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&c., vide 6, N. S., 133, 654; 11 Louisiana R., 571; 7 N. S., 183, 433; 4 Louisiana R., 174. The settlement established by the judge in a judgment against a curator or executor. (Code of 1809, p. 180, art. 145.)

As to the appointment of a defensor to represent absent heirs in suits and vacant successions, vide 4 Martin, 666; 10 Martin, 17; 545*] *4 Lousiana R., 259; 6 Martin, N. S., 17; Seymour's case (9 Louisiana R., 79).

10. Homologations, like other judgments, must be annulled by a judgment of the court which rendered them. (12 Louisiana R., 406.)

Every judgment in Louisiana is subject to an action of nullity, but it must be brought before the court by which the judgment was rendered. (1 Louisiana R., 21; Code of Practice, article 608, and notes.)

If the court would not give the party relief, then, and only then, can relief be sought before the courts of the United States. The doctrine established by this court in the Gaines case, concerning relief against the effect of a will, is similar in all respects to that which is here invoked.

11. It appears that in the account filed by the executors in the Court of Probates of New Orleans, and exhibited, with the will, to the heirs in Europe by J. F. Girod, on which he made the payments to the heirs, were two sums with which the executors charged the succession of Claude Girod; one was for $40,413.09, as paid to Nicolas Girod; and the other was for $8,258.20, paid to J. F. Girod. The sums are stated to be by account annexed, approved by the judge. (Vide Code of 1809, p. 180, article 145.)

The complainants, acting uniformly on the principle of one course of conduct for the living and another for the dead, have discharged J. F. Girod, and seek to make N. Girod's succession responsible for both debts.

| establishing in an ordinary tribunal, [*546 as the laws stood before the Code of Practice? The art. 137 (p. 248, Code of 1809) gives the power of one executor to represent the succession, where there are more than one executor who has accepted. (Code, 1674; vide 3 Martin's R., 247.) The appearance and answer of the defensor of absent heirs strengthens the validity and fairness of the proceedings.

The judgments, being valid in point of form, must stand until they are annulled and declared void by a proper tribunal. (7 Martin, N. S., 257; 11 Martin's R., 607; 5 Martin, N. S., 664.)

These judgments are attacked as fraudulent. Unfortunately for the complainants, there is no circumstance by them even conjectured which may not have been removed by evidence.

The testimony and evidence on which these judgments were rendered is not before us; but let us take up that in favor of N. Girod, which is the only one we have any interest in maintaining, since the release of J. F. Girod.

Claude Girod was a trader, and left at his death various accounts, books, papers, &c., which were inventoried at his death.

He had transactions with his elder brother Nicolas, who was a merchant at New Orleans. The witnesses examined by the arbitrators were Boussignes, Pacaud, Guillot, and J. F. Girod.

The arbitrators, as will be seen by the reasons appended to each item, founded their opinions on the testimony of witnesses, and the examination of books, documents, and vouchers.

It is complained that the case was referred to arbitrators; was it not a case of old and complicated accounts? (7 Peters, 625; 1 Martin's Digest, verbo Accounts, 405.)

Arbitrators, by our code, are to decide according to the strictness of the law. (Louisiana Code, 3077, Code of 1809, p. 442, art. 12; Law of 1805, verbo Accounts; 1 Martin's Dig., 405.)

The interest may well have been due. Suppose that C. Girod, in his books, charged interest on his accounts with his brothers; was

he not bound to allow it?

It appears that the judge of the Court of Probates did not approve these accounts against the succession of Claude Girod until they had been litigated on, and settled judicially, in a court of law. Judgments were rendered on each The prescription may have been proved to claim in the court of the parish and city of have been interrupted by acknowledgment and New Orleans; on that of N. Girod on the 5th promises. The interruption is proved positiveDecember, 1814, and on that of J. F. Girod only by the testimony of Guillot. It was only in the 6th May, 1815. On these judgments the vials of wrath are poured forth by the complainants. (Rec., 163-182.)

Recourse is had to conjecture, when nothing would have been easier than to prove any fact in relation to these judgments by J. F. Girod himself, who, so far from being interrogated concerning these debts, is provided with a complete and full discharge.

