King of Hanover, 1843-8 the jurisdiction be exercised, so far as the circumstances of the case will allow ? Admitting it to be the general rule, that sovereign princes are not liable to be sued, and that all sovereign princes may consider themselves interested to maintain the inviolability which each one claims, and that any aggression upon it might, in ordinary circumstances, be a cause of war; yet observing what is stated to be the law of nations in the case of ambassadors, conceiving that a rule applicable only to the case of sovereigns who are subjects, and think fit actively to exercise their rights as subjects, cannot have any extensive application, and is not likely to excite any general interest, or any alarm, and having regard to that which is absolutely required to maintain the relation of sovereign and subject in any country, I am of opinion that no complaint can justly or will probably arise, from any legal proceeding, the object of which is to compel, as far as practically may be, a sovereign prince residing in the territory of another prince, whose subject he is, to perform the duties of a subject, in relation to his own acts done in the character of subject only. that in a And it further appears to me, suit in this Court against a sovereign prince, who is also a subject, the bill ought, upon the face of it, to show that the subject-matter of it constitutes a case in which a sovereign prince is liable to be sued as a subject. I cannot, therefore, consider the present suit as an ordinary suit between subject and subject; it is a suit against a defendant who is primâ facie entitled to special immunities, and it ought to appear on the bill, that the case made by it is a case to which the special immunities ought not to be extended. Is What is shown is, that the defendant is an English subject, and may therefore not be exempt from suit in some cases. it shown that this is one of the cases in which the defendant is liable to ba sued ? I The object of the suit is to obtain an account of property belonging to the plaintiff, alleged to have been possessed by the defendant, under colour of an in strument creating a species of guardian ship unknown to the law of England. is not pretended that any one act wa done, or that any one receipt in respect o which the account is asked was made i Every act alleged as And admitting that, in ordinary cases, this country. it may happen, that the execution of a ground of complaint was done abroad, No act alleged as decree cannot be enforced against a sove- Brunswick, in Hanover, or elsewhere reign prince though a subject of this foreign countries. realm, I do not think that, for that ground of complaint, was done by th reason, a plaintiff should be deprived of defendant before he became King all means of establishing his right in a Hanover, and from the nature of the tran due course of procedure; I do not think action, and the recitals in this instrumen that I ought to presume that a sovereign there are strong grounds to presume th prince, who deems it to be consistent with it was only by reason of his being King his dignity and interest to come here and Hanover, that the defendant was appoint practically exercise the rights of an Eng-guardian of the plaintiff's fortune a lish subject, will not also deem it consistent with his dignity and interest to yield willing obedience to the law of England when duly declared. And for these reasons I am of opinion that His Majesty the King of Hanover is and ought to be exempt from all liability of being sued in the courts of this country for any acts done by him as King of Hanover, or in his character of sovereign prince, but that, being a subject of the Queen, he is and ought to be liable to be sued in the Courts of this country, in respect of any acts and transactions done by him, or in which he may have been engaged, as such subject. And in respect of any act done out of this realm, or any act as to which it may be doubtful, whether it ought to be attributed to the character of sovereign or to the character of subject, it appears to me, that it ought to be presumed to be attributable rather to the character of sovereign than to the character of subject. property. It is not pretended that t instrument has been impeached, or tempted to be impeached, in the count where alone it has its locality and ope tion, although it is alleged to be illes there, and no reason is given why plaintiff has not availed himself of t illegality to obtain relief from it. It is alleged to be null and void he and upon this I may observe, that althou with regard to English instrumen intended to operate according to Eng] law, the Court, knowing the nature of instrument, the relation between parties to it, and the law applicable to case, may be able, even on demurrer o simple case, to adjudicate thereon upo mere allegation that the instrumen null and void, yet that, with regard t foreign instrument, intended to ope according to a law not known in Engl and which as foreign law is to be pro as a fact in the cause, an allegation the instrument is void is too vague. passing that over and considering ther matters which I have mentioned, observing, notwithstanding the alle-n at the bar that the instrument plained of is wholly independent of political or state transaction, it is in bill stated as the sequel to a political lution, which resulted in the deposiof a sovereign prince and the appointt of a successor, made under the ority of a decree of the Germanic Diet he late King of Hanover and the reignDuke of Brunswick; considering also the