to her, and France would in the end be considered as a natural enemy. I am persuaded, she has wisdom enough to see it in its true light. No. 11.-1782, January 8: Extract from Report of a Committee of Congress, consisting of Mr. Lovell, Mr. Carroll, and Mr. Madison, to which had been referred certain papers relative to the fisheries and Proceedings in Congress in regard thereto on 22nd January and 20th August, 1782. Another claim is the common right of the United States to take fish in the North American seas, and particularly on the banks of Newfoundland. With respect to this object, the said ministers are instructed to consider and contend for it, as described in the instruc tions relative to a treaty of commerce, given to John Adams on 29 the twenty-ninth of September, 1779, as equally desired and ex pected by Congress with any of the other claims not made. ultimata in the instructions given to the ministers plenipotentiary for negotiating a peace on the day of last, and are therein referred to as objects of the desires and expectations of Congress. They are also instructed to observe to his most christian majesty with respect to this claim, that it does not extend to any parts of the sea lying within three leagues of the shores held by Great Britain or any other nation. That under this limitation it is conceived by Congress, a common right of taking fish cannot be denied to them without a manifest violation of the freedom of the seas, as established by the law of nations, and the dictates of reason; according to both which the use of the sea, except such parts thereof as lie in the vicinity of the shore, and are deemed appurtenant thereto, is common to all nations, those only excepted who have either by positive convention, or by long and silent acquiescence under exclusion, renounced that common right; that neither of these exceptions militate against the claim of the United States, since it does not extend to the vicinity of the shore, and since they are so far from having either expressly or tacitly renounced their right, that they were prior to the war, though indeed not in the character of an independent nation, in the constant, and even during the war, in the occasional exercise of it; that although a greater space than three leagues has in some instances been, both by publick treaties and by custom, annexed to the shore as part of the same dominion, yet, as it is the present aim of the maritime powers to circumscribe, as far as reason will justify, all exclusive pretensions to the sea, and as that is the distance specified in a treaty to which both Great Britain and his majesty are parties, and which relates to the very object in question, it was supposed that no other distance could, in the present case, be more properly assumed; that if a greater or an indefinite distance should be alleged to be appurtenant by the law of nations to the shore, it may be answered, that the fisheries in question, even those on the banks of Newfoundland, being of so vast an extent, might with much greater reason be deemed appurtenant to the whole continent of North America than to the inconsiderable portion of it held by Great Britain; that Congress expect, with greater assurance, the concurrence of his majesty in these ideas, since his own claim to the fisheries would, by a contrary doctrine, be suspended on the mere concession of Great Britain, instead of resting on the solid and honourable basis of the law of nations. and of right; that if Great Britain cannot, by virtue of her occupancy of the shore, claim an exclusive use of the fisheries beyond the vicinity thereof, and a right to the common use is incident to the United States as a free and independent community, they cannot admit that they have no such right, without renouncing an attribute of that sovereignty which they are bound, as well by respect for his majesty's honour as for their own interests and dignity, to maintain entire; that this right is no less indispensable in its exercise than it is indisputable in its principles, the inhabitants of a considerable part of the United States being dependent thereon, both for a material proportion of their subsistence, and for the means of their commerce; and as they were in the full enjoyment of this resource prior to the revolution, the loss of it by an event from which very different expectations have been cherished, and which ought to bestow, as far as possible, equal advantages on all who have laboured equally for its accomplishment, could not fail to be attended with disappointment, and mortifying comparisons: that from these considerations, Congress have the most earnest desire, as well as the most sanguine hope, that his majesty's efforts will obtain for his allies a stipulation on the part of Great Britain, not to molest them in the common use of the fisheries, as above stated; or, if insuperable difficulties should oppose a positive stipulation in their favour, that his majesty will in every event find means to avoid a surrender of that common right; that whilst, however, this latter expedient is suggested to his majesty, it cannot escape his discernment that it is so pregnant with dangerous consequences, that the former cannot be contended for with too much urgency and zeal. * * On the 22d of January, 1782, the foregoing report was referred to another committee, consisting of Mr. Carroll, Mr. Randolph and Mr. Montgomery, who on the 16th day of August, 1782, reported, that they have collected facts and observations as follows, which they recommend to be referred to the secretary for foreign affairs, to be by him digested, completed and transmitted to the ministers plenipotentiary for negotiating a peace, for their information and use. * * * * August 20, 1782.