their findings on that matter. The Supreme Court criticised the practice on the part of the railroad companies of withholding the larger part of their evidence from the Commission and first producing it in the circuit court, and held that the theory of the act is that the facts of the case are to be fully disclosed before the Commission.

In this case the Supreme Court also proceeded to discuss the power of the Commission to fix rates and said that the power of the Commission to pass upon the reasonableness of rates did not necessarily imply the right to prescribe rates; that the reasonableness of a rate in a given case depends on the facts, and the function of the Commission is to consider these facts and give them their proper weight; and that if the Commission instead of withholding judgment in such a matter until an issue shall be made and the facts found, fixes the rate, that rate is prejudged by the Commission to be reasonable. While this language of the Supreme Court tended to express the view that the Commission could not prescribe a reasonable maximum rate, it was exceedingly doubtful whether this expression of opinion did not refer to the fixing of a rate by the Commission without testimony; in other words, in the first instance.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION V. DETROIT, GRAND HAVEN AND MILWAUKEE RAILWAY COMPANY.

(3 I. C. C. Rep., 613; 57 Fed. Rep., 1005; 74 Fed. Rep., 803; 167 U. S., 633.)

Stone & Carten, a firm doing business at Ionia, Mich., complained against the Detroit. Grand Haven and Milwaukee Railway Company, before the Commission, alleging that Ionia and Grand Rapids take the same freight rates from eastern points and that the carrier discriminated against Ionia, the shorter distance point, by granting free cartage of freight from its depot to places of business of merchants in Grand Rapids and refusing to grant such free cartage at Ionia. The Commission held that by granting such free cartage at Grand Rapids and withholding it at Ionia, the shorter distance point, the carrier violated section 4 of the act to regulate commerce and ordered it to cease and desist from such violation. The defendant refused to comply with the order and suit to compel compliance was brought in the circuit court for the western district of Michigan.

The circuit court sustained the Commission and decreed enforcement of the order, but the circuit court of appeals in 1896, and the United States Supreme Court in 1897, refused to affirm the decision of the circuit court and held that furnishing free cartage at the more distant point and withholding it at the shorter did not violate the long and short haul clause. The Supreme Court said, through Mr. Justice Shiras: "We agree with the circuit court of appeals in holding that the fourth section of the interstate-commerce act has in view only the transportation of passengers and property by rail and that when passengers and property have reached destination and are discharged from the cars at the company's warehouse at Grand Rapids for the same charges as they receive for similar services at Ionia, the duties and obligations cast upon this company by the fourth section are fulfilled and satisfied."

The court also said: "We are informed by an extract from the annual report of the Commission for 1889 that there are many railroads throughout the country that furnish free cartage at some of their stations, but in no instance would the rate sheets contain any statement to that effect. If, in a matter of this kind, which shall be left to the judgment of the Commission, should it direct by a general order that railway companies shall thereafter regard cartage when furnished free as one of the terminal charges and include it in their schedules such an order may be regarded as a reasonable exercise of the Commission's powers."

Subsequently, the Commission, in accordance with the decree of the Supreme Court, issued such order.

FLORIDA FRUIT EXCHANGE V. SAVANNAH, FLORIDA AND WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY ET AL.

(5 I. C. C. Rep., 13, 136; 4 I. C. Rep., 400, 589; 167 U. S., 512.) The railroad commission of Florida filed a complaint with the Commission, alleging that the Savannah, Florida and Western Railway Company and connecting carriers had, at the beginning of the season of 1890–91, advanced the rate on

oranges from Florida points to New York and other northeastern markets 10 cents per box, and that such advance was unjust and unreasonable. The Commission in October, 1891, held upon testimony presented that the advance of 10 cents per box was without justification so far as it exceeded 5 cents per box and was unreasonable and contrary to the law. The Commission ordered the carriers to cease and desist from charging more than 5 cents per box above the rates in effect on November 23, 1890. The defendant carriers refused to obey the order, and the Florida Fruit Exchange, an association of interested shippers, brought suit to enforce the order in the United States circuit court for the northern district of Florida. The circuit court sustained the order of the Commission and decreed its enforcement. The appeal by the carriers to the circuit court of appeals was dismissed and the decree of the circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court in May, 1897, refused to affirm the decision of the circuit court of appeals, and the circuit court on the ground that, under the conclusions announced at the same time in what is known as the Maximum Rate Case" (hereinafter discussed), the Commission has no authority under the statute to prescribe a reasonable maximum rate.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION V. TEXAS AND PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY.