instrument, stated as the sequel these political proceedings (which I st consider to be either wholly immaal, or as introduced into the bill for purpose of showing the character of transaction in question), is stated to e been executed by the late King of nover and the reigning Duke of Brunsk; and considering further, the objects which the instrument is purported to ve been executed, connecting those ects with the political transactions ted in the bill, and the transactions eged to have taken place at Osterode in 30, I should, if it were necessary for me decide the question, be disposed to think at the instrument complained of is concted with political and state transtions, and is itself, what in common rlance is said to be a state document, id evidence of an act of state. But, upon this occasion, it is not necesry for me to give any opinion upon the nestion whether the act complained of , or is not, an act of state, or upon the uestion, which seems to have been raised 1 France, whether the courts of a foreign ountry ought to take notice of such an nstrument, for the purpose of enabling he guardian, under its authority, to ossess the property and effects of the plaintiff in such foreign country; it is not even necessary for me to decide the question whether, as against a subject only, this Court could have any jurisdiction to give relief in respect of acts done abroad, under such a foreign instrument as this. The question which I have had to consider is, whether, under the circumstances of this case, and as against a sovereign prince who is a subject of the Queen, this Court has the jurisdiction which is attributed to it by this bill. And I am of opinion that the alleged acts and transactions of the defendant, under colour or under the authority of the instrument in question, are not acts and transactions in respect of which the defendant is liable to be sued in this Court, or in respect of which this Court IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS. July 25, 27, 31, 1848. Present: Lords COTTENHAM, L.C., LYNDHURST, BROUGHAM, and CAMPBELL. House of Lords the case was heard four The plaintiff having appealed to the years after the judgment of the Court below. Rolt (a) and Heathfield for the appellant : The respondent's defence is put on two grounds. 1st. That as an independent sovereign he is not liable to be sued in the Courts of this country even though a British subject. 2nd. That the matters complained of are matters of state. The transactions referred to in the bill, and admitted by the demurrer, are not matters of state, they do not relate to the appellant's sovereignty or dukedom, but to his private property. The bill states that the instrument purporting to deprive the plaintiff of his property is invalid by the law of Brunswick and Hanover as well as of England; they also must be taken as admitted. Both appellant and respondent are British subjects. If these transactions had taken place between private individuals there could be no doubt of the appellant's right to an account. The defence that these are acts of state has long been exploded. The principle of our Courts is that, whenever a person subject to their jurisdiction, whether sovereign or not, acts without authority, or exceeds, he is liable to account. Nabob of the Carnatic v. East India Co., (b) Mostyn v. Fabrigas, (c) Frewen v. Lewis, (d) A. G. v. Forbes, (e) Ellis v. Lord Grey.(f) The sovereign of this country has no power by law to authorise a person in this country to seize and retain without account the property of another. Do the laws of Brunswick or Hanover confer such authority? The bill charges that they do not, but the demurrer implies that they do. This is res judicata. The defendant before putting in the demurrer adopted the ordinary course of moving to discharge the process as in Viveash v. Becker, (g) Davidson v. Marchioness of Hastings, (h) Kinder v. Forbes, (i) but Lord Lyndhurst refused the application, observing that the defendant was a peer, had taken the oath of allegiance, had a seat in the House of Peers, and was then residing in this country. There is no case showing that a foreign Sovereign may not be sued in our Courts. The Master of the Rolls referred to Bynkershoeck, Tom. 2, De foro Legatorum, cap.2, but not to cap. 4, De principis bona in alterius imperio, where there is a clear opinion applicable to the present question. "In causa civili cum id inter privatos obtineat, ubicunque arresta frequentantur, ego nullus animadverto, cur non idem obtinere oporteat quod ad bona externorum principum. Si ab arresto Principis temperemus ob sanctitatem personæ, quis bona Principis in alieno imperio æque sancta esse dixerit?" (a) Ambassadors are exempt by 7 Anne, c. 12., but redress may be sought from their own sovereign and governments, but here there would be a complete failure of justice. A foreign sovereign may not be liable to arrest, but there is no reason for staying proceedings up to sequestration. A foreign sovereign may sue at law and there is no reason why he should not be sued: Calvin's case, (b) Hullett v. King of Spain, (c) King of Spain v. Hullett, (d) Glyn v. Soares and the Queen of Portugal, (e) Queen of Portugal v. Glyn, (f) Melan v. Duke de Fitzjames, (g) Barclay v. Russell, (h) De la Torre v. Bernales, (i) Moodalay v. The East India Company,(j) Munden v. The Duke of Brunswick.