-The report being under debate for referring the foregoing facts and observations to the secretary for foreign affairs, to be by him digested, completed and transmitted to the ministers plenipotentiary of the United States for negotiating a treaty of peace A motion was made by Mr. Rutledge, seconded by Mr. Williamson, to postpone the consideration of the report to make way for a motion which he read in his place by way of argument. On the question for postponing, the yeas and nays being required by Mr. Telfair So the question was lost. * A motion was made by Mr. Witherspoon, seconded by Mr. Montgomery, that the report be committed; and on the question for commitment, the yeas and nays being required by Mr. Bland— . . . .o So it was resolved in the affirmative. 30 No. 12.-1782, January 31: Extract from letter, United States OFFICE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEAR SIR: I was this day favored with yours of the 13th ultimo. I need not tell you that the intelligence it conveyed, and the spirit in which it was written, afforded me the most sensible pleasure. The idea it holds forth of an attempt upon Charleston, and the prospect of success in it, is one that we dare not indulge here, more especially as troops have sailed from New York, and, as we presume, to Charleston, but you have taught us rather to measure your success by your genius than by your means. I wish it were in my power to tell you that our accounts from Europe were proportionate to our expectations. The combined fleets, as you know, have returned and separated without having effected anything. The British are again masters of the ocean. Gibraltar is a rock on which all the exertions of Spain seem to split, and the siege of Fort St. Philip seems to be carried on in the most energetic manner. We have no prospect of forming an alliance either with Spain or Holland, who both appear to sigh for peace. Our loan on the guarantee of France with the last is nearly completed. But what is not a little unsatisfactory, it is also nearly expended by advances which France has made us on the credit of it. From Spain we are likely to get nothing. The negociations for a peace are entirely at a stand; the mediating powers have no interest in wishing it, and the belligerent nations are neither of them sufficiently weakened to request their interposition. The Count de Vergennes assures us that Britain will still make the most vigorous exertions. I mention these circumstances not only for your information, but that you may make the proper use of them in animating the exertions of the southern States. It is the misfortune of America to presume too much upon each dawning of success, and to believe that peace must tread upon the heels of every little advantage, instead of being taught by her own struggles and difficulties that every nation has resources that surpass the expectations of its enemies. Would to God that you could be enabled, by the animated exertions of the southern States, to expel the enemy from them without the aid of our allies. This would re-establish our character for activity in Europe. where, I am sorry to say, it has for some time past been upon the decline, and I do sincerely believe that, co-operating with the brilliant successes of the last fall, it would incline the enemy to peace, without which I have no expectations of it. But I fear this is rather to be wished for than expected. . . a A vote was taken. Ayes 10. Noes 0. No. 13.-1782, February 19: Extract from letter, United States Secretary of State (Mr. Livingston) to the Governors of the various States. It is an undeniable fact that Britain has not, in the course of the last campaign, gained any advantage of her enemies, but, on the contrary, has seen their fleets ride triumphant in the seas she proudly called her own, and an army in which she placed her fondest hopes made captive. But, on the other hand, we are compelled to admit that she has met with no such reverse of fortune as materially to debilitate her or weaken her resources for another campaign. Her trade has, for the most part, returned in safety. Her fleets have blocked up those of the Dutch, and, upon the separation of the combined fleets, recovered the superiority in the European seas. The army taken in America is only so far decidedly ruinous to her affairs here as we know how to avail ourselves of the advantage it affords. That her pride is not humbled, that she did not wish for peace prior to this advantage is obvious, 1st, from her refusing to make a separate treaty with the Dutch, who, under the mediation of the Empress of Russia, seemed anxiously to wish it; 2dly, from her neglect to notice the last proposals of the mediating powers, which yet remain unanswered; so that if any alteration is made in their sentiments on this subject they must originate in their ill success in America, for in every other quarter their defensive war seems to have been supported with