istence and which they will gladly exchange for the proceeds of his wages pursuant to contracts freely made between them?

While the whole industrial activity of man depends upon his belief in the fulfillment of contracts, there is often a strong tendency in legislatures and governments to repudiate debts or obstruct their collection. When, therefore, Marshall placed the obligation of contracts beyond the power of any State to disturb, he made the industry of this country the most prosperous in the world by making its fruits the most secure.

If I were to summarize Marshall's service I should say that on the solid foundation of the Constitution he made power, justice, peace and prosperity the four great pillars of our governmental system — power by establishing the sovereignty of the General Government over the States, thus making it the strongest nation in the world; justice by establishing the dominion of the Constitution over all the departments of government; peace by establishing freedom of intercourse between all the States; prosperity by establishing the inviolability of private contracts. The decisions of Marshall's successors, without disturbing these pillars, have strengthened them, and the stately fabric of government which they support.

The stability of the Union has been secured as much by forbearance in refusing to exercise powers not properly belonging to it as by firmness in enforcing those essential to its existence. The inviolability of contracts has not been allowed to pervert franchises granted for the public convenience into monopolies beyond the power of the State to control. The right of every citizen to trade, move or labor everywhere throughout the whole territory of the United States on equal terms with all

others has not been allowed to interfere with the right of each State to protect health, order and morals within its limits the only restriction on its police power being the requirement that every exercise of it must apply equally to citizen and stranger under its jurisdiction.

It is perhaps the most extraordinary feature of our political system as it is the most impressive tribute to Marshall's genius that the power of the judiciary - now unquestioned to fix the limits of its own authority and the authority of all other departments rests not upon any specific provision of the Constitution, but on a principle of construction first announced authoritatively in the case of Marbury against Madison. The approval bestowed on that momentous decision and on every subsequent amplification of its doctrine has been so universal that the judicial department has been encouraged to extend the buckler of its authority over an ever-widening field, until it has become the dominant force in our national life - the one element which through all our existence has steadily grown in power and beneficence. Never has the Supreme Court exercised its supreme power of setting aside a law of Congress or of a State that the people did not sustain its course with substantial unanimity. With the exception of the Eleventh Amendment, there is not in the history of the United States, or of any State, a single instance in which the people consented to a constitutional provision limiting the power of the judiciary, while the tendency everywhere has always been to enlarge it. While this respect for the judiciary remains a conspicuous feature of our national life no peril to our institutions can ever become serious.

It is often said, and I think with truth, that the close of the nineteenth century witnessed a decline in the popu

larity of those parliamentary institutions which, at its beginning, were universally believed to be the sure panacea for all social or economic ills. In France, in Austria, in Italy and in Spain legislative chambers have sunk into universal contempt. Even in England the House of Commons has so far declined in popular respect that the House of Lords now assumes to reject its measures without fear of popular condemnation. In the present temper of the English people, if Edward VII. were possessed of real abilities, he might be able to impose his authority on both houses. If, for instance, he were to lift his voice now for justice to the Boers and denounce the South African war as a conscienceless manoeuvre of parliamentary politicians for political advantage, I believe that the conscience of the country would sustain him, as I know the public opinion of the world would applaud him, and Parliament would very probably be compelled to follow him. It would need but a few such exercises of leadership to make his authority permanent over both houses, for obedience is largely habit. Indeed, it is by no means impossible that the importance of the Crown, which began to decline after the death of Elizabeth, may begin to revive after the death of Victoria. In this county, representative bodies have not escaped the disrepute which has overtaken them in other lands. With us corruption is sometimes attributed to Congress, quite generally to State legislatures, universally to municipal councils. But in our government there is one department untainted by any breath of suspicion, to which the people are so passionately attached that the slightest attempt to disturb its independence or even to review its decisions at the ballot box would be the ruin of the political party suggesting it. Where Parliament is supreme, corruption of

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legislative bodies undermines the life of the whole State, for when the omnipotent source of power itself becomes corrupt, all the streams which flow from it must be tainted, and laws springing from greed are sure to be adminis tered for the plunder and oppression of the people. Under such conditions industry languishes, prosperity withers, civilization itself is imperiled. But under our democratic government the right of the citizen to come and go as he pleases, the right to enjoy his property, to exchange the product of his industry against the commodities produced by others, depend not upon the honesty of the legislature, or the loyalty of the executive, but upon the virtue and independence of the judiciary. If corruption exists in this country it can only affect the bestowal of favors by the government, it cannot endanger the life, liberty or property of a single individual. There may be partiality-corruption, if you will-in the bestowal of public franchises, of public offices and of public contracts, but while there is none in the administration of justice, while the courts remain true to the example and precepts of Marshall, all the essential rights of the citizen are as secure as the earth under his feet-they can no more be invaded than the stars in heaven can be blotted from his gaze.

One hundred years after the establishment of our Constitution what purpose expressed in its preamble remains to be accomplished - what hope cherished by its framers is unfulfilled? I know of none. Look around you and tell me if this be an idle boast. Has not the Union been made perfect through the wisdom of the great magistrate who showed its necessity and the blood of the heroes who cemented it? Is not justice firmly established by the unquestioned dominion of the Constitution? Is

not domestic tranquillity absolutely insured since perfect freedom of intercourse and trade removes all provocation to hostile acts or feelings between the States? Is not the common defense abundantly provided for by the overwhelming strength of a populous nation whose every inhabitant would die for the integrity of its soil and the glory of its flag? Has not the general welfare been promoted beyond the wildest hopes of the fathers since the security of property encourages industry to wring measureless abundance from a fruitful soil? Are not the blessings of liberty secured for ourselves and our posterity beyond fear of invasion or danger of abridgment by the effective protection which the judiciary casts over the essential rights of every citizen?

But the authors of this Constitution, in framing Article III, builded even wiser than they knew. At this moment the court is considering the gravest question ever submitted to a judicial tribunal in the history of mankind. Within a few days it must decide whether the Government of the United States, or rather whether two of its departments, can govern territory anywhere by the sword, or whether authority exercised by officers of the United States must be controlled and limited every where by the Constitution of the United States.

I do not mention this momentous question to express the slightest opinion upon its merits, but merely that this assemblage of judges and of lawyers may realize the part which the judiciary is now required to play in determining the influence which this country must exercise forevermore in the family of nations. The power of Congress to acquire territory is of course unquestioned, but the disposition to exercise that power will always be controlled by the conditions under which newly-acquired