(k) Vattel, B. 4. c. vii. s. 108. Bynkershoeck, Tom. 2. c. 4, all show that if process can be enforced against a foreign sovereign he is liable to the jurisdiction. Turner (1) and Elmsley for the respondent were not called upon. Lord COTTENHAM, L.C.: I find that all the noble and learned Lords, who attend on this argument, are clearly of opinion that the judgment of the Master of the Rolls is right. The whole case must depend on the allegations of the bill, there being no matters out of the bill which can be brought into question, except so far as they are referred to by the bill. After the House has heard the very able arguments that have been adduced in opposition to the judgment of the Master of the Rolls, we are all of opinion that there is no ground for impeaching that judgment. The whole question seems to me to turn upon this (that is to say, for the purpose of this decision, it has not been otherwise contended at the bar, and if it had been, it is quite clear that the contention could not be maintained). that a foreign sovereign, coming into this for an act done in his sovereign character country, cannot be made responsible herd in his own country; whether it be an act right or wrong, whether according to the constitution of that country or not the Courts of this country cannot sit in judgment upon an act of a sovereign effected by virtue of his sovereign authority abroad, an act not done as a British sub ject, but supposed to be done in the exer cise of his authority vested in him a sovereign. That is the sole question; therefore avoid the question which does not neces sarily arise-how far a foreign sovereign coming into this country, is amenable & all. I do not enter upon that question because it does not necessarily arise upo the proper disposal of the matter no before us, as I am of opinion that, upc the face of this bill, the allegations sho that the acts could not have been don and were not done in any private chara ter, but that they were done, wheth right or wrong, in the character of t sovereign of a foreign state. My Lords, that must be found upon t face of the bill; or rather, I should say, t converse ought to be found upon the face the bill; because, before you can raise question how far a foreign sovereign is a swerable for a private transaction in t case of some person complaining of an a done by him as an individual, the Co would require that there should_app clearly upon the face of the bill such a c as gives the Court jurisdiction. The Ma of the Rolls seems to have thought th was a nice balance as to whether allegations amounted to acts done by vir of sovereignty abroad, or whether t were merely to be considered as acts d in a private character. He scems to h held that, whilst there was any ambigu upon that subject, the Court could entertain a bill, which did not distin state a matter bringing it within jurisdiction of the Courts of Equity this country. Certainly, looking at t pleadings, there does not appear to to be any ambiguity at all, but that whole transaction arose from acts don exercise of rights of sovereignty, | Britain and Ireland, and of Hanover, Duke of ed to be vested in those who were ctors. The commencement of the the foundation of the whole transn, in my mind, sufficiently shows ere are, in point of fact, but two ges which seem to me to be necessary - adverted to for the purpose of showthe authority under which the acts plained of are alleged to have taken 5. The bill states : hat pending the aforesaid revolutionary ment, and before the same could be sub- a decree of the Germanic Diet of Conration was made or passed, bearing date 2nd of September, 1830, whereby your or's brother, William, Duke of Brunswick, invited to take upon himself provisionally government of the said Duchy, and the left it to the legitimate agnati of your or to provide for the future government of said Duchy." Brunswick and of Luneburg, and We, William, "moved by the interests of our house, whose Your Lordships will observe that they say the duty had devolved upon them, and they state how it devolved upon them, that right which had originally belonged to the Emperor of Germany, had now devolved to them as the heads of foreign states. As such heads of foreign states, "hat, at least, was an act of sovereign and by virtue of the law and constitution ce; it was by virtue of a decree of the to which they refer, they are authorized to manic Diet. Whether the constitution give directions for the appointment of a Germany authorized it or not, is a ques-heads of sovereign states, who, by the deguardian, not as individuals, but as the n we have no power to interfere with, to inquire into. There is no allegation at, according to the constitution of rmany, it was not a legal act; but ere is upon the face of the bill, that ich is the foundation of all, namely, e decree of the Germanic Diet, deprivthe plaintiff of the sovereignty of the achy, and appointing his brother William take his place, and that the Diet left it the legitimate agnati to provide for the ture government of that Duchy. Then the bill alleges Then comes the instrument under which the defendant, or his predecessor, the Duke of Cambridge, acted. That is stated upon the face of the bill; it is part of the statement, and when you come to consider it, I do not apprehend there can be a doubt upon the face of that instrument-which is the foundation upon which all those transactions have taken place-that it does allege that those acts are acts of persons claiming to have the right so to act by virtue of their sovereign authority. It is stated to have been made between his late Majesty, King William the Fourth, and cree of the Germanic Diet, had previously It is true, the bill states that the instrument was contrary to the laws of