nomination hearings and the prospective Ervin Committee hearings, rather than to Ehrlichman as it was taking up too much of Mr. Ehrlichman's time from his regular duties. (Bk. 7, p. 2739) Previous to this Dean had been keeping himself informed as to the progress of the FBI and Department of Justice investigation on Watergate so that he could keep Ehrlichman and Haldeman informed. Both Attorney General Kleindienst and Mr. Petersen confirmed that Dean had represented to them that he was "responsible to keep the President informed." (Bk. 9, p. 3618); that he "had been delegated by the President to be posted and kept informed throughout the course of the investigation". (Bk. 9, pp. 3575, 3576, 3652) It is equally clear from the recorded conversations between Dean and the President that he did not keep the President fully informed until March 21, 1973.2 Indeed, on April 16, 1973, Dean so acknowledged that fact to the President, when he said: D. I have tried all along to make sure that anything I passed to you didn't cause you any personal problem. An analysis of the March 21, 1973, A.M. conversation thus becomes important in assessing the conduct of the President. On the previous evening the President and Dean talked by telephone and Dean requested a meeting with the President. They met the next morning, alone, at first, and later Mr. Haldeman joined them about half way through the meeting, rather than for only the last few minutes, as Dean testified. (Bk. 4, p. 1383) After some preliminary remarks concerning the Gray confirmation hearings, Dean stated the real purpose for the meeting: D. The reason that I thought we ought to talk this morning is because in our conversations I have the impression that you don't know everything I know and it makes it very difficult for you to make judgments that only you can make on some of these things and I thought that-(Emphasis supplied) He then proceeded to detail for the President what he believed the President should be made aware of, first in the "overall". Dean stated, "We have a cancer within, close to the Presidency, that is growing." and that "people are going to start perjuring themselves . . ." He described the genesis of the DNC break-in; the employment of Liddy; Apparently Dean even on March 21, 1973, concealed other matters from the President as well. In U.S. v. Stans, et al, he testified that despite the fact that he had made calls to the SEC, he told the President "no one at the White House has done anything for Vesco." Of course the statement to the President was not true if Dean did make such calls for he certainly was at the White House. Among the other significant matters which Dean did not report to the President, even on March 21, 1973, were (1) that Dean had assisted Magruder in preparing his perjured Grand Jury testimony; (2) that Dean had authorized promises of executive clemency to be made to Watergate defendants; (3) that he had personally handled money which went to the Watergate defendants: (4) that he had delivered documents from Hunt's safe to F.B.I. Director Gray; (5) that Dean had personally destroyed documents from Hunt's safe: or (6) that Dean had ordered Hunt out of the country, and then retracted the order. the formulation of a series of plans by Liddy which Dean disavowed, as did Mr. Haldeman; the belief that the CREP had a lawful intelligence gathering operation and the receipt of information from this source; and the arrest at the DNC on June 17, 1972. He then informed the President of a call to Liddy shortly thereafter inquiring "... whether anybody in the White House was involved in this" and the response "No, they weren't." Dean then advised the President of the allegation that Magruder and Porter had committed perjury before the grand jury in denying knowledge that the DNC was to be bugged. He did not tell the President he had helped "prepare" Magruder's testimony as he later admitted before the Senate Committee. (Bk. 3, p. 1206) Dean said he did not know what Mitchell had testified to before the grand jury. Dean next laid out for the President what happened after June 17. He informed the President “I was under pretty clear instructions not to investigate this . . . I worked on a theory of containment - to try to hold it right where it was", and he admitted that he was "totally aware" of what the FBI and grand jury was doing. Throughout these disclosures the President asked Dean a number of questions such as: P. Tell me this: did Mitchell go along? P. Did Colson know what they (Liddy and Hunt) were talking about? P. Did he (Colson) talk with Haldeman? P. Did he (Haldeman) know where it (the information) was coming from? All together, the President asked Dean more than 150 questions in the course of this meeting. Dean then described to the President the commencement of what he alleges was a cover-up involving himself and others. Implicit in these revelations, of course, is that the President was not involved but rather he was learning of these allegations for the first time. In fact, later in the conversation, Dean said: D. I know, sir, I can just tell from our conversation that these are things you have no knowledge of. (Emphasis supplied) Dean next recited receiving a demand "from Hunt to me" through an intermediary for "$120,000 for personal expenses and attorney's fees". D. "... he wanted it as of the close of business yesterday" (March 