(4 I. C. C. Rep., 447; 4 I. C. Rep., 62; 52 Fed. Rep., 187; 57 Fed. Rep., 948; 162 U. S., 197.)

In December, 1889, the New York Board of Trade and Transportation complained to the Commission that the Pennsylvania Railroad Company and numerous other carriers were practicing unjust discrimination by charging higher rates on domestic traffic from the eastern and Gulf ports of the United States to interior destinations than on import traffic for inland transportation between the same points. The carriers asserted that the competition of ocean carriers prior to reaching the ports of entry created circumstances and conditions governing the import traffic dissimilar to those relating to domestic traffic, and that this necessitated a lower charge for the transportation of imported goods.

After the case was at issue the Texas and Pacific and a number of other carriers were made additional defendants. The case thereby became so broadened in its scope as to practically raise the general question whether, in the carriage of goods from American seaports, carriers subject to the act to regulate commerce could lawfully charge less for the transportation of import than of domestic traffic of like kind to the same destination. After an extended hearing and careful investigation, the Commission held that any difference in charge as between foreign and domestic traffic was unlawful, and ordered such of the defendant carriers as were found to be making lower rates on imported goods to cease and desist from so doing. Some of these carriers, including the Texas and Pacific, refused to obey this order, and a petition was thereupon filed against that company in the United States circuit court for the southern district of New York, praying that the order be enforced.

A plea to the jurisdiction was entered by the Texas and Pacific, based upon its claim that its principal office, within the meaning of section 16 of the act to regulate commerce, was not in New York, but rather in the State of Texas, where its line is operated. The court held that the principal office of the carrier is the one where its principal officers have their business domicile, the meetings of stockholders, directors, and executive committees, where the stock books are kept, and the dividends declared, rather than the place where the subordinate officers in charge of the operating, traffic, and accounting departments of the business discharge their duties; and as that office was in the city of New York the plea was overruled.

The order of the Commission was sustained by the circuit court, and on appeal by the carrier to the circuit court of appeals the decree of the circuit court was affirmed. The case was then appealed by the Texas and Pacific to the Supreme Court of the United States.

The Commission had based its decision upon a construction of the act to regulate commerce to the effect that the provisions of that statute have no application to the transportation of commerce from a foreign country not adjacent to the United States, and that as the regulation provided for by the act does not apply to or govern such transportation the circumstances and conditions pertaining to the carriage of freight from a foreign port to the United States

can not be held to constitute reasons in themselves why imported freight should be transported by the domestic carrier at lower rates than the same carrier charges on domestic goods of like kind from the port of entry to the same destination in the United States. The Commission said:

"It is apparent, from the evidence in this case, that many American manufacturers, dealers, and localities in almost every line of manufacture and business are the competitors of foreign manufacturers, dealers, and localities for supplying the wants of American consumers at interior places in the United States, and that under domestic bills of lading they seek to require from American carriers like service as their foreign competitors in order to place their manufactured goods, property, and merchandise with interior consumers. The act to regulate commerce secures them this right. To deprive them of it by any course of transportation business or device is to violate the statute. Such a deprivation would be so obviously unjust as to shock the general sense of justice of all the people of the country except the few who would receive the immediate and direct benefit of it."

Upon the hearing before the Commission many disparities in rates were shown to exist which favored import as against domestic shipments. Not only was there a lower rate for the inland carriage of foreign traffic, but in numerous cases the total charge from the foreign place of origin through our seaports to destinations in the interior of the United States was much less than the rail charge alone on domestic goods of like description from the same seaports to the same destinations. The domestic rate on books, buttons, carpets, clothing, and hosiery from New Orleans to San Francisco was $2.88 per 100 pounds, while the total through charge on the same articles from Liverpool to San Francisco was only $1.07 per hundred. Boots, shoes, cashmeres, cigars, confectionery, cutlery, gloves, hats, caps, laces, linen, linen goods, saddlers' goods, and woolen goods were carried from Liverpool through New Orleans to San Francisco for $1.07, though domestic commodities of the same kind were charged $3.70 for the haul from New Orleans to the same destination.

