Gambar halaman
PDF
ePub

SEC. 9. That the President be, and he hereby is, empowered to organize the said levies, and alone to appoint the commissioned officers thereof, in the manner he may judge proper.

*

*

*

Section 12 gave $3 bounty to each enlisted man of the "levies," and section 14 gave recruiting officers $2 for each man enlisted in the regulars.

During the Revolution the regular troops or Continentals, were largely supplemented by militia, and it will be remembered that the latter, having little or no respect for officers of their own choosing, would not submit to the restraints of discipline, and never could be depended upon.

This fact was distinctly recognized in the law just quoted, which took the radical step, far in advance of our Revolutionary war policy, of creating an entirely new class of troops to support the regular army in case of emergency.

The above legislation merits our closest scrutiny. Here was laid the foundation of the volunteer system, which attained its fullest development during our long civil war. The "levies," known later as "volunteers," were authorized under the plenary power of Congress to "raise and support armies," and the power of appointing their officers was given the President, to whom it obviously belonged, as the "levies" were wholly distinct from the militia or State troops.

The subsequent transfer of this power from the President to the governors of the States was a voluntary return to the practice under the Confederation and a surrender of the prerogatives of the General Government under the Constitution.

ST. CLAIR'S DEFEAT.

The great lessons of the Revolution, as well as those taught by the recent Miami expedition, were wasted upon the Government. A year after Harmar's defeat General St. Clair was sent against the Indians with another mixed force of regulars and militia. His little army, counting but 1,400 effectives, was attacked on the 4th of November, 1791, by a nearly equal force of Indians, and routed, with a loss of 632 killed and 264 wounded.

The committee of the House of Representatives appointed to investigate this disaster reported that "the militia appear to have been composed principally of substitutes and totally ungovernable and regardless of military duty and subordination;" and that "the attack was unexpected, the troops having just been dismissed from morning. parade. It commenced upon the militia, who were in advance of the main army, and who fled through the main army without firing a gun. This circumstance threw the troops into some disorder, from which it appears they never recovered during the action." In the opinion of the committee, "the want of discipline and experience of the troops' was one of the main causes of the defeat.

The report concludes as follows:

[ocr errors]

The committee conceive it but justice to the Commander in Chief to say that, in their opinion, the failure of the late expedition can in no respect be imputed to his conduct, either at any time before or during the action.

It is indisputable that the policy adopted by Congress of depending upon raw troops caused the needless sacrifice of 632 lives, and the

י

reader should note that this number exceeded the total killed in the battles of Long Island and Camden, the two most sanguinary contests of the Revolution.

The strength and organization of the army authorized by Congress on the 3d of March, eight months before the massacre, was as follows:

[blocks in formation]

Had the President been empowered to increase the 28 companies from 76 to 150 men the enlisted strength of the Army could have been raised from 2,128 to 4,200. Far from permitting this, the law itself almost discouraged a quick recruitment of the new regular regiment, by authorizing the enrollment of levies or militia to make up for deficiencies in its effective strength.

ORGANIZATION OF 1792.

St. Clair's defeat was followed on the 5th of March, 1792, by an act "making further and more effectual provision for the protection of the frontiers of the United States.”

By the terms of this act the battalion of artillery and the two regiments of infantry, then in service, were to be filled up to the maximum fixed for the enlisted men of each infantry regiment, not to exceed 960.

Three additional regiments of infantry were likewise authorized to be raised for a period not exceeding three years, two of which, each of 960 men, were to be organized like the two existing regiments, while the third was to consist of two battalions of infantry, and a squadron of light dragoons, the enlisted men of each battalion and of the squadron to number 320.

As if anticipating that fighting on foot would be the future rôle of our cavalry, the law prescribed that "it shall be a condition in the enlistment of the said dragoons to serve as dismounted dragoons whenever they shall be ordered thereto."

The staff under this establishment was the same as that of 1791.
The line was organized as follows:

[blocks in formation]

The field and staff of each regiment and battalion of infantry and of the artillery battalion were the same as in the organization of 1790. Each company of infantry consisted of 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 ensign, 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, 2 musicians, 70 privates; total, 83. The field and staff of the squadron of light dragoons comprised 1 major, 1 adjutant, 1 quartermaster, and 1 surgeon's mate. Each troop of cavalry consisted of 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 cornet, 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, 1 farrier, 1 saddler, 1 trumpeter, and 69 dragoons; total, 83. The bounty under this act was increased to $8, and equalization was insured to all men in service who had enlisted since April,

1790.

The thirteenth section authorized the President to call into service as many cavalry, and for such periods, as he might deem requisite, appointing the officers thereof. Instead of leaving their pay and allowances to his discretion, however, as in 1791, the pay was fixed at $1 per day for each noncommissioned officer and 75 cents per day for each private, who at his own risk should find his horse, arms, and accouterments, 25 cents per day being allowed in lieu of rations and forage. The officers were likewise allowed 50 cents per day for the use and risk of their horses.

In addition to this cavalry force, the President was empowered to employ Indians at his discretion, at a total compensation not exceeding $20,000.

The pay of the army was also increased, as shown by the following table, the allowances being the same as before:

[blocks in formation]

Aid-de-camp, in addition to pay in line..

24.00

Brigade major, to act as deputy inspector, in addition to pay in line.

24.00

Principal artificer.

40.00

Second artificer

26.00

REGIMENTAL OFFICERS.

[blocks in formation]

The pay of enlisted men was exempt from all previous deductions. Adjutants and paymasters were given $10 per month and quartermasters $8 per month extra pay. It should be noted as a peculiar feature of this law that infantry and cavalry were united in the same regiment, as were infantry and artillery by the law of 1785.

