers, or heavily laden with agricultural produce or merchandise; and that either a very great expense must be annually incurred in repairs, or the road, in a short time, would be entirely broken up and become unfit

for use.

As no permanent provision had been made for these repairs, applications were made to Congress for the necessary funds; and as

these demands upon the public treasury unavoidably increased as the road was extended or longer in use, they naturally produced a strong feeling of dissatisfaction *and opposi- [*164 tion in those portions of the Union which had no immediate interest in the road; and the constitutional power of Congress to make these appropriations was also earnestly, and upon many applications, contested by many of the eminent statesmen of the country. It therefore became evident, that unless some other means than appropriations from the public treasury could be devised, a work which everyone felt to be a great public convenience, in which a large portion of the Union was directly and deeply interested, and which had been constructed at so much cost, must soon become a total ruin.

In this condition of things, the State of Ohio, on the 4th of February, 1831, passed an act, proposing, with the assent of Congress, to take under its care immediately the portion of the road within its limits which was then finished, and the residue from time to time as different parts of it should be completed, and to erect toll-gates thereon, and to apply the tolls to the repair and preservation of the road, specifying in the law the tolls it proposed to demand, and containing a proviso in relation to the property of the United States, and to persons in its service, in the following words: "That no toll shall be received or collected for the passage of The Cumberland Road has been so often the any stage or coach conveying the United States subject of public discussion, and the circum- mail, or horses bearing the same, or any wagon stances under which it was constructed and or carriage laden with the property of the afterwards surrendered to the several States United States, or any cavalry or other troops, through which it passes, are 80 generally arms, or military stores belonging to the same, known, that we shall forbear to state them or to any of the States comprising this Union, further than may be necessary for the purpose or any person or persons on duty in the mili

It will be seen from this statement, that the constitutional power of the general government to construct this road is not involved in the case before us; nor is this court called upon to express any opinion upon that subject; nor to inquire what were the rights of the United States in the road previous to the compacts herein before mentioned. The road has in fact been made at the expense of the general government. It was the great line of connection between the seat of government and the western The sum appropriated, as above mentioned, States and territories, affording a convenient and was, however, found insufficient for the pur- safe channel for the conveyance of the mails poses for which it was intended, and by an act and enabling the government thereby to comof June 24th, 1834, the further sum of $300,000|municate more promptly with its numerous was appropriated; and this act states the ap- officers and agents in that part of the United propriation to be made for the entire comple- States west of the Alleghany mountains. The tion of the road east of the Ohio, and other object of the compact was to preserve the road

States, nor that she would be less anxious to give every facility in her power to the general *government when carrying out through [*170 her territory the important and necessary operations of the Postoffice Department. Nor could she have supposed that Congress would give privileges to one State which were denied to others; and, after having done equal justice to all in the repair and preparation of the road wherever needed, make different contracts with the different States; and, while it bargained for the exemption of its mails in one or more of them, consent to pay toll in another. The fact that they are clearly and explicitly exempted from toll in Ohio and Virginia is a strong argument to show that it was intended to exempt them in all, and that the compacts with Pennsylvania and Maryland were understood and believed to mean the same thing, and to accomplish the same objects. And this conclusion is greatly strengthened by the fact that Maryland, where the words of the law are precisely the same with those of Pennsylvania, has never claimed the right to exact tolls from carriages carrying the mail; nor did Pennsylvania claim it in the first instance, and they were always al lowed to pass free until the Act of 1836. Indeed, that law itself appears to recognize the right of the mail and other property of the United States to go free, and the imposition of only half toll would seem to imply that the State intended to reach other objects, and did not desire to lay the burden upon anything that properly belonged to the United States. And so far as we can judge from its legislation, Pennsylvania has never to this day placed any other construction upon its compact than the one we have given, and has never desired to depart from it.

contract he must add to the sum he would be self which were not extended to the other otherwise willing to take. It is of no consequence to the United States whether charges for repairs are cast upon it through its treasury or Postoffice Department. In either case it is not free from expense in relation to the road, according to the compact upon which it was surrendered to and accepted by the States. Neither do the words of the law of Pennsyl169*] vania of 1831 require a different construction. The United States have unquestionably a property in the mails. They are not mere common carriers, but a government, performing a high official duty in holding and guarding its own property as well as that of its citizens committed to its care; for a very large portion of the letters and packages conveyed on this road, especially during the session of Congress, consists of communications to or from the officers of the executive department, or members of the Legislature, on public service, or in relation to matters of public concern. Nor can the word "laden" be construed to mean "fully laden," for that would in effect destroy the whole value of the exemption, and compel the United States to pay a toll even on its military stores and other property, unless every wagon or carriage employed in transporting it was as heavily laden as it could conveniently bear. We think, that a carriage, whenever it is carrying the mail, is laden with the property of the United States within the true meaning of the compact; and that the act of Congress of which we have spoken, and to which the State assented, must be taken in connection with the State law of 1831 in expounding this agreement. Consequently, the half toll imposed by the Act of 1836 cannot be recovered. The acts of assembly of Ohio and Virginia have been relied on in the argument by the plaintiff in error: and it has been urged that, inasmuch as the laws of these States, in so many words, exempt carriages carrying the mail of the United States, the omission of these words in the law in question shows that Pennsylvania intended to reserve the right to charge them with toll. And it is moreover insisted that, as the law of Ohio which contains this provision passed sometime before the act of Pennsylvania, it ought to be presumed that the law of the latter was drawn and passed with a full knowledge of what had been done by the former, and that the stipulation in favor of the mail was designedly and intentionally omitted, because the State of Pennsylvania meant to reserve the right to charge it.

If we are right in this view of the subject, the error consists in the mode by which the State endeavored to attain its object. Unquestionably the exemption of carriages bearing the mail is no exemption of any other property conveyed in the same vehicle, nor of any person traveling in it, unless he is in the service of the United States, and passing along in pursuance of orders from the proper authority. Upon all other persons, although traveling in the mail stage, and upon their baggage or any other property, although conveyed in the same car riage with the mail, the State of Pennsylvania may lawfully collect the same toll that she charges either upon passengers or similar property in other vehicles. If the State had made this road herself, and had not entered into any compact upon the subject with the United States, she might undoubtedly have erected toll-gates thereon, and if the United States afterwards adopted it as a post-road, the carriages engaged in their service in transporting the mail, or otherwise, would have been liable to pay the same charges that were imposed by the

The court think otherwise. Even if the law of Ohio is supposed to have been before the Legislature of Pennsylvania, it does not by any means follow that the omission of some of its words would justify the inference urged in the argument, where the words retained, by their fair construction, convey the same meaning. Indeed, if it appeared that the Ohio law was in fact before the Legislature of Pennsyl-State on other vehicles of the same kind. And vania when it framed its own act upon the subject, it would rather seem to lead to a contrary conclusion. For it cannot be supposed that in the compact which the United States was about to form with four different States, and when the agreement with one would have been of no value without the others, Pennsylvania would have desired or asked for any privileges to her

as any rights which the United States might be supposed to have acquired in this road have been surrendered to the State, the power of the latter is as extensive in collecting toll as if the road had been made by herself, except in so far as she is restricted by her compact; [171 and that compact does nothing more than exempt the carriages laden with the property of