MUTINY OF RECRUITS. Although the war was over, the members of the Continental Congress were destined to personally experience some of the dangers connected with the employment of raw troops. In June, some 80 recruits mutinied at Lancaster, and fancying themselves aggrieved, marched to Philadelphia, where they were joined by about 200 comrades from the barracks. Proceeding with music and fixed bayonets to the statehouse, where Congress and the executive council of Pennsylvania were in session, they placed sentinels at every door to prevent egress, and then served upon both bodies a written demand for the redress of their grievances, threatening military violence in case their wrongs were not righted in the brief space of twenty minutes. For several hours Congress and the executive council found themselves at the mercy of an armed and undisciplined soldiery. In this extremity, fearing that the State of Pennsylvania could not furnish adequate protection, Congress called for regular troops, and, abandoning the capital, adjourned to meet at Princeton. On the receipt of a despatch from the President of Congress, Washington sent General Howe with 1,500 Continentals to the scene of disturbance, but before the troops could arrive the mutiny was happily quelled without bloodshed. Several of the mutineers were tried by court-martial, four received corporal punishment, and two were even sentenced to death, though pardoned later. The views which Washington entertained of this mutiny and his reflections on the character of raw and of veteran troops are given in his reply of June 24 to the President of Congress: While I suffer the most poignant distress, in observing that a handful of men, contemptible in numbers, and equally so in point of service (if the veteran troops from the southward have not been reduced by their example), and who are not worthy to be called soldiers, should disgrace themselves and their country as the Pennsylvania mutineers have done, by insulting the sovereign authority of the United States and that of their own, I feel an inexpressible satisfaction that even this behavior cannot stain the name of the American soldiery. It can not be imputable to or reflect dishonor upon the army at large; but on the contrary, it will, by the striking contrast it exhibits, hold up to public view the other troops in the most advantageous point of light. Upon taking all the circumstances into consideration, I can not sufficiently express my surprise and indignation at the arrogance, the folly, and the wickedness of the mutineers; nor can I sufficiently admire the fidelity, the bravery, and the patriotism which must forever signalize the unsullied character of the other corps of our army. For, when we consider that these Pennsylvania levies, who have now mutinied, are recruits and soldiers of a day, who have not borne the heat and burden of the war, and who can have in reality very few hardships to complain of; and when we at the same time recollect that those soldiers who have lately been furloughed from this army are the veterans who have patiently endured hunger, nakedness, and cold; who have suffered and bled without a murmur, and who with perfect good order have retired to their homes without a settlement of their accounts, or a farthing of money in their pockets, we shall be as much astonished at the vir tues of the latter as we are struck with horror and detestation at the proceedings of the former; and every candid mind, without indulging ill-grounded prejudices, will undoubtedly make the proper discrimination, a DISBANDMENT OF THE ARMY. On the 2d of November, at Princeton, Washington issued his farewell address, and on the following day the army was disbanded, with a Sparks's Writings of Washington, vol. 8, pp. 455, 456. the exception of one regiment of infantry and two battalions of artillery, retained under the command of General Knox, for the defense of the Highlands. On the 17th of November the British evacuated New York, and on the 22d of December, at Annapolis, Washington resigned his commission to Congress. PENSIONS. From the ill-judged economy which contributed so largely during the whole war to deprive our commanders of adequate armies, we may turn with pleasure to the generosity which our Government has ever displayed toward those who have risked their lives in the national defense. The liberality of the Government in the matter of pensions has not been confined to the brave men who have been maimed in battle, or whose health has been ruined by disease, it has been justly extended to the widows and orphans of soldiers who, from whatever cause, have perished that their country might live. In proportion, too, as wars have receded, public opinion has justified Congress in the extension of pensions, until thousands of men have been added to the rolls who never saw an enemy, and whose terms of service may not have exceeded two weeks. So just, however, is the principle of pensions, and so strong in the popular mind is the determination to reward the citizen soldier, that since the early days of the Republic, but one Senator or Representative in Congress has ventured to make the