Hanover and Brunswick, but, notwithstanding that it is so stated, still if it is a sovereign act, then, whether it be according to law or not according to law, we cannot inquire into it. If it were a private transaction, as in some of the instances referred to in the argument was the case, then the law upon which the rights of individuals may at the beginning, if it be a matter of Sovereign authority, we cannot try the fact whether it be right or wrong. The allegation that it is contrary to the laws of Hanover, taken in conjunction with the allegation of the authority under which the defendant had acted, must be conceded to be an allegation, not that it was contrary to the existing laws as regulating the right of individuals, but that it was contrary to the laws and duties and rights and powers of the sovereign exercising Sovereign authority. If that be so, it does not require another observation, because it has not been doubted, to show that no Court in this country can entertain questions to bring sovereigns to account for their acts done in their sovereign capacities abroad. For these reasons it does appear to me, that as the bill fails in stating facts bringing the case within the cognizance of the Courts of Equity in this country, the demurrer, which assumes all the facts to be correct as stated, was very properly allowed by the Master of the Rolls. I move, therefore, that your Lordships do affirm his judgment. Lord LYNDHURST: I am entirely of the same opinion. None of the acts stated upon the face of this bill was done in this country, nor, as it appears to me, by the defendant in his character of a subject of this country. They were all done abroad; and admitting that circumstances may exist in which a foreign sovereign may be sued in this country for acts done abroadabout which I say nothing, because it is not necessary to decide such a question upon the present occasion-there are no such facts stated upon the face of this bill as to justify us in entertaining a suit of this description. It must be a very particular case indeed, even if any such case could exist, that would justify us in interfering with a foreign sovereign in our Courts. No such case appears to me to be stated on the face of this bill, but as it seems to me, upon the proper construction of this instrument, directly the contrary appears. Without, therefore, further entering into the consideration of this question, I am of opinion that the judgment of the Master of the Rolls must be affirmed. Lord BROUGHAM: I entirely agree with both my noble and learned friends upon this subject. I had no doubt whatever upon it in the course of the argument. The moment you come to look at the facts disclosed in this bill, which the demurrer admits for the argument's sake at least admits and denies the equitable jurisdiction and relief sought; the moment you see those facts, it is clear in every way that it is not a case for the interference of a Court of Equity here. It would have been necessary where two foreign princes come to the Courts of this country respecting a matter transacted abroad, to have disclosed such a case as would have shown clearly that it was upon a private matter, and that they were acting as private individuals, so as to give the Courts in this country jurisdiction. I will not argue the question as to how far one sovereign might sue another in respect of any matter not a matter of state; it is unnecessary, for that is not the case here. If that had been the case, it might have been fit for us to discuss the point. It is not the case, however, and I agree with my noble and learned friend (Lord Lyndhurst), that that not being the case here, there is no occasion to say, one way or the other, how we should deal with such a case if it were to arise. This is quite clear, that, at all events, it ought to have been shown that there were private transactions in order to make it possible that the Court conlo have jurisdiction. But, on the contrary it is clear that these are acts between the parties in their sovereign capacities; they are clearly matters of state upon which the question arises. It is not at al necessary to say that, supposing a foreig Sovereign, being also a naturalised sub ject in this country, had a landed estat in this country, and entered into an transactions respecting it, as a contract o sale or mortgage; it is not necessary t say that a Court of Equity in this cour try might not compel him specifically 1 perform his contract That question do not arise here; there is nothing like it and I do not say that the Courts he would not have jurisdiction in that cas as in cases of all other parties, subject their jurisdiction. But this is a case of foreign sovereign, doing an act assumed be in his capacity of sovereign, he assu ing that he has a right to do that act, whi assumption is denied by the other part Although these are matters of state th are in controversy between the parties, t bill, instead of setting forth-what oug to have been done clearly-that they w private transactions subject to the jur diction of the Courts in this country, s forth the very reverse, and thereby, my opinion, excludes the jurisdiction. I have, therefore, no hesitation wh ever in agreeing with my noble learned friends that the Master of Rolls has come to a perfectly right d sion, ably supported by him in a v elaborate argument, and that his decis ought to be affirmed, with costs. Lord CAMPBELL: I am of the 88 opinion. In the first place, it seems to that there is no ground at all for c tending that this is res judicata. W |