In response to this call his force for the brief space of one month increased to 4,500 men. Smyth's first effort to invade Canada was made on the 28th of November. His advanced guard, under cover of night, crossed the river and returned after spiking several of the enemy's batteries. At daylight the main body began to embark, but late in the afternoon the expedition was postponed and the men ordered back to land. On the 1st of December the attempt was renewed with a similar ending. After advancing nearly a quarter of a mile from the shore, the front line of boats was recalled and the announcement made that the expedition was given up. Although the officers of the volunteers and militia had advised in council of war against invasion, the behavior of their men on receiving this information is thus described by Thompson: The scene of discontent which followed was without a parallel. Four thousand men without order or restraint indignantly discharged their muskets in every direction. The person of the commanding general was threatened. Upward of 1,000 men of all classes of society had suddenly left their homes and families, and had made great sacrifices to obey the call of their country under General Smyth's invitation. He possessed their strongest confidence and was gaining their warmest affections. He could lead to no post of danger to which they would not follow. But now the hopes of his Government, the expectations of the people, the desires of the Army, were all frustrated, and he was obliged to hear the bitter reproaches and the indignant epithets of the men whom he had promised to lead to honor, to glory, to renown. The inhabitants refused to give him quarters in their houses, or to protect him from the rage of those who considered themselves the victims of his imbecility or his deceit. He was obliged constantly to shift his tent to avoid the general clamor, and to double the guard surrounding it, and he was several times fired at when he ventured without it. a The general sincerity of this outburst is somewhat impeached by the following passage in Smyth's official report: There were some groups of men not yet embarked; they were applied to, requested, and ordered by the brigade-major to get into the boats; they did not. He estimated their number at 150; it was probably greater. Thus another effort to lean on the "broken reed," as the militia were styled by Washington himself, had come to naught, and the troops under Smyth's command had failed "to conquer or to die" in the language of his high-flown proclamation. Unable to withstand the odium he had called upon himself, the commanding general "was hissed and hunted from one hiding place to another, and at length compelled to fly for safety to his own home in Virginia." When their anger had cooled, the militia made their way home as best they might, while the regulars, like the Continentals of the Revolution, retired to their winter quarters. THE NORTHERN ARMY. The forces assembled in the neighborhood of Lake Champlain, under General Dearborn, were intended to invade Canada by way of Montreal. Without, however, performing any exploit which history has recorded, save a reconnaissance across the line to the La Colle River and the capture of a blockhouse, the troops, 5,737 strong, fell back and went into winter quarters. a Thompson's Late War, p. 87. Fay's American War, p. 64. c Armstrong's Notices of the War of 1812, vol. 1, p. 113. The construction which the militia troops put on the powers of Congress to call them out, under the Constitution, to "repel invasions," was again illustrated on this occasion. Of the 3,000 militia who marched with Dearborn for Canada, nearly all refused to cross the line, including a company who advanced with Pike, but halted at the very border, a TROOPS EMPLOYED IN 1812. The militia called into service during the year 1812 numbered 49,187, of whom 208 were from Massachusetts and none from Connecticut. Adding 15,000 regulars (the number of volunteers not being stated) we find that the total strength of the troops who drew Government pay during the year 1812 was not less than 65,000 men. The British estimated their regular force at 1,450, but General Brown, afterwards Commander in Chief, computed the whole number of British regulars in the province of Upper Canada, during the year, at less than 1,200 men, still further qualified by the remark that— at no time did the command of this distinguished chief (General Brock) consist of less than one-third of old men and boys, fit only for garrison duty, e COMMENTS ON THE RESULTS OF THE CAMPAIGN. The failures and disasters of the campaign can be plainly traced to the pernicious military organization established by the act of 1792. It will be remembered that instead of relying upon a small but welldisciplined regular establishment, this law intrusted the safety and honor of the nation to armies of militia supported by the several States during the long intervals of peace. These armies, though elaborately organized on paper, into battalions, brigades, and divisions, were only to receive such drill and instruction as the various States might think proper. Though an alarming defect became apparent at the very outset of the war, when the unlooked-for opposition of two State governors deprived the President of the control of a portion of the militia, it remained for the fruitless campaigns at the West and the cruel and disheartening experiences at Queenstown to fully reveal the utter worthlessness of the new system. Led to a certain extent