slightest opposition to this important and most commendable feature of our military policy. The statesman therefore who would relieve us from the burdens of taxation, as well as the philanthropist who would save the health, the lives, and the limbs of our people, must turn from the list of deserving pensioners to the cause, and seek by judicious and humane legislation to set on foot a military system which by lessening the demand for men, will, with equal_certainty, economize both life and treasure. The statistics of the Revolution already quoted, show that our extravagance_called out from first to last more than 395,000 men, all of whom, under our pension system, had a claim upon the gratitude of the nation. The greatest number of troops that Congress was able to raise during any one year of the war (1776) was 89,600 men, of whom 42,700 were militia. The largest force, Continental and militia, that Washington could lead to battle at any one time was less than seventeen thousand, while at the battles of Trenton and Princeton, during the time of our greatest peril, his effective strength was less than four thousand. If we now turn from the reports of the small armies in the field to the report of the Commissioner of Pensions it will be found that a feeble military policy gave us an army of pensioners numbering 95,753, of whom 39,287 were widows. Unlike the dissolving armies in the field, the pension rolls for 1875 show that ninety-two years after the close of the war the army of the Revolutionary pensioners was still represented by 379 widows. The last Revolutionary soldier expired in 1869, eighty-six years after the close of the struggle. The total amount paid to Revolutionary pensioners up to June 30, 1876, for periods of service of six months and over was $46,177,845.44. To widows of soldiers who served six months the total amount paid to June 30, 1876, was $19,668,795.70. 34760°-16-5 a If to these figures be added $15,000,000, the approximate amount paid to invalids disabled in the Revolution, the total of pensions in round numbers amounts to $80,000,000, a sum equal to five-twelfths of the two hundred million of irredeemable currency issued by Congress, and equal to nearly one-half the debts recognized by Congress and the States at the close of the war. EXPENSE OF THE WAR. Exclusive of bounties paid by individuals, towns, and counties, and of provisions seized by impressment for the use of the Army, the debt of Congress and of the States, at the close of the war, amounted to $170,000,000. If to this sum be added the two hundred millions of currency, for the redemption of which the faith of the Continental Congress and the Confederation was twice solemnly pledged, the debt actually incurred by the war amounted to $370,000,000. Small as this sum may appear when compared with the Rebellion war debt of three thousand millions, investigation will show that the indebtedness of the Revolution was greater in proportion to population. Assuming three millions as the total number of our people at the beginning of the Revolution, the whole cost of this war to each man, woman, and child, was $123, while, upon the basis of a population of 31,000,000 in 1861, the total cost per capita of the War of the Rebellion was but $96. Both of these wars were waged upon the same extravagant system, and so long as we blindly adhere to it similar pecuniary sacrifices are sure to follow in the train of every great military contest of the future. LESSONS OF THE REVOLUTION. The lessons to be drawn from the Revolution are: First. That nearly all of the dangers which threatened the cause of independence may be traced to the total inexperience of our statesmen in regard to military affairs, which led to vital mistakes in army legislation. Second. That for waging either an offensive or a defensive war a confederation is the weakest of all forms of government. Third. That in proportion as the general government gives the States authority to arm and equip troops, it lessens the military strength of the whole people and correspondingly increases the national expenditures. a The foregoing figures were furnished by Mr. T. A. Bentley, Commissioner of Pensions. The war of the Revolution left unpaid a national debt of near $360,000,000; whereas not long after the war of 1812, a debt of $123,000,000 was paid. (Ingersoll's Second War, vol. 1, p. 14). The same writer, page 58, in speaking of the payment of the war debt of 1812, states, "Within twenty-three years afterwards, the whole debt of the United States was extinguished, with partial atonement of the nonpayment of that of the Revolution, by an expensive pension system, somewhat requiting the soldiers of the Revolution, defrauded of their pay by Continental or paper money and national insolvency." On the same bases of population, the annual expense per capita of the Revolutionary war was $17, and that of the rebellion $24, this larger sum being due to the shorter duration of the contest. Fourth. That the war resources of a nation can only be called forth and energetically directed by one general government to which the people owe a paramount allegiance. Fifth. Admitting