in those respects, must, as to national matters committed to it, possess powers co-ordinate with those of the Parliament of Great Britain, and that the possession of such powers cannot in any way tend to produce the dangerous results predicted by Mr. Harrison.

It is England's boast that the Anglo-Saxon heritage of personal freedom is nowhere so thoroughly protected as it is in Great Britain; there are, however, no written limitations upon Parliamentary action of any kind-in fact, Parliament, being the mouthpiece of the people, is necessarily supreme. The notes to section 11 of this chapter show that the sovereignty of the British Constitution is lodged, as declared by Blackstone, in Parliament; Professor Chase's note on this statement in his American edition of Blackstone's Commentaries, which is appended to this section, shows the difference between an act of Congress and an act of Parliament as to matters which are covered by the Constitution;1

But here the government is the | as dear to the people, and afforded government of the people; all its officers are their officers, and they can exercise no right or powers but such as the people commit to them. In such a case the silence of the Constitution argues nothing. The trial by jury, the freedom of the press, and the liberty of conscience are not taken away, because they are not secured. They remain with the people among the mass of ungranted powers, or find an appropriate place in the laws and institutions of each particular State.

at least an equal protection to persons and property. The same remark may be made of several other provisions included in the amendments. But these will more properly fall under consideration in our commentary upon that portion of the Constitution. The promptitude, zeal and liberality with which the friends of the Constitution supported these amendments evince the good faith and sincerity of their opinions, and increase our reverence for their labors, as well as our sense of their wisdom and patriotism." 1 Story's Com. on the Cons. of the U. S. 5th ed. §§ 300 -305, pp. 217-220.

See also Thorpe's Constitutional History of the United States, vol. 2, chap. VI, p. 199, et seq. § 40.

"Notwithstanding the force of these suggestions, candor will compel us to admit that, as certain fundamental rights were secured by the Constitution, there seemed to be an equal propriety in securing in like manner others of equal value and importance. The trial by jury in criminal cases was secured; but this clause admitted of more clear definition and of auxility of the legislative branch of the iary provisions. The trial by jury Government in England and in the in civil cases at common law was United States. The English Par

1"There is a fundamental difference between the power and author

the same difference cannot exist, however, as to matters which are lodged generally in the National Government or which it possesses not by delegation but as the attributes of sovereignty of a national government. Blackstone, however, and other writers upon the fundamental law of England, trace the British Constitution, unwritten as it is, from the earliest sources, showing that personal liberty and personal rights are amply protected from legislative aggression, and that no person can be deprived of them in any manner whatsoever. Undoubtedly the Supreme Court of the United States can be entrusted with the protection of personal rights of Americans, and of the inhabitants of any territory under the jurisdiction of the United States, to the same extent that the English courts can be trusted with the similar protection of citizens and subjects of Great Britain.

§ 41. Simultaneous development of nationality and limitations by fundamental principles of natural and healthy growth. The simultaneous development of the two theories of complete nationality and sovereignty, and of the limitation of congressional action in regard to national matters by liament is not limited, as regards is upon previous acts of Parliathe scope and extent and subject-ment, upon custom and tradition, matter of legislation, by a written is subject to change and modificaconstitution defining and restricting its powers, and its enactments therefore constitute the supreme law of the land and are absolutely binding upon the courts, which have no option but to appropriately enforce them. It is for this reason that Parliament is sometimes said to be "omnipotent." What is spoken of as the "English Constitution" embraces the body or system of laws, rules, principles and established usages, upon which is based the organization of the Government, the relation of its various departments or branches to each other, and the nature of their functions, and in accordance with which the administration of the Government is regularly conducted. But this Constitution, based as it

tion by other acts of Parliament, though it is undoubtedly true, that it has, by force of precedent, and by the natural effect of ordinary usage upon the habits and ideas of people, great controlling and restrictive power upon the course of legislation. But in the United States, legislation is uniformly controlled by written constitutions adopted by the people in their sovereign capacity. The United States Constitution limits and defines the powers of Congress, and is also binding upon the legislatures of the several States, so that their enactments cannot violate its provisions. The legislation of the States is also further controlled by the special Constitution which each has adopted. To the courts is com

