The only conditions imposed upon it were those growing out of the history of the people. When a new state comes into existence it can organize itself either as a simple or as a federal state. There is no authority standing above it which can compel it to take one form or the other. If, however, the people, while wishing to establish a national government, were attached to their state governments and were unwilling that they should disappear, they would find a place for them in the new system. Shorn of sovereignty and of some of their most important functions, they might still be allowed the uncontrolled exercise of the remaining functions of government, subject, however, to have their competence still further restricted at the will of the state into whose system they had entered. They would not thereby cease to be states. States differ from mere administrative districts in that their action, unlike that of the latter, is not subject to control. There is no reason why a state should not incorporate other states into its system, assigning them important functions in the exercise of which they shall be free from control; but in doing so, it must subject them to its sovereignty, in that it vindicates for itself the right of deciding what are the limits of their competence, and of changing those limits at its pleasure. Functions can be distributed to the different organs of the federal state, some being assigned to those which it has in common with the simple state, others to the states; but sovereignty, which is in its nature indivisible, cannot be divided between the states and the federal state. The states may retain autonomy; sovereignty they must relinquish.

It lies, indeed, in the nature of sovereignty that it is unlimited, that no obligation can be imposed upon it by any earthly power. A state the limits of whose competence are determined for it, cannot be a sovereign state. Two sovereigns cannot rule over the same territory at the same time, nor divide between them the life of a nation. In order to reconcile the sovereignty of the union with the sovereignty of the states, jurists have drawn a line on one side of which they have placed the sovereign powers of the Union, on the other the sovereign powers of the states. This line which divides the powers is, according to their view, the boundary between sovereign states. This theory overlooks the organic nature of the

state. The functions of government may be assigned to different organs, but these organs must be the organs of the one sovereign state. As well set up two sovereigns within the life of the individual as within the life of the state. There is no clear and sharply defined line between state and federal powers. They are so interlaced and intertwined that it taxes the ingenuity of our highest tribunal to determine where federal functions end and state functions begin. Can it be that these delicate and perplexing questions are to be regarded as boundary disputes between two sovereigns, and is the federal judiciary a board of arbitration to which these sovereigns have agreed to refer their disputes? Moreover this boundary between federal and state powers should not be unchanging. As the conditions of national life change, it becomes necessary that the federal goverment should assume jurisdiction over subjects which in simpler conditions are left to the states. With a written constitution, which cannot be easily amended, it is inevitable that this transference of power should be made largely by interpretation. But by whatever process the change is wrought, whether by interpretation or by constitutional amendment, the competence of the state is narrowed even against its will by the action of the federal state. It is, indeed, inconceivable that a nation should allow such vital questions as the distribution of governmental functions to depend upon the decision of another sovereignty and to be settled by an international agreement.

The

With these deductions from the nature of sovereignty the federal Constitution is in accord. All cases involving questions of federal authority are decided by the federal judiciary. limits of the competence of the states may be changed by constitutional amendment. But from the fact that the assent of three fourths of the states is required, it has been inferred that this is not federal but state action. The states, it is said, relin. quish powers which they reserved when the Constitution was established. To this it may be replied that the Article prescrib ing how the Constitution may be amended is, like the constitution of which it forms a part, a fundamental federal law binding upon the states. Moreover, since the assent of three fourths of the states is sufficient, what becomes of the sovereignty of the dissenting fourth-a fourth, too, that may change with every new