The consequences and effect of this discharge of the plaintiff in one of the suits, and the recipient of the money and the defendant in the other, will certainly have an important bearing on the equity of the complainants' case; and the absence of this proof, which is at hand, will show that they rely more on confusion and conjecture for success than on evidence.

The court of the parish and city of New Orleans had jurisdiction of the cases, as has been shown.

An objection has been made, that there were not proper parties. What prevented an executor, who had a disputed claim on a succession,

the case of Goddard and Urquhart, in 1834, that the prescriptions under the Spanish law were established. In Lobdell's case (7 Martin, N. S., tion of a promissory note, under the Spanish 109), the Supreme Court held that the prescriplaw, was thirty years. It is a mistake that Claude Girod says ir his will that he leaves no debts but to the amount of $30,000. He says, "I am indebted to divers persons by obligations, and little by accounts, in a sum of about $30,000." He may have meant to persons other than his brothers-to persons out of his family. Debts, especially old ones, between brothers, are lightly thought of by debtors; but [*547 creditors have better memories.

The declarations, indefinitive as these, in a man's will, are bad arguments against the existence of a debt, and no proof at all.

Nor did N. Girod, in his petition for the sale of the property of Claude Girod's succession in New Orleans, limit the legacies and debts to $60,000. He says the amount of legacies and debts which it is necessary to pay without de lay is that sum, or thereabouts.

Several of the persons who are parties to these | formalities prescribed by law are not complied suits are still living; the respectable counsel for with. (Psyche v. Paradǝl, 6 Louisiana R., 366; the plaintiff is still at the bar, and the gentle- McDonough v. Gravier's Curator, 9 Louisiana men appointed arbitrators were persons whose R., and cases there cited.) characters were of the highest consideration. But this court will enter into no such inquiry in a matter in which the presumption is omnia acta rite esse.

Supposing there were no judgments, were not the amounts exhibited to complainants, when the payments were made to them, and the will, with its contents, shown to them, and does not the claim for these amounts resolve itself into a personal action to recover money unlawfully retained, as they allege; and is not an action of this kind prescribed by ten years, according to complainants' own showing? (Goddard's case, Louisiana R., 660.)

It is believed that the grounds of defense to this action are so obvious as to require little else from the court than an examination and scrutiny of the facts. To aid in this examination, this summary has been prepared, and is respectfully submitted.

Assignment of Error.

The appellants assign for error in the decree rendered against them in the court below1. That there is a total want of equity throughout the complainants' bill, and in the evidence adduced in support of it.

2. That, under the evidence and allegations of the bill, the complainants have no claim in a court of equity, by reason of their long silence, laches, and acquiescence in the acts complained of since 1814.

3. That the cause of action, as set forth by the complainants, is barred and prescribed by lapse of time under the laws of Louisiana.

4. That the disallowance of the sums of $40,418 and of $8,253, and the decree concerning the judgments for said amounts, is contradictory and in violation of law.

5. That the agreements made by two of the complainants with the defendant in 1817 are valid, obligatory, and conclusive upon the parties; that the declaration of the co-executor, J. F. Girod, has the same effect.

6. That the discharge of J. F. Girod, the coexecutor, destroys all claim in equity against the defendants.

548*] *Mr. Janin, for the appellees, relied upon the following points and authorities:

1. Although the will authorized the executors "to sell the property, or cause it to be sold, as to them would seem best for the heirs of the testator, without the intervention of justice," the Spanish law, then in force in Louisiana, yet required that the property should be sold at public sale, by order of court, and after thirty days' advertisement. (Gayoso v. Garcia, 1 Martin's R., N. S., 324.)

2. A succession sale, made by the register of wills in the Parish of New Orleans, or by the parish judges in the country parishes, who there perform the functions of the register of wills (Code of 1808, p. 182, art. 153), is null and void, if not preceded by an order of the Court of Probates. (Elliott v. Labarre, 2 Louisiana R., 326.)

3. Probate sales, sheriff's sales, or judicial sales of any kind can be set aside by the parties in interest, and treated as uullities, if the

4. The Act of the Legislature of Louisiana of March 10, 1834, by which certain irregularities in judicial sales are cured by the lapse of five years, applies only to irregularities in the advertisements. (Morton v. Reynolds, 4 Louisiana R., 28; McCluskey v. Webb, Ibid., 206.) And even so far as the statute is applicable to the facts of this case, it cannot avail the defendants, because it was not pleaded.