fundamental principles, has up to the present time inured to the advantage and mutual benefit alike of the powers that govern, and of the people who are governed; this same development will undoubtedly continue in the spirit of AngloSaxon liberty without danger to the personal rights of individuals, or the enactment of any such grotesque legislation as is feared by the ex-President; in this respect it must be remembered that the combined action of the three departments of the American Government is always subject to the control of the people by the frequent recurrence of elections; the reversal or repeal of congressional action always follows when it appears that the legislation enacted is not in accord with the spirit of liberty as it is understood by the people, who must eventually be the sole judges as to whether or not the powers of sovereignty lodged in the National Government, great as they are, are being properly exercised. Not until the spirit. of the people changes can Congress act with the spirit of despotism. If, however, the minds of the American people can ever become so perverted as to favor despotism in any form, that degeneracy will be reflected in Congress, and no constitutional provisions, or fundamental principles of liberty, will suffice to prevent the enactment of legislation which will accord with the popular sentiment as to those matters which are wholly within the domain of the National Government, and therefore under the control of the people themselves. No such danger exists to-day; let us hope that it never will exist.

mitted the power and duty of determining whether particular enactments are in conformity with Constitutional provisions; and if it is adjudged that they are not, such laws are pronounced null and void, either in whole or in part (Civil Rights cases, 109 U. S. 3; Baldwin vs. Franks, 120 U. S. 678; Duryee vs. Mayor of N. Y. 96 N. Y. 477). This is not, however, done by the courts of their own motion, but only in the 70

course of decision of actually litigated causes in which the Constitutionality of the statute is essentiaily involved. But all statutes not in conflict with the provisions of the Constitution of the State or of the United States are as supreme and absolute, within their appropriate sphere, as the acts of the English Parliament." Chase's Blackstone (3d ed.), p. 15, note.

CHAPTER II.

THE NATIONALITY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF THE UNITED STATES AS

EVIDENCED BY ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY.

§ 42. Development of United States from a Confederation into a Nation; recognition of Sovereignty.-We have already seen, in the last chapter, that the Government of the United States has developed from the mere central government of a confederation into a great national government possessing and exercising, as to all national matters, every sovereign power which any other sovereign nation of the world possesses and exercises; also that this nationality and sovereignty has been recognized by our own people and our own courts. It is purposed in this and the succeeding chapter to show that these attributes of sovereignty and nationalty have been exercised in adding to our domain vast tracts of territory, over which the Government of the United States has extended in its national and sovereign capacities, and also that the nationality and sovereignty of the United States have been continuously recognized by every other sovereign nation.

§ 43. Right of sovereign powers to acquire territory.— The right of sovereign powers to cede territory to, and to acquire territory from, other sovereign powers, with the accompanying transfer of sovereignty thereover, is one of the elementary principles of international law. It is essential, however, that the contracting powers should be fully sovereign in order to act either as transferrer or transferee.1

$ 43.

1 TRANSFER OF TERRITORY; VIEWS OF PUBLICISTS.

PROFESSOR POMEROY.

"It may be laid down as an universal doctrine of the international law, that every sovereign independent state may transfer or acquire territorial or other possessions. I say this is a doctrine of the international law, which does not concern itself with the internal organization of countries, and the powers committed to governments, or to any departments thereof. Whether, therefore, any particular nation may transfer its territory or acquire territory from another is a question to be answered by examining the constitution of that country, the functions and capacties conferred upon its rulers. This belongs entirely to public and not to international law. The same is true of the subordinate inquiry, what department of a government may effect the transfer or receive the acquisition? Whether the king or other executive, the legislature, or the people assenting and ratifying the acts of their governmental agents. We are not called upon to discuss this subject; and although Vattel devotes a large space in his treatise to its consideration, he has therein