The Texas and Pacific claimed that ocean competition from English ports via Cape Horn or Panama compelled these rates on through traffic from foreign points of shipment to San Francisco, and a variety of other conditions, not relating to the conduct of transportation over its lines, were also relied upon to justify these differences in rates for rail transportation admittedly the same in both cases.

The Supreme Court, however, decided, three of its members dissenting, that this view of the law was erroneous, and it accordingly reversed the decision of the lower courts, which enjoined compliance with the Commission's order. The question determined by the Supreme Court did not directly involve the reasonableness of either the import or the domestic charges which were found to be in force, as the Commission based its conclusions upon the general ground that no difference between import and domestic rates could be lawfully made by the inland carrier when the services performed by it were practically the same for both classes of traffic. In announcing its decision the Supreme Court distinctly refrained from expressing an opinion as to the legality of the rates themselves, but held that the Commission, in denying the right to charge more in any case for the transportation of home than of imported merchandise, had not correctly construed the statute. In rejecting the Commission's interpretation of the law and sustaining the contention of the defendant, a majority of the court held, in substance, that, in the investigation of complaints founded upon differences between import and domestic rates, all the circumstances and conditions relating to the traffic, including ocean competition from foreign ports to ports in the United States, should be considered by the Commission.

It will be observed that the great differences in import as compared with domestic rates, which were shown to be enforced by the Texas and Pacific Company for carriage and like service from New Orleans, are not sanctioned by this decision. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the judgment of the court defeats the general rule, which the law was thought to prescribe, of like charges for like service in the transportation between the same points of both home and foreign goods of similar description; that it takes from the statute its prohibitive force against discrimination of this character, and makes the act provide merely for hearing and investigation of such complaints relating to specific rates on import and domestic traffic as may from time to time be presented to the Commission.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION V. NEW YORK, PHILADELPHIA AND NORFOLK RAILROAD COMPANY ET AL.

(4 I. C. C. Rep., 588; case in court never reported.)

The Delaware State Grange of the Patrons of Husbandry filed a petition with the Commission against the New York, Philadelphia and Norfolk Railroad Company and others, alleging that the defendants' charges for the transportation of specified kinds of vegetables from stations on the carriers' lines in Delaware and Maryland, including those on the peninsula in Maryland and some stations In Virginia, to Jersey City and Philadelphia, were excessive and unreasonable, and that the charges were unlawfully higher for the shorter distance from such stations in Delaware and Maryland than for the longer distances from Norfolk, Va. The carriers denied that the rates were unreasonable, in view of the nature and expense of the service, and alleged water competition at Norfolk as justification for the lower rates from that point.

The Commission held that the charges on certain articles specified in its decision from points on the peninsula to Jersey City and Philadelphia were unreasonable, and ordered a reduction. The long and short haul question in the case was reserved for such future consideration as might be required.

The defendants having failed to comply with the order, a petition for its enforcement was filed in the United States circuit court for the eastern district of Virginia. The case was conducted by the interested parties, and upon the additional evidence taken in court, the petition was dismissed. The decision of the court was never reported.

NEW YORK AND NORTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY V. NEW YORK AND NEW ENGLAND BAILROAD COMPANY ET AL.

(4 I. C. C. Rep., 702; 50 Fed. Rep. 867.)

The New York and Northern Railway Company complained to the Commission against the New York and New England Railroad Company, the Housatonic Railroad Company, and the New England Terminal Company, under the second paragraph of section 3 of the act to regulate commerce, that the New York and New England Railroad Company, which had had for some time a through billing arrangement and agreement upon through rates for traffic destined to New York City over its own road and that of the New York and Northern, it had discontinued this arrangement and had entered into a new arrangement with another road whereby a New York City line was formed over which it was intended to take the business which formerly passed over the New York and New England and New York and Northern.