34760°-16-6

LEGION OF THE UNITED STATES.

Among the many experiments so rapidly succeeding each other, was a scheme for merging the infantry, cavalry, and artillery into a single body under the designation of the Legion of the United States.

66

The plan seems to have originated with Baron von Steuben, who, "upon a review of all the military of Europe," frankly stated that "the legion alone has not been adopted by any," yet he ventured to recommend it for reasons as follows:

1. Being a complete and little army of itself, it is ready to begin its operations on the shortest notice or slightest alarm.

2. Having all the component parts of the largest army of any possible description, it is prepared to meet every species of war that may present itself.

Despite all the experience of Europe and even of America, despite all the changes in arms and tactics since the days of ancient Rome, the plan so completely captivated General Knox, the Secretary of War, that he unhesitatingly recommended its adoption both for the Army and the militia.

In regard to the latter he proposed:

All the militia of the United States shall assume the form of the Legion, which shall be the permanent establishment thereof.

The militia was to be divided into three bodies, to be designated the "advanced," "main," and "reserved" corps.

The first corps was to embrace all youths of 18, 19, and 20 years of age; the second, all men between the ages of 21 and 45; the third, all men between the ages of 46 and 60. All members of the "advanced corps" under 20 were to receive military instruction for thirty days at "annual camps of discipline," while the other young men of the corps were only required to be present during the last ten days of the encampment. After graduating in this school the members of the advanced corps were to pass into the "main corps," their instruction in the art of war being continued by "exercise and maneuvers," four days in each year.

On the 27th of December, 1792, the legional organization was adopted, and the fact communicated to Congress as follows:

The President of the United States, by virtue of the powers vested in him by law, hereby establishes the following organization of the troops of the United States: The commissioned officers hereinafter designated, together with noncommissioned officers, musicians, and privates authorized by law, amounting to 5,120, are to be denominated the Legion of the United States, which is to be divided into four sublegions.

THE LEGIONARY STAFF.

One major-general or legionary general, 2 aids-de-camp, 1 adjutant and inspector, 1 major commandant of cavalry, 1 major commandant of artillery, 1 quartermaster, 1 deputy quartermaster, 1 surgeon, 1 chaplain.

THE SUBLEGIONS.

Each sublegion to consist of the officers hereinafter named, and 1,280 noncommissioned officers, musicians, and privates, to wit:

Staff-1 brigadier or sublegionary general, 1 aid-de-camp, 1 brigade or sublegionary major and inspector, 1 quartermaster, 1 surgeon.

a The Duc de Lanzun's legion, which formed part of Rochambeau's army, consisted of infantry, cavalry, and artillery.

One troop of dragoons.-Consisting of 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 cornet, 6 sergeants, 5 corporals, 1 farrier, 1 saddler, 1 trumpeter, 65 dragoons.

One company of artillery.-To consist of 1 captain, 2 lieutenants, 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, 2 musicians, 50 privates, including 10 artificers.

Two battalions of infantry and one battalion of riflemen.-Each consisting of: 1 major, 1 adjutant, 1 quartermaster, 1 surgeon's mate, 1 sergeant-major, 1 quartermastersergeant, 1 senior musician.

Four companies.-Each to consist of: 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 ensign, 6 sergeants, 6 corporals, 2 musicians, 81 privates.

N. B.-The rifle companies: 1 bugler and 82 privates.

[blocks in formation]

The Legion of the United States, noncommissioned officers and privates. 5, 120

SUMMARY VIEW OF THE GENERAL, FIELD, COMMISSIONED, AND STAFF OFFICERS OF THE LEGION OF THE UNITED STATES.

General staff.-One major-general or legionary-general, 4 brigadiers general or sublegionary-generals, 1 adjutant, 1 quartermaster, 1 deputy quartermaster, 1 surgeon, 1 chaplain.

Field.-14 majors, commissioned, 46 captains, 60 lieutenants, a 48 ensigns, 4 cornets. Medical staff.-4 surgeons, 12 surgeon's mates, 6 surgeon's mates for garrison duty and extra service.

The recruiting of the Legion was so slow that up to November, 1794, it only numbered 3,692 men, of whom 2,643 participated in General Wayne's expedition against the Indians. This officer moved from Fort Washington (Cincinnati) in September, 1793, and built a fort some 80 miles to the north, on the site of the present town of Greenville, Ohio, where he went into winter quarters.

In the following June, a strong detachment marched to the scene of St. Clair's defeat, and erected Fort Recovery, which a few weeks after was unsuccessfully attacked by the Indians. Moving forward, Wayne finally engaged and routed the main body of the Indians on the 20th of August, 1794, near the rapids of the Maumee River, about 7 miles from a military post established by their British sympathizers. Though reenforced in July by some 1,100 mounted volunteers from Kentucky, he had still a large preponderance of well-disciplined regulars, and it was their charge with the bayonet that broke the Indian center and drove the savages under the guns of the English fort. This brilliant victory avenged the defeats of Harmar and St. Clair, and struck a blow which resounded along our frontier from the Lakes to the Gulf of Mexico.

ORGANIZATION OF THE MILITIA.

From the small size and temporary duration of the military establishment created by our early legislators, it is plain that their intention was to entirely dispense with a standing army. But, as time rolled on, Shay's rebellion, the constant Indian troubles, and the possibility of a conflict with foreign powers, brought about a widespread conviction that the national defense could not be neglected. After much discussion, our statesmen then turned to the militia and tried to satisfy

a The aids-de-camp are included in the number of commissioned officers.

« SebelumnyaLanjutkan »