the poverty of the colonies, their want of credit, their inability to provide proper clothing, food, arms, ammunition, and other supplies for the Army; also the possibilities of a confederation which might deprive Congress of the power to enforce its requisitions-all of these considerations, instead of being accepted as reasons for adopting a feeble military policy, called for wise legislation looking to a vigorous prosecution of the war with the least expense in men and money. Sixth. No matter what reasons may be given for the adoption of an unwise military policy, that these are powerless to diminish or modify the disastrous effects which inevitably follow. Seventh. That when a nation attempts to combat disciplined troops with raw levies, it must maintain an army of at least twice the size of that of the enemy, and even then have no guarantee of success. Eighth. That neither voluntary enlistments based on patriotism, nor the bounty, can be relied upon to supply men for the army during a prolonged war. Ninth. That the draft, connected or not connected with voluntary enlistments and bounties, is the only sure reliance of a government in time of war. Tenth. That short enlistments are destructive to discipline, constantly expose an army to disaster, and inevitably prolong war with all its attendant dangers and expenses. Eleventh. That short enlistments at the beginning of a war tend to disgust men with the service, and force the government to resort either to bounties or the draft. Twelfth. That regular troops, engaged for the war, are the only safe reliance of a government, and are in every point of view the best and most economical. Thirteenth. That when a nation at war relies upon a system of regulars and volunteers, or regulars and militia, the men, in the absence of compulsion, or very strong inducements, will invariably enlist in the organizations most lax in discipline. Fourteenth. That troops become reliable only in proportion as they are disciplined; that discipline is the fruit of long training, and cannot be attained without the existence of a good corps of officers. Fifteenth. That the insufficiency of numbers to counterbalance a lack of discipline should convince us that our true policy, both in peace and war, as Washington puts it, "Ought to be to have a good army rather than a large one.' CHAPTER VIII. THE MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM THE Washington's solicitude in regard to our military policy did not end with the Revolutionary struggle. In taking leave of the governors of the States before resigning his commission, he wrote with a wisdom no less becoming the soldier than the statesman: There are four things, which I humbly conceive, are essential to the well-being, I may even venture to say, to the existence of the United States, as an independent power. First. An indissoluble union of the States under one federal head; Third. The adoption of a proper peace establishment; and, Fourth. The prevalence of that pacific and friendly disposition among the people of the United States, which will induce them to forget their local prejudices and policies; to make those mutual concessions which are requisite to the general prosperity; and in some instances, to sacrifice their individual advantages to the interest of the community. In amplification of his views as to a proper peace establishment, he continues: It is necessary to say but a few words on the third topic which was proposed, and which regards particularly the defense of the Republic; as there can be little doubt that Congress will recommend a proper peace establishment for the United States, in which a due attention will be paid to the importance of placing the militia of the Union upon a regular and respectable footing. If this should be the case, I would beg leave to urge the great advantage of it in the strongest terms. The militia of this country must be considered as the palladium of our security, and the first effectual resort in case of hostility. It is essential, therefore that the same system should pervade the whole; that the formation and discipline of the militia of the continent should be absolutely uniform, and that the same species of arms, accouterments, and military apparatus, should be introduced in every part of the United States. No one, who has not learned it from experience, can conceive the difficulty, expense, and confusion, which result from a contrary system, or the vague arrangements which have hitherto prevailed. * * * Despite this advice, the moment independence was established, all the States hastened to resume nearly every attribute of sovereignty. So unmindful were they of the common welfare, that every measure looking to the discharge of the national debt was resisted, and remonstrance was necessary to induce them to send enough delegates to Congress to constitute a quorum for business. The finances of the nation being completely exhausted, Congress on the 2d of June, 1784, resolved That the commanding officer be, and he is hereby, directed to discharge the troops now in the service of the United States, except twenty-five privates to guard the stores |