20). Dean told how he rejected the demand D. "If you want money, you came to the wrong man, fellow. I am not involved in the money. I don't know a thing about it. I can't help you. You better scramble about elsewhere." Dean also claimed that Hunt had threatened Ehrlichman if he wasn't paid the money he demanded. Dean analyzed the situation as he saw it, pointing out that a number of people know about these events, including Mrs. Hunt who had died in a plane crash. At the mention of Mrs. Hunt, the President interjected that this was a "great sadness" and that he "recalled a conversation with someone about Hunt's problem on account of his wife and the President said that "of course commutation could be considered on the basis of his wife's death, and that was the only conversation I ever had in that light." During their conversations, the President repeatedly and categorically rejected the idea of clemency. Following this lengthy description of what had transpired, the conversation dealt with what should be done about the situation presented by Hunt's demands. A number of alternatives were considered. Dean pointed out that the blackmail would continue, that it would cost a million dollars and it would be difficult to handle. D. What really bothers me is this growing situation. As I say, Dean then made a recommendation: Dean was unsure of the best course to follow, but stated the approach he preferred. D. That's right. I am coming down to what I really think, is that Bob and John and John Mitchell and I can sit down and spend a day, or however long, to figure out, one, how this can be carved away from you, so that it does not damage you or the Presidency. It just can't. You are not involved in it and it is something you shouldn't... Dean then suggested that another grand jury be convened but Dean points out that "some people are going to have to go to jail. That is the long and the short of it also." Among the alternatives considered were the payment of the money generally and the payment of the amount demanded by Hunt, specifically. The mechanics of these alternatives, such as how the money could be raised and delivered, were explored. The President expressed the belief that the money could be raised, and perhaps, even, a way could be found to deliver it. However, he recognized and pointed out that blackmail would continue endlessly, and in the final analysis would not be successful unless the Watergate defendants were given executive clemency, which he said adamantly, could not be done. The President stated: P. No, it is wrong that's for sure. After the alternatives were explored, the President's conclusion regarding the demands for money were clearly stated: P.... But in the end, we are going to be bled to death. And in the end, it is all going to come out anyway. Then you get the worst of both worlds. We are going to lose and the people are going to— H. And look like dopes. P. And in effect look like a cover-up. So that we can't do... Restating it, the President said: P. But my point is, do you ever have any choice on Hunt? That is the point. No matter what we do here now, John, whatever he wants if he doesn't get it-immunity, etc., he is going to blow the whistle. Finally the discussion as to what should be done was concluded by the President, at least tentatively deciding to have another grand jury investigation at which members of the White House staff would appear and testify: P. I hate to leave with differences in view of all this stripped land. I could understand this, but I think I want another grand jury proceeding and we will have the White House appear before them. Is that right, John? D. Uh huh. Further discussion ensued concerning the benefits of calling for a grand jury investigation - political as well as substantive - and the meeting ended with an agreement to have Dean, Mitchell, Haldeman and Ehrlichman meet the next day to consider what they would recommend. The conclusion of the meeting, however, was not ambigu ous: H. We should change that a little bit. John's point is exactly right. The erosion here now is going to you, and that is the thing that we have to turn off at whatever cost. We have to turn it off at the lowest cost we can, but at whatever cost it takes. D. That's what we have to do. P. Well, the erosion is inevitably going to come here, apart from anything and all the people saying well the Watergate isn't a major issue. It isn't. But it will be. It's bound to. (Unintelligible) has to go out. Delaying is the great danger to the White House area. We don't, I say that the White House can't do it. Right? D. Yes, Sir. As the President has stated, the transcript of the meeting on the morning of March 21, 1973, contains ambiguities and statements which taken out of context could be construed to have a variety of meanings. The conversation was wide ranging, consideration was given to a number of different possibilities, but several things clearly stand out: 1. The President had not previously been aware of any payments made allegedly to purchase silence on the part of the Watergate defendants. 2. The President rejected the payment of $120,000 or any other sum to Hunt or other Watergate defendants. 