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CORPORATIONS—(Continued.)

sections amended are re-enacted and published at length. This is
sufficient. State, ex rel. v. Knowles, et als., 577.

It was

5. The Florida Agricultural College is a public corporation.
founded by the State of Florida with public moneys derived in
trust from the government of the United States. It is within the
power of the Legislature to change the trustees named as corpora-
tors. Id.

6. The corporators in such a corporation having made a particular con-
tract with an individual, is no reason why such corporators are not
subject to legislative control and removal. Id.

COSTS. See Bailiff, Jurors and Jury, Office and Officer, 6, 7; County.

1. Chancery practice forbids a direct taxation of costs as between solicitor
and client against defendant; and the Code practice is not different in
this respect.
State v. Florida Central R. R. Co., 703.

2. Where the counsel has been employed to obtain or create a fund for the
joint benefit of both parties, his fees, if he prevails, not if he loses, may
be paid out of the funds; but where the interests of the parties are
adverse, only the legal taxable costs can be allowed. Id.

3. Where neither partner is blameless the costs should be divided among
the parties in a suit for dissolution and account. Chandler v. Sherman, 99.

COUNTIES.

1. In 1876 there was no statute making a bill incurred for the board of
jurors engaged in the trial of a capital felony a charge against the
county in which the trial happened, nor was the board of bailiffs in
whose charge such jurors were a charge against the county. County of
Nassau v. Downie, 171.

2. In order to constitute a charge against a county, the thing for which
it was incurred must be authorized by law. No officer can bind
either the State or county, unless there is authority, either ex-
pressed or necessarily implied, given by law to make the contract
sought to be enforced. Id.

COUNTY COURTS. See Jurisdiction (of Probate Judge).

COVENANTS RUNNING WITH LAND. See Lessor and Lessee.

CREDITOR'S BILL. See Pleading, 11.

CRIMINAL LAW. See Bill of Exceptions, 4; Exceptions, 9, 10, 11; Ha-
beas Corpus.

1. Where it appears that a committing magistrate, on complaint that the
accused had threatened to do damage to a schooner, and also to do
bodily harm to the complainant. issued a warrant of commitment to
the jail for want of sureties against doing damage to the property and
to keep the peace toward the complainant: Held, that this was errone-

CRIMINAL LAW-(Continued.)

ous. Sureties of the peace against doing damage to property (except
as to threats to burn a dwelling-house) are not authorized by the com-
mon law or by statute, and imprisonment for want of such sureties is
not allowed by law. Ex-parte Harfourd, 283.

2. The commitment having been made for want of bail for an act not
criminal, and also for a criminal act, is irregular. The security should
be fixed according to the degree of the criminal act charged, and the
court on habeas corpus should, if required by the accused, hear and
examine into the evidence for the purpose of determining what crim-
inal act has been committed, and the probable cause shown against
the accused, and this, whether the warrant of commitment was regu-
lar or irregular. Id.

3. In an indictment for procuring property by fa se pretences, it is not suffi
cient to charge that the prisoner "designedly, and by a false pre-
tence, and with intent to defraud one A. P., did obtain with such intent
the following property." It must charge what that pretence was,
and allege specifically that it was false. Hamilton v. State, 288.

4. The record showing that the defendants were brought into court, that
they appeared by counsel, plead to the indictment, were tried and
convicted, is sufficient evidence of a proper arraignment. Story & Sullivan
v. State, 564.

Where a party has been tried and convicted of an offence before a Jus-
tice's Court, and a fine imposed under the statute, and the Justice in
his commitment recites the fact of the conviction and the imposition
of the fine, and further directs that the accused "be conveyed to the
county jail to be employed at such manual labor as the County Com-
missioners may direct, which time shall not exceed ninety days," and
the statute under which the accused was convicted limits the term of
imprisonment to which he may be sentenced to sixty days: Held,
That so much of the commitment as seems to authorize an imprison-
ment for ninety days may be treated as surplusage and void, without
affecting the legality of the commitment for the non-payment of the
fine. The term of the imprisonment for such non-payment is regu-
lated by the statute. The writ of habeas corpus is refused. Ex-parte
Hunter, 575.

6. To authorize a witness to testify as to the reputation of another fo:
truth and veracity in order to impeach him, it is not necessary that
he should know what a majority of his neighbors or associates say
or think of his character for truth. Robinson v. State, 835.

7. If a witness testifies that he knows the reputation for truth and ve-
racity of the party to be impeached where he lives, the questions as
to whether that reputation is good or bad, and whether from that
reputation he would believe him under oath, are proper. Id.

8. The opposing party can, upon

cross-examination, ascertain the ex-

CRIMINAL LAW-(Continued.)

tent of the information of the witness, and the sources of his know-
ledge.

Id.

CROSS-BILL. See Pleading, 10.

DECREE PRO CONFESSO. See Appeals, 9.

1. A service of subpœna upon a sheriff, as ex-officio administrator, before
he has been ordered by the Judge of Probate to take charge of the
estate of a deceased mortgagor, does not authorize a decree pro con-
fesso. Wilson et al. v. Dibble, 782.

2. "Proof by affidavit to the judge" that the order requiring a defendant
resident of another State to appear and answer has been published in
the manner and for the time prescribed by law, is one of the require-
ments of the statute in order to perfect a constructive service. This
proof must be made before the judge can grant an order taking the
bill for confessed. Tunno and Jesup & Co., v. Roberts, 738.

DEFAULTS. See Judgments, 2, 3.

DEFINITIONS. See Words.

DEMURRER. See Pleading, 1, 3, 6; Practice (Law), 5.

EJECTMENT.

1. The action of ejectment is one in which the plaintiff must show that
he has not only the legal interest, but a possessory title in and to the
permises in controversy before he will be entitled to recover.
Jones v.
Lofton, 189.

