ambiguity. The prohibitory words are general:

mat no one of the persons therein described De capable of contracting matrimony."

d again:

That every marriage or matrimonial conof any such person shall be null and void intents and purposes whatsoever." he statute does not enact an incapacity ontract matrimony within one parar country and district or another, to contract matrimony generally, and the abstract. It is an incapacity, ching itself to the person of A. B., ch he carries with him wherever he s. But, as a marriage once duly conted in any country will be a valid riage all the world over, the incapacity contract a marriage at Rome is as arly within the prohibitory words of statute as the incapacity to contract England. So again, as to the second annulling branch of the enactment,

at every marriage without such consent shall null and void; '

e words employed are general, or more operly, universal; and cannot be satisd in their plain, literal, ordinary meang, unless they are held to extend to all arriages in whatever part of the world ey may have been contracted or celeated.

The words of the second section throw ght upon and confirm the interpretation be given to the first. By the second ection the descendants of the body of Feo. 2, being above the age of 25 years, ho shall persist in their resolution to ontract a marriage disapproved of or Lissented from by the King, upon giving notice to the Privy Council, are enabled, t any time from the expiration of 12 calendar months after such notice, to contract such marriage, and such marriage may be duly solemnised without the previous consent of his Majesty, his heirs or successors; and such marriage is declared to be good, as if that Act had never been made, unless both Houses of Parliament shall, before the expiration of the said 12 months, expressely declare their disapprobation of such intended marriage. The words employed in this section are the same as in the first, "to contract a marriage," and "marriage generally, and without any reference to the country wherein the marriage is contracted or solemnised. But, as no doubt could be entertained by any one but that a marriage, taking place with the due observance of the requisites of the second section.

[trary to all established rules of construction if the very same words in the first section were to receive a different sense from those in the second; if it should be held that a marriage at Rome, contracted with reference to the second section, is made valid, and at the same time a marriage at Rome is not prohibited under the first.

Indeed it is scarcely supposable that the Legislature should have provided the minute and laborious machinery of the second section; that it should have interposed such checks against a marriage without consent, and at the same time have rendered such a marriage ultimately valid in one given state of circumstances, if the party himself who is the subject of such legislation, by an easy journey, or a voyage of a few hours, could render all these provisions useless, and set the statute at defiance by contracting a marriage abroad with whomsoever he thought proper. And it is not unworthy of reof this Act in order to discover its intermark, whilst we are looking to the body pretation, that the very exception from the prohibitory clause of the issues of those princesses who have married or may marry into foreign families affords some proof that marriages abroad could not have been out of the view or contemplation of the Legislature at the time of passing the Act, as such marriages in all probability might not unfrequently be celebrated out of England.

It was contended in the course of the argument at your Lordships' bar, that an Act of the English Legislature can have no binding force beyond or out of the realn of England; and, if by this is meant only that it can have no obligatory force upon the subjects of another state, the position is no doubt correct in its full extent; but it is equally certain that an Act of the Legislature will bind the subjects of this realm, both within the kingdom and without, if such was its intention. Indeed it was admitted by the learned counsel for the claimant, that, if there had been found in this statute the words "marriages within the realm of England, or without," or any other words equipollent thereto, under such an enactment the capacity to contract a marriage at Rome would have been taken away, and the marriage there solemnised would have been made null and void. But if the words actually found in the statute are comprehensive enough to include all marriages, as well those within the realm as without, as we think they are, and if at the same time the restraining the sense of those words to

follow that the construction of the Act must be the same, whether those words are found within the statute or not. Surely, if the marriage of a descendant of George the Second, contracted or celebrated in Scotland or Ireland, or on the Continent, is to be held a marriage not prohibited by this Act, the statute itself may be considered as virtually and substantially a dead letter from the first day it was passed. But the object and purpose for which the Act was passed, and the mischief intended to be prevented thereby, are clear, and leave no doubt as to the proper construction of the Act. It was founded upon the policy and expediency which requires that no marriage of any branch of the Royal Family should be contracted which might be detrimental to the interests of the State, either at home or abroad. The object declared by the preamble is,

