tions of the Emperor and of the Federal Council and which provides, not for the control, but for the coöperation of the Reichstag in the manner marked out by the Constitution itself. It is then not for the policy of the government but for the due observance of the Constitution, for keeping within the limits that the Constitution has established and for obtaining the cooperation of the Reichstag where the Constitution makes such coöperation necessary, that the Chancellor is responsible.

It is by its control over the budget that the English House of Commons has gained control over the government, and since the Constitution of the Empire provides that the budget shall be enacted yearly in the form of a law, it might be expected that this provision would assure a like position and authority to the German Reichstag. But such an interpretation would overthrow the Constitution itself, which, while providing for the coöperation of the legislature, is far from having handed the government over to that body. Shall the refusal of the Reichstag to exercise this right of coöperation, or even the failure to agree upon a budget before the beginning of the fiscal year, a failure which may imply no fault on the part either of the government or of the Reichstag, have the effect of suspending the operation of existing laws and of striking with paralysis the institutions of the Empire, which rest upon laws as authoritative as the budget and even on the Constitution itself? The budget, far from being such a formidable constitutional weapon, is an agreement between the government and the Reichstag in regard to the accuracy of the government's financial proposals and the necessity and expediency of the several items. If, then, the object of the budget is to determine the necessity and expediency of appropriations, it follows that even without a budget the government can continue to levy the taxes provided for by existing laws as well as to defray the expenditure of any institution or service legally existing. But the government would have no right to levy taxes or to incur expenditure the only authorization for which would have been contained in the budget that has failed to become law. But ministerial responsibility even with these limitations is deprived of much of its value, since the Constitution of the Empire, following in this respect the example of Prussia

rather than that of the other German states, has made no provision for its enforcement.

In the German Empire amendments to the Constitution take the form of ordinary laws with the sole difference that they fail if fourteen votes are recorded against them in the Federal Council. Inasmuch as in this body the votes are cast by states the opposition of a few states, unless indeed of the smaller, can in Germany as in America prevent the adoption of constitutional changes. But it is not necessary there as it is here, that any measure which involves constitutional changes should be preceded by a formal change in the Constitution. Such a measure becomes law if there are not more than fourteen votes against it in the Federal Council. This indirect method of amending the Constitution makes it less easy than it is in this country to determine at any given time the precise condition of constitutional law.

In Germany the judiciary does not play such an important part as the guardian of the Constitution as is assigned to it in this country. Strong governments which deal out rights sparingly to the representatives of the people, are less likely than our own to submit questions involving the limits of their competence to an impartial tribunal. It has also been thought that judicial interpretation passes imperceptibly into judicial revision of the Constitution, and that the technical training of the judges is not the best preparation for the decision of questions that have a political bearing. Moreover the peculiar relation between the federal government and the states, to which attention has already been called, raises questions which are not judicial in their character. Where the position of the states in their relation to the federal government is, in regard to many of their functions, analogous to that of administrative districts, the system which works so admirably in this country of maintaining intact the boundary between the federal and state jurisdictions by means of judicial decisions, is inapplicable. The right of control over state administration possessed by the Empire, cannot be exercised through the courts. It should be remembered also that part of the revenue of the imperial government consists in contributions from the states and that there must be a method of enforcing their payment other than an

appeal to the courts. But whatever may be the explanation, the fact cannot be doubted that no German jurist has the opportunity of gaining such a position as in this country belongs to Chief Justice Marshall as expounder of the Constitution.

The question whether the courts have the right to pass upon the constitutionality of imperial laws has occasioned much controversy, but the prolonged academic discussion which it has provoked indicates that they do not actually exercise this authority. Those who deny that the authority belongs to them hold that the promulgation of a law by the Emperor is conclusive evidence of its constitutionality, for although he has no veto power yet he has the right and the duty to refuse to promulgate as laws, measures which have not been enacted according to the provisions of the Constitution. The Constitution of Prussia expressly denies to the courts the right to pass upon the constitutionality of Prussian laws.

