Opinion Per Curiam. conditions and covenants and have expended large sums of money in improving their respective lots with fine private residences." The court of appeals found "that the allegations of said amended petition are true," and further found "that the language used in said restrictive covenants, taken in the light of the surrounding circumstances at the time said general or uniform plan was adopted, and the conduct of the parties themselves and their successors in title, and the construction placed upon said covenants by said parties and their successors in title, make manifest an intention to limit the use of said premises to one single residence or house on each lot," and that "Sadie Arnoff and The Clair-Doan Building & Construction Company had due notice of said general plan of restrictions and of the observance thereof." The proposed construction was therefore declared a violation of the covenant, and the present plaintiffs in error were perpetually enjoined from constructing the flat or apartment building in question. Mr. David Perris and Mr. C. A. Niman, for plaintiffs in error. Messrs. White, Johnson, Cannon & Spieth and Mr. H. A. Beckett, for defendants in error. BY THE COURT. The finding of facts by the court of appeals is called in question, but a reading of the record discloses that said finding is not un Opinion Per Curiam. supported by evidence. By that finding this court is therefore bound. Consequently a question of law is presented, whether the building restrictions, when construed in the light of the facts as found, will justify the decree under review. In Arnoff v. Williams et al., 94 Ohio St., 145, this court was called upon to construe the following phrase used in a deed, "No more than one residence building shall be located upon a lot or tract of land of fifty feet in frontage," and it was held that such restriction did not prevent the erection of a four-suite apartment house. It is contended that this holding, together with a like interpretation in Hunt v. Held, 90 Ohio St., 280, of the phrase "for residence purposes only," is conclusive of the issue in the case at bar. In each of the cases referred to there was involved simply the bald construction of the phrases quoted, with no extrinsic aids to construction other than such as appeared in the instruments of which the phrases were a part. However, even if we could confine our view within the narrow limits of the words themselves, the instant case could not be disposed of upon the authority of the cases cited, since the word "house," though in some connections used as synonymous with "building," is unquestionably used, and commonly, both in literature and in common speech, as the equivalent of that sort of a home technically known as a single family residence. The latter interpretation gains in force when it is observed that the term "building" or "structure" is used when it is desired to control the Opinion Per Curiam. place of construction, and the phrase "for residence purposes" when the general character of the occupancy is in question. The further and distinct limitation of each lot owner to "one house only" was evidently inserted for another purpose. It would be hypertechnical to interpret that purpose as satisfied by the construction of as many abodes as can be arranged vertically or horizontally under a common roof. The truth is that attempts to give precise scope and meaning to common words of homely speech are bound to fail, unless resort is had to the surroundings both of parties and subject-matter, the writer and the matter written about. In the instant case the proper tribunal of fact has found that the words of restriction, employed in the written instruments under which both parties claim, have acquired, by common understanding long observed, a special significance in the particular vicinity, and that the plaintiffs in error had due notice thereof. In a court of equity the result must be the same as if technically apt words had been used to restrict the building operations of the parties within the limits which local but known and observed usage had given the words actually employed. For the reasons assigned the judgment of the court of appeals must be affirmed. Judgment affirmed. MATTHIAS, JOHNSON, ROBINSON and MERRELL, JJ., concur. Statement of the Case. THE STATE, EX REL. HART, V. THE BOARD of COMMISSIONERS OF HOCKING COUNTY. Civil service-Jurisdiction of state commission - Appeal by removed employe-Refusal by commission to entertain proceeding-Mandamus-Superintendent and matron of county home-State civil service Kule VI, Section 3 (1919) — Husband successful, but wife fails in examination-Section 2522, General Code (108 O. L., pt. 1, 267), inapplicable, when — Notice and certificate of eligibility distinguished — Continuing jurisdiction of applicants and eligible list. (No. 16561-Decided June 17, 1920.) IN MANDAMUS. The relator, Lucius Hart, filed his petition here against the Board of County Commissioners of Hocking County and the State Civil Service Commission for a writ of mandamus to require the Board of County Commissioners to certify to the State Civil Service Commission its record of proceedings suspending and removing relator from the position of Superintendent of the County Home of Hocking County, Ohio, and to require the State Civil Service Commission to entertain an appeal from the decision of the Board of County Commissioners.. The petition and the amendment thereto allege that on the first day of September, 1919, the commissioners of Hocking county appointed the relator as superintendent of the county home, and that on the 30th day of January, 1920, while he was holding the position of such superintendent, they filed certain charges and made certain findings against him, as a result of which they suspended and re Statement of the Case. moved him from his office and employment as such superintendent; that he was given five days to make answer to the charges, which he did; that the board of county commissioners refused to certify the record to the State Civil Service Commission; that he made application to the State Civil Service Commission in the nature of an appeal; that the State Civil Service Commission refused and still refuses to entertain jurisdiction thereof; and that relator at the time of his appointment was first upon the eligible list and that he obtained his appointment by virtue of and under authority of the laws of the state of Ohio with reference to civil service appointments. To the petition the defendants filed their answer admitting the filing of the charges against the relator by the board of county commissioners, the making of the findings against him, his suspension and removal from the position of superintendent of the county home, the refusal of the board of county commissioners to reinstate him, that he made application to the state civil service commission in the nature of an appeal, and that the state civil service commission refused and still refuses to entertain jurisdiction of such appeal. By way of defense they aver that prior to the employment of the relator the state civil service commission under and by virtue of Section 486-9, General Code, had adopted the following rule: "In positions where the nature of the public service requires the joint employment of persons related by blood or marriage, such as husband and wife, father and |