5. By the civil law, as well as by the law of chancery, an executor cannot purchase the property of the estate which he administers. (Harrod v. Norris's Heirs, 11 Martin's R., 298; Longbottom's Ex'r v. Babcock et al., 9 Louisiana R., 48; Scott's Ex'rs v. Gorton, 14 Ibid., 114, 122; McCluskey v. Webb, 4 Rob R., 201; 1 Story's Eq. Jurisp., 315; Prevost v. Gratz, 1 Pet. C. C. Rep., 368; Wormley v. Wormley, 8 Wheat., 421; Case v. Abeel, 1 Paige, 397; Davoue v. Fanning, 2 Johns. Ch. R., 252; Rogers v. Rogers, 1 Hopk., 525.)

6. The judgments obtained by Nicolas Girod for $40,418.09, and by J. F. Girod for $8,253.20, were the result of the fraudulent contriv ances disclosed by the evidence. It is well settled that chancery will relieve collaterally against frauds in judgments. (1 Story's Eq. Jurisp., sec. 252; 2 Ibid., sec. 1252; 1 Maddock's Ch. Pr., 300; Mitford's Eq. Plead., 266; Brashear v. West, 7 Peters, 616; Pratt v. Notham, 5 Mason, 103; Garnett v. Mason, 2 Brock., 213; Marine Ins. Co. v. Hodgson, 2 Cond. R., 526: Bateman v. Willoe, 1 Sch. & Lef., 205; Winthrop et al. v. Lane, 3 Desaus., 323; Irby v. M'Crae, 4 Dessaus., 429; Barnsly v. Powell, 1 Ves., Sen., 289.)

7. Even without fraud, these judgments could not be binding upon the heirs, for they [*549 were not parties to them, and the executors did not represent them or the estate in these proceedings. These were indeed judgments without parties. Co-executors are bound jointly and severally. (Code of 1808, p. 248, art. 177; 2 Story's Eq. Jurisp., secs. 1280, 1281.) One of them may act for all. (Same article of the Code of 1808.) They are considered in law as one person. (2 Williams's Executors, 620.) Hence, if one confess the action, judgment shall be given against them all. (Ibid., 621.) And they cannot sue one another, if they have ac cepted the trust. (Ibid., 685, 818.)

8. Though the attorney of the absent heirs was made a party to these suits, the judgments are not binding on the heirs. The duties of such an attorney are merely conservatory-he never represents the estate. In cases of mere neglect, and free from fraud, judgments obtained contradictorily with the attorney of the absent heirs have been treated as nullities. (Stein v. Bowman, 9 Louisiana R., 282; Collins v. Pease's Heirs, 17 Ibid., 117.) As a gen eral rule, the courts disregard entirely judg ments opposed to parties who were not cited or not properly represented. (Psyche v. Para dol, 6 Louisiana R., 366; Marchaud v. Gracie, 2 Ibid., 148.)

9. The homologation of the account of 1817 is not res judicata. It appears from the peti tion of the executors, and from the order there on, that the heirs were not at all represented

in this proceeding; the executors themselves preferring to represent them. An attorney was indeed appointed to represent the three heirs of the Poidebard family, who had not sent their powers of attorney to the executors, and who were, together, entitled to one sixteenth of the estate. But they, also, will be relieved from the effects of the homologation on account of the fraud of the executors, and the neglect, if not worse, of the attorney of the absent heirs.

10. The proof of fairness, in dealings between trustee and cestui que trust, lies upon the former. (8 Cond. Ch. R., 495; 1 Story's Eq. Jurisp., sec. 218.)

11. By the civil law, a purchase, by an executor of the property, of the estate administered by himself is radically null, and cannot be cured by prescription. His possession as executor is called, in that system of jurisprudence, a "precarious" possession; by no act of his own can he alter its character; he cannot sell to himself; notwithstanding an attempted purchase, the law considers his possession as the precarious possession of an executor, and a precarious possession cannot prescribe by any lapse of time. (Macarty v. Bond's Administrator, 9 Louisiana R., 355; McCluskey v. Webb, 4 Rob. R., 201; Montamat v. Debon, 4 Martin's R., N. S., 152; Troplong on Prescription, Nos. 509, 517; 1 Vazeille on Prescription, Nos. 148, 149; Porthier's Treatise on Possession, Nos. 64-66.)

