ARTICLE IV.

Section 4.

1. The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature can not be convened), against domestic violence.

2. This Constitution, and By-Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land.

We have only to compare the war powers of Congress under the Confederation and under the Constitution to perceive that the ratification of the last-named instrument meant a radical change in our form of government. Acts of Congress having the effect and force of law now took the place of resolutions which amounted to but little more than recommendations and appeals to the several States.

Up to this time Congress could justly claim that its feeble and exhausting military policy was largely due to the inadequate powers conferred by the Articles of Confederation. Under the Constitution however, the authority to raise and support armies," "to provide and maintain a navy, to levy and collect taxes," and "to borrow money on the credit of the United States" was unqualified and gave every war power that the most despotic ruler could ask.

Henceforth there could be no division of responsibility between the General Government and the States. If disasters should happen in the future like those which twice forced the Continental Congress to hand over its authority to a military commander; if raw levies hereafter should be swept away as they were at Long Island and at Camden, and large portions of our territory given over to the ravages of war; if vast armies and prodigal counties again should deplete the national Treasury, the whole responsibility must lie at the doors of a President and a Congress clothed with unlimited power to meet every emergency.

Our liberties and independence, our country's honor and credit were thus all committed to one General Government, it being fully expected by a generous and confiding people that each representative in the discharge of this sacred trust should regard the national defense as “one of the cardinal duties of a statesman."

As the first step toward enabling our rulers to wisely and humanely organize and direct the military powers of the people, every cause that has tended in the past to prolong our wars, destroy the lives of our citizens, and waste our treasure, should receive in justice to all, the most attentive and painstaking scrutiny.

ORGANIZATION OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT.

The adoption of the Constitution soon led to changes in our military system. The first important act was approved August 7, 1789, and provided

That there shall be an Executive Department to be denominated the Department of War; and that there shall be a principal officer therein, to be called the Secretary

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for the Department of War, who shall perform and execute such duties as shall, from time to time, be enjoined on or entrusted to him by the President of the United States, agreeable to the Constitution, relative to military commissions, or to the land or naval forces, ships or warlike stores, of the United States. And furthermore, that the said principal officer shall conduct the business of the said Department in such manner as the President of the United States shall, from time to time, order or instruct.

SEC. 2. That there shall be in the said Department an inferior officer, to be appointed by the said principal officer, to be employed therein as he shall deem proper, and to be called the chief clerk in the Department of War, and who, whenever the said principal officer shall be removed from office by the President of the United States, or in any other case of vacancy, shall, during such vacancy, have the charge and custody of all records, books, and papers appertaining to the said Department.

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The effect of this law was to make the Secretary of War, in the discharge of his duties, responsible to the President instead of to Congress.

PEACE ESTABLISHMENT OF 1789.

The act of September 29, 1789, laid the foundation of our existing Army by recognizing "the establishment for the troops in the service of the United States," and requiring all officers and men to take the oath of allegiance. The only change made was in the method of appointing officers, this power being vested for the first time in the President of the United States. Under this act the Army was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Harmar, of the infantry, the staff consisting of a paymaster-general, an acting adjutant-general, and an acting quartermaster-general.

To protect the frontiers from the Indians, the fifth section of the law authorized the President to call into service such part of the militia as he might judge necessary, the militia to have the same pay and subsistence, when in service, as troops of the regular establishment. In this section we have the key to our whole subsequent military policy in regard to Indian hostilities.

As the Continental troops during the Revolution were never maintained in sufficient strength, it was necessary to fall back on the militia to meet current emergencies, and when Indian wars had to be dealt with after the Revolution the same system was continued as involving the least expense. Thus, as events soon proved, a shortsighted and mistaken economy was to jeopardize the lives and property of our hardy settlers on the frontier.

REORGANIZATION OF 1790.

The first general organization of the Army under the Constitution was pursuant to the act of April 30, 1790," the first section of which fixed the strength of the noncommissioned officers and privates at 1,216, enlisted for the term of three years unless sooner discharged. The term of the officers was the same as for the men.

The infantry of this force was organized into a regiment of 3 bat talions, of 4 companies each.

The field and staff consisted of 1 lieutenant-colonel, 3 majors, 3 adjutants, 3 quartermasters, 1 paymaster, 1 surgeon, and 2 surgeon's

mates.

a The dates of all acts refer to the time of their approval by the President.

Each company was composed of 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 ensign, 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, 2 musicians, and 66 privates.

Total company, 79; total battalion, 320; total regiment, 962.

The artillery consisted of a battalion of 4 companies, with the following field and staff: One major, 1 adjutant, 1 quartermaster, 1 paymaster, and 1 surgeon's mate.

Each company was composed of 1 captain, 2 lieutenants, 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, 2 musicians, and 66 privates.

Total company, 79; total battalion, 321; aggregate infantry and artillery, 1,283.