2. In order to enable a plaintiff to recover in such an action, when his
right of possession is controverted, he must prove-first, that he had
the legal title to the premises at the time of the commencement of the
action; second, that he had the right of entry; and third, that the de-
fendant, or those claiming under him, were in possession at the time
the suit was commenced. Id.

3. A mortgagee cannot restrain the prosecution of a suit in ejectment
(brought by a purchaser under a junior lien) against the mortgagor or
his tenant. Thompson v. Maxwell, 773-

4. Where the verdict of the jury is plainly against testimony, as to which
there is no question of credibility, a new trial should be awarded.
Hence, in an action of ejectment, under our statute, where there is no
question as to the allowance of mesne profits, and where the value
is fixed by the testimony, the jury must find some damages. Duncan v.
Jackson et als., 338.

5. Under the statutes of this State, certain occupying claimants, after
judgment of eviction against them, may have the value of their im-
provements assessed by a jury in a particular manner and under a
, special charge. This and other provisions of the statute are of such
character that the value of the improvements cannot be set off be-

EJECTMENT-(Continued.)

fore judgment against the mesne profits recoverable as damages in
the action of ejectment. Id.

6. A suit in equity to recover the possession of lands under a legal title, and
for mesne profits, cannot be maintained. All the issues of law and
fact in regard to the title and the rents and profits may be tried in
a court of law. Cavedo v. Billings, et al., 261.

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1. Whether a vote cast at an election was legally cast, or whether an elec-
tion held on the day appointed of which due return is made to the
Board of State Canvassers was a legal election, are judicial ques-
tions which the Board of State Canvassers of elections cannot deter-
mine. The general power and duty of this Board is to ascertain and
declare who received the majority of votes cast. This is a ministe-
rial duty, and its exercise may be controlled by mandamus. State ex rel.
v. Board of State Canvassers, 17.

2. The words "true vote," in the statute governing the Board, mean the
actual vote cast as distinct from the strictly legal vote. Where a re-
turn is so irregular, false, or fraudulent that the Board is unable to
determine the actual vote cast, the entire return, under the statute,
should be rejected. While this power to determine the falsity or
irregularity is something more than simply counting or computing,
still such power necessarily appertains to the discharge of every min.
isterial duty of this character. Id.

3. Where acts admitted to be done by the answer of respondents in a
proceeding by mandamus disclose erroneous action and a failure to
discharge a ministerial duty imposed by law, and a consequent vio-
lation of right, this court has power to order a Board of State Can-
vassers to reassemble and discharge their duty. Id.

4. Under the statute, the proper and only place ter the filing of the original
certificate of a canvass by the Board of State Canvassers of the votes
cast at a general election for Governor in this State, is the office of
the Secretary of State. Where such an original certificate is filed in
this court as a response to a peremptory writ commanding a canvass,
this court should direct its return to its only proper legal place of de-
posit. While it is the duty of this court to compel the Board of State
Canvassers to perform their duties, still the canvass made by them
under our order is their canvass. This court is not a Board of State
Canvassers. Id.

5. Where a canvass for votes cast for persons at an election for the office
of Governor of this State is commanded by a peremptory writ, a re-
sponse showing a canvass of votes cast for other officers is surplus-
age, which the court of its own motion should strike out. Id.

EQUITY AND EQUITY JURISDICTION. See Chancery Jurisdiction,

Estoppel, Injunction, Mortgage, Parties, Practice, (Code,) Practice,
(Equity,) Trusts.

ESTATES OF DECEASED PERSONS. See Administrators and Ex-
ecutors.

ESTOPPEL.

Where A. attends conferences of creditors as to the general settlement
of the estate of an insolvent debtor, and during this period collects an
asset of the insolvent under directions from him to hold the proceeds
until settlement with creditors, and afterwards, at a final conference
of creditors, resulting in a general assignment, he signs a statement
admitting the claim so collected to be an asset of the insolvent, he is
estopped from afterwards denying that fact and setting up his own
claim as a set-off. Keyser, Judah & Co. v. Simmons, et als., 268.

EVIDENCE. See Witnesses.

1. After a deed has been offered and read in evidence to the jury without
objection, and the party offering it in evidence has closed, it is too
late to insist upon the formal proof of its execution. Dupuis v.
Thompson, 69.

2. The legal presumption is that an officer does his duty when acting un-
der a general power, such as a sale under fi. fa. A party claiming
under a sheriff's deed of this character, need not prove the advertise-
ment when he puts in evidence the judgment, the execution, the
levy, the return of the sheriff, and his deed reciting due and legal ad-
vertisement and sale. Id.

3. A leading question should be permitted only when it appears essential
to justice; where a witness is persistently unwilling, or biased, or
there exists some like reason, the court should allow it. In some
cases a party may and should be permitted to lead his own witness.
This matter, however, is in the discretion of the court. It is not
ground of error, and Appellate Courts universally refuse to review
such exercise of discretion. Coker & Scheiffer v. Hayes, 368.

4. After a witness has been examined in chief, and is recalled in rebuttal,
the court may, very properly, prevent a simple repetition of his tes-
timony. A party after his examination of a witness, and after closing
his testimony, has not absolute right to recall this witness to establish
matters not in rebuttal. Whether this rule ought to be varied is a
question for the Circuit Court, and an Appellate Court, if it interferes
at all, should only do so where it sees that injustice has been done
through this action. Id.

5. Questions leading to testimony apparently not pertinent to any issue
are properly overruled. Id.

6. Where, upon the face of the record, a question clearly open to the ob-
jection that it is leading and suggestive is rejected, and no ground for
its rejection appears upon the record, the action of the court must be

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