Opinion, per JOHNSON, J. Vroom), 49; Kane v. State, 79 N. J. L. (52 Vroom), 594, affirmed Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S., 160, and Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S., 610. Complaint is also made as to the classification contained in the statute. Tractors are exempt, but the statute taxes the use of trailers except such as are designed with animal power and for agricultural purposes. The authorities agree that a statute is general and uniform if it operates equally upon every person and locality within the circumstances covered by the act, and when a classification has a reasonable basis it is not invalid merely because not made with exactness, or because in practice it may result in some inequality. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S., 61, and Steele, Hopkins & Meredith Co. v. Miller, 92 Ohio St., 115, 127. In this case the thing that the tractor hauls is taxed. If the duty had been ours of making the classification originally we might have made a different provision. We think the legislature might well have included a strong provision regulating the use of cleats on the wheels of tractors. But we are not able to say that it is unreasonable, or that the general assembly in making the classification violated the requirement of uniformity. For these reasons the judgments below will be affirmed. Judgments affirmed. NICHOLS, C. J., JONES, MATTHIAS, WANAMAKER, ROBINSON and MERRELL, JJ., concur. Statement of the Case. PHELPS, A TAXPAYER, V. HE LOGAN NATURAL GAS & FUEL CO. ET AL. Municipal corporations - Gas-rate ordinance — Abrogation or modification before expiration-Ordinance increasing rate valid, when-Mutuality of contracts - Specific performance - Right of taxpayer to sue. 1. Pending the term of a gas-rate ordinance passed by the council of a municipality and accepted by the gas company, it is competent for the parties to modify or abrogate by mutual agreement the contract thus entered into. 2. Where the council of a municipality has determined by ordinance the rates to be charged consumers of gas for an ensuing period of ten years, and the gas company has accepted the provisions of such ordinance, an ordinance passed four years later and also accepted by said company, providing for an immediate increase in the rates to be charged, is a valid exercise of municipal power, and constitutes a binding contract between the municipality and the gas company, abrogating and superseding the prior gas-rate ordinance. 3. A taxpayer of a municipality has no vested interest in a contract between the municipality and a gas company for the supply of gas to consumers at specified rates for a definite term, such as will entitle him to maintain an action for specific performance of such contract after the same has been abrogated by agreement duly entered into between the municipality and the gas company. (No. 16346-Decided March 2, 1920.) ERROR to the Court of Appeals of Hancock county. The parties stand in this court in their original relation, and will therefore be referred to as plaintiff and defendants. The plaintiff, suing as a taxpayer of the city of Findlay, brought this action to compel the specific performance by the defendant, The Logan Natural Statement of the Case. Gas & Fuel Company, of a certain contract entered into in June, 1914, between it and the city of Findlay. That contract, which was for the supply of natural gas for public and private use for the period of ten years ending June, 1924, was preceded in 1903 by a franchise granted by the city council to the gas company, for distributing and vending natural gas to the city of Findlay and its citizens. This franchise was indefinite as to the term of enjoyment, but prescribed the price and rate which the gas company was permitted to charge. At the expiration of the ten-year period, the gasrate ordinance of June, 1914, was passed by the city council and formally accepted by the gas company. The rate therein fixed was 33 cents per 1000 cubic feet for the first five years, and 38 cents per 1000 cubic feet for the last five years of the ordinance period. Both rates were subject to discount for prompt payment. On or about October 18, 1918, the defendant gas company applied to the city council for a new gasrate ordinance, upon the statement that in view of the increase in the cost of labor and material, and consequent increase in the cost of producing and distributing natural gas, the company could not afford to supply gas to the city and the citizens thereof at the rate fixed in the ordinance of June, 1914; that unless the ordinance rate were increased it would result that the consumer would necessarily be deprived of adequate service. In a circular letter to its consumers, the gas company set forth Statement of the Case. the reasons for which it had applied to the city council for a new rate ordinance. The foregoing appears from the finding of facts, and it further appears that on October 18, 1918, "after due and proper consideration in open meeting, the said council promptly and unanimously passed an ordinance upon such application and request of the defendant gas company, and the mayor of said city formally approved an ordinance, the first section of which repealed the rate ordinance of June 29, 1914, in toto, thus abrogating the contract involved in said ordinance of 1914, and the acceptance and operation thereunder, and absolved the defendant gas company from its obligation to the city and her citizen gas consumers involved in the promulgation and acceptance thereof." By the second section of this ordinance, the defendant gas company was "authorized, directed, and permitted to file a schedule with the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, fixing a rate of 38 cents per 1000 cubic feet, less 3 cents per 1000 cubic feet [discount], together with a minimum charge of the price of 2000 cubic feet per month at the aforesaid rate, which when filed with the Public Utilities Commission, as required by law, shall be effective and binding on both parties from and after the twenty-fourth day of November, 1918, and until changed conditions justify a change of rate," etc. * * * This ordinance was formally accepted by the gas company, which, after the date named, began Opinion, per MERRELL, J. imposing and collecting from the city and other consumers the increased rate. The court of appeals found that the ordinance of October 18, 1918, was a valid exercise of the power vested in the council of the defendant city, and was binding and obligatory upon the defendant city and its citizen consumers. The plaintiff seeks to reverse the judgment of the court of appeals based upon the foregoing conclusions of law. Mr. George H. Phelps, for plaintiff in error. Mr. S. M. Douglass; Mr. Freeman T. Eagleson; Mr. J. Warren Madden and Mr. J. C. Bitler, for defendants in error. MERRELL, J. The claim here urged is in substance this: that pending the term of a gas-rate ordinance, passed by a city council, and accepted by a gas company, it is incompetent for the parties to abrogate by mutual agreement the contract thus entered into. In support of this claim it is insisted: first, that the consumers of gas who are citizens of the municipality in question have a vested interest in the rate contract for the term thereof; and, second, that certain statutory provisions forbid, directly or by necessary implication, the abrogation of such contract. The theory that the individual consumer has a vested interest in a contract made by his city with a public utility, and in the provisions thereof with respect to rates for service, finds no support in the authorities. The individual citizen is in no exact |