While the courts are bound to give to the laws of the Empire the precedence over state laws, which, according to the Constitution, belongs to them, yet this is far from being the only method of maintaining the authority of the Empire as against the states. It is the duty of the Emperor to call the attention of the states to any law enacted by them or to any act or omission on their part in violation of the Constitution or laws of the Empire. In case of a difference of opinion the decision lies with the Federal Council, which as the assembly of the associated governments seems best fitted to deal with such delicate questions and to show proper respect to the rights and wishes of the states. If the state still refuses to yield, the Federal Council may decree execution against it, which is to be carried out by the Emperor with the military resources of the Empire. The coercion of states is foreign to American constitutional law and does not seem in harmony with that uncontrollable power residing in them which is so closely akin to sovereignty. The War of the Rebellion was carried on, not to coerce the states, but to compel the citizens of the United States to remain true to the allegiance which they owed to the Federal Government.

RICHARD HUDSON.

ARTICLE II.-IN MEMORIAM. NATHANIEL J. BURTON.

Yale Lectures on Preaching and Other Writings. By NATHANIEL J. BURTON, D.D., Pastor of the Park Church, Hartford, Conn. Edited by RICHARD E. BURTON. New York Chas. L. Webster & Co. London: Chatto &

Windus. 1888.

WE welcome this volume as a memorial of affection and a monument of fame for a friend who was beloved and honored amongst us. We have long felt that our literature should be enriched by the affluent thought and the suggestive imagery and opulent diction of Dr. Burton. And now that we are to hear his voice no more, we are glad to have communion with him through these practical and edifying Writings, which will perpetuate his influence with us and widen it with those to whom he was not personally known. The Lectures on Preaching are unique and characteristic and will hold a high place in the series of lectures on the Lyman Beecher foundation which have employed the talent of a succession of very able men; while they will be instructive and profitable not only to students of theology, for whom they were specially delivered, but also to ministers and pastors in the actual service of the profession. The "Other Writings," in their wider range and variety, will give stimulus and uplift to many minds, carrying comfort, and hope, and abounding gratification to sufferers and toilers and the great company who are walking and working by faith in those things that are invisible but vastly real.

NATHANIEL JUDSON BURTON was born in the State of Connecticut in 1824: he was nearly 29 years of age at his ordination for the ministry of the Gospel, and was nearly 63 years old at the time of his death. His father was a Methodist clergyman, so that from early life he was accustomed to hear theological conversation and discussion and to share the inconveniences of the Methodist itineracy. His academic education

was pursued at the Wesleyan University, but he came to Yale for theological study, having intelligently decided in favor of the Congregational polity for himself.

During his senior year in the Seminary he was called to the pastorate of the Fair Haven Second Church in New Haven, in which he remained three years and a half. Then he accepted a call to broader work and to larger influence as the pastor of the Fourth Church in Hartford. For thirteen years he served that church, and then for seventeen years he was the pastor of the Park Church in the same city. From that post of usefulness his personality became more observed and he was a recognized power in the ecclesiastical affairs of the Commonwealth. He was the leader and the life of the ministerial gatherings in the Capital, while in the State Association and Conference his presence was a continual benediction and his voice carried cheer and guidance to his brethren. Dr. Burton was frequently invited to public service beyond the limits of his parish. He was the preacher at ordinations. He was appointed to the Lyman Beecher Lectureship at Yale. He was elected a member of the Corporation of Yale University. Seven days before his death he was chosen to preach the sermon at the next annual meeting of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions at Cleveland.

We can here but very briefly touch upon some of the more prominent traits of Dr. Burton's personality and character. It was apparent that he was a man of large affectionateness. He was great-hearted. Full of sympathy for all who were in distress, prodigal of tenderness and of benefactions such as he could render to the miserable and needy, he could not endure the sight of others' sufferings. He had the qualities of the divine Master by which He is represented as the Physician of souls. He carried the sorrows and bore the griefs of other men, in ready imitation of his Lord. When the Humane Society was formed, he became an active officer in it, and he plead for the dumb animals as if he were their chosen advocate, say ing too that he sometimes felt as though he ought to be one of them. His overflowing benevolence went out to all overburdened men, and the oppressions and wrongs of the world roused his consternation and his indignation. Most gentle to