under the common law, both mill owners must be in a position to use the aquatic power naturally, it would be inconsistant with every legal principle that a right under the common law alone and for the natural use of flowing water, should rest upon conventional stipulations made by the parties with reference to artificial means of supply; these conventional and artificial means must be altogether put aside and the locations to be effected under the common law, must be left in the natural position of each in relation to the water power or stream.

But the parties in this case are not in the position of such joint proprietors or users of running water, the stream does not naturally flow through the superior to the inferior land or property, nor does it flow in any naturally useful manner where it can be applied naturally to the inferior location; its useful portion passes along the riparian property of the superior lot, and all the water, whether taken from the new dam or passing along the sides of the river, is discharged into the stream before it reaches the Flour-Mill where it cannot by any posibility be made a motive power at all except by steam, or other artificial means.

This is not a question of first occupancy or prescriptive right whereby a property in the course of a river is acquired, but it is in fact the question of the superior right of the defendants under their superior location, and here again there appears no color to charge them in the exercise of their use of the water with having illegally diverted the natural course of the stream, as regards the location of the Flour-Mill, or of having unnecessarily wasted the water or wantonly detained it longer than was reasonable or necessary for their own machinery and water works. Although some conflict may be produced in the use and enjoyment of undivided rights under the common law in the natural water, it cannot by the judgment of law, be considered an infringment of the right. If it become less useful to one, in consequence of the employment of another, it is by accident

and because it is dependant on the exercise of the equal rights of others; if therefore the use of the right be reasonable, no action can lie. This is the decision of English Jurisprudence; the French Jurisprudence is not unlike it: "Il résulte des principes du Droit Romain admis dans nos "coutumes que le propriétaire ne peut être attaqué s'il ne "fait que retenir les eaux pour les besoins de son industrie en profitant à cet égard de sa position sans en abuser à "l'exercice et usage."

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"L'exercice d'une faculté légale ne peut être prise pour un trouble," so says Daviel, so that by the common law also, the plaintiffs' pretensions are ill-founded and cannot be maintained.

Judgment. The Court, &c.-Considering that in the Judgment complained of there is no error, doth maintain and affirm the said judgment, with costs, &c.

STUART, Q. C., for plaintiffs.
VANNOVOUS, for defendants.

BANC DE LA REINE,

DISTRICT DE QUÉBEC.

EN APPEL.

Présents:-DUVAL, Juge-en-Chef, AYLWIN, MEREDITH, DRUMMOND et MONDELET, Juges.

Les procédures en Cour Inférieure avait été interrompues par le mariage de Sarah Côté, la demanderesse, avec

F. X. Masse, l'intimé, et il était en conséquence nécessaire que le dit F. X. Masse reprit l'instance conjointement avec la demanderesse. Les intimés firent émaner un bref de sommation "pour voir dire le dit défendeur, que l'instance ci-devant pendante devant la Cour sera et demeurera reprise entre lui et les demandeurs en reprise d'instance." Le défendeur en Cour Inférieure répondit à cette action par une défense au fonds en fait. Le 25 février, 1865, un jugement accordant aux demandeurs les conclusions de leur demande fut rendu.

C'est de ce jugement qu'il y avait appel.

L'appelant prétendit qu'une action étant l'exercice d'un droit en justice, il n'était pas nécessaire d'intenter une poursuite contre lui pour permettre aux demandeurs de reprendre l'instance suspendue par le changement de qualité de l'un d'eux, mais que cela aurait dû être fait comme il est d'usage, par motion ou par requête; une procédure aussi nouvelle et si peu raisonnable ne devait pas être permise par cette Cour.

L'intimé demanda lui-même la révision du jugement.

La Cour: Considérant que les intimés n'ont fait aucune preuve quelconque des allégations de la déclaration produite en cette cause:

Considérant de plus que le writ de sommation émané en cette cause à la poursuite des intimés et l'action en reprise d'instance par eux portée contre l'appelant, sont des procédures illégales, irrégulières, et opposées à la pratique des cours de justice dans le Bas-Canada, cette Cour annulle et met de côté toutes les procédures adoptées depuis l'enfilure de l'exception péremptoire produite en cette cause.

FOURNIER et GLEASON, pour l'appelant.

Judgment rendered the 8th of March, 1866.

The action was instituted for the recovery of $254, due on the defendant's promissory note in favor of the plaintiffs, alleged to have been given them for value received; which words "for value received," appeared on the face of the said note. This note was signed by the defendant, with his own signature alone. To this action, the defendant pleaded by perpetual exception, the following facts: That he, the defendant, had been acting as the agent of another firm at the time of the making and signing of the promissory note declared upon; that he had purchased timber from the plaintiffs in his said capacity of agent, and this to the knowledge of the plaintiffs; that in his said capacity of agent, he had signed the note in question, in payment of the timber so purchased from the plaintiffs, but that he had personally never received any consideration or value for the said note, except in his quality of agent.

The plaintiffs at the enquête objected to the defendant being allowed to go to proof on his plea, inasmuch as the plea had been filed without the affidavit required by the 86 sec. of the 83 cap. of the Con. Stat., L. C., in which it was enacted : "That if in any such action, any defendant "denies his signature or any other signature, &c., to or

upon such bill, note, &c., or the genuineness of such "instrument or of any part thereof, such instrument and

"signature shall nevertheless be presumed to be genuine, "&c., unless with such plea there be filed an affidavit, that "such instrument or some material part thereof, are not ge nuine, &c., and in what the alleged irregularity consists.”

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The Court held that the production of this affidavit was necessary.

The defendant thereupon moved to amend his plea by filing the requisite affidavit. No cause having been shewn against this motion, it was granted by the Court, on the payment to the plaintiffs' attorney of a fee of fourteen dollars.

GOWEN and LLOYD, for plaintiffs.

HEARN, JORDAN and ROCHE, for defendant.

The action was instituted in the Superior Court, at Quebec, and the defendant (appellant) was represented by Mr. C. T. Suzor as his attorney ad litem. Judgment was rendered against the defendant in the Superior Court, and from that judgment the defendant instituted an appeal, being still represented by Mr. Suzor, the attorney who had represented him in the Lower Court. The record upon