550*] *12. If any prescription was applicable to the purchases of the executors, it would be the prescription of thirty years, which protects purchasers in bad faith. (Code of 1808, p. 486, art. 66; Code of 1825, art. 3438, 3465; Francois v. Delaronde, 8 Martin's R., 629; Troplong on Prescription, Nos. 905-907, 915, 918; 21 Duranton, Nos. 352-354.)

13. The prescription of ten and twenty years relied on by the defendants, that is, of ten years between present, and of twenty years between absent persons, can be pleaded only by those whose possession was acquired-first, honestly; second, by virtue of a just title; third, by a title not defective in form. (Code of 1808, p. 486, art. 67; Devall v. Choppin, 15 Louisiana Rep., 566; Code of 1825, art. 3442, 8445, 3449-3454.)

But this prescription was not pleaded by the defendants.

14. The only prescription which the defendants plead in their answer is the prescription of the action of nullity (p. 81 of the answer). This is a prescription of ten years, established by art. 204, p. 303, of the Code of 1808, which is literally the same as article 2218 of the Code of 1825, and article 1304 of the Napoleon Code. The answer rests this prescription on the receipts given in 1817 by Mme. Pargoud and Mme. Adam, representing two of the five branches of heirs on whose behalf this suit has been brought.

The terms of the law show that this prescription applies only to actions of nullity or rescission to set aside an "agreement." This is not an action of nullity, but an action of revendication, or petitory action, which, as has been seen, is barred only as between absent persons by the prescription of twenty or of thirty years, according as the purchaser was in good or in bad faith.

The receipts were not "agreements," but an acknowledgment of the reception of a sum of money, which the executors represented as all that was coming to those two heirs from the succession.

Even if these receipts were "agreements," in the sense of the article, the right to set them aside would be barred only by the term of ten years "from the discovery of the fraud." The evidence shows that the complainants had not the slightest knowledge of the fraudulent act now proved before 1837.

15. The defendants also contend that these two receipts imply a ratification of the acts of the executors. The definition and attributes acts of confirmation and ratification are given in article 238, p. 310, of the Code of 1808, which is a literal copy of article 1338 of the Napoleon Code, and which was retained in the Code of 1825 as article 2252.

But no ratification or confirmation exists in this case, because,

1st. The original sales, being absolute nullities, are not susceptible of ratification. [*551 If it was the intention of the injured party to sanction them, nothing less than a new sale would have been required to accomplish this. object. Acts infected with a radical nullity cannot be ratified; they must be made anew. (Solon, Théorie sur la Nullité, Vol. II., pp. 262, 292, 294, 296, 301, 321, 327, 328, 373 et seq., 406; Troplong on Prescription, n., 905-907.) 2d. If considered as an express ratification of its fraudulent sales and judgments, the receipts are inoperative, for they do not contain, in the words of the law (Code of 1808, p. 310, art. 238), "the mention of the motive of the action of rescission, and the intention of supplying the defect on which that action is founded."

3d. If considered as a tacit ratification, all the authorities concur that all the facts and circumstances must be fully and completely known, and that the act relied on as a tacit ratification can be susceptible of no other interpretation. (Rivas's Heirs v. Bernard, 13 Louisiana R., 175, and authorities there cited: Copeland v. Mickie, 17 Ibid., 293; 2 Solon, p. 370; Perrin, Traité des Nullités, p. 350.)

16. The defendants also rely, in their printed argument, on the prescription of five years, established by art. 3507 of the Code of 1825. This prescription was not pleaded by them. Had it been, the answer would be, that it applies, in terms, to "contracts, testaments, and other acts," like art. 204, p. 303, of the Code of 1808; and that it does not extend to cases of fraud, which are exclusively provided for in the last mentioned article.

17. If the case be tested by the rules of chancery, the resale would be the same.

In chancery, a purchase by a trustee can be cured by lapse of time.

The cases on this subject are nowhere better reviewed than in Kane v. Bloodgood (7 Johns. Ch. Rep., 90). But the statute of limitations begins to run only from the open disavowal of the trust.