by those who had gained actual military experience during the Revolution or on the Indian frontier, endowed with perhaps more average intelligence and education than the regulars; supplied with the same food, clothing, and equipments as they were, the marked inferiority of the militia troops was largely due to the brief period of their service, to the conviction that their time would soon be "out," and that others must take their places and bear the burdens and dangers of the contest. While their pay was no greater than that of other troops, when we deduct the time lost in coming and going, as well as that consumed in a Ingersoll's Second War, vol. 1, p. 101. The above figures were furnished by the Adjutant-General of the Army. The return from the Army in February, 1813, shows 19,036. d James's Military Occurrences between Great Britain and the United States, vol. 1, p. 56. Armstrong's Notices of the War of 1812, vol. 1, p. 224. Extract from letter from General Brown, dated July 20, 1813. partial and unavailing instruction, their real cost to the country was infinitely greater. OPERATIONS OF THE NAVY. The first naval exploit of the war took place on the 13th of August, when Captain Porter with the Essex frigate captured the English sloop of war Alert in the brief space of eight minutes; on the 19th of August, after an engagement of thirty minutes, the English_frigate Guerriere, 38 guns, was taken by the Constitution, Captain Hull; on the 17th of October the American sloop of war Wasp, Captain Jones, captured the brig Frolic, 22 guns, after a contest of forty-three minutes, but the same day, with its prize, was compelled to surrender to the enemy's seventy-four gun ship Poictiers; on the 25th of October the frigate United States, Commodore Decatur, captured the English frigate Macedonian, 49 guns. The destruction of the Java, 38 guns, by the Constitution, Commodore Bainbridge, on the 29th of December, closed the brilliant record of our Navy for the year. It has been fortunate for the fame of our country, no less than for its finances, that Congress has never been tempted to delegate to the States any portion of its constitutional power to provide and maintain a navy. As a consequence, in this branch of the national defense the honor of our flag and the protection of the persons and property of our citizens have been intrusted to disciplined seamen, commanded by officers of professional training and experience. To that skill, discipline, and valor, which are essential elements of a regular service, must be ascribed this series of brilliant victories on the sea which electrified the nation and made it justly proud of its Navy. Far from appreciating the excellent footing upon which Congress had placed our Regular Navy, and ignorant of the character and discipline of its officers and men, the Cabinet was completely overawed by the supposed naval supremacy of Great Britain, and adopted the timid policy of passive resistance as the only means of preventing the destruction or capture of our national ships. So suicidal a resolution can only be explained by the disposition only too prevalent among many of our public men to ignore in the management of military and naval affairs the opinions and advice of professional experts. The urgent verbal and written remonstrances of Captains Bainbridge and Stewart alone induced the President to overrule the twicematured resolution of his Cabinet, to dismantle our men-of-war and convert them into floating batteries for mere harbor defense. The change of policy brought about by these brave officers amply indemnified the Government for every dollar expended on the Navy since its foundation, and largely atoned for the universal discomfiture of our land forces. In speaking of the deplorable results that might have otherwise ensued, Ingersoll states: Importunity overcame Cabinet deliberation which might have brought the war to an end, with nothing but defeats by land, without one redeeming triumph on the water. If so, the Administration must have been borne down by overpowering opposition and its own incapacity, the war spirit discouraged, the war party overthrown, Congress either not called together at all till December, instead of being convoked in extraordinary session in May, 1813, and in December not to vote taxes for vigorous prosecution of hostilities. but to ratify dishonorable peace, a a Ingersoll's Second War, vol. 1, p. 382. CHAPTER X CAMPAIGN OF 1818. MILITARY LEGISLATION. The accumulated disasters of the late campaign reacted upon Congress, and we find "that in order to complete the present military establishment to the full number authorized by law, with the greatest possible despatch," the law of January 20, 1813, granted $24 of advanced pay to every soldier who, after the 1st of February, should enlist for five years or during the war. This advance was exclusive of $16 bounty and three months' pay and 160 acres of land which the soldier would receive upon his discharge. Even with this inducement, the aggregate of the Army in February only reached 19,036. The sixth section of the law prescribed that it should "be lawful for any person, during the time he may be performing a tour of militia duty, to enlist in the Regular Army of the United States." This provision relieved the General Government in a measure from the embarrassments incident to the law of 1792, which made every citizen, not specially excepted, a member of the militia. It being by no means certain that the offers already made would attract men to the ranks, Congress recurred to the principle of short enlistments and authorized the President, on the 29th of January, to increase the regular infantry by twenty regiments, to be enlisted for one year. Exclusive of the staff, the Army in March, 1813, now consisted of— 44 regiments of infantry. 