I. Respondent's argument that the Pennsylvania court should have applied state rather than admiralty law in measuring the rights of the parties cannot be sustained.

We do not have in this case an effort of the state court to enforce rights claimed to be rooted in state law. The petitioner's suit rested on asserted rights granted by federal law and the state courts so treated it. Jurisdiction of the state court to try this case rests solely upon § 33 of the Jones Act and upon statutes traceable to the Judiciary Act of 1789 which "in all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" saves to suitors "the right of a common-law remedy where the common law is competent to give it." These statutes authorize Pennsylvania courts to try cases coming within the defined category. Whether Pennsylvania was required by the Acts to make its courts available for those federal remedies, or whether it could create its own remedy as to maintenance and cure based on local law, we need not decide; for, having voluntarily opened its courts to petitioner, the questions are whether Pennsylvania was thereupon required to give to petitioner the full benefit of federal law and, if so, whether it failed to afford that benefit.

There is no dearth of example of the obligation on law courts which attempt to enforce substantive rights arising from admiralty law to do so in a manner conforming to admiralty practice. Contributory negligence is not a barrier to a proceeding in admiralty or under the Jones Act, and the state courts are required to apply this rule in Jones

5

в

28 U. S. C. § 371.

• Engel v. Davenport, 271 U. S. 33, 37, 38 (Jones Act); The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, 644; Leon v. Galceran, 11 Wall. 185, 187-188; Panama R. Co. v. Vasquez, 271 U. S. 557, 560-561. The last three cases involve non-statutory actions.

"The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398, 404; Just v. Chambers, 312 U. S. 383, 391.

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Act actions. Beadle v. Spencer, 298 U. S. 124. Similarly state courts may not apply their doctrines of assumption of risk in actions arising under the Act. The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U. S. 110; Socony-Vacuum Co. v. Smith, 305 U. S. 424. State courts, whether or not applying the Jones Act to actions arising from maritime torts, have usually attempted, although not always with complete success, to apply admiralty principles. The federal courts, when treating maritime torts in actions at law rather than in suits in admiralty, have also sought to preserve admiralty principles whenever consonant with the necessities of common law procedure.”

This Court has specifically held that the Jones Act is to have a uniform application throughout the country, unaffected by "local views of common law rules." Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375, 392. The Act is based upon, and incorporates by reference, the Federal Employers' Liability Act, which also requires uniform interpretation. Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 55 et seq. This uniformity requirement extends to the type of proof necessary for judgment. New Orleans & Northeastern R. Co. v. Harris, 247 U. S. 367.

In many other cases this Court has declared the necessary dominance of admiralty principles in actions in vindication of rights arising from admiralty law.10 Belden v.

8 Colonna Shipyard v. Bland, 150 Va. 349, 358, 143 S. E. 729 (contributory negligence); Paulsen v. McDuffie, 4 Cal. 2d 111, 47 P. 2d 709 (assumption of risk); Lieflander v. States S. S. Co., 149 Ore. 605, 42 P. 2d 156 (burden of proof).

Berwind-White Coal Mining Co. v. Eastern Steamship Corp., 228 F. 726; Port of New York Stevedoring Corp. v. Castagna, 280 F. 618. 10 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205; Chelentis v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 247 U. S. 372; Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149, 159; Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U. S. 255, 259; Messel v. Foundation Co., 274 U. S. 427, 434; and see Schuede v. Zenith

Chase, 150 U. S. 674, an 1893 decision which respondent relies upon as establishing a contrary rule, has never been thus considered in any of the later cases cited.

It must be remembered that the state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts to try actions either under the Merchant Marine Act or in personam such as maintenance and cure. The source of the governing law applied is in the national, not the state, government." If by its practice the state court were permitted substantially to alter the rights of either litigant, as those rights were established in federal law, the remedy afforded by the State would not enforce, but would actually deny, federal rights which Congress, by providing alternative remedies, intended to make not less but more secure. The constant objective of legislation and jurisprudence is to assure litigants full protection for all substantive rights intended to be afforded them by the jurisdiction in which the right itself originates. Not so long ago we sought to achieve this result with respect to enforcement in the federal courts of rights created or governed by state law.12 And admiralty courts, when invoked to protect rights rooted in state law, endeavor to determine the issues in accordance with the substantive law of the State.13 So here, in trying this case the state court was bound to proceed in such manner that all the substantial rights of the parties under controlling federal law would be protected. Whether it did so raises a federal question reviewable

12

S. S. Co., 216 F. 566. Disagreement over the Constitutional issues of the cases in the Jensen line has not extended to this principle. Cf. The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558, 575; Detroit Trust Co. v. The Thomas Barlum, 293 U. S. 21, 43.