In this case, the possession was not known to the heirs to be adverse to the trust, except from the time when they were informed that the sales to Laignel and St. Felix were simulated. Until then, they believed the executors

to be, as the executors pretended themselves to be, bona fide purchasers from Laignel and St. Felix, who, it was believed and represented, were themselves serious purchasers from the estate.

The courts of the United States, sitting as courts of equity, apply the statutes of limitations of the respective States. (6 Peters, 291; 16 Peters, 455, 495; 11 Peters, 369, 393, 406.) When the statute limits not at law, the same length of time is not a bar in equity. (Boone v. Chiles, 10 Peters, 177; Cook v. Ankam, 6 Cond. Rep., 287; Baker v. Whiting, 3 Sumner, 486.)

"In a case of trusts of lands, nothing short 552*] of the statute period *which would bar a legal estate or right of entry would be permitted to operate in equity as a bar of the equitable estate." (Judge Story, in Baker v. Whiting, Sumner's Rep., 486.)

The conclusions to which we have come in this cause do not require from us any comment upon its facts.

We concur with the learned judge in the Circuit Court in setting aside the purchases by which Nicolas Girod and Jean François Girod became the possessors of their testator's entire estate. *But the morality and policy [*553 of the law, as it is administered in courts of equity, induce us to add, that those purchases were fraudulent and void, and may be declared to be so, without any further inquiry, upon the ground that they were made by the intervention of persons who were nominal buyers of the property for the purpose of conveying it to the executors. Such a transaction carries fraud upon the face of it. (Lord Hardwicke v. Vernon, 4 Ves., Jun., 411; 14 Ves., Jun., 504; 2 Bro. C. C., 410, note.) It matters not, in such a case, whether the sales are made with or It has been seen that no other prescription without the sanction of judicial authority, or but that of thirty years would, by the law of with ministerial exactness. The rule of equity Louisiana, bar the action of revendication. is, in every code of jurisprudence with which Nothing is better settled, in the law of chan- we are acquainted, that a purchase by a trustee cery, than that, in cases of fraud, the statute or agent of the particular property of which be of limitations does not begin to run until a full has the sale, or in which he represents andiscovery of the frauds practiced. (Boone v. other, whether he has an interest in it or notChiles, 10 Peters, 223; Aylward v. Kearney, 2 per interpositam personam-carries fraud on Ball & Beat., 476; Murray v. Palmer, 2 Sch. the face of it. In this instance, Laignel and & Lef., 486; Hovenden v. Lord Annesley, 2 Sch. St. Felix were the instruments of the executors. & Lef., 632; Bond v. Hopkins, 1 Sch. & Lef., They bid off the property, paid nothing, re413; 1 Hovenden on Frauds, 480; Croft v.ceived titles, and conveyed what they nominally Adm'rs of Townsend, 3 Desaus., 239; Wamburzee. v. Kennedy, 4 Desaus., 474, 485, 489; Randall v. Errington, 10 Ves., 423.)

And vague rumors and reports do not constitute that kind of knowledge of the fraud which will give course to the statute of limitations. (Flagg v. Mann, 2 Sumner, 491, 551, 563; Irby v. M'Crae, 4 Desaus., 431; Randall v. Errington, 10 Ves., 423; 11 Louisiana R., 139; Conway v. Williams's Adm'r, 10 Ibid., 568; Tyson v. McGill, 15 Ibid., 145.)

The acquiescence and ratification of two of the complainants is attempted to be inferred from their receipts. These parties assuredly knew nothing of the frauds of the executors when they signed the receipts, and acted with blind confidence. In equity, as long as the injured party does not know the full extent of his rights, and that the transaction is impeachable, any act done by him subsequently will not amount to a ratification or confirmation. As long as the dependence of the cestui que trust upon the trustee and the fiduciary relation continues, an alleged ratification will always be scrutinized with the utmost jealousy; and a party possessing only imperfect information cannot be held guilty of laches. (1 Story's Equity, sec. 345; Butler v. Haskell, 4 Desaus., 651, 709, where the principal cases are reviewed; Murray v. Palmer, 2 Sch. & Lef., 486; 1 Hovenden on Frauds, 152, 484; Purcell v. McNamara, 14 Ves., 107, 120; Cole v. Gibbons. 3 P. W., 293; Brooke, Ex'r, v. Gally, 2 Atkyns, 34; Cole v. Gibson, 1 Ves., Sen., 507; Taylor v. Rockfort, 2 Ves., Sen., 281; Roche v. O'Brien, 1 Ball & Beat., 230; Morse v. Royall, 12 Ves., 364; Wood v. Downes, 18 Ves., 120.)