4 regiments of artillery. 2 regiments of dragoons. 1 regiment of rifles, and the Corps of Engineers. In the aggregate 57, 351 men. As was the case during the Revolution, Congress, however, had again to learn the vital distinction between "voting battalions and raising men." Further legislation during the year looked chiefly to the enlargement of the staff. This was accomplished in the lower grades by details of line officers, but the saving thus effected in the item of staff officers' pay was more than offset by the dangers of defeat, many companies and battalions being left without a proper complement of officers to lead them into battle. In view of the fruitless employment of so many militia troops at the West during the previous year, the Government decided to limit the Army under General Harrison to 7,000 men." This step was the outcome of an attempt to wage the war with regu lar rather than with raw troops, a change of policy forced upon the a Armstrong's Notices of the War of 1812, vol. 1, p. 176. Administration no less by the ridicule of the opposition than by the force of public opinion, which demanded a vigorous prosecution of hostilities. General Harrison's views as to this change of policy are expressed in a letter to the Secretary of War, dated March 17, 1813: The force contemplated in your letter is, in my opinion, not sufficient to secure success. Admitting that the whole should be raised by the time pointed out, they would be very little superior to militia, the officers having, with scarcely an exception, to learn their duty before they could instruct their men. We have, therefore, no alternative but to make up by numbers the deficiency in discipline. I am well aware of the intolerable expense which attends the employment of a large militia force. We are now, however, in a situation to avoid those errors which made that of the last campaign so peculiarly heavy. Our supplies are procured, and so deposited, that the period for the march of the army from the advanced posts can be ascertained to an hour, and of course the troops need not be called out until the moment they are to act. Experience has convinced me that militia are more efficient in the early than in the latter part of their service. * * * With regard to the quantum of force, my opinion is, that not only the regular troops designated in your letter, but a large auxiliary corps of militia should be employed. The only objection arises from the expensiveness of troops of that description. This, however, could not be an object, considering the very short time that it would be necessary to employ them. Let the moment for the commencement of the march from the Rapids be fixed, and the militia might be taken to that point, proceed and accomplish the object, and return home in two months. Amongst the reasons which makes it necessary to employ a large force, I am sorry to mention the dismay and disinclination to the service which appears to prevail in the western country; numbers must give that confidence which ought to be produced by conscious valor and intrepidity, which never existed in any army in a superior degree than amongst the greater part of the militia which were with me through the winter. The new drafts from this State are entirely of another character, and are not to be depended on. I have no doubt, however, but a sufficient number of good men can be procured, and should they be allowed to serve on horseback, Kentucky would furnish some regiments that would be not inferior to those that fought at the river Raisin; and they were, in my opinion, superior to any militia that ever took the field in modern times. a While Washington persistently opposed a dependence on raw troops as being a policy fraught with the utmost danger to our liberties, it will be perceived that General Harrison sought by "numbers" alone to replace that "confidence which ought to be produced by conscious valor and intrepidity." The exhaustion of the Treasury involved in so reckless a program, elicited the following reply from the Secretary of War, dated April 4: It now remains only to signify to you, clearly and distinctly, the kind of force the Government mean hereafter to employ in offensive operations, if it can be obtained. When the Legislature at their last session adopted the measure of augmenting the Army to fifty-two regiments of the line it was expressly in the view of superseding hereafter the necessity of employing militia, excepting in moments of actual invasion. In obedience to this policy the President assigned to the eighth military district of the United States four of these regiments, which, if filled, and superadded to the two regiments of the line now in that district, and the twenty-fourth in march for it, will give a total of seven regiments, or seven thousand men. This number forbids the belief that any employment of militia drafts will be necessary, when it shall have been collected. The difficulty, however, of recruiting the Army by volunteer enlistments compelled him to add: Till, however, this be done, or at least till time be given for the experiment, so many militia only are to be called out as shall be necessary for the defense of your posts a American State Papers, vol. 1, p. 452. |