The Commission held this to be in violation of the second paragraph of section 3, which requires carriers to afford all reasonable, proper, and equal facilities for the interchange of traffic between their respective lines, and for the receiving, forwarding, and delivering of passengers and property to and from their several lines and those connecting therewith, and that they shall not discriminate in their rates and charges between such connecting lines.

Based upon this decision, the Commission issued an order directing the New York and New England to cease and desist from discriminating against the New York and Northern, a connecting line, in favor of the Housatonic Railroad Company, another connecting line, in regard to rates and facilities for the interchange of traffic destined to or shipped from New York City. The New England Company restored the rates which had been in force prior to the complaint before the Commission under an agreement for the interchange of traffic between its own and the petitioner's line, but it so arranged the running of its trains as practically to defeat the object of the order. The New York and Northern Company filed a petition in the circuit court for the enforcement of the order of the Commission. A motion on behalf of the New York and New England to dismiss the petition was denied by the court in an opinion which considered and practically disposed of the case, and although a trial of the issues was allowed no further proceedings were had, and the New York and New England thereupon complied fully with the requirement of the order issued by the Commission.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION V. LOUISVILLE AND NASHVILLE RAILROAD COM

PANY.

(5 I. C. C. Rep., 466; 73 Fed. Rep., 409.)

In an investigation instituted by the Commission upon a complaint referred to it from the Department of Justice, entitled "In the matter of alleged unlawful charges for the transportation of coal by the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company," the Commission held, upon the answer of the carrier and a formal hearing, that the rate of $1 per ton charged by the Louisville and Nashville upon coal, run of mines, nut and slack," from mines in Kentucky to Nashville was not unreasonably low nor disproportionate to the rate of $1.40 per ton in force to Memphis, and in view of the circumstances affecting coal traffic at Memphis that the rate of $1.15 on screened coal from Nashville was not relatively unreasonable as compared with the Memphis rate, but that so long as the Memphis rate does not exceed $1.40 the rates on run of mine, nut and slack, and on screened coal should not during any portion of the year exceed $1 and $1.15, respectively, any reduction in the Memphis rate to be accompanied by proportionate reductions in rates on such coal to Nashville. It appears that the rate to Memphis on screened coal was $1.15, April to September, and for the remainder of the year $1.40. The order issued by the Commission required the defendant to reduce the rate from $1.40 to $1.15 and to make that rate uniform the year round.

Additional evidence was taken in the circuit court, and upon the record so made the court held that the order of the Commission should not be sustained. At the end of its decision the court calls attention to the decision of the Supreme Court, which had just been rendered in the Social Circle Case, and said that the "Social Circle Case denies power in the Commission to fix rates and puts that question at rest." The court further said, referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in the Import Rate Case, that in the determination of a question arising under section 2 or 3 of the act as between different places the condition of competitive rates is an element which the Commission has not taken into consideration, and it is a material issue in the case which the Commission is not at liberty to disregard.

It is evident that in this case in applying the decision of the Supreme Court in the Social Circle Case the court must have refused to sustain the order upon the ground that the Commission was without authority to prescribe a maximum rate, even if it had reached the determination that otherwise the order should have been enforced.

The case was appealed by the Commission to the circuit court of appeals, but was subsequently discontinued for the reason that the Supreme Court had in the meantime definitely decided in the Maximum Rate Case that the Commission is without authority to prescribe in any case a maximum rate for future observance by the carrier.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION V. CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE AND ST. PAUL BAILWAY COMPANY ET AL.

(5 I. C. C. Rep., 571; no decision by circuit court.)

The Chamber of Commerce of Minneapolis complained against the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Company, the Great Northern Railway Company, and others, that rates established and charged by defendants for the transportation of wheat from points in North and South Dakota were unreasonable and unjust, and unjustly discriminating against Minneapolis in favor of Duluth and other lake ports.

The Commission found that the adjustment of rates complained of did unjustly discriminate against Minneapolis in favor of Duluth, and in its order, issued in 1893, the carriers were required to readjust their charges in accordance with distances computed and ascertained in the manner set forth and described by the Commission in its decision. The defendants failed to comply with the order, and a petition for enforcement thereof was filed by the Commission in the United States circuit court for the district of Minnesota.

Before the case could be disposed of by the court the Chamber of Commerce of Minneapolis and the various defendants applied to the Commission for a