welfare. for all crimes (q); but as the cases where such a (xi.) Public plea would be applicable are happily rare, it is unnecessary in a work like the present to do more than mention it as a ground of excuse. The intentional infliction of death or bodily harm (xii.) Lawful is not a crime. when it is done by any person— (a) in the due execution by the proper officer of a lawful sentence passed by a competent Court; or (b) in the prevention of a felony where the felon so acts as to give reasonable grounds for supposing that he intends to accomplish his purpose by open force; or (c) in the arrest, recapture, or retention of a felon, even though the felon offers no violence to any person; Provided always in the last two instances that the object for which death or harm is inflicted cannot be otherwise accomplished. In the case of a general and dangerous riot, the plea of lawful authority would excuse the acts of those persons duly authorized to engage in its suppression, and acting within the scope of that authority. § 6. Period of Time which will bar a Criminal Prose cution. By the common law, there is no time limited after the commission of a crime within which an indictment must be preferred. Certain statutes have, (2) Vide Bentham, Theory of Legislation, p. 266, authority. : however, in the cases of a few crimes, imposed limitations which may be thus enumerated (r) :(a) 7 & 8 Will. III. c. 3, s. 5. For treason, if committed in Great Britain, three years. (b) 60 Geo. III. & 1 Geo. IV. c. 1, s. 7. For training to arms and military practice, six months. (c) 9 Geo. IV. c. 69, s. 4. For poaching offences under the statute, one year. (d) 16 & 17 Vict. c. 107, s. 303. For offences against the Customs Act, three years. (e) 31 Eliz. c. 5. Indictments or informations upon any statute penal, whereby the for feiture is limited to the sovereign, two years. (f) 31 Eliz. c. 5. Where the forfeiture is limited to the sovereign and the prosecutor, one year. (g) 46 & 47 Vict. c. 51, s. 51. A proceeding against a person in respect of any offence under the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act or under this Act must be commenced within one year after the commission of the offence, or, if it was committed with reference to an election with respect to which an inquiry is held by election commissioners, then within one year after the commission of the offence, or within three months after the report of such commissioners is made, whichever period last expires, so that it be commenced within two years after the commission of the offence. (r) Harr. Crim. Law, ed. 3, p. 354. In all cases under these two Acts the proceedings are to date from the service or execution of the summons, warrant, writ or other process, except where the service or execution thereof is prevented by the absconding or concealment or act of the alleged offender. § 7. Parties to a Crime. Every person engaged in the commission of a crime is either a principal or an accessory. cipals are classified as (a) Principals in the first degree. (b) Principals in the second degree. Accessories are classified as(a) Accessories before the fact. (b) Accessories after the fact. Prin first degree. A principal in the first degree is one who either Principals in actually commits, or employs an innocent agent to commit, or takes part in the actual commission of a crime, whether he is on the spot when the crime is committed or not. Thus, where A. tells B., a child under seven, to bring to A. money belonging to C., and B. does so, A. is a principal in the first degree (8). Also, where A. lays poison for B., which B. takes in A.'s absence, A. is a principal in the first degree (t). Where a crime is committed partly in one place and partly in another, any one who commits any part of it in any place is a principal in the first degree. (s) R. v. Manley, 1 Cox, C. C. 104. Principals in second degree. Thus, where A. steals goods, and deposits them in a place where B. by previous concert carries them away for sale, A. and B. are both principals in the first degree (u). Whoever aids or abets the actual commission of a crime, either at the scene of its commission or elsewhere, is a principal in the second degree. Thus, A., B., C. and D. go out with a common design to rob; A. commits the robbery; B. stands by ready to help; C. is stationed at a distance to warn them of anyone's approach; D. is posted with a conveyance to favour the escape of the others; A. is a principal in the first, B., C., D. in the second degree (x). When several persons take part in the execution of a common criminal purpose, each is a principal in the second degree in respect of every crime committed by any one of them in the execution of that purpose. Provided always, that if any of the offenders commits a crime foreign to that purpose, the others are neither principals in the second degree nor accessories, unless they actually instigate or assist in its commission. For example, (1) Several constables go to arrest A. at a house containing several persons, including B., C., D. The latter assist in driving off the former, and one of the constables is killed. A., B., C., D. are each responsible for the constable's death (y). (2) A. and B. go out to commit a theft. A., un (u) R. v. Kelly, 2 C. & K. 379. (x) Foster, 350. (y) Sissinghurst House case, 1 Hale, P. C. 462. known to B., puts a pistol in his pocket, sponsible for the shot (2). Mere presence on the occasion when a crime is committed does not make a person a principal in the second degree, even if he makes no effort to prevent the crime, or to arrest the criminal; but such presence may be evidence for the consideration of the jury of an active participation in the crime. Moreover, when the existence of a particular intent forms part of the definition of an offence, a person charged with aiding and abetting the commission thereof must be shown to have known of the existence of the intent on the part of the person so aided. E. g., B. is indicted for inflicting on C. an injury dangerous to life with intent to murder: A. is indicted for aiding and abetting B. A. must be shown to have known of B.'s intent to murder C., and it is not enough to show that A. helped B. in what he did (a). The punishment of a principal in the second degree is generally the same as that of a principal in the first degree. fore the fact. An accessory before the fact is one who, being Accessory beabsent at the time of its commission, directly or indirectly counsels, procures, or commands any felony or piracy which is committed in consequence of such counselling, procuring, or command. But mere knowledge of a person's intention to commit such felony or piracy, or conduct connected (z) Duffey's case, 1 Lew. 194. (a) R. v. Cruse, 8 C. & P. 546. Cf. R. v. Coney, 8 Q. B. D. |