"more effectually to guard the descendants of his late Majesty King George the Second, from marrying without the approbation of the reigning Sovereign";

it declares

applicable to those cases alone where they can be applied, namely, to the case of a marriage celebrated in England by licence. For it would be impossible to contend, if the marriage of A.B. had been celebrated at Rome with the previous consent of His Majesty King George the Third, signified under the Great Seal, and declared in Council, that such marriage would not have been good and valid to all intents, and purposes, although the observance of the direction that such consent should be inserted in the licence and register of the marriage had become in that case impracticable.

It was further contended in argument, that inasmuch as by the 3rd section of the Act all persons who wilfully and knowingly presume to solemnize or assist, or be present at the celebration of any marriage or at the making of any matrimonial con tract, without such consent, shall incu the penalties of a pramunire; and as ther is no provision made in this section fo the trial and consequently the punishmen of the offender where the offeuce shall b committed out of England, the necessar inference must be that the statute itsel

"that therefore the kings of this realm have ever been entrusted with the care and approbation thereof."(a)

But this object is frustrated, the mischief is remediless, and the power of the Sovereign nugatory, if the marriage which in England would have been confessedly void is to be held good and valid when celebrated out of the country.

It was argued on the part of the claimant that, as it is directed in the 1st section of the Act that the consent under the Great Seal shall be set out in the licence and register of the marriage, and as this direction can only be applicable to the case of a marriage celebrated in this country, so the prohibition must be construed as confined to a marriage in this country only, and as not extending to a foreign marriage. But to this objection it appears to us to be a sufficient answer, that the only words in that section that are essential to make the marriage a valid marriage, are those which require

"the previous consent of His Majesty, signified under the Great Seal, and declared in Council"; and that the words which follow, directing such consent to be set out in the licence and the register of marriage, are, as the very words import, directory only, not essential, and are

(a) See the Opinions of the Judges, 15 St. Tr. 1295, and 12 Rep. 94.

of England; but we think the inferend that the penal clause is itself defective, not making provision for the trial British subjects when they violate t statute out of the realm, is the more ju should refuse on that account to give and reasonable inference; not that plain words of the statute their necessa force, and hold the enactment itself to therefore think, for the reasons hum substantially useless and inoperative. V eldest son of A. B., under the circu submitted to your Lordships, that t stances stated in your lordship's questi and regard being had to the 12 Geo. 3. c. 11, could not make on good title as heir to A. B., to the la sought to be recovered.

stat

Lord LYNDHURST, L.C., after thank Lordships, proposed to resolve, that the judges, and consulting with th the opinion of the Committee that Claimant has not made out his claim.

Lord BROUGHAM: My Lords, in agre friend, and in expressing my entire to the motion of my noble and lea judges, I do so upon the ground not currence with the opinion of the lea that the object of the Act is clear, that the words of the Act are suffic (for that is necessary also) to accom the manifest purpose of the Act... this, because it is not a sufficient grou hold that the purpose is clear, unles words are sufficient to accomplish purpose, though otherwise the Act n have been rugatory. It was so in

of the General Marriage Act. It was e clear that that Act was intended to vent minors from marrying without sent, unless with the publication of us; and yet, notwithstanding that, by ng to Scotland, a very short journey, parties intended to be affected by the namely, wealthy persons, could easily complish the purpose, and defeat the

t.

My opinion is that, if that Act had ed the same phraseology as this, and d rendered the parties incapable of conacting matrimony, we should never have ard of Compton v. Bearcroft (a) and lerton v. Ilderton.(b) At all events, ere is sufficient in my mind to stamp ith perfect accuracy the opinions devered by the learned judges. Parties re rendered incapable of contracting atrimony, and not merely, as in the case f Lord Hardwicke's Act, the marriage endered null and void. It therefore ollows that a Prince going abroad and contracting matrimony is, for all British purposes, with a view to the Crown and the rights of Peerage, incapable of contracting matrimony, and any marriage So contracted is null and void.