bought to the executors. In this way Nicolas Girod became the purchaser of all the testator's property in New Orleans, and himself and his brother Jean François, the other executor, were joint purchasers of the lands and slaves in the parish of Assumption, and of the testator's lands elsewhere. Jean François, some years afterwards, sold out his half of their joint purchase to Nicolas, for seventy thousand dollars. Thus the latter became the possessor of the entire estate, and held it until he died, to the exclusion of all the other testamentary heirs. Some of those heirs, and the representatives of others of them, now sue the representatives of Nicolas Girod, and seek to set aside the purchases of the executors. They allege that they were fraudulently made, ask that they may have assigned to them their respective portions of the estate, with an account of rents and profits, excepting from their claim for the latter the moiety which had been received by Jean François Girod. The defendants reply, and deny fraud in fact or in intention on the part of the executors. They declare that the sales were judicially ordered and conducted, that the purchases were rightfully made, for a fair price. at public auction, that the complainants have no standing in a court of equity by reason of their long silence, laches, and acquiescence in the acts of which they complain, and that their rights are barred by lapse of time, under the laws of Louisiana. They also say that receipts or acquittances were given to the execu tors by two of the complainants, which are valid and obligatory upon them. The bill and answers, and the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants, then, involve the question of the right of executors to purchase any part of the estate which they administer, for a fair

Mr. Justice WAYNE delivered the opinion of price, at a public sale judicially ordered and the court:

conducted. Remarking, first, that an executor

╚=

554] or administrator is in equity a trustee | (9 Ves., Jun., 248; Ex-parte Bennet, 10 Ves.. for heirs, legatees, and creditors, we proceed to Jun., 381.) give our opinion of the law in respect to purchases of the estate represented by them, and of purchases made by other trustees and agents, and all persons qui negotia aliena gerunt. The rule as to persons incapable of purchasing particular property except under particular restraints, on account of the rules of equity, is compendiously given by Sir Edward Sugden, in his second section of purchases by trustees, agents, &c. It has been adopted by almost every subsequent writer, and we cite the passage with confidence, having verified its correctness by an examination of all the cases cited by him; by an examination, also, of other cases in the English courts, and of cases in the courts of chancery of several of the States in our Union, sustaining the doctrine, to the fullest extent, of the incapability of trustees and agents to purchase particular property, for the sale of which they act representatively, or in whom the title may be for another. He says, "it may be laid down as a general proposition, that trustees (unless they are nominally such to preserve contingent remainders), agents, commissioners of bankrupts, assignees of bankrupts, solicitors to the commission, auctioneers, creditors who have been consulted as to the mode of sale, or any persons who, by their connection with any other person, or by being employed or concerned in his affairs, have acquired a knowledge of his property, are incapable of purchasing such property themselves, except under the restraints which will shortly be mentioned. For if persons having a confidential character were permitted to avail themselves of any knowledge acquired in that capacity, they might be induced to conceal their information, and not to exercise it for the benefit of the persons relying upon their integrity. The characters are inconsistent. Emptor emit quam minimo potest, venditor vendit quam maximo potest." (2 Sugd. Vendors and Purchasers, 109, London ed., 1824.)1 The principle has been extended to a purchase by an 555*] *attorney from his client whilst the relation subsists. (Bellew v. Russell, 1 Ball & Beatty, 96; 9 Ves., Jun., 296; 13 Ves., Jun., 133; as to gifts, Lord Selsey v. Rhoades, 2 Sim. & Stu., 41; Williams v. Llewellyn, 2 You. & Jer., 68; Champion v. Rigby, 1 Russ. & Myl., 539.) Nor can an arbitrator buy up the unascertained claims of any of the parties to the reference. (Blennerhasset v. Day, 2 Ball & Beatty, 116; Cane v. Lord Allen, 2 Dow., 289.) Where a person cannot purchase the estate himself, he cannot buy it as agent for another.

