INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY.*____“The aim of this work," says the author in his Preface, "is given in its title: First, it is an Introduction' only, and does not go into the details or the literature of the subject. . . . Secondly, it is an introduction to psychological theory, and aims less at a knowledge of facts than at an understanding of principles." Accordingly, after an opening chapter on the nature and method of Psychology, we have treated in Part I. " the Factors of the Mental Life," and in Part II. "the Factors in Combination." This division results in no little repetition and crossing back and forth in the discussion of the separate topics. Thus sensation is treated in part first, and perception in part second; the mechanism and cerebral theory of reproduction are topics forming chapters in part first, but the forms of reproduction are reserved for part second; the "thought factor" is got ready for action in part first, but it apparently gets itself into action as a "thought process" only when part second is reached; the subject of the mental life, which certainly requires that the factors should be in combination, is nevertheless polemically discussed among the factors of the mental life, at the very beginning of the book, while its interaction with the body is considered at nearly the close.

The excellences of this work are those which mark the other productions of the author. The statement of views is clear and rhetorically effective; and is not infrequently decidedly brilliant and even epigrammatic. It is never "dull" philosophy which we come across in these pages, although it is sometimes "crabbed." The polemic in which the book abounds is for the most part sharp and spirited, whether or not it be judicious and convincing. Some of its criticism is subtle; and a fair, perhaps a generous, amount of information on current psychological questions is in general displayed.

We feel confident, however, that the more thoughtful, intelligent, and truth-seeking readers of this book will lay it down with a feeling of disappointment. Its method is not that of patient, candid seeking, and cordial reception of truth; nor does it show the calm, well-balanced mind which philosophy requires. Its language is often needlessly irritating and offensive to those whose points of view and conclusions differ from the author; it is sometimes undignified, -the jaunty, semi-jocose manner, with which

Introduction to Psychological Theory. By BORDEN P. BOWNE, Professor of Philosophy in Boston University. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1887.

we are familiar in newspapers not of the highest order. Thus we have references to the "circle-squaring type of minds;" those who have not yet abandoned "the attempt to tell how or why, nervous action is followed by sensation" (p. 41); and we are told that "concerning the particular form of the nervous action nothing can be known!" (p. 46); though, since "vibrations are always fashionable, we may view it as a species of vibration, etc." Indeed, we cannot help feeling that it is a pity to have acerbity of judgment and temper, and smartness of tone, mar so much in Professor Bowne's book which would otherwise be good and helpful reading.

"The plan of the work," we are told in the Preface, precludes much attention to physiological psychology. As a matter of fact, however, considerable attention is given to this branch of the science, and that by no means of the most polite, not to say flattering kind. Indeed, a by no means small portion of the book consists either of polemical treatment of the contributions made by physiology to psychology, or of a re-statement, for purposes of the author's theory, of these same contributions. We do not believe that a single intelligent adherent of views at all resembling those against which Professor Bowne directs his shafts of irony and ridicule will be influenced to modify them by this criticism; and we fear that inquirers into the truth on those subjects with which physiological psychology deals will be little informed or helped by it. Surely, from whatever point of view the author is inclined to consider his book, he might have spared himself the trouble of remarking upon the exploded "separate cell theory' as a current form of materialism in cerebral localization.

We have not space to consider the treatment which Professor Bowne gives to the subjects of the separate chapters. His treatment of the "sensations" is quite unsatisfactory. The division of them into extra-organic, organic, and subjective, is untenable (p. 40); and indeed, he seems himself to depart from it later on (p. 59). Here facts and opinions in physiological psychology are constantly referred to in a way to confuse and mislead the uninformed reader.

The later chapters on the thought factor and on perception are much better than the earlier chapters. Perception is correctly stated to be a process into which all forms of mental activity enter to a greater or less degree. An attack, showing acute reasoning, is made upon that "common-sense realism," which has until re

cently been a kind of standard or orthodox philosophy in this country, as an importation largely from Scotland; but which is now rapidly everywhere being abandoned as most untenable. But perhaps the best chapter in the book is the one entitled "The Thought Factor"; in this chapter (as elsewhere, and notably in treating of space and of the connection of body and soul) Professor Bowne has followed Lotze closely and somewhat minutely.