3. The President determined that the best way to proceed was to have White House people appear before a grand jury even though it meant that some people might have to go to jail. Tapes of recorded conversations following the meeting in the morning of March 21, 1973, further establish that the President not only did not approve of any payment to Hunt, but he did not even know a payment had been made to Hunt's lawyer in the amount of $75,000. In the afternoon of the same day, March 21, 1973, the President met again with Dean, Haldeman and now Ehrlichman. This conversation makes it even more clear that the President did not suggest that blackmail should be paid to Hunt. Ehrlichman pointed out: E. The problem of the Hunt thing or some of these other people, there is just no sign off on them. That problem goes on and on. The President again reiterated his view: P. Maybe we face the situation. We can't do a thing about the participants. If it is going to be that way eventually why not now? That is what you are sort of resigned to, isn't it? And later near the end of the meeting: P. You see, if we go your route of cutting the cancer out- - if we cut it out now. Take a Hunt, well wouldn't that knock the hell out from under him? D. That's right. Shortly after this the President terminated the meeting, apparently rather abruptly, inquiring as to the time for the meeting the next day among Mitchell, Dean, Haldeman and Ehrlichman. Again the recorded conversation clearly discloses that not only did the President not approve or even know of a payment made or to be made to Hunt. It is in fact quite clear that, subject to some other solution being suggested at a meeting scheduled for the next day at which Mr. Mitchell would attend, he favored "cutting the cancer now". out... The President next met with his principal aides and now Mitchell on the afternoon of March 22, 1973. This was the first meeting of the President with John Mitchell following the disclosures of March 21, 1973. Mitchell and the others had met that morning as the President had requested. If the allegations of the grand jury as stated in pending indictments are correct as to when the arrangements for the payment of Hunt's legal fees were made, they would have had to have been made prior to this meeting on the afternoon of March 22nd. The tape recording of this meeting establishes that no one at the meeting disclosed to the President that such an arrangement had been made. In fact, the President was not informed about these arrangements until mid-April when Ehrlichman was reporting the results of his investigation to the President. In attempting to pin down what had happened, the President was given two versions, one by Ehrlichman and Haldeman on April 14 and another by John Dean on April 16. Ehrlichman and Haldeman explained to the President what had transpired: P. What happened? E. And he just said, "It's taken care of." H. Mitchell raised the problem to Dean and said, "What have you done about that other problem?" Dean said, he kind of looked at us, and then said, "Well, you know, I don't know." And Mitchell said, "Oh, I guess that's been taken care of." Apparently through LaRue. P. Apparently who? H. LaRue. Dean told us, LaRue. On April 16 Dean described how it happened that Hunt's legal fees were paid. After repeating Hunt's threat against Ehrlichman he said: D. . . . Alright I took that to John Ehrlichman. Ehrlichman said "Have you talked to Mitchell about it?" I said "No I have not." He said "Well, will you talk to Mitchell?" I said "Yes I will." I talked to Mitchell. I just passed it along to him. And then we were meeting down here a few days later in Bob's office with Bob, and Ehrlichman and Mitchell and myself, and Ehrlichman said at that time, "Well is that problem with Hunt straightened out?" He said it to me and I said "Well, ask the man who may know; Mitchell." Mitchell said "I think that problem is solved." P. That's all? D. That's all he said. If Dean's disclosure to the President on April 16, 1973, about the payment of Hunt's legal fees is to be believed, then it is clear that this fact was concealed from the President when he met with Mitchell and the others on the afternoon of March 22nd. The explanation for this concealment perhaps is contained in a significant statement made by Dean to the President at their meeting on the morning of April 16, 1973: D. I have tried all along to make sure that anything I passed to you myself didn't cause you any personal problems. This explanation for not making a full disclosure to the President may have been well intentioned at the time but in the last analysis only served to prolong the investigation. The Conduct of the President Following the Disclosures Made on March 21, 1973 Dean disclosed for the first time on March 21, 1973, that he had been engaged in conduct that might have amounted to obstruction of justice and allegations that other high officials and former officials were also involved. These matters were thoroughly probed by the President in his talk with Dean, with the President often taking the role of devil's advocate; sometimes merely thinking out loud. Having received this information of possible obstruction of justice having taken place following the break-in at the DNC the President promptly undertook an investigation into the facts. The record discloses that the President started his investigation the night of his meeting with Dean on March 21st, as confirmed by Dean in his conversation with the President on April 16, 1973. P. Then it was that night that I started my