amendment. The objection rests upon a misconception of the nature of a federal state and of what constitutes federal action. The states are not outside of the federal state but are parts of it. They are indeed its organs, although enjoying greater freedom of action than belongs to administrative districts. If we are to deny the character of federal action to everything in which the states take part, we shall have to deny it to laws enacted by a Congress one branch of which is chosen by the states. While we have denied that the states are sovereign we have not claimed that the sovereignty resides in those organs of the federal government which bear a distinctively national character and which it has in common with every simple state. The sovereignty is lodged in the federal state. There are to be seen in the museums of Europe, large collections of antiquated armor. A proposition to equip a modern army with these ancient weapons might excite a smile. This mirth-provoking spectacle we actually see in America where the two great political parties confront each other armed with weapons which should long ago have been consigned to a museum of antiquities. One of these antiquated missiles is the doctrine of state sovereignty. Formidable as it may have been, it is now dangerous only to to those who wield it. For it is not only antiquated but dishonored. The fact that it came so near being fatal to the union has brought it into perpetual discredit. There are, we are aware, but few in our day who accept Calhoun's doctrines. But there is no middle ground between Calhoun's principles and the views here advanced. Sovereignty belongs either to the federal Union or to the states. Either the federal government is the agent of the sovereign states, or the states are organs of the federal state and subject to its supreme authority. The federal state is not the negation of the idea of the state. Although the states are not subject to control, since, within the sphere of their competence, they have the right to establish the law as well as to administer it, yet they are the organs of the federal state, which in depriving them of sovereignty has left them autonomy. The Democratic party is, in virtue of its history, the champion of state autonomy; but, also as a result of its history, it is fighting for a good cause with antiquated and discredited weapons.

RICHARD HUDSON.

ARTICLE IV.-ANTHROPOLOGICAL MYTHOLOGY.

Myth, Ritual and Religion. By ANDREW LANG. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1887. 2 vols.

AMONG the newer sciences which have recently attracted the study of scholars, none is of wider scope and greater interest than anthropology. Men have at last realized more than ever before that there is, in a sense, a limit to the profit of the study of the single functions of man, and that the truest and most instructive method of regarding him is in his entirety. The anthropologist views man as a whole, developed under varying conditions of climate, situation, race, and temperament. The influence of his environment is considered as bringing about different states of life, manners, customs and ideas. His intel lectual development is studied as being due in large measure to his surroundings, and nothing is overlooked which may in the least have contributed to this development. The theory of Evolution and the "survival of the fittest," has been one of the most powerful factors in awakening interest in this subject, and it is in the phenomena of this science that the working and results of this principle can perhaps be most readily observed and vividly portrayed. Evidently anthropology must call in the assistance of her sister sciences, and in turn she is not niggardly in returning facts which add much to their value. We are now inclined to wonder how it could be that the study of man as a being composed of both body and mind should have been so long neglected. With the gradual growth of the conviction that the so-called "historical" method promised the truest results in all lines of inquiry, has come also the convic tion that the development of any part must depend in some measure upon the corresponding development of the whole, and the good consequences of this belief are everywhere visible. Mr. Andrew Lang's Myth, Ritual and Religion, is the latest and most noteworthy attempt to apply the method and conclu sions of anthropology to the settlement of some of the problems

of that much debated subject, mythology. Mythology has long been synonymous with uncertainty. For many years students refused to take hold of it in any scientific way, very likely because the idea that such an apparently confused and heterogeneous mass of legends could be brought under any general categories, did not occur to them. Moreover the real distinction between mythology and religion was not observed, and there has always been more or less reluctance to submit religion to any scientific study. Again, it must be acknowledged by all that comparative philology is necessary, as an aid, at least, to any fruitful study of mythology. It was natural and necessary that the first steps in the direction of a science of comparative mythology should be made by philologists, and we can truthfully say that Max Müller, Bréal, and Adalbert Kuhn were the real founders of this science. Theirs are the great names in mythology, and should every one of their theories be disproved and rejected, they would still be deserving of as much honor as is cheerfully given to Bopp for his pioneer work in another field. Probably nothing so stimulates investigation among scholars as the desire to discover some new truth or law, which shall invalidate received opinions and overthrow the results of earlier labors. Therefore they are the more courageous and deserving of honor, who first offer themselves to the dissecting knife of the future critic. Since the time when the results of the investigations of these pioneers were laid before the public, our ethnological knowledge has increased so much, and so much new material has accumulated that at the present time years are required to thoroughly familiarize one's self with the established data of mythology. The scope and extent of the science has also widened, and even the most rigid "Aryans" will accept non-Aryan myths and folklore as illustrations at least.

Naturally the question which presents itself to every mythologist is, "How can I account for the existence of this body of legend?" and it is the answer given to this question by each investigator that determines his explanation of each particular myth. It may be well to enumerate three or four schools of mythical interpretation resulting from the different ways of answering this question. First of all in importance comes the philological school. Its adherents, comprising some of the most