If the question concerns government ownership of munition plants, it is bare assertion to say that the Government can save money by making its munitions. It is not much better to add that Secretary Daniels says so. It is more convincing to say, "Secretary of the Navy Daniels, in his Report for the year 1913, declares that 'the Navy Department, in what it manufactures, does so, from a superdreadnaught to a gallon of paint or a pound of powder, cheaper than the same can be purchased."" It is still more effective to add more definite citations, for example: "Secretary Daniels says, on page 10 of his latest Annual Report, that at the government torpedo works at Newport, R.I., 'the cost of manufacture of each torpedo has been reduced from $4200 to $3200. These torpedoes, if bought at the only private torpedo plant in the country, would cost $5000.''

In trying to prove that the United States has no right to intervene in the Congo Free State, one might say: "An eminent authority, who is in a position to know the facts, says in a letter of recent date, that this country, on account of certain negotiations, has no right to intervene in the Congo." But such a citation would be too vague to carry weight with competent judges. Indeed, it might only arouse suspicion as to the reliability of a witness and a letter to which one dared refer only at arm's length. Observe the gain in strength when this reference to authority is made definitely:

Hon. John A. Kasson, United States delegate to the Berlin Conference, in his letter quoted in the Boston Transcript of April 17, 1906, says: "The United States, through the failure of the Senate to ratify the Berlin Act, failed to become a party to the contract, and only contracting parties have the right to insist upon the due observance of all the clauses of the contract." Clearly, then, the United States officially and deliberately refused to assume the special right to interfere. Therefore, we by no means stand sponsor, as our opponents contend, for the Congo Free State.

In a debate on the proposition, "The United States should

subsidize the American Merchant Marine," a speaker said: "That American shipping needs no subsidies is shown by the fact that an American capitalist has put millions of American capital into the business." But, while the speaker rushed on to new assertions, the audience found themselves asking: "Who is this man? What is the source of your information? Under what conditions, in what manner, at what place, and at what time were these investments made?”

Unless the persons addressed are likely to accept a given citation without question, the reference should be sufficiently exact to enable any one, if he wishes, to look up the original source for himself. To quote "House Report 32,” or “an official report of the Treasury Department," or "Volume 33 of the Forum," or "a recent book on the war," is to substitute a weak, general reference for a strong, specific reference.

Goldsmith's Citizen of the World reports a story heard from his landlady, who had it from one neighbor, who had it from another neighbor, who heard it on very good authority. That is called hearsay evidence. Its value does not depend wholly on the credit to be given one person, but also on the veracity and the competency of other persons. The objections to hearsay evidence, for purposes of argument, are (1) the variations from truth liable to occur during its passage through such fallible media as human minds and language, and (2) its irresponsibility. So small are the chances of getting the truth unblemished through such a course, and so great is the difficulty of calling it to account, that hearsay evidence is weak at one remove from the original source, and in a few removes may become worthless. Its intrinsic weakness, its incompetency to satisfy the mind as to the existence of the fact, and the frauds that may be practiced under its cover, combine to support the rule that hearsay evidence in courts of law is usually inadmissible. It is true that outside of the courts, there is no obligation to abide strictly by court rules; but the objections to hearsay testimony are valid

anywhere. It is too indefinite to be given any weight as authority.

2. Is the authority capable of giving expert testimony? The value of expert testimony depends on the judgment of the audience concerning the special ability of the witness to speak on the point at issue. Assuming that he is honest, and void of any special interest in the case to be decided, his testimony is valuable in proportion to his mastery of the subject. Experts on mental diseases are constantly called in court to testify as to the sanity of prisoners; engineers are called to give expert opinion as to the condition of bridges; expert foresters are engaged to estimate the value of timberlands. But each man's judgment is given special consideration only on those subjects in which he is especially skilled.

Even expert testimony must be closely scrutinized. A first reason is that the expert is inclined to be prejudiced in favor of the side that calls him to its support and pays him for his testimony. A second reason is that in almost every issue, specialists can be found by both sides: some to testify that the blood is human, others that it is not human; some to testify that the signature is genuine, others that it is a forgery; some to testify that the milk is adulterated, others to affirm that it is pure. "The devil can cite Scripture to his purpose."

"What the telescope can assure us of; what the microscope can assure us of; what we can be assured of by chemical tests; what we can be assured of by careful induction produced by long and accurate observation as to all these lines of information experts are summoned to give their testimony under oath. They are, in the main, highly cultivated men, sensitively conscientious. They are usually selected from among the front ranks of their class. They have ample time given to them for their investigations. They are liberally paid for their services, so as to enable them to take any trouble requisite for their special inquiries. Yet, notwith

standing this, there is scarcely a case in which expert testimony is summoned where we do not find, after two or three experts have testified on one side, about the same number ready to testify on the other side.1 "

3. Has the authority had sufficient opportunity to know the facts? Expert testimony is satisfactory only when the authority is accepted as an expert on the subject by those whom we are seeking to convince: otherwise the words of the expert - no matter how competent he may be — are only assertion and in as much need of evidence as any other unsupported assertion.

Accordingly, it is often necessary to apply other tests even to experts. Why do we give special weight to the words of Luther Burbank concerning the care of orange groves, to the words of Henry Ford concerning the economic effects of an eight-hour day, to the words of Andrew Carnegie concerning the needlessness of a tariff on steel, to the words of Commander Peary concerning the construction of an Arctic sledge, to the words of Charles W. Eliot concerning the form of government for a privately supported university, to the words of Wilfred Grenfell concerning the needs of the children of Labrador and to the words of Herbert Hoover concerning the treatment of the Belgians? We value the testimony of these men on these subjects primarily because they have had special opportunities to know the facts whereof they speak. But we do not ask for Mr. Ford's opinion on fruit or Mr. Burbank's on finance. No man's acquaintance with the facts in any one field makes him an authority in a different field. Whatever other tests we apply, we always ask whether the experience of the authority should have given him sufficient knowledge concerning the particular point at issue.

4. Is the authority prejudiced? The reason why we dis1 Francis Wharton, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence in Criminal Issues,

trust prejudiced authority is grounded in human nature itself; and is quite apart from the question of the integrity of the authority. A prejudiced man sees evidence in a distorted way; he has a keen eye for what supports his own interests or opinions and is liable to overlook the rest. He is inclined to evade complete research when he has an instinctive feeling that the results will not be pleasing to him; he is inclined to carry his arguments only far enough to support his preconceived notions, instead of pushing them rigorously to their logical conclusions. His desire that such and such should be the truth tends to make him believe that it is the truth. For these reasons his testimony is not wholly trustworthy, no matter how sincere may be his beliefs.

It is therefore weak to quote, in favor of shipping subsidies, the opinion of a shipbuilder; or the testimony of the owner of a stockyard as to the need of government inspection. If the president of a temperance union and the head of a brewery should have exactly the same opportunities for observation, and should be equally honest, their reports of the working of the prohibitory law in Butte would probably vary. This is common experience. Prejudice narrows the vision, distorts the view, colors all the objects of sight, and obscures the very reasoning process itself.

Burke, in his speech at Bristol, tried to show that he was not prejudiced:

I confess to you freely that the sufferings and distresses of the people of America, in this cruel war, have at times affected me more deeply than I can express. . . . Yet, the Americans are utter strangers to me; a nation among whom I am not sure that I have a single acquaintance.

Senator Thurston opened his speech on "Affairs in Cuba" in this way:

I went to Cuba firmly believing that the condition of affairs there had been greatly exaggerated by the press, and my own efforts were directed in the first instance to the attempted exposure of these sup