Lord LYNDHURST, L.C.: I do not entertain the slightest doubt of the sufficiency of the evidence to establish the marriage as a marriage in fact.

Lord DENMAN, L.C.J.: After the observations of my noble and learned friends, there does not appear to me to be any sufficient reason for postponing the decision on this claim. I join in the thanks which I think we owe to the learned judges for the very clear and satisfactory document which has been read before your Lordships, and I am happy and very much satisfied in being enabled to say that my opinion entirely agrees with that of your Lordships; I think the operative words of the Royal Marriage Act, taken alone, are perfectly clear to show that this is no marriage by the law of England.

Lord CAMPBELL: My Lords, I agree with my noble and learned friend, the Lord Chancellor, that, as the evidence now stands, there would be a marriage in fact; because the evidence that has been given to us of the Roman law, uncontradicted as it is, would prove that a narriage at Rome of English Protestants, contracted according to the rites of their own church, would be recognised as a marriage by the Roman law, and therefore would be a marriage all over the world. I own that that evidence rather surprised me. I had imagined that it was impossible that there could be a valid marriage at Rome be

D

man, such as the Roman law would recognise. As the evidence stands at your Lordships' bar it would appear, however, that the Roman law would recognise such a marriage without the religious ceremonies required by the Romish Church before the Council of Trent, namely, without the intervention of a priest, and would treat it as a marriage valid by the universal law of the Church before the date of the decree of that Council; and it would appear that the decree of the Council of Trent respecting marriages was not meant to apply to the marriage of Protestants, who could not conform to it. That, my Lords, I think is the universally prevailing opinion. But when we come to the Royal Marriage Act, it seems to me that there is an insuperable bar to the validity of this marriage. The elaborate opinion that has been delivered by the Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas appears to me to have entirely exhausted this part of the subject. It accords with the opinion I had originally formed. I kept my mind, however, entirely open till I had heard the arguments on both sides, and I am now confirmed in my previous opinion by the legal reasoning laid before us in the most admirable opinion we have this day heard delivered by the Lord Chief Justice. entirely concur with that opinion. I have no doubt that it is competent to the British Legislature to pass a law making invalid the marriage of particular British subjects all over the world. I have no doubt that it was the object of that Act of Parliament to invalidate marriages of the descendants of George the Second (with the exception of Princesses married into foreign royal families) without the consent of the Crown, wherever these marriages might be celebrated; and I am clearly of opinion that the intention is sufficiently testified by the language which has been employed.

66

I

Lord LYNDHURST, L. Č.: My Lords, I wish to explain, that by a 'marriage in fact,' I mean that I think the evidence is sufficient to show that these parties were married at Rome by a clergyman of the Church of England, in conformity with the rites and ceremonies of the English Church. With regard to the evidence, as referred to by my noble and learned friend Lord Campbell, that evidence is sufficient, as it at present stands, to show that this marriage would be a valid marriage of Protestants at Rome, according to the law of Rome; whether such a marriage would be a valid marriage in this country, for any purpose independently of the Royal

Lord COTTENHAM: My Lords, after the discussion which has taken place, I think it right to say that my opinion is formed entirely and exclusively upon the Royal Marriage Act. It is only that part of the case which has been concluded, and that is the only part upon which we can properly express an opinion. I entirely agree in the opinion which has been expressed by the learned judges, inasmuch as by the construction of the Royal Marriage Act, whether the marriage would be valid by the law of Rome or not, it would not be valid by the law of this country. My opinion therefore is against the claim.

It was then resolved that the claimant had not made out his claim to be Duke of Sussex, Earl of Inverness, and Baron of Arklow, and the Chairman was directed to report the same to the House.

The resolution was accordingly reported to the House, and affirmed. And the same was reported by the House to Her Majesty.-Lords' Journals, 9th July 1844.

MATERIALS MADE USE OF. The above report has been compiled from the reports in 11 Cl. & F. 85, 8 Jur. 793, and the Minutes of Evidence printed by order of the House of Lords.