No provision was made for a General Staff, except that the President in his discretion could appoint one or two inspectors, who were to receive the pay of captains, with an allowance of $10 per month for forage.

The pay of the Army was as follows:

Monthly deductions from the pay of enlisted men on account of clothing and hospital stores were made as follows:

Lieutenants doing duty as adjutants received an extra allowance of $10 per month; quartermasters and paymasters, all of whom were to be appointed from the line, received $5 extra per month. All officers were granted either actual rations or their equivalent in money computed at contract rates, as follows:

Mounted officers were allowed forage or a pecuniary commutation at the rate of—

Rank.

Per month

Lieutenant-colonel.
Majors and surgeons
Surgeon's mates..

$12.00 10.00

6.00

The inadequacy of this small force was recognized in the last section of the law, which authorized the President to call out the militia of the States to aid in the defense of the frontiers against the Indians. A feature of this law worthy of notice is the division of the regiment of infantry into three battalions, showing that nearly a century ago we had the same organization, the depot excepted, that now prevails in Europe. Going still further back, early in the Revolution, Hazen's regiment, recruited at large, consisted of four battalions. Such an organization, with the depot battalion as a link between the troops in the field and the people at home, has shown itself best suited to meet the demands of a long war.

HARMAR'S MIAMI EXPEDITION.

Harmar's expedition against the Miamis afforded the first test of our new policy in regard to Indian hostilities. His force consisted of 320 regulars and 1,133 militia, though but 60 regulars and 340 militia took part in the disastrous attack upon the Indian village" October 22, 1790, their loss being 183 killed and 31 wounded.

We learn from the evidence laid before the court of inquiry which investigated General Harmar's conduct that "amongst the militia were a great many hardly able to bear arms, such as old, infirm men, and young boys; they were not such as might be expected from a frontier, viz, the smart, active woodsman, well accustomed to arms, eager and alert to avenge the injuries done them and their connections;" also that many of the militia were "substitutes."

This evidence further shows that in the attack on the village the militia behaved badly, disobeyed orders, and left the regular troops to be sacrificed. As a consequence, the expedition returned to Fort Washington (Cincinnati). After weighing the testimony and making full inquiry as to the facts, the court found

that the conduct of the said Brig. Gen. Joseph Harmar merits high approbation. The story of this expedition must convince us that the characteristic features of our Revolutionary military policy were in no wise dependent upon the magnitude of the operations involved. Whether from indifference or inability to appreciate the value of discipline and instruction, we have never yet been able to utilize the principle of expansion now so successfully applied in military organization by other civilized nations.

Under the law of April, 1790, the President could not add a single soldier to the Regular Army, while his authority to call out raw troops perhaps largely composed of "old, infirm men, and young boys,"

a Situated near the site of the present city of Fort Wayne, Indiana.

with officers to match, was solely limited by his discretion. At this very time, by increasing the enlisted strength of each company from 76 to 200, the three-battalion regiment of infantry and the battalion of artillery were capable of expansion to more than 3,200 men. Instead of being able to adopt this simple and economical expedient, the President had no other alternative than to call out militia, the records of the court of inquiry bearing eloquent testimony as to the result.

ORGANIZATION OF 1791.

The insufficiency of our small military force having been painfully shown by the Miami expedition, Congress, on the 3d of March, 1791, added another regiment for a term of three years, with the pay and organization of the one already in service, its enlisted men being limited to 912.

By the fourth section of the law, men enlisted for the new regiment were given a bounty of $6, and by way of equalization, its inevitable concomitant, the same allowance was granted to all enlisted men of the previous establishment.

The fifth section authorized the President to appoint, for such time as he might deem necessary, 1 major-general, 1 brigadier-general, 1 quartermaster, and 1 chaplain.

The major-general was authorized to choose his aid-de-camp and the brigadier-general his brigade-major (adjutant-general) from the captains or subalterns of the line.

The monthly pay and allowances of the Army in these early days of the Republic were as follows:

The seventh section authorized the President, in his discretion, to engage a body of militia to serve as cavalry, they furnishing their own horses, arms, and provisions. The pay and allowance of these troops were to be at the discretion of the President, which left the door open for extravagant expenditure.

The eighth and ninth sections were as follows:

SEC. 8. That if the President should be of opinion that it will be conducive to the public service to employ troops enlisted under the denomination of levies, in addition to, or in place of, the militia which, in virtue of the powers vested in him by law, he is authorized to call into the service of the United States, it shall be lawful for him to raise, for a term not exceeding six months (to be discharged sooner if the public service will permit), a corps not exceeding two thousand noncommissioned officers, privates, and musicians, with a suitable number of commissioned officers. And in case it shall appear probable to the President that the regiment directed to be raised by the aforesaid act, and by this act, will not be completed in time to prosecute such military operations as exigencies may require, it shall be lawful for the President to make a substitute for the deficiency by raising such farther number of levies or by calling into the service of the United States such a body of militia as shall be equal thereto.