We note, in closing, that the author also adopts the view of the same German thinker in denying the "natural immortality" of the soul, and bases the claim to immortality for man solely on the formal principle: "Those things that have perennial significance for the Universe will abide" (p. 316 f.); therefore, since only moral goodness, or the moral personality, has absolute worth, we must rely on moral nature and revelation for our argument, faith, or hope, touching this subject. Metaphysics is agnostic here.

THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT.*-Under this title the celebrated author presents us with no compact and systematic treatment of the human thinking faculty, such as to merit the word "Science," but with a number of rather miscellaneous essays somewhat loosely hung together upon the thread of a theory. Accordingly the book, although abounding in interesting and suggestive passages, has the appearance of being made up for the disposal of material collected in the "workshop" of the philologue rather than constructed out of resources won by genuine philosophical research. The first volume, after two chapters on "the constituent elements of thought," and on "thought and language," discusses Kant's philosophy, Darwinism as falsely holding that an animal with language can have been developed from one without it; and then spends many pages in defending Heyse's view, that the sounds of roots are derived from the rings, given out by different substances when struck (the so-called "ding-dong" theory of the origin of language), and in commending and expounding Professor Noire's tenet, that "no concept can be framed without a name, and no name can be framed without a concept." The second volume contains nearly two hundred pages of technical philology, concerning "the roots of Sanscrit," and "the formation of words." The book then closes with a short chapter on "propositions and syllo

* The Science of Thought; by F. MAX MÜLLER, New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons. 1887.

gisms," and a somewhat lengthy recapitulation. Numerous shorter or longer excursions occur.

Müller's statements in this book as elsewhere, are often so unqualified as to be striking without being convincing to reflective minds. In the Preface (p. x.) we are told that the outcome of his system may, "not unfairly" be represented as being that "there is no such thing as intellect, understanding, mind, and reason, but that all these are only different aspects of language." Later on (p. 27) the remark of the Indian commentator is quoted with approval; "when one thing cannot exist without the other, the two are said to be identical." By language, says Müller (p. 28), "we mean what the Greeks called Logos, word and meaning in one, or rather something of which word and meaning are only, as it were the two sides." In his historical Introduction to Müller's Translation of Kant, Professor Noiré, whom the author of this work on the "Science of Thought" commends so highly, frequently represents the relation between thought and language as one of identity. The only satisfying way to study the growth of mind is in the history of language. Language is "subjective nature." Now, strictly speaking, such a claim as that mentioned above, is not simply doubtful or untenable, it is even unintelligible and absurd. For what can be meant by identifying language and thought, or in the simplest case-the conception and the root which serves as its name. Words, apart from the feelings, mental images, volitions, or forms of abstract thought, which they support and express, are not a whit essentially different from all other physical changes. They are motions, mere motions, in molecules and masses of matter. On the utterer's part they are molecular changes in certain cerebral areas; then in certain down-going nervous tracts; then in the vocal organs or muscles of hand and arm (in the case of written words). Between the utterer and the receiver of these words are nothing but acoustic waves or waves of luminiferous ether. On the receiver's part, words are vibrations of the eardrum, connecting chain of bones, fluids, and otoliths, etc., of the inner ear; then molecular agitations of the organ of Corti; then nerve-commotions in certain up-going nervous tracts, and finally in certain cerebral regions. In all this their being, from one brain, mid-air, to another brain, words are no more to be identified with thoughts than sensations of blue and red and green are with nerveaction in the retina, the corpora quadrigemina, and "sight-centres " of the cerebrum. To speak of language as identical with thought

is indeed another one of the many instances of mistaking mere words for real, clear conceptions. We are curious to know what thought in Müller's mind is identical with the word "language, what conception with the word "word."

But probably the author's statement must not be taken seriously. If, however, he intended simply to maintain that the relation of language and thought is one of the most close and complete dependence (although not indentity), so that we can form no conception except as belonging to a name, we can discover in his treatise no sufficient proof even of this. It appears to add nothing whatever to the discussion and comprehension of the old and much debated problems. Moreover, what little evidence we can appeal to, of the nature of fact, seems to show that some appreciable progress can be made in thought-i. e. in the forming of abstract conceptions and logical judgment-without use of the power of naming.

As for the author's peculiar form of Monism, it is certainly not a legitimate deduction from any genuine discoveries touching the real relations of thought and language, but may be considered a quite foreign affair.