1.-Trustees.-Fox v. Mackreth, 2 Bro. C. C., 400; 4 Bro. P. C. (Tomlins'), 258; Hall v. Noyes, 3 Bro. C. C., 483, and see 3 Ves., Jun., 748; Kellick v. Flexny, 4 Bro., C. C., 161; Whitcote v. Lawrence, 3 Veз, Jun., 740; Campbell v. Walker, 5 Ves., Jun., 678, and Whitackre v. Whitackre, Sel. Chan. Cases, 13. Remainders.-See Parks v. White, 11 Ves., Jun.,

226.

Agents.-York Buildings Company v. Mackenzie, 8 Bro. P. C., 42; Lowther v. Lowther, 13 Ves., Jun., 95; see Watt v. Grove, 2 Sch. & Lef., 492; Whitcomb v. Minchin, 5 Madd.. 91; Woodhouse v. Meredith, 1 Jac. & Walk., 204.

Commissioners of Bankrupts.-Ex-parte Bennet, 10 Ves., Jun., 381; Ex-parte Dumbell, Aug. 13, 1806, Mort., notes, 33, cited; Ex-parte Harrison, 1 Buck, 17.

The general rule stands upon our great moral obligation to refrain from placing ourselves in relations which ordinarily excite a conflict between self-interest and integrity. It restrains all agents, public and private; but the value of the prohibition is most felt, and its application is more frequent, in the private relations in which the vendor and purchaser may stand towards each other. The disabilty to purchase is a consequence of that relation between them which imposes on the one a duty to protect the interest of the other, from the faithful discharge of which duty his own personal interest may withdraw him. In this conflict of interest the law wisely interposes. It acts not on the possibility that, in some cases, the sense of that duty may prevail over the motives of self-interest, but it provides against the probability in many cases, and the danger in all cases, that the dictates of self-interest will exercise a predominant influence, and supersede that of duty. It therefore prohibits a party from purchasing on his own account that which his duty or trust requires him to sell on account of another, and from purchasing on account of another that which he sells on his own account. In effect, he is not allowed to unite the two opposite characters of buyer and seller, because his interests, when he is the seller or buyer on his own account, are directly conflicthe buys or sells. (2 Burge's Com., 459.) Cases ing with those of the person on whose account Louisiana which maintain the rule in all its inhave been frequently decided in the courts of tegrity. In Pennsylvania it is enforced, though, unsustained by any reference to adjudged cases, on looking over its reports, we find a case, but in which it is said that an executor might buy at a sale of the testator's effects, if he did land, the courts of chancery carry out the rule so for a fair price, at public auction. In Maryto the fullest extent of the principles upon which it is founded, and as they have just been stated by us. In the case of Wormley v. Wormley (8 Wheat., 421) this court declared that no rule is better settled than that a trustee cannot become the purchaser of the trust estate. He cannot be, at the same time, vendor and vendee. It had been previously ruled, in the case of Prevost v. Gratz (6 Wheat., 481), and this court afterwards, in Ringo et al. v. Binns et al., re-affirmed the rule by its application to an agent who had bought land to which *his principal was in equity entitled. [*556 It said: "The proposition laid down by this court is, that if an agent discovers a defect in

Assignees of Bankrupts.-Ex-parte Reynolds, 5 Ves., Jun., 707; Ex-parte Lacey, 6 Ves., Jun., 625; Ex-parte Bage, 4 Madd., 459; Ex-parte Badcock, 1 Mont. & Mac., 231.

Solicitors to the Commission.-Owen v. Foulkes, 6 Ves., Jun., 630, note b; Ex-parte Linwood; Ex-parte Churchill, 8 Ves., Jun., 343, cited; Ex-parte Bennet, 10 Ves., Jun., 381; Ex-parte Dumbeil, Aug. 13, 1806, Mont., notes, cited; see 12 Ves., Jun., 372; 2

Mer., 200.

Auctioneers, creditors consulted as to mode of sale, or any persons who by their connection with, or concern in, the affairs have acquired a knowledge, &c.-See Ex-parte Hughes, 6 Ves., Jun., 617: Coles v. Trecothick, 9 Ves., Jun., 234; 1 Smith's Rep., 233; Oliver v. Court, 8 Price, 127.

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