11 The Steamer St. Lawrence, 1 Black 522, 526-527.

12 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64.

13 Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U. S. 233, 242. Cf. The Hamilton,

supra.

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317 U.S.

here under § 237 (b) of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. § 344 (b).14

14

II. A seaman in admiralty who attacks a release has no such burden imposed upon him as that to which the Pennsylvania rule subjects him. Our historic national policy, both legislative and judicial, points the other way. Congress has generally sought to safeguard seamen's rights. The first Congress, on July 20, 1790, passed a protective act for seamen in the merchant marine service, safeguarding wage contracts, providing summary remedies for their breach, and requiring shipowners to keep on board fresh medicines in condition for use. 1 Stat. 131. The fifth Congress, July 16, 1798, 1 Stat. 605, originated our present system of marine hospitals for disabled seamen. The language of Justice Story, sitting on Circuit in 1823, described the solicitude with which admiralty has traditionally viewed seamen's contracts:

"They are emphatically the wards of the admiralty; and though not technically incapable of entering into a valid contract, they are treated in the same manner as courts of equity are accustomed to treat young heirs, dealing with their expectancies, wards with their guardians, and cestuis que trustent with their trustees. . . . If there is any undue inequality in the terms, any disproportion in the bargain, any sacrifice of rights on one side, which are not compensated by extraordinary benefits on the other, the judicial interpretation of the transaction is that the bargain is unjust and unreasonable, that advantage has been taken of the situation of the weaker party, and that pro tanto the bargain ought to be set aside as inequitable. . . . And on every occasion the court expects to be satisfied, that the compensation for every material alteration is entirely adequate to the diminutior

14 See Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130, 136-42; cf. Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U. S. 481, 483.

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of right or privilege on the part of the seamen." Harden v. Gordon, Fed. Cas. No. 6047, at pp. 480, 485.

In keeping with this policy, Congress has itself acted concerning seamen's releases in respect to wages by providing that a release for wages must be signed by a seaman in the presence of a shipping commissioner, and that, even then, "any court having jurisdiction may on good cause shown set aside such release and take such action as justice shall require." 15 General Congressional policy is further shown in the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U. S. C. §§ 915, 916, in which all releases not made under the express terms of the Act are declared invalid.

The analogy suggested by Justice Story, in the paragraph quoted above, between seamen's contracts and those of fiduciaries and beneficiaries remains, under the prevailing rule treating seamen as wards of admiralty, a close

Whether the transaction under consideration is a contract, sale, or gift between guardian and ward or between trustee and cestui, the burden of proving its validity is on the fiduciary. He must affirmatively show that no advantage has been taken; and his burden is particularly heavy where there has been inadequacy of consideration.16

The wardship theory has, as was recognized by the courts below, marked consequence on the treatment

15 46 U. S. C. § 597. See Pacific Mail S. S. Co. v. Lucas, 258 U. S. 266; ibid., 264 F. 938.

18 Michoud v. Girod, 4 How. 503, 556; cf. Magruder v. Drury, 235 U. S. 106, 120; Thorn Wire Co. v. Washburn & Moen Co., 159 U. S. 423, 443; Klamath Indians v. United States, 296 U. S. 244, 254; and United States v. Dunn, 268 U. S. 121, 131. The admiralty rule is well within the bounds put on these other relationships, since many trusteecestui or guardian and ward contracts are voidable on the election of the beneficiary. See Wade v. Pulsifer, 54 Vt. 45, 62; Hatch v. Hatch, 9 Ves. 291 (1804); and cf. Madden, Domestic Relations, Ch. 12, and 3 Bogert, Trusts, § 493.