investigation. P. . . . That is when I frankly became interested in the case At the meeting with Mitchell and the others on the afternoon of March 22nd, the President instructed Dean to prepare a written report of his earlier oral disclosures: H. I think you (Dean) ought to hole up for the weekend and do that and get it done. P. Sure. H. Give it your full attention and get it done. P. I think you need - why don't you do this? Why don't you go up to Camp David. D. I might do it, I might do it. P. Completely away from the phone. Just go up there and (inaudible). I want a written report. (Emphasis supplied) Later during this same conversation the President said: P. I feel that at a very minimum we've got to have this statement. Let's look at it. I don't know what it where is it If it opens up doors, it opens up doors you know. The recording of this conversation in which the President instructed Dean to go to Camp David to write a report should be compared with Dean's testimony in which he stated: "He (the President) never at any time asked me to write a report, and it wasn't until after I had arrived at Camp David that I received a call from Haldeman asking me to write the report up." (Bk. 4, p. 1385) (Emphasis supplied) Dean in fact did go to Camp David and apparently did some work on such a report but he never completed the task. The President then assigned Ehrlichman to investigate these allegations. By as early as March 27, the President met with Ehrlichman and Haldeman to discuss the evidence thus far developed and how it would be best to proceed. Again the President stated his resolve that White House officials should appear before the grand jury: P.... Actually if called, we are not going to refuse for anybody called before the grand jury to go, are we, John? The President then reviewed with Haldeman and Ehrlichman the evidence developed to that time. They stated that they had not yet talked to Mitchell and indicated this would have to be done. They reviewed what they had been advised was Magruder's current position as to what had happened and compared that with what Dean had told them. They reported that Hunt was before the grand jury that same day. It is interesting to note that neither the President, Haldeman nor Ehrlichman say anything that indicate surprise in Hunt's testifying before the grand jury. If in fact he had been paid to keep quiet, it might have been expected that someone would have expressed at least disappointment that he was testifying before the grand jury less than a week later. They confirmed to the President, as Dean had, that no one at the White House had prior knowledge of the Watergate break-in. Ehrlichman said, "There just isn't a scintilla of a hint that Dean knew about this." The President asked about the possibility of Colson having prior knowledge and Ehrlichman said, “His response was one of total surprise . . . He was totally nonplussed, as the rest of us." Ehrlichman then reviewed with the President the earlier concern that they had for national security leaks and the steps taken to find out about how they occurred. It was decided to ask Mitchell to come to Washington to receive a report of the facts developed so far and a call was placed to him for that purpose. It was also decided that Ehrlichman should also call the Attorney General and review the information on hand with him. It was during this meeting that the possibility of having a commission or a special prosecutor appointed in order to avoid the appearance of the Administration investigating itself and a call was placed to former Attorney General Rogers to ask him to meet with the President to discuss the situation. The next day Ehrlichman, pursuant to the President's direction given the previous day, called Attorney General Kleindienst and among other things advised him that he was to report directly to the President if any evidence turns up of any wrongdoing on the part of anyone in the White House or about Mitchell. Kleindienst raised the question of a possibility of a conflict of interest and suggests that thought be given to appointing a special prosecutor. On March 30, 1973, consideration was given to the content of a press briefing with respect to White House officials appearing before the grand jury. As a result thereof, Mr. Ziegler stated at the Press briefing that day: "With regard to the grand jury, the President reiterates his instructions that any member of the White House staff who is called by the grand jury will appear before the grand jury to answer questions regarding that individual's alleged knowledge or possible involvement in the Watergate matter.” 3 Even prior to the completion of Ehrlichman's investigation, the President was taking steps to get the additional facts before the grand jury. On April 8, 1973, on the airplane returning to Washington from California, the President met with Haldeman and Ehrlichman and directed they meet with Dean that day and urge him to go to the grand jury - "I am not going to wait, he is going to go." (Bk. 7, p. 2757) Haldeman and Ehrlichman met with Dean that afternoon from 5 to 7. At 7:33 Ehrlichman reported the results of that meeting to the President by telephone: P. Oh, John, Hi. E. I just wanted to post you on the Dean meeting. It went fine. He is going to wait until after he'd had a chance to talk with Mitchell and to pass the word to Magruder through his lawyers that he is going to appear at the grand jury. His feeling is that Liddy has pulled the plug on Magruder and that (unintelligible) he thinks he knows it now. And he says there's no love lost there, and that that was Liddy's motive in communicating informally. Indeed, Dean did, in fact, communicate his intentions to Mitchell and Magruder not to support Magruder's previous testimony to the grand jury. (Bk. 6, p. 1006) This no doubt was the push, initially stimulated by the President, which got Magruder to go to the U.S. AttorO Copy submitted with transcript of conversations. 37-434 O 74-8 neys on the following Saturday, April 14, and change his testimony. On the morning of April 14, 1973, the President met again with Haldeman and Ehrlichman to discuss the Watergate matter. This was an in-depth discussion lasting more than two and one-half hours. The obvious purpose was to review the results of three week's investigation on the part of Ehrlichman and Haldeman and determine what course of action they would recommend. Several conclusions were reached at that meeting by the President. From Ehrlichman's report on what Ehrlichman called "hearsay" facts, the President concluded, with regard to Mitchell: P. I'm not convinced he's guilty but I am convinced that he ought to go before a grand jury. There was a discussion as to who would be the appropriate person to talk to Mitchell and tell him that continued silence did not well serve the President. Ultimately, it was decided that Haldeman should call Mitchell to come to Washington and that Ehrlichman should talk to him. With respect to Magruder, the President said: P. We've come full circle on the Mitchell thing. The Mitchell thing must come first. That is something today. We've got to make this move today. If it fails, just to get back our position I think you ought to talk to Magruder. H. I agree. P. And you tell Magruder, now Jeb, this evidence is coming in, you ought to go to the grand jury. Purge yourself if you're perjured and tell this whole story. H. I think we have to. P. Then, well Bob, you don't agree with that? The President instructed Ehrlichman to see Magruder, also, and tell him that he did not serve the President by remaining silent. The President's decision to urge Mitchell and Magruder to go to the grand jury was based on his recognition of his duty to act on the body of information Ehrlichman had reported to him: E. Here's the situation. Look again at the big picture. You now are possessed of a body of fact. P. That with knowledge we're still not doing anything. E. Right. P. That's exactly right. The law and order - That's the way I am. You know it's a pain for me to do it the Mitchell thing is damn painful. A decision was reached to speak to both Mitchell and Magruder before turning such information as they had developed over to the Department of Justice in order to afford them "an opportunity to come forward". The President told Ehrlichman that when he met with Mitchell to advise him that "the President has said let the chips fall where they may. He will not furnish cover for anybody." The President summed up the situation by stating: P. No, seriously, as I have told both of you, the boil had to be pricked. In a very different sense that's what December 18th was about. We have to prick the boil and take the heat. Now that's what we're doing here. We're going to prick this boil and take the heat. I – am I overstating? E. No, I think that's right. The idea is this will prick the boil. It may not. The history of this thing has to be though that you did not tuck this under the rug yesterday or today, and hope it would go away. The decision was also made by the President that Ehrlichman should provide the information which he had collected to the Attorney General. Ehrlichman called the Attorney General, but did not reach him. Mitchell came to Washington that afternoon and met with Ehrlichman. Immediately following that meeting, Ehrlichman reported to the President, stating Mitchell protested his innocence, stating: "You know, these characters pulled this thing off without my knowledge I never saw Liddy for months at a time.. I didn't know what they were up to and nobody was more surprised than I was . . . I can't let people get away with this kind of thing. I am just going to have to defend myself every way I can." Ehrlichman said he explained to Mitchell that the President did not want anyone to stand mute on his account; that everyone had a right to stand mute for his own reasons but that the "interests of the President . . . were not served by a person standing mute for that reason alone." Ehrlichman said that he advised Mitchell that the information that had been collected would be turned over to the Attorney General and that Mitchell agreed this would be appropriate. Even later on April 14, Ehrlichman finally was able to reach Magruder and met with Magruder and his lawyers for the purpose of informing him that he should not remain silent out of any misplaced loyalty to the President. Ehrlichman found, however, that Magruder had just come from a meeting with the U.S. Attorneys where he had told the full story as he knew it. He, Magruder, told Ehrlichman what he had told the U.S. Attorney, which Ehrlichman duly reported to the President. During this meeting with the President, Ehrlichman's carlier call to the Attorney General was completed, and |