advantage. How far this will operate admits of a doubt which prudence directs us not to rely upon. Money, the great support of modern wars, has been raised with more facility in England than in any country in the world; and we find the minority last year censuring Lord North for giving the advantage of lending to his friends. Their losses may indeed render subscriptions more expensive to the public, but there is no well-grounded room to suppose they will not fill up, and still less reason to believe, if the means for carrying on the war are attainable, that the vindictive spirit of the king and his ministry and the overweening pride of the nation will soon yield to make a peace which involves their disgrace and humiliation. But as strength or weakness are mere comparative terms, we can form no judgment of the measures of Britain but by attending to the force and disposition of her enemies. 31 The United Provinces are evidently dragged into the war, and have prosecuted it as if they momentarily expected a peace. The colonies in the West Indies have been taken without being in a state to make the smallest resistance, and the active interposition of France alone saved those in the east from sharing the same fate. Our last letters from Holland place the distress of their commerce in a strong point of view. They are unhappily rent by parties which clog the wheels of Government, though it is said the party opposed to England are the most numerous and growing in strength, so that at some future day we may reasonably hope they will assume the entire ascendency; yet we can build very little on this till the close of another year. This much is certain, they are not yet allied to us, nor have they given us reason to believe that they intend to be so. They wish for peace, and will take no measures that can obstruct it. They have lent us no money, nor are they likely to do it; from whence we may presume either that they doubt our success or do not much interest themselves in it. Our expectations from Spain are scarcely more flattering. Some little aids of money have been received after long solicitation; hardly so much as paid the expense of soliciting. We have reason to suppose that no more will be granted. They are still cold with regard to our alliance; nothing but brilliant success can bring it to a conclusion. Nor have we the smallest reason to expect any pecuniary aid from her, even if she should confederate with us in time to be of use for the next campaign. She has at this moment very many and very expensive operations on hand; and, till she has allied herself to us, we have no certainty that she will choose to continue the war for the attainment of our independence, if Britain should be sufficiently humbled to sacrifice to her the objects which led her into the war. To France then we turn as the only enemy of Great Britain, who is at the same time our ally, who will persevere in the war for the attainment of our independence. She has already done so much for us in order to afford us the means of doing something for ourselves that she may reasonably hope to find the effects of her benevolence. Her fleets have protected our coasts, her armies have fought our battles; she has made various efforts to restore our finances by paying the interest of our loans, by obtaining credit in Europe on our account for clothing, arms, and necessaries, by advancing money and by opening and guaranteeing a loan for us to a considerable amount in Holland, when by the abolition of paper our finances were totally deranged. These sums are nearly expended, and another campaign is about to be opened. France assures us that it is not in her power to make us any further grants of money. Her Ministers repeat this to us in every letter in a tone that persuades us of their determination on that point. What, then, is to be done? Are we to relinquish the hopes which the present debility of the enemy affords us of expelling them by one decided effort, and compensating all our losses by the enjoyment of an active commerce? Are we to return to the wretched, oppressive system we have quitted? Are we to carry on a weak and defensive war with an unpaid army, whose precarious subsistence must depend upon what can be torn by violence from the industrious husbandman? Shall we vainly, and I think disgracefully, supplicate all the powers of Europe for those means which we have in our own hands if we dare call them forth, and which after all must be called forth if we continue the war (and upon that subject there can be no doubt till the end for which we took up arms is attained). The only question is whether each State shall fairly and regularly contribute its quota, or whether that which happens to be the seat of war shall (as has too often been the case) bear the whole burden, and suffer more from the necessities of our own troops than the ravages of the enemy. Whether we shall drive the enemy from their posts with a strong body of regular troops or whether we shall permit them to extend their devastations, while with our battalions and fluctuating corps. of militia we protract a weak defensive war till our allies are discouraged and some unfavorable change takes place in the system of Europe. Your excellency, I am persuaded, will pardon the freedom